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Every Citizen a Statesman 




This dissertation asks how far Americans in the twentieth century reconciled the demands of 
global supremacy with the claims and realities of democracy. As an answer, it offers the first 
history of the movement for citizen education in world affairs. This movement, loose but 
coherent, acted on the belief that since the United States was a mass democracy, the creation of 
an interested, informed public for foreign policy was essential to its peace and security.  
 After World War I, members of the foreign policy elite resolved to teach Americans to 
lead the world, and they created a network of new institutions to do so. The most important and 
visible of these institutions was the Foreign Policy Association, a non-profit, non-partisan group 
founded by New York progressives in 1918 to support Woodrow Wilson in the fight over the 
Treaty of Versailles. By 1925, it had morphed into the first true foreign policy think tank in the 
nation, with a research staff creating new, public-facing knowledge and disseminating it to a 
broadening public. The research staff’s Foreign Policy Reports and Foreign Policy Bulletin gave 
information to diplomats, scholars, editors, businessmen, lawyers, and teachers, information that 
was otherwise inaccessible. As democracy was threatened at home and abroad during the Great 
Depression, the Association became more ambitious, founding branches in twenty cities to 
 circulate foreign diplomats and a new breed of experts in international politics around the 
country. It pioneered broadcasts over the nascent national radio network, and tapped into a 
broader movement for adult education. With the encouragement of Franklin Roosevelt, a former 
member, the Association promoted intervention in World War II, and became a key partner of 
the State Department in the selling of the United Nations. 
 Many members of the foreign policy elite believed that the rise of the United States to 
world leadership entailed new responsibilities for its citizens. As the prewar functions of the 
Association had been rendered obsolete, it resolved after 1947 to promote community education 
in world affairs, to make world leadership a part of daily life. Under the rallying cry of “World 
Affairs Are Your Affairs,” the Association partnered with the Ford Foundation to help create 
dozens of World Affairs Councils, most of them patterned on the success of the Cleveland 
Council on World Affairs. These Councils became a stage for international politics, bringing the 
world to cities across America, and those cities to the world. 
 But by its own measurements, let alone the results of surveys or the intuition of officials, 
this movement to make every citizen a statesman failed. The Association and its subsidiary 
Councils remained weak, short on cash and beset by rivalries. Increasingly, they took refuge in an 
ever-smaller, educated, white elite, and, informed by social science, they wrote off ever more of 
the American electorate as uninterested or incapable when it came to world affairs. Very few 
Americans, it became clear by the early 1960s, were willing to dedicate themselves to world 
affairs on the model of citizenship that their leaders hoped, and to those leaders, the public 
therefore seemed fundamentally apathetic. The infrastructure that the foreign policy elite had 
spent decades building calcified, even before the traumas of the Vietnam War. A chasm 
developed between policymakers and the public, one that has proven impossible to bridge since. 
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Life magazine always presented its millions of readers with a glossy, optimistic vision of the 
future, but the issue it published on June 5, 1939, went further than usual.1 Timed for the 
opening of the New York World’s Fair, Lady Liberty soared on its cover. Inside, the pages were 
filled with the photojournalism that the magazine so successfully brought to the masses, but this 
week there were also an unusual number of maps. One set of twelve, specially-drawn, pointed to 
the economic capacity of the United States, plotting its ability to produce iron, cotton, wheat, 
and electricity. The maps showed not only that the country was “‘richer’ and ‘greater’ than any 
other in the world,” the text said, but that it was “so basically different from the rest of the 
world’s nations that it can hardly be compared with them.” That, indeed, was the point of the 
issue. “By examination of our heroic past and hopeful present,” an editorial said, it aimed to 
suggest “the richer and happier America which will be ours when we have nerved ourselves to 
accept our bounty and our destiny.”2 
 Henry Luce, the publisher of the Time-Life empire, left Walter Lippmann to elaborate. 
The American people were troubled, indecisive, scared, Lippmann wrote in the only serious 
article in the issue, “The American Destiny.” They were “embarrassed” by their preeminence. 
Their foreign policy was consequently “an attempt to neutralize the fact that America has 
preponderant power and decisive influence in the affairs of the world.” They had tried to act out 
 
1 LIFE had a circulation of 2,500,000 million by the summer 1939; many more Americans read it than bought it. 
See Alan Brinkley, The Publisher: Henry Luce and His American Century (New York: Knopf, 2010), p. 224. 
2 “America: Rich In Union,” Life (June 5, 1939), pp. 50-51. 
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that power once before, and remained scarred twenty years later. They had not yet, therefore 
“acquired the training or the experience that were needed in order to succeed,” nor developed the 
“experienced men” required to run the foreign policy of a great power. But surely, Lippmann 
wrote, this was just a “passing mood, the curious mood of a peculiar epoch.” Surely Americans 
would accept their fate one day, for they lived amid “one of the greatest events in the history of 
mankind.” America had been made great. “What Rome was to the ancient world,” Lippmann 
wrote, “what Great Britain has been to the modern world, America is to be to the world of 
tomorrow.” And there was no way to avoid all that that entailed. “When the destiny of a nation 
is revealed to it,” Lippmann said, “there is no choice but to accept that destiny and to make ready 
in order to be equal to it.” 
 There was a catch, and Lippmann knew it; indeed, it was why he was writing in a mass-
market magazine like Life, and not in his usual New York Herald Tribune or Foreign Affairs. 
There was a choice. After all, America was not Rome. America was not even Great Britain. 
America was special, America was different; America was to become the leading power in the 
world not as a republic, nor as a parliamentary monarchy, but as a mass democracy. That 
mattered. The problem of America was not a problem of policy, or of party, but of people. “The 
indecision which pervades the American spirit,” Lippmann said, “has its root in the refusal by the 
American people to see themselves as they are, as a very great nation, and to act accordingly.” 
Americans still clung, he continued, to “the mentality of a little nation on the frontiers of the 
civilized world, though we have the opportunity, the power, and the responsibilities of a very 
great nation at the center of the civilized world.” This would not do. Americans would move 
forward only “when they allow themselves to become conscious of their greatness, conscious not 
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only of their incomparable inheritance but of the splendor of their destiny.” Americans needed to 
teach themselves to lead the world. “Then the things that seem difficult will seem easy,” 
Lippmann concluded, “and the willingness to be equal to their mission will restore their 
confidence and make whole their will.”3 
 
* * * * * 
 
Walter Lippmann occupied a particular position in American life, as a theorist and commentator 
on both foreign policy and democratic theory. Particular, this dissertation argues, but not unique. 
Lippmann was just one of many Americans who thought hard about how to reconcile American 
power with American democracy. Some did it as academics, or as columnists. Some did it as 
policymakers, whether at the State Department, or at the non-state institutions that have circled 
it. Some did it as activists, rousing their neighbors, their cities, their states, to take command of 
their nation’s diplomacy. Many more looked at foreign policy and decided to leave it well alone. 
Either way, to think about foreign policy in the United States has been, however implicitly, to 
think about democracy in the United States.4 Which foreign policy the United States should 
follow has, at bottom, often been a question of who has had the power to decide. 
 
3 Walter Lippmann, “The American Destiny,” Life (June 5, 1939), pp. 47, 72-73 
4 I thank Tom Arnold-Forster for this insight, from Tom Arnold-Foster, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the 
Political Thought of Walter Lippmann,” SHAFR Annual Conference, June 22, 2018. 
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How, then, did people like Lippmann try to reconcile democracy and diplomacy? As one 
of Lippmann’s friends put it, they sought to make “every citizen a statesman.”5 They did not 
agree on what those words meant — not “every,” not “citizen,” and not “statesman.” Some 
looked forward to the day when the entire population had a working understanding of world 
affairs. Others felt that it would be more proper to sustain the interest of a few, chosen notables 
who might one day become policymakers themselves. These debates were not just theoretical, 
but practical; they played out in the pages of journals, yes, but also in board meetings, discussion 
groups, and parades across America. 
What follows is the first history of the foreign policy elite’s effort to interest, inform, and 
educate Americans about the world, so that they could play their necessary role in a democratic 
foreign policy. At its most energetic between the end of the Great War and the start of the war 
in Vietnam, this movement for what became known as “citizen education in world affairs” was 
led nationally by the Foreign Policy Association, a non-profit, non-partisan, and relatively 
progressive institution based in New York City, and extended locally by a host of community 
groups, eventually called World Affairs Councils, in cities across the country.6  
These voluntary associations were far from trivial. They were central to the project of 
American world leadership, and they played with high stakes. High government officials lent 
them their support. Philanthropists spent four decades and millions of dollars funding them. 
 
5 Brooks Emeny, “Every Citizen a Statesman,” The Kiwanis Magazine (November 1946), pp. 7, 30-31, Brooks 
Emeny Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Box 1. 
6 This name comes from Bernard C. Cohen, Citizen Education in World Affairs (Princeton: Center of International 
Studies, 1953). Taking this name for the movement is not ideal, as it reflects Cohen’s own understanding of how 
citizens related to policymakers and experts, as explained in chapter five. However, no better name exists to describe 
the movement over sixty years, so it is used throughout here. The term “citizen educators” refers to those led the 
movement, particularly staff and volunteers at the Foreign Policy Association and the World Affairs Councils. 
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Their prestige and their power shifted over time, as did their aims. At first, they brought foreign 
policy to high society, then to the newspapers, in the hope that the information they provided to 
the wealthy and the educated would trickle down. Later, when trickle-down diplomacy seemed 
insufficient, they tried to take foreign policy to the masses. There were times when they thought 
they were about to succeed, times when American foreign policy seemed more truly democratic. 
And yet, a decade or so into the cold war, these institutions started to fade. Those who ran them 
became convinced that they had failed. An informed, educated public did not really appear to 
have been built, at least not an adequate one. As protests broke out over the war in Vietnam, the 
institutions that had tried to make sure that foreign policy was not merely the plaything of the 
establishment were accused of serving that establishment alone. The institutions lived on, but 
their animating, officially-sponsored dream of a more democratic foreign policy was dead. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Why take this approach to the question of the public, beyond the most basic intention of writing 
the history of institutions that have, so far, gone largely unexamined?7 Scholars, after all, have 
 
7 Only three previous works have dedicated more than a page or two to the Foreign Policy Association, and one of 
those is an internal chronicle published by a former staff member, rather than a scholar. See Don Dennis, Foreign 
Policy in a Democracy: The Role of the Foreign Policy Association (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 2003). One 
dissertation has sketched the first two decades of the Association’s work, but it primarily looks at how Association 
figures responded to specific diplomatic problems, rather than the problem of the public. See Frank Winchester 
Abbott, “From Versailles to Munich: The Foreign Policy Association and American Foreign Policy,” PhD thesis, 
Texas Tech University, 1972. The only published academic work on the Association is a comparison with the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, again from the perspective of foreign policy issues. See Alan Raucher, “The First 
Foreign Affairs Think Tanks,” American Quarterly 30 (1978), pp. 493-513. This dissertation is the first work to use 
the Association’s full archive, the first to use the archives of any World Affairs Council, and the first to put those 
archives in the context of government records, foundation records, and personal papers. 
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needed no instruction on the importance of the public in the making of U.S. foreign policy, nor 
in the history of U.S. foreign relations more broadly. Often, however, the way in which we have 
expressed that understanding has been oblique, an incidental corollary to studies of domestic, 
partisan politics.8 Careful historians have tried to trace the impact of specific opinions on specific 
policies, but without digging much into the political theories and communications technologies 
through which that process has operated.9 Others have tried to show how individual policies or 
entire wars have been sold, again without paying much attention to how public opinion has been 
conceived of politically, intellectually, or technologically.10  
Meanwhile, cultural historians have spent decades looking at how what we might think 
of as specific publics have thought about and expressed themselves on foreign policy, as a by-
product of using the analytical categories of gender, of race, of religion, and more.11 Scholars 
combining cultural and transnational history have shown us that Americans have been implicated 
in world affairs in myriad ways, whether in their civic politics, in their faiths, or in the movies 
 
8 See, e.g., Fredrik Logevall, “Politics and Foreign Relations,” Journal of American History 95 (2009), pp. 1074-1079; 
Thomas Alan Schwartz, “‘Henry,… Winning an Election Is Terribly Important’: Partisan Politics in the History of 
U.S. Foreign Relations,” Diplomatic History 33 (2009), pp. 173–190. 
9 See, e.g., Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and the War Against Nazi 
Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Mara Oliva, Eisenhower and Public Opinion on China (Cham: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). 
10 See, e.g., Steven Casey, “Selling NSC-68: The Truman Administration, Public Opinion, and the Politics of 
Mobilization, 1950-51,” Diplomatic History 29 (2005), pp. 655-690; Steven Casey, “The Campaign to Sell a Harsh 
Peace for Germany to the American Public, 1944-1948,” History 90 (2005), pp. 62-92; Steven Casey, Selling the 
Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion in the United States, 1950-1953 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008). 
11 For summaries of these literatures, see Paul A. Kramer, “Shades of sovereignty: racialized power, the United 
States and the word,” in Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan (eds.), Explaining the History of American Foreign 
Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); pp. 245-270; Judy Tzu-Chun Wu, “Gendering American 
foreign relations,” in Costigliola and Hogan (eds.), Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, pp. 271-
283; Andrew Preston, “The religious turn in diplomatic history,” in Costigliola and Hogan (eds.), Explaining the 
History of American Foreign Relations, pp. 284-303. 
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they have seen, the crops they have grown, even the kitchens they have bought.12 We are left 
with an odd paradox. Americans, as historians now see them, have always been “in the world”; 
Americans, as policy elites have seen them, have always been out of it. 
This dissertation uses the frame of “public opinion” to explore this tension. At precisely 
the moment that historians have embarked on an immense effort to show how world affairs 
inflected every aspect of American life, “public opinion” has dropped out of our analyses. It was 
the recipient of an article in the first edition of the field-defining Explaining the History of 
American Foreign Relations, published in 1991, but it has not been heard from in any edition 
since. Even historians who are deeply interested in the subject, and insist on both the importance 
of studying policymakers and the influence of public opinion upon them, tend to think not in 
that precise category, but in terms of domestic politics.13 And yet the category was separate, 
productive, and important — an intellectually-constructed, elite-dominated field of contestation 
that allowed policymakers to decide who really mattered, and who did not. It still does, with 
 
12 For arguments that this is, or is not, the strength of current diplomatic historiography, see the debate around 
Thomas W. Zeiler, “The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field,” Journal of American History 95 
(2009), pp. 1053-1073. For these examples, see, e.g., Meredith Oda, “Masculinizing Japan and Reorienting San 
Francisco: The Osaka-San Francisco Sister-City Affiliation During the Early Cold War,” Diplomatic History 41 
(2017), pp. 460-488; Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy 
(New York: Knopf, 2012); Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Kristin L. Hoganson, The Heartland: An American History (New 
York: Penguin, 2019); Ruth Oldenziel and Karin Zachmann (eds.), Cold War Kitchen: Americanization, Technology, 
and European Users (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009). For one example of the limits of this cold war politics, especially 
relating to the consumerism of national security policy, see Thomas Bishop, “‘The Struggle to Sell Survival’: Family 
Fallout Shelters and the Limits of Consumer Citizenship,” Modern American History 2 (2019), pp. 117-138. 
13 See, e.g., Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999); Logevall, “Politics and Foreign Relations”; Campbell Craig and Fredrik 
Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); Fredrik 
Logevall, “Structure, Contingency, and the War in Vietnam,” Diplomatic History 39 (2015), pp. 1-15; Fredrik 




serious consequences for U.S. foreign policy specifically, and international politics more 
broadly.14 
 Part of the problem has been that the very idea of public opinion has been intractable. 
Definitions have proven impossibly unstable, shifting violently over time. 15 Harwood Childs, the 
founding editor of the Public Opinion Quarterly, of all journals, wrote eighty years ago that the 
term “by itself has very little meaning,” a useful evasion that allowed him to suggest that “the 
 
14 Patrick Porter, “Why America’s Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy 
Establishment,” International Security 42 (2018), pp. 9-46. Unlike historians, political scientists and international 
relations theorists have not forgotten the category of “public opinion.” For an idea of where that scholarship lies, see 
the implicit debate going on in Elizabeth N. Saunders, “War and the Inner Circle: Democratic Elites and the 
Politics of Using Force,” Security Studies 24 (2015), pp. 466-501; Joshua D. Kertzer and Thomas Zeitzoff, “A 
Bottom-Up Theory of Public Opinion about Foreign Policy,” American Journal of Political Science 61 (2017), pp. 
543-558; Alexandra Guisinger and Elizabeth N. Saunders, “Mapping the Boundaries of Elite Cues: How Elites 
Shape Mass Opinion across International Issues,” International Studies Quarterly 61 (2017), pp. 425-441. 
15 Insisting that the “public,” its “opinion,” and “public opinion” are constructed ideas, this dissertation uses no set 
definition of these terms. However, it employs one crucial distinction that needs elaboration in terms of theory. 
Citizen educators thought of the “public” in much the same, classical terms as Jürgen Habermas, which is 
no surprise, as they were influenced by John Dewey and Walter Lippmann just as much as he. Central to 
Habermas’s idea of a classic public is “organized discussion among private people that tended to be ongoing,” 
discussion that “presupposed the problematiziation of areas that until then had not been questioned” and that 
“became ‘general’ not merely in their significance, but also in their accessibility.” See Jürgen Habermas, The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1991), p. 36. As both theoretical constructs and historical realities, such publics do not naturally exist. See, e.g., 
Michael Schudson, “Was There Ever a Public Sphere? If So, When? Reflections on the American Case,” in Craig J. 
Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 143-164. Publics have to be built. 
Even if citizen educators thought in terms of reforming democracy, or informing public opinion, this is what they 
were functionally trying to do — trying to create a “public” that came closer to normative goals. Habermas feared 
that a classical “public” would be impossible under conditions of mass society; Dewey and those he inspired feared 
likewise, but tried to prove themselves wrong. 
The crucial distinction to be made is between a “public” and an “audience,” one that relates to ideas about 
publics that have followed Habermas. Michael Warner sees a public as a “social space created by the reflexive 
circulation of discourse,” and that a public therefore exists “only by virtue of address” by a “concatenation of texts 
over time.” When actual people appear in Warner’s theory, it is as an “audience” which is no more than “a crowd 
witnessing itself in visible space.” Warner’s telling example is that he considers someone “sleeping through a ballet 
performance as a member of that ballet’s public because most contemporary ballet performances are organized as 
voluntary events, open to anyone willing to attend or, in most cases, to pay to attend.” See Michael Warner, “Publics 
and Counterpublics,” Public Culture 14 (2002), pp. 49-90. Citizen educators probably would have taken the entrance 
fee of Warner’s somnolent ballet-goer, but they would not have been impressed. They sought not a passive audience, 
but an active public, a public of discussion like that described by Habermas. 
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nature of public opinion is not something to be defined but to be studied.”16 Rather than being 
stipulated precisely in itself, Susan Herbst has written, public opinion has often been thought of 
in terms of “the tools we have on hand to measure it at any given historical moment.”17 For most 
since Childs’ time, public opinion has been reduced to the results of opinion polls.18 But polling 
has always been a methodologically controversial technology, so much so that Pierre Bourdieu 
has declared that, if seeing through surveys, “public opinion does not exist.”19 And yet clearly it 
does, at least in the sense that policymakers have thought about it, have acted upon it, have 
found themselves sending people to their deaths by it. 
 This tension between the theoretically ephemeral and all too real senses of public opinion 
has exasperated the few historians who have confronted the question directly. Bernard C. Cohen 
spent his career on the question of public opinion and foreign policy, and his research features 
prominently in the story told here. But after twenty years of effort, crowned by The Public’s 
Impact on Foreign Policy, he still found himself “with the unsatisfactory conclusion that public 
opinion is important in the policy making process, though we cannot say with confidence how, 
 
16 Harwood L. Childs, “‘By Public Opinion I Mean’ —," Public Opinion Quarterly 3 (1939), pp. 328, 336. 
17 Susan Herbst, “Public Opinion Infrastructures: Meanings, Measures, Media,” Political Communication 18 (2001), 
pp. 451-464. For the history of those “tools,” see Susan Herbst, Numbered Voices: How Opinion Polling Has Shaped 
American Politics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993). 
18 Philip E. Converse, “Changing Conceptions of Public Opinion in the Political Process,” Public Opinion Quarterly 
51 (1987), pp. S12-S24. 
19 Pierre Bourdieu, “Public Opinion Does Not Exist,” in Armand Mattelart and Seth Siegeluab (eds.), 
Communication and Class Struggle: An Anthology in 2 Volumes (New York: International General, 1976), pp. 124-130; 
Susan Herbst, “Surveys in the Public Sphere: Applying Bourdieu's Critique of Opinion Polls,” International Journal 
of Public Opinion Research 4 (1992), pp. 220-229. As Herbst points out, Bourdieu’s argument largely follows that of 




why, or when.”20 Melvin Small agreed in that lonely article in the 1991 edition of Explaining the 
History of American Foreign Relations that “it is one thing to assert that public opinion plays an 
important role in the decision-making process,” but “quite another to demonstrate that impact.” 
He warned those who would try to do so that “the public opinion factor is ever present but 
always elusive,” that “the search will be arduous, the evidence often impressionist, and the 
intuitive leaps challenging.”21 Ernest R. May had more of a chance than most, moving so easily 
between academia and policymaking, but even he struggled to get much further. Writing 
between the publication of two books on public opinion and the colonial wars of the turn of the 
twentieth century, May argued in 1964 that it was “one of our most powerful traditions” to have 
“faith that public policy is an expression of public opinion.” But he was not so sure that that faith 
was not “largely mythical.” May notably took issue with the idea that “public opinion is an entity 
which can be described, dissected, and analyzed at all,” variously dubbing it a “tradition,” an 
“invention,” a “construction,” and even a “fiction.” “Perhaps at least some studies of it,” he 
concluded, “ought to begin not with what is observed but with the observers.”22 
 Fifty and more years later, that is the approach taken here. As the chosen instruments of 
the foreign policy elite for reconciling diplomacy with democracy, the Foreign Policy Association 
 
20 Bernard C. Cohen, The Public’s Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), p. 7. 
21 Melvin Small, “Public Opinion,” in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (eds.), Explaining the History of 
American Foreign Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 169, 175-176. Small ended up 
writing less on “public opinion” and more on domestic politics. See Melvin Small, Democracy & Diplomacy: The 
Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789-1994 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
22 Ernest R. May, “An American Tradition in Foreign Policy: The Role of Public Opinion,” in William H. Nelson 
and Francis L. Loewenheim (eds.), Theory and Practice in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1964), pp. 102, 121-122; Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, 1961); Ernest R. May, American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay (New York: Atheneum, 1968). 
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and its associated World Affairs Councils thought constantly about public opinion. They did not 
always think about every aspect of public opinion in equal measure. They paid more attention to 
who it ought to include than what it ought to know, more attention to how to create it than how 
to use it. In every aspect of their operations, they took intellectual constructions of public opinion 
and tried to enact them on the ground. This interaction of theory and practice was not simple, 
but contested. Activists had their own ideas about public opinion, ideas that often conflicted 
with those of intellectual pioneers, whose fields were themselves changing. In a process that took 
in everyone from government officials to volunteers, foundation grant officers to interested 
scholars, publics were defined, produced, organized, used, and, ultimately, ignored. And it is in 
that contestation that we can see that the argument that the foreign policy elite, working inside 
and outside the government, somehow succeeded in “engineering consent” for “globalism” is far 
too simplistic.23 To be sure, the staffs of the Foreign Policy Association and the World Affairs 
Councils were avowed internationalists, and, very occasionally, they sought to “sell” individual 
policies on that basis. Their work on the whole, however, was slower and directed to less specific 
ends.  
 
23 Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of 
American Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), p. 27. Parmar gives a pocket history of the Council 
on Foreign Relations, the Foreign Policy Association, and the Institute of Pacific Relations (pp. 65-96), but one 
that is both archivally thin and intended only to show the power of top-down opinion-making unleashed by the 
state. This dissertation instead illustrates how the state, foundations, voluntary associations, and activists contested 
visions about democracy and foreign policy. Parmar’s work does, however, raise the question of the state, particularly 
in terms of foundations. To be sure, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations (especially the latter) were imbued with 
the “state spirit” with which Parmar attributes them, but the documentary evidence suggests that their support of the 
citizen education movement was about more than just perpetuating elite or state control. Rockefeller and Ford did 
not want to create an internationalist public that would solely support the state; “support,” yes, “unquestioningly,” 
no. In its emphasis on the unity of purpose among the state, foundations, and voluntary associations, and on the 
ways in which that unity was contested, what follows is indebted to Brian Balogh, The Associational State: American 
Governance in the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). 
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 Narrating the course of this movement requires combining several kinds of historical 
inquiry. Touching on the histories of urban life, education, communications, political science, 
democratic theory, and more, this dissertation takes a broad view of what political history entails, 
combining social and cultural approaches. Among the most important is to insist on the unity of 
the histories of foreign relations and political thought. This is far from new; witness, for instance, 
the many histories of modernization theory, or of the cold war social sciences more generally.24 
The difference comes in asking how that unity was expressed at home, in the State Department’s 
Office of Public Affairs, rather than in the Peace Corps or the United States Information 
Agency. The same definitions of democracy that modernization theorists employed abroad, with 
all that those definitions entailed for the client states that theorists sought for America, were also 
employed at home. The same fears of propaganda that psychological warfare specialists slowly 
but surely put aside in the face of the Soviet threat, were felt at home, albeit in a different way 
and for different reasons. Moreover, intellectual history here is not treated as the sole property of 
intellectuals. This dissertation argues that thinking about the relationship between democracy 
and diplomacy is found not just among university faculty or government propagandists, but also 
among the program committee chairs, the membership secretaries, the treasurers, and the 
discussion participants who enacted the commitment to a democratic diplomacy on a day-to-day 
basis, across the country. 
 
24 See, e.g., Michael Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy 
Era  (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization 
Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); David Ekbladh, The Great American 
Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2010); Philip Mirowski, “A History Best Served Cold,” in Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell (eds.), Uncertain Empire: 
American History and the Idea of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 61-74; Lawrence 
Freedman, “Social Science and the Cold War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38 (2015), pp. 554-574. 
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 Mediating activism and academia were the foundations, another relatively new field of 
inquiry for historians of foreign relations.25 Each of the major philanthropic foundations in turn 
— Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford — took responsibility for the citizen education movement, 
expending millions of dollars on the conviction that the creation of an informed, educated public 
was possible, would benefit policymakers and, ultimately, might secure a more peaceful world 
under American leadership. Seeing the foundations from the perspective of groups seeking their 
favor, as well as from the perspective of those trying to direct them, this dissertation draws 
special attention to the capricious nature of foundation policymaking. Foundations are not 
monoliths any more than government departments; they are sites of politics, as well as actors. 
The members of the Social Sciences Division at the Rockefeller Foundation did not all agree 
with one another on the nature or urgency of a democratic foreign policy; nor did the members 
of the International Affairs staff at the Ford Foundation. Moreover, both of those foundations 
undermined their own programs. One part of the Rockefeller Foundation sought to achieve a 
democratic foreign policy through adult education; another sought to achieve it through the 
propaganda techniques that adult educators thought fascistic. One part of the Ford Foundation 
filled the airwaves with the idea that “world affairs are your affairs”; another funded the 
behavioral social science that fatally undermined the progressive democratic theory on which that 
idea relied. If the professional staffs of the major foundations were hardly unified, they clashed, 
too, with the trustees who doled out the cash, This story ends, for instance, with turmoil at Ford, 
 
25 See, esp., Inderjeet Parmar and Katharina Rietzler, “American Philanthropy and the Hard, Smart and Soft Power 
of the United States,” Global Society 28 (2014), pp. 3-7. 
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a battle among trustees, staff, and the foundation’s president, McGeorge Bundy, about the very 
nature of democracy, a battle that Bundy won. 
Bundy was an elitist’s elitist, a card-carrying member of the establishment who 
contributed nothing to the citizen education movement, then killed it off. But among men in his 
position, Bundy was the exception to the rule, not the rule itself. The need to teach Americans to 
lead the world was not a minority pursuit among leading policymakers, who tended at the very 
least to offer rhetorical support, or who exerted their influence through a quiet word. Secretaries 
of state, undersecretaries of state, and assistant secretaries of state all were involved in the affairs 
of the Foreign Policy Association in one way or another; all spoke from its platforms, or for the 
World Affairs Councils. The fact that the citizen education movement drew such support from 
policymakers, albeit support that ebbed over time as the nature of the national-security 
bureaucracy changed, makes it all the more important to understand the public that the 
movement sought to create.  
If we see in the history of the Foreign Policy Association that the foreign policy elite did 
not reserve to itself sole power over U.S. foreign policy, we see, too, that the public it sought to 
create was strictly limited. The standards that the policy elite set for authentic participation in 
foreign policy were extraordinarily high, and became higher over time. Elite definitions of 
participation, not coincidentally, correlated with social standing, wealth, and, above all, 
education. That had significant consequences. Although Americans of color had a long history 
of engagement with the world on their own terms, the foreign policy public of the elite’s 
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imagination was almost exclusively white.26 The Foreign Policy Association made next to no 
effort to ally itself with black voluntary associations; it made no explicit effort to desegregate its 
events; it avoided the South so that it would not have to deal with the politics of racism. When 
non-white Americans are permitted to appear in its minutes, it is always with a strange mix of 
pride and outright shock. The same was the case with Americans of lesser wealth. Membership 
in the foreign policy public was expensive. It cost money to be a member of a World Affairs 
Council, to attend a luncheon, to subscribe to publications, even to spare the time to listen to a 
radio broadcast or to watch a panel show on public television. The Association’s early 
commitment to high-society diplomacy meant it never quite shook off its reputation as being a 
forum for the well-off, for bankers and lawyers, for corporate professionals, if not for corporate 
titans. Its persistent interest in working with labor only rarely resulted in serious engagement.27 
 
26 See, e.g., Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American 
Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Jonathan Rosenberg, How Far the Promised Land? World 
Affairs and the American Civil Rights Movement from the First World to Vietnam (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2006); Sean L. Malloy, Out of Oakland: Black Panther Party Internationalism during the Cold War (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2017); Keisha N. Blain, Set the World on Fire: Black Nationalist Women and the Global 
Struggle for Freedom (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018); Keisha N. Blain and Tiffany M. Gill 
(eds.), To Turn the Whole World Over: Black Women and Internationalism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2019). 
Parmar offers an example of a foreign policy institution trying to engage with the black community, but his article 
relies on an incorrect conflation of the Council on Foreign Relations with the Committee to Defend America by 
Aiding the Alliances, which was merely a pressure group, seeking support wherever it could find it. When it came to 
creating permanent publics for foreign policy, institutions were not so inclusive. Cf. Inderjeet Parmar, “‘… Another 
important group that needs more cultivation’: The Council on Foreign Relations and the Mobilization of Black 
Americans for Interventionism, 1939–1941,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 27 (2004), pp. 710-731. 
27 Despite being staffed mostly by progressives, the Foreign Policy Association did not work closely with labor until 
the late 1950s and early 1960s; World Affairs Councils certainly did not. For labor internationalism, see, e.g., 
Elizabeth McKillen, Chicago Labor and the Quest for a Democratic Diplomacy, 1914-1924 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1995); Elizabeth McKillen, Making the World Safe for Workers (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2013); 
Dorothy Sue Cobble, “A Higher “Standard of Life” for the World: U.S. Labor Women's Reform Internationalism 
and the Legacies of 1919,” Journal of American History 100 (2014), pp. 1052-1085. 
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 If the foreign policy elite’s preference for its wealthy and white own is not a surprise, this 
might be: the history of these institutions shows that active interest in foreign policy in the 
United States has primarily been the province of women. It is no exaggeration to say that none of 
the institutions devoted to citizen education in world affairs could have survived without the 
work, professional or otherwise, of women; if they did not quite emerge from the women’s 
movement, they thrived only in alliance with it. Most of those who volunteered, who bought 
memberships, and who went to events were white, upper- and upper-middle class, often college-
trained women. The senior leadership of the League of Women Voters had places on the board 
of the Foreign Policy Association almost by tradition; League of Women Voters members and 
their like took the lead making sure that foreign policy discussion became part of their 
communities; they tended to be better than their male, often academic counterparts at the hard 
work of improving attendances, at selling memberships, at devising new ways to interest people 
in world affairs. These institutions, occupying a half-lit place in the shadow of the state, were 
crucial places through which women could access the foreign policy world, shaping how foreign 
policy was perceived. That access was not unlimited. Female participation (and, not least, pay) 
was always regulated by prevailing norms and underlying power structures. Men like Christian 
Herter and Adlai Stevenson used foreign policy institutions to launch their careers; Louise 
Leonard Wright and Vera Micheles Dean went no further. And that points to one reason why 
men like Bundy, ultimately, chose to efface the vision of a democratic foreign policy that they 
pursued. 
 
* * * * * 
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Chapter one tells the story of the early years of the Foreign Policy Association, starting with an 
account of its birth as a progressive alternative to conservative internationalism in the fight over 
the Treaty of Versailles. Once that fight was lost, the Association promoted public discussion 
about foreign affairs through society luncheons in New York and elsewhere, but it struggled to 
reconcile its desire to promote a more liberal world with its ambition to become the dominant 
national institution devoted to foreign policy education. By the late 1920s, the latter tendency 
had won out, and the Association had turned to the production of “objective” research on 
international affairs, as part of a global burst of knowledge creation and a turn to expertise. 
Acting as the first genuine foreign-policy “think tank” in the United States, the Association 
hired a research staff and pumped information about international relations into the public 
sphere, aiming particularly at a reading public. Drawing particular attention to the centrality of 
women in the Association’s work, this chapter shows how it operated on traditional assumptions 
about how public opinion operated, and sought to create an opinion elite from which 
enlightened, internationalist opinions would trickle down. 
 Chapter two demonstrates how that faith in trickle-down diplomacy weakened during 
the depression, as activists outside New York sought to push deeper into their communities, to 
make the facts mined by the first generation of foreign-policy researchers more widely known. 
The Cleveland Council on Foreign Affairs was the pioneer in this, allying with the adult 
education movement, which came to the social sciences before World War II. Community 
education in foreign affairs was hard work, requiring the forming of all kinds of alliances between 
institutions with competing understandings of democracy, and, in the view of the Cleveland 
Council’s leadership, requiring the masculinization of a domain previously dominated by women. 
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The aim was still the creation of a public, however, rather than the promotion of a single 
understanding of foreign affairs; and, as the end of the chapter shows, that public could escape 
the control of the experts who formed it, especially when it came to questions of war and peace. 
 Chapter three shows how the Foreign Policy Association eventually began to seek a 
broader public, under the pressure of the intervention debates and, ultimately, World War II. 
What it concentrates on, however, is how the war played out across the foreign-policy 
infrastructure, picking winners and losers and, in turn, elevating certain visions of a democratic 
foreign policy over others. With the Council on Foreign Relations ascendant, the Association 
remained a trusted partner of the State Department, but its earlier functions as an information 
bureau, and as a center of independent research, were seriously threatened. Meanwhile, although 
adult education approaches found a voice at State, they were quickly eclipsed by understandings, 
methods, and institutions that promised to mobilize Americans more quickly and more reliably. 
This was a fateful choice. The heady success of the United Nations campaign masked what 
would become fundamental difficulties, as deliberative, participatory visions of democracy in 
foreign policy were overshadowed by the creation of the national security state. Those difficulties 
continued throughout the early cold war, chapter four shows, until the Ford Foundation came 
onto the scene. Bankrolling the Association to the tune of millions of dollars, Ford pushed the 
development of World Affairs Councils across the United States, all of them based on the 
Cleveland model. Few succeeded in becoming genuine community centers, as the social fabric on 
which the white, urban vision of the Councils was torn apart by suburbanization and racism. 
 As chapter five shows, that failure was proof, to many postwar social scientists, that older 
ideas about democracy were outdated and unworkable in the atomic, superpower age. Social 
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scientists across several fields rapidly rethought political theory, downplaying the ability of, and 
the need for, the public to participate, privileging expertise. Even at the height of the cold war, 
social science and foreign policy did not exist in an exact and consequent relationship. The 
Association therefore tried to prove the conclusions of social science wrong, and tried to bring 
world affairs to the masses through a study-discussion program, “Great Decisions,” in which 
hundreds of thousands of Americans met in private homes, in libraries, even in car pools, to talk 
about foreign policy. Although the headline numbers of the “Great Decisions” program were 
startling, it failed to reach the public for which it had been intended, ironically confirming a 
suspicion that it was created to disprove: that participation in foreign policy, as elites conceived 
of it, was the preserve of a white, educated, and usually wealthy elite. 
 Chapter six, finally, shows how the Ford Foundation steadily lost faith. It proved 
impossible, over the long term, to sustain public engagement on the terms that policymaking 
elites understood. The foreign policy infrastructure steadily calcified, not least as it became clear 
that the public it had created was of little use to policymakers. Vietnam only confirmed this 
trend, rather than starting it. Ford withdrew its funding at the end of the 1960s, turning to the 
urban crisis. Citizen education institutions lived on, but barely. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Studying how the foreign policy elite imagined reconciling diplomacy with democracy has value. 
Neither the stereotype that that elite was stubbornly insular nor the faith that public opinion has 
interacted easily with foreign policy will suffice. The story is one of change over time, of rise and 
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fall. Pursuing American supremacy, the foreign policy elite steadily set aside the institutions it 
had created to secure the democratic foreign policy that it claimed to represent. The roots of the 
contemporary crisis in the legitimacy of American power at home are to be found here; so, too, 









Herbert Croly and Alvin Johnson were there, from The New Republic. Representatives of The 
Public, The Dial, and The Independent were there too. Charles Beard showed up, the historian 
who had resigned from Columbia over the war, and Henry R. Mussey of The Nation, who had 
resigned from Columbia over its treatment of Beard. British allies arrived, notably Norman 
Angell, author of The Great Illusion and founder of the Union of Democratic Control, which was 
sending shockwaves through the traditionalist corridors of Whitehall.1 Given all their divisions 
over the war that the United States now fought, it was a surprisingly catholic group of 
progressives that assembled on April 23, 1918, at the Columbia University Club.2 And they were 
there at the asking of Paul U. Kellogg, the social worker turned editor of The Survey. 
 Kellogg was a protean, popular figure among these men. A player in both the American 
Union Against Militarism and the American Neutral Conference Committee, he was not 
 
1 The Union of Democratic Control, founded in Britain in 1914, anticipated many of the views later expressed by 
the League of Free Nations Association, but connections between the two were limited at best. The Association 
rejected affiliation with the Union in October 1919. See Sally Harris, Out of Control: British Foreign Policy and the 
Union of Democratic Control, 1914-1918 (Hull: University of Hull Press, 1996); James Cotton, “On the Chatham 
House project: interwar actors, networks, knowledge,” International Politics 55 (2018), pp. 820-835; “Executive 
Committee Meeting L.F.N.A.,” October 21, 1919, FPA, Part II, Box 15. 
2 “In Attendance at Meeting Columbia University Club, April 23, 1918, to Discuss Organized Group Action 
Backing Up Wilson Policies,” Paul U. Kellogg Papers, Social Welfare History Archives, University of Minnesota, 
Box 33. The League of Free Nations Association period in the history of the Foreign Policy Association is its most 
studied. For a sustained treatment, see Wolfgang J. Helbich, “American Liberals in the League of Nations 
Controversy,” Public Opinion Quarterly 31 (1967), pp. 568-596. 
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himself a radical pacifist, or a radical anything. He had easily reconciled himself to American 
entry into the war, and had cooperated with statesmen holding far more conservative views to 
plan for the peace.3 In September 1917, he had gone to Paris to spend five months working for 
the Red Cross. On his way home, he had stopped in England to acquaint himself with its trade 
unions and its Labour party.4 What struck him, he told the editors, academics, and activists who 
gathered that night back in New York, was the difference in atmosphere on the progressive left. 
England, he wrote in a report, was a place “where Wilson’s name is cheered, where people speak 
of the American policies as if the whole new world were ablaze with them.”5 And yet it seemed 
to Kellogg that “the principles which President Wilson has made the hope of the world” had not 
caught fire at home. The only real work was being done by the League to Enforce Peace, what 
he thought of as “the forces of reaction.”6 Liberals, even the more pacifically inclined, retained an 
 
3 On Kellogg’s work before Congress declared war, and particularly on the way that Kellogg cooperated with 
movements that were led by women, see David S. Patterson, The Search for Negotiated Peace: Women’s Activism and 
Citizen in World War I (New York: Routledge, 2008). Kellogg cooperated with conservatives including Elihu Root, 
Charles Evans Hughes, Nicholas Murray Butler, Henry Morgenthau, and Henry Stimson to set up the Conference 
on the Foreign Relations of the United States, held over three days at Long Beach in the spring of 1917, at which 
nearly 300 policymakers, academics, lawyers, and activists had gathered to educate themselves — and, through the 
attendant press, others — about international politics. See Stephen Duggan, “Conference on the Foreign Relations 
of the United States: An Experiment in Education – Report of the National Conference on the Foreign Relations of 
the United States, Held at Long Beach, New York, May 28-June 1, 1917,” International Conciliation 4 (1917), pp. 
235-302. 
4 Clarke A. Chambers, Paul U. Kellogg and the Survey: Voices for Social Welfare and Social Justice (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1971), pp. 62-76. 
5 On the spread of Wilsonian ideas beyond American borders, see Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-
Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
6 The League of Free Nations Association did collaborate with the much more powerful, and far better-financed, 
League to Enforce Peace. Their members shared platforms, and signed onto joint programs. See, e.g., “League 
Writes Platform for Lasting Peace,” New York Tribune (November 25, 1918), p. 3. But this collaboration was never 
taken all that seriously by either side. On the League to Enforce Peace, see Stephen Wertheim, “The League That 
Wasn't: American Designs for a Legalist-Sanctionist League of Nations and the Intellectual Origins of 
International Organization, 1914–1920,” Diplomatic History 35 (2011), pp. 797-836; Benjamin Coates, Legalist 
Empire: International Law and American Foreign Relations in the Early Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), pp. 136-176. 
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“ignorance of foreign affairs,” Kellogg explained, and they still suffered under “the psychology of 
the first year of the war,” in which progressive hopes for reform had been dashed by censorship, 
propaganda, and nationalism.7 This was unacceptable. “It is thoroughly undemocratic and 
unsound not to have a body of thinking democratic citizens banked up behind the policies of a 
democratic president,” Kellogg wrote. What was needed was a group that would be more than 
the peace movement rebranded. It would be non-partisan, open especially to “radicals and 
democrats and liberals.” It would support the administration, and a “democratic order of world 
relations.” It would claim Wilsonianism for itself, true Wilsonianism.8 
Over the next few months, the new Committee on American Policy grew to include 
more journalists and more academics.9 They met every so often to learn the catechism of 
internationalism. Beard wrote a curriculum, covering trade, “backward countries,” “racial 
antagonisms,” raw materials, and the idea of a League of Nations.10 They heard from outside 
speakers, including Tomas Masaryk, who was months away from becoming president of 
Czechoslovakia.11 They asked Stephen Duggan, who would soon found the Institute of 
International Education, to draw up plans for an institution that would provide for nationwide 
 
7 See, esp., John A. Thompson, Reformers and War: American Progressive Publicists and the First World War (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the 
Making of the Modern American Citizen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
8 “Memorandum by Paul U. Kellogg,” attached to “Minutes of Meeting of the ‘Committee on Nothing at All’,” 
April 23, 1918, Records of the Foreign Policy Association, Wisconsin Historical Society [FPA], Part II, Box 15. 
9 “Committee on American Policy: List of Members,” undated, Kellogg Papers, Box 33. 
10 “Committee on American Policy,” June 27, 1918, FPA, Part II, Box 15. 
11 “Committee on American Policy,” July 11, 1918, FPA, Part II, Box 15. 
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education “by liberally minded men” towards “the international mind.”12 Taking their cue from 
kindred spirits across the Atlantic, they decided in October to form a “League of Nations 
Society,” to aid “in development and popularizing the plans for the formation of a League of 
Nations on sound and practicable lines.”13 Days after the Armistice, they elected the former 
Harper’s editor Norman Hapgood as their president, and adopted another name used by British 
activists. Then they went public.14 
 The League of Free Nations Association announced itself on November 27. Much of its 
statement of principles was stock internationalism, broad enough that it could be signed by 
figures as politically diverse as John Dewey, Felix Frankfurter, Jane Addams, and the J. P. 
Morgan banker Thomas W. Lamont.15 It accepted the use of power in international affairs, but 
sought to end power politics through the promotion of “security” and “justice.” Security, it stated, 
 
12 “Minutes of Meeting of the ‘Committee on Nothing at All’,” May 13, 1918, FPA, Part II, Box 15; “Meeting of 
the ‘Committee on Nothing at All’,” June 14, 1918, Survey Associates Records, Social Welfare History Archives, 
University of Minnesota, Box 67; Stephen P. Duggan to Kellogg, July 31, 1919, Kellogg Papers, Box 33; Kellogg to 
Duggan, August 8, 1918, Survey Associates Records, Box 67. 
13 “Committee on American Policy in International Relations,” October 3, 1918, FPA, Part II, Box 15. For the 
international context and the rise of League of Nations Societies in member and non-member states, see Thomas R. 
Davies, “Internationalism in a Divided World: The Experience of the International Federation of League of Nations 
Societies, 1919–1939,” Peace & Change 37 (2012), pp. 227-252. For the League of Nations Society and League of 
Free Nations Association, which merged to become the powerful League of Nations Union in 1918, see John A. 
Thompson, “The League of Nations Union and Promotion of the League Idea in Great Britain,” Australian Journal 
of Politics & History 18 (1972), pp. 52-61; Helen McCarthy, The British People and the League of Nations: Democracy, 
Citizenship and Internationalism, c. 1918-45 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), pp. 2-3. 
14 “Minutes of Meeting of Organizing Committee of League of Free Nations Association,” November 13, 1918, 
FPA, Part II, Box 15; “Minutes of Meeting of Organizing Committee of League of Free Nations Association,” 
November 19, 1918, FPA, Part II, Box 15. 
15 Dewey said that although he signed the Association’s statement of principles, his “personal connection with the 
document was nil.” See Robert B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1991), pp. 235-236. Lamont wrote to Duggan that “I still feel that the attempt has been made to cover too much 
ground, opening way to possible controversy, where a simpler, briefer statement would gain more prompt adherents. 
But I have been glad to subscribe to the document and shall give it my best support.” See Thomas W. Lamont to 
Duggan, December 4, 1918, Thomas W. Lamont Papers, Baker Library, Harvard Business School, Box 48. 
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would be achieved if nations ended their search for an “individual preponderance of power,” and 
“pledged to uphold by their combined power international arrangements ensuring fair treatment 
for all.” Justice, it said, would come if “co-operative” nationalism replaced “competitive,” if 
“interdependence” and “equality of economic opportunity” could be promoted everywhere. More 
radical was the deliberative, democratic political order that they sought to erect. “If the League of 
Nations is not to develop into an immense bureaucratic union of governments instead of a 
democratic union of peoples,” they declared, “the elements of (a) complete publicity and (b) 
effective popular representation must be insisted upon.” That way, the League would become “an 
extension of the principles that have been woven into the fabric of our national life.” Just as they 
had sought reform through public opinion at home, so these progressives sought to reform the 
world.16 
 Kellogg had brought together enough people of prominence to draw fire from the New 
York Times, which snickered that this “somewhat eclectic body,” with its “hackneyed Socialist 
theory” and hopes for “the reformation of fallible humanity,” might better be called the “League 
for the Resuscitation of German Commerce at the Expense of the Allies.”17 As the Times 
implied, this loose alliance of lawyers, bankers, academics, journalists, clergy, social workers, and 
heiresses could not hold. Anxious that they were cut out of the secret negotiations in Paris, 
 
16 League of Free Nations Association, “Statement of Principles,” November 27, 1918, FPA, Part II, Box 224; 
Thompson, Reformers and War, pp. 197-198; Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a 
New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 160; Trygve Throntveit, Power Without Victory: 
Woodrow Wilson and the American Internationalist Experiment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), pp. 263-
270. The Association is absent from John Milton Cooper, Jr., Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and 
the Fight for the League of Nations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), which underplays the fractures 
among Wilson’s progressive supporters that are rightly emphasized by the three authors above. 
17 “The League of Free Gratis Nations,” New York Times (November 28, 1918), p. 16 
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despite sending Angell to France, they soon fell out.18 The Covenant of the League of Nations 
was a disappointment. The executive committee liked the creation of a “permanent international 
instrumentality,” the protection of “backward races,” and the assurance of publicity, but they 
were angry, if not surprised, that a League “drawn according to old-fashioned, diplomatic 
formulae” was “not self-powerful,” “not democratic,” “not world comprehensive,” and, worst, “a 
league of governments not of peoples.”19 They immediately took their complaints directly to 
Wilson.20  
Wilson seems to have seen that the Association was a serious threat to his policy. The 
president sent the assistant secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, to speak at an 
Association event in New York, and bought Hapgood off with an appointment as minister to 
Denmark.21 It worked. The president granted that the Covenant was not ideal, but urged 
Hapgood and Duggan at the White House to “get behind the Covenant as it is.”22 After a 
referendum of its few hundred members, the Association issued a pamphlet advocating 
ratification, although it noted that the Covenant “is not perfect, failing in particular to go far 
enough toward securing the popular control of the proposed league so often emphasized by 
 
18 “Cables Protest to Wilson: League of Free Nations Association Demands Peace Publicity,” New York Times 
(January 18, 1919), p. 3. 
19 “Meeting of the Executive Committee,” February 18, 1919, FPA, Part II, Box 15. 
20 Joseph Tumulty to James G. McDonald, February 27, 1919, FPA, Part II, Box 11 
21 “No ‘Red Flag’ in League, Says F. D. Roosevelt,” New York Tribune (March 2, 1919), p. 4; “Hapgood for Danish 
Post,” New York Times (February 27, 1919), p. 7; Hapgood to Woodrow Wilson, February 26, 1919, FPA, Part II, 
Box 11; Hapgood to Wilson, March 4, 1919, FPA, Part II, Box 11. 
22 “Meeting of Executive Committee,” March 4, 1919, FPA, Part II, Box 15. 
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President Wilson.”23 Others, most angrily the same editors of The New Republic and The Nation 
who had met at Columbia a year earlier, split off, taking their irate opposition to its logical 
conclusion.24 
 Support for Wilson weakened still more after the unveiling of the full Treaty of 
Versailles. The Treaty, the Association told Wilson in a cable, was “unfavorable to future peace 
and incompatible with principles mutually accepted as a basis for the armistice.”25 A slim 
majority of members still voted in favor of ratification in another referendum taken in July, but 
only if ratification were to be accompanied by a unilateral declaration interpreting the Treaty in a 
liberal light.26 Even that compromise was not enough, as what little progressive unity still 
remained broke down, not least as leftists also divided over labor strife, anti-communist hysteria, 
and Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer’s raids on radicals.27 Kellogg was the only founding 
editor still actively involved; Hapgood proved too sympathetic to the Bolsheviks to have his 
nomination even voted on by the Senate; Dewey, only ever peripherally involved, had taken up a 
much more radical position. Executive responsibilities fell to James G. McDonald, a nobody in 
 
23 “Conference of Members,” March 8, 1919, FPA, Part II, Box 15; “Meeting of Executive Committee,” March 11, 
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24 Knock, To End All Wars, pp. 233-239. 
25 “Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting,” May 27, 1919, FPA, Part II, Box 15;  
26 “National Conference of Members,” July 8, 1919, FPA, Part II, Box 15; James G. McDonald to Norman Angell, 
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(March 1920), pp. 1-3, 5-6; “See ‘Red Hysteria’ in Sedition Curb,” New York Times (February 29, 1920), p. 14. 
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progressive politics who had just arrived in town, having abandoned life as a history professor in 
Bloomington, Indiana.28 Adrift, like the League to Enforce Peace, the Association could do 
little.29 Before the first Senate vote on the treaty in November, it resolved to oppose the Lodge 
reservations, believing that “the Treaty was at best a compromise with old world diplomacy and 
that if further emasculated by the fifteen reservations proposed it would be difficult to urge its 
ratification.”30 After the vote, it shifted course. McDonald saw Colonel House to urge that 
Wilson accept most of the Lodge reservations, including the most controversial, which watered 
down Article X and its call for collective security among members of the League.31 When Wilson 
refused, McDonald forlornly wrote that “the entire League of Nations Covenant may be lost.”32 
 
28 James G. McDonald, Grover to his family but to nobody else, was born in Coldwater, Ohio, in 1886. He moved 
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By March, and the second vote, it was. “To speak frankly,” the executive committee wrote sadly 
to Wilson in May, “we have all of us failed.”33 
 
* * * * * 
 
The debacle of the Treaty of Versailles was a funny kind of failure. The Treaty, after all, was 
remarkably popular. The Senate defeated the peace despite the avowed support of most 
newspaper editors, a majority of state legislatures and gubernatorial mansions, and almost every 
major voluntary association in the land.34 There was not yet a surge of “isolationism,” as later 
propagandists would claim, but rather a surge of internationalisms, internationalisms that 
overlapped, conflicted, and, ultimately, clashed to ruinous effect.35 Those internationalisms 
survived the vote of March; indeed, they prospered as never before. At home and abroad, 
American internationalists, men and women alike, built a remarkable array of institutions, 
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official, semi-official, and private.36 Attuned by their progressivism to the importance of expertise 
and the shaping of public opinion, American internationalists were particularly influential in the 
creation and expansion of new forms of knowledge, in binding and reshaping networks of 
scholars and practitioners, and in founding new avenues of intellectual inquiry, including the 
discipline of international relations theory.37 If it took years for many of them to abandon their 
hopes that their government might ultimately join the League, they found still that the 
deliberative, “scientific” order they had helped to conceive — which their hero, Wilson, said 
“substitutes discussion for fight” — gave them a microphone through which to speak.38 
 Trying to reform the world at large, American progressives did not stop trying to reform 
their polity or their citizenry at home. True enough, progressivism did not recover as a force in 
national elections after the victory of Warren Harding. But while most historical treatments of 
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the progressive movement end there, with its coherence gone, its vitality sapped, its characters 
broken, history itself was not so clean.39 Progressives lived.40 Many of them, indeed, expanded 
the spatial imaginary of their politics, continuing their work at the local and state levels and 
combining it with a new or renewed interest in the international, pushing beyond their borders 
their concerns about democracy, about expertise, and more.41 They applied what they had 
learned in municipal reform, in settlement houses, and in industrial relations.42 They applied the 
methods and the institutional templates that they had developed to a newly unified field, one 
that merged their interests in law, in empire, in faith, in peace, and in much else.43 Conscious 
that the power and position of the United States required a more coherent and sustained 
approach than it had had before, they called this field “foreign affairs,” “foreign relations,” or, 
increasingly, “foreign policy.”44 
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As even diplomats understood, the new diplomacy was here to stay.45 The only question 
was what kind of democracy foreign policy might require. Conservatives offered one set of 
answers, particularly the international lawyers who had spent years championing “public opinion” 
— felt, or bred, as character and morality — as the ultimate guarantor of a world of law.46 One of 
these, Nicholas Murray Butler, the president of Columbia University, had pleaded as early as 
1912 for the inculcation of an “international mind,” and put the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace behind that vision.47  
Perhaps even more influential in a purely domestic context was Butler’s fellow 
Republican, Elihu Root. Root had been calling for a better popular understanding of 
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international relations since his service as secretary of state under Theodore Roosevelt.48 “A 
democracy which undertakes to control its own foreign relations ought to know something about 
the subject,” he told the American Society of International Law in 1916.49 Root put stark limits 
on this. “Popular diplomacy” was a naturally progressive idea, he wrote in 1922, one that 
inevitably and irrevocably “followed the exercise of universal suffrage, the spread of elementary 
education, and the revelation of the power of organization.” But it would be dangerous unless 
properly led. “The people of the United States have learned more about international relations 
within the past eight years than they had learned in the preceding eighty years,” he admitted, but 
they were “only at the beginning of the task.” They needed officials with a “sense of public 
responsibility in speech and writing.” They needed “correct information.” And they needed a 
sense of place. “This is a laborious and difficult undertaking,” Root wrote; “the subject is 
extensive and difficult and a fair working knowledge of it, even of the most general kind, requires 
long and attentive study.”50 But the postwar years were extraordinarily participatory by the 
standards of U.S. foreign policy, and by 1925, Root already thought that things were getting out 
of hand. “What is everybody’s business is nobody’s business,” he huffed. “To get things done 
some human agency must be designated to give effect to the general desire that they be done.”51 
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Root had ideas about that, too. It was no coincidence that each of Root’s three articles on 
public opinion appeared in Foreign Affairs, the journal that was one of the few concessions made 
to the outside world by the Council on Foreign Relations, a secretive, all-male dinner-club-cum-
study-group that Root helped to found in the three years after the war.52 With that in mind, it is 
tempting to think of this new attachment to “popular diplomacy” as merely a “pretense,” one that 
masked views not all that different to those held by later “realists.”53 Perhaps it merely shielded 
the creation of a “foreign policy establishment” or a “foreign policy elite.”54 Perhaps, but those 
terms were alien even to men like Root. They were an invention of the calamity of the cold war, 
bearing within themselves a critique of an insulated and undemocratic cabal of aging, white men 
who had sunk the ship of state on the shores of Vietnam.55 Trying to locate the ancestry of that 
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elite in the postwar period is valuable history, but it can obscure contingency. After all, although 
the Council was prestigious, it was rather a peripheral institution in its first decade and a half. It 
makes more sense to see it less as setting the tone for U.S. foreign policy, and more as an 
institution whose commitment to secrecy and restricted membership policies were a response to 
more revealing developments elsewhere. 
The attention that the early Council has received — despite activities that were limited to 
private audiences with speakers, discussion groups for members, and the publication of Foreign 
Affairs and occasional books — is symptomatic of a tendency within the historiographies of both 
U.S. foreign relations and international affairs that underplays what we might call the publicness 
of public opinion. Yes, as international historians have emphasized, new knowledge networks, 
new forms of credentialing, and new species of institutions were dramatic developments in the 
postwar period; but much of that process took place in public view, and with good reason.56 Yes, 
as intellectual historians have explained, progressives maintained their faith in expertise after 
their experience of the war, and heightened that faith as they sought new means of social control 
in response to new psychological theories, to new revelations about propaganda, to new evidence 
of the power of corporate marketing, all of which cast doubt on the power, the competence, and 
the rationality of the public; but the response outside the highest echelons of academia was not 
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one of retreat.57 The intellectual spirits of the age were not always read by contemporaries in the 
way that they are read by historians today, Those still invested in the creation of a participatory, 
progressive democracy read books like Walter Lippmann’s Public Opinion as encouragements, 
not as obituaries. As McDonald wrote in April 1922, while Lippmann made clear “the factors 
within and without ourselves which cause so seldom to understand and so frequently to 
misunderstand the world about us,” he also helped show the way towards “appreciating more 
fully some of the ways in which these dangers must be met.”58 Calls for a “popular diplomacy,” 
then, just like calls for an “international mind,” could be read in more participatory ways than 
their conservative authors intended. Certainly that was the case with Root, whose words were 
quoted endlessly by much more progressive forces than the Council of his dreams, and not least, 
ironically, by the activist women whose suffrage he had opposed to the bitter end.59  
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Salmon O. Levinson, Outlawry of War (Chicago: American Committee for the Outlawry of War, 1921), p. 7. For 
the hopes that Dewey invested in the outlawry movement, and particularly for his prayer that it would create the 
engaged public of his dreams, see Molly Cochran, “Dewey as an international thinker,” in Molly Cochran (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Dewey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 309-336; Dominique Trudel, 
“«The Outlawry of War» ou l’autre débat Dewey-Lippmann,” Canadian Journal of Communication 41 (2016), pp. 
135-156; Charles F. Howlett and Audrey Cohan, “John Dewey and the Significance of Peace Education in 
American Democracy,” Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 16 (2017), pp. 456-472. 
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To be sure, foreign policy as conducted by the State Department at no point became a 
subject of mass concern, and few progressives thought it should. Progressives sought instead to 
create a different, more participatory kind of elite to that envisioned at the Council, one that was 
open as to gender, although still structured by the norms of the day; one that was more open as 
to class, although still mediated by cost and education; one that was not, however, particularly 
open as to race. What they built might be seen as the truer foreign policy elite, truer because it 
was intended to be more representative of the breadth of interest in foreign relations in postwar 
America, and of the diversity of ways in which that interest was enacted.60 The story of public 
opinion in this dissertation is, then, about the rise and sidelining of this other, more participatory 
vision. And it was to pursue that vision, to promote democracy in foreign policy rather than 
merely to achieve specific internationalist aims, that the League of Free Nations Association 
changed its name in March 1921. It became the Foreign Policy Association.61  
 
* * * * * 
 
 
60 Robert Vitalis has hinted at this by arguing that the Association was a “more influential group in those years” than 
the Council, but does not explore why: for all his laudable focus on race, Vitalis ignores the importance of gender, 
and especially the power and influence that the Association drew by harnessing the activism and expertise of (white) 
women. Cf. Vitalis, White World Order, Black Power Politics, pp. 9-11, 61-62. 
61 Although the idea of changing the Association’s name had been around for a while, what prompted the official 
change was pressure from the Boston branch, which feared that the old name “would be a serious handicap in 
getting adequate support for our work.” See “Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting L.F.N.A,” April, 5, 
1921, FPA, Part II, Box 15. In June, the Bulletin reported that the new name “at relieves us of the necessity of 
frequent explanations,” not least that “we are not propagandists for the Sinn Feiners, the Bolsheviks and the various 
groups working for the independence of Ireland, Egypt and West Ukrainia.” Hence the new moniker better 
represented a group “working for real freedom of thought and discussion, and for popular education in foreign 
affairs,” a “vast field.” See “The Change of Name,” Bulletin of the Foreign Policy Association 2 (June 1921), p. 4. 
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The Foreign Policy Association celebrated its tenth birthday, on November 10, 1928, with a 
meal for a thousand paying guests in the grand ballroom of the Hotel Astor. It was the 109th 
such luncheon it had held in New York, a fixture in the social calendar that it replicated in 
fourteen other cities as far west as Minneapolis and as far south as Richmond. On its national 
council sat a roster of predominantly liberal lawyers, industrialists, and educators, as well as a 
who’s-who of the international women’s movement, led by Jane Addams and Carrie Chapman 
Catt. At its head remained McDonald, who had shot to fame. Devoted to the promotion of 
foreign policy in the public consciousness, and to education in the facts, it was not a mass 
organization. With about 9,000 members, it had a budget of $160,000, much of it raised from 
bankers including Felix Warburg, Otto Kahn, and Arthur Sachs.62 But the Association was by 
far the most promising and potent institution of its kind, drawing admiring notices in the press 
and congratulatory telegrams from all over the country, and beyond.63 
 Only part of this dramatic growth can be attributed to the Association’s Wilsonianism, to 
the policy positions it espoused in its first few years. As its genetics would suggest, it promoted 
the League, reporting on its proceedings from Geneva, celebrating its officials and its founding 
spirits in New York, and keeping close contact with its advocates in the United States and 
elsewhere. It pressed for disarmament. It sought normality in relations with Russia. It lambasted 
U.S. colonialism in the Caribbean. It sent a Howard University professor, Alain Locke, to report 
 
62 “Contributions of $500 and Over, October 1927-September 1928,” undated, Carnegie Corporation Records, Rare 
Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, Series III.A [CC, refers to Series III.A unless otherwise 
stated], Box 147. 
63 Ten Years of the F.P.A. (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1929); “Says Japan Studies Monroe Doctrine,” 
New York Times (November 11, 1928), p. 20; “Looking Out Across Borders,” New York Herald Tribune (November 
10, 1928), p. 10; “Facts Upon Facts Educating Public on World Amity,” Christian Science Monitor (November 12, 
1928), p. 5. 
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critically on the mandatory administration of the League.64 Its staff were usually allowed to 
advance causes on their personal authority, as long as they did not create undue difficulties. And 
even when the Association lacked inspiration of its own, it was a gathering point for inspirations 
that came from elsewhere, using its good offices to coordinate, for instance, the crusade to join 
the World Court. 
Despite its efforts, the early Association had little direct influence on diplomacy. Spats 
over Russian policy led to a frosty relationship with the State Department, so the Association 
turned to the semi-official figures whose work anyway seemed better to express the importance 
of the United States in the international community.65 Bankers were favorites, despite the 
controversial space they occupied in the progressive imaginary. Rumors abounded that it was a 
front for the House of Morgan.66 With the United States now a creditor nation, and with New 
York the center of the world financial system, the partners of J. P. Morgan & Co. were united in 
their awareness of their nation’s power, and their own.67 They differed, however, on what that 
 
64 Vitalis, White World Order, Black Power Politics, pp. 79-82 
65 The Association, for instance, rashly published documents relating to Russian-American relations. See C. K. 
Cumming and Walter W. Pettit (eds.), Russian-American Relations: March, 1917 – March, 1920 (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920); “Nonpartisan Light on Russia,” New York Tribune (June 6, 1920), p. F11; Felix 
Cole to Christina Merriman, October 22, 1920, FPA, Part II, Box 10; Merriman to Cole, November 4, 1920, FPA, 
Part II, Box 10. For the Association’s early faith in experts, see, e.g., McDonald, “Will Experts’ Report Be 
Accepted,” News Bulletin 3 (March 14, 1924), pp. 1-2; McDonald, “The Dawes Report–An Analysis,” News 
Bulletin 3 (April 18, 1924), pp. 1-2. 
66 Raymond Leslie Buell wrote from Washington that “some people told me the F.P.A. was a Morgan organization, 
while other people said that it was extremely radical, which is, I suppose, what we want them to say.” Buell, 
“Memorandum on Washington Trip,” October 4, 1927, Raymond Leslie Buell Papers, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress, Box 41. 
67 On Morgan and diplomacy, see Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990), 
esp. pp. 165-301; Emily S. Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar 
Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Susie Pak, Gentleman Bankers: The World of J. P. Morgan 
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power meant for American democracy. While some of the partners turned to the Council on 
Foreign Relations, others sought more inclusive approaches, above all Thomas W. Lamont, the 
suave senior partner who was the leading financial diplomat of the time and one of the most 
influential men in the world.68 Lamont gave McDonald cash and he gave him access, whether 
that was gossip during their frequent rides uptown or an invitation to observe negotiations 
firsthand.69 In return, McDonald sent Lamont articles to edit before publication, put his wife on 
the board, and provided him with a platform.70 At a luncheon in January 1926, for instance, 
Lamont stood next to the president of the Fascist League of North America and declared his 
 
68 On Lamont, see Robert Freeman Smith, “Thomas W. Lamont: International Banker as Diplomat,” in Thomas J. 
McCormick and Walter LaFeber (eds.), Behind the Throne: Servants of Power to Imperial Presidents, 1898-1968 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), pp. 101-125; Edward M. Lamont, The Ambassador from Wall 
Street: The Story of Thomas W. Lamont, J. P. Morgan’s Chief Executive (Lanham: Madison Books, 1994). Dwight M. 
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special minute praising President Coolidge for a decision that was “courageous because certain to be attacked on the 
ground that the firm of Morgan has interests in Mexico,” but “discerning because [of] Mr. Morrow’s extraordinarily 
wide and thorough knowledge” and “high sense of public duty.” See “Minutes of a Meeting of the Executive Board,” 
October 19, 1927, FPA, Part II, Box 15. 
69 Although the Lamonts made significant contributions to many internationalist organizations, they contributed to 
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Committee, represented by Mr. Thomas W. Lamont, for the refunding of the Mexican debt.” “Mexico,” News 
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Bulletin 1 (June 23, 1922), p. 1. 
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admiration for Mussolini, asking an outraged audience whether it was “liberal enough to let Italy 
have the kind of government she seems to want?”71 
What was a fascist doing speaking to these apostles of liberalism, over three courses and 
in white tie? Part of the answer lies in their desire to restore free speech after the restrictions of 
the war, at whatever the cost. But the larger part testifies to the continuing relevance not just of 
progressivism generally, but of pragmatism specifically. Increasingly unfashionable intellectually, 
the pragmatist legacy had been central both to Wilson’s plans for the League of Nations and to 
liberals’ rejection of them.72 It was still claimed long afterwards by any number of activists who 
maintained deliberative visions of politics local and international, not least by members of the 
Association’s national council, Dewey and Addams included. And the events that made the 
Association’s reputation were distantly based on the pragmatist conviction that citizens, when 
gathered together in a public, could be educated towards truth through participation in open 
discussion of ideas. Such citizens could discover the public interest, and act upon it; publics could 
be educated and empowered at the same time, with little theoretical tension between the two. A 
luncheon, then, was not just a luncheon.73 
The Association started its luncheon series shortly after it announced its creation, with a 
meeting of ninety or so guests at the Café Boulevard on January 11, 1919. Already wedded to the 
multi-speaker format that it stuck to for two decades, three speakers addressed themselves to 
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“The Problem of the Adriatic”; the next week, three more discussed “Poland and Danzig”; the 
week after that, five discussed Russia, three anti-Bolshevik, and two pro-.74 An internal history 
written by Edwin Björkman, a Swedish literary critic and wartime propagandist for the 
Committee on Public Information, recounted that “the membership sat back and listened while 
the various topics under debate were presented to them by experts representing every national 
interest, every racial cause, every territorial, political and economical problem,” and that 
“scrupulous care was taken to hear all sides.”75 Even if all but a very few meetings had at least two 
speakers, this claim was not strictly true; in the first season, Manuel Quezon and other Filipino 
representatives presented their case for independence unchallenged.76 But the choice and breadth 
of topics was indicative of the range of issues that an America fully engaged in the international 
community could expect to have to educate itself on. By April, when Hamilton Holt, David 
Lawrence, and Walter Lippmann were debating the relationship between the Fourteen Points 
and the League, 1,400 people were in attendance at the Hotel Commodore, and the discussions 
were being reported as news in the Times.77 Three years later, the luncheons moved to the grand 
ballroom of the Hotel Astor, the playground of Gilded Age plutocrats that was the centerpiece 
of the entertainment district around Times Square. 
 
74 “Call Soviet Money Mere ‘Dirty Paper’,” New York Times (January 26, 1919), p. 23. 
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76 “Final Plea Here For Free Filipinos,” New York Times (April 20, 1919), p. E1. 
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This was the public that the Association’s leadership initially situated itself within, not so 
much intentionally as by the default of a privilege and wealth that progressive policies had only 
enhanced in New York City.78 American internationalism of this kind was a product of the clubs 
and ballrooms that were, quite explicitly, intended to close off the elite from the mass.79 Rare was 
the day that McDonald did not take both meals at a top-ranked private club. The executive 
committee that he chaired met in the clubs favored by elite reformers, or, more often, at the 
Cosmopolitan or Women’s City Clubs, which were founded and frequented by the wealthy, 
progressive former suffragists that the board both comprised and hoped to attract.80 And in a city 
painfully stratified by inequalities of all kinds, to learn about foreign policy in the ways 
sanctioned by these progressives was costly, assuming one had the right hat or ball gown. 
Membership cost at least $5 annually, between $60 and $100 today, but a meal ticket to each of 
the twelve or so Saturday luncheons held every year cost $2-$3 for members, twice the price of a 
grandstand seat at Yankee Stadium. It usually cost 50 cents to $1 to attend even for those who 
skipped lunch and wanted only to watch the spectacle of the discussions. 
And a spectacle they often were, as dramatic as the pageantry that internationalist 
teachers employed in their classrooms, or as the rituals put on by the publicity wizards of 
 
78 Sven Beckert, The Monied Metropolis: New York City and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850-1896 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); David Huyssen, Progressive Inequality: Rich and Poor in New York, 
1890-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014). 
79 Clifton Hood, In Pursuit of Privilege: A History of New York City’s Upper Class and the Making of a Metropolis (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2017), pp. 193-204. 
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Geneva.81 McDonald built a supreme reputation as a commanding, witty, and charming 
chairman, and under his gavel the luncheons turned foreign policy into the stuff of society 
glamor. They tended to showcase academic experts, but more often political officials, bankers, 
lawyers, international civil servants, editors, and foreign correspondents, people who had lived 
their experiences, rather than learned them. Although education was the name of the game, and 
maps, reading lists, and pamphlets were laid out on the tables for perusal between courses, debate 
and dispute were the methods of choice. “I understand that the exigencies of the budget,” Edwin 
Borchard of Yale Law School quipped at a luncheon in December 1928, “require that these 
discussions become intellectual battles, and that people do not feel they have been a success 
unless there has been a very sharp and acrimonious, if not bloody, contest.”82 Time was always 
left for audience questions, which often became notable speeches in themselves, written out by 
the speakers, planted in advance by the chairman, and reported as news in the papers.  
For all their social standing, these luncheons were far from genteel. Gilbert Murray, the 
chairman of the League of Nations Union, discovered that when he was subjected to hostile 
questioning from “representatives of subject portions of the Empire” in November 1926. As 
McDonald recorded in his diary, the “cumulative effect caused him [Murray] to be a little 
explosive, particularly as he answered the Negro.”83 One luncheon, in January 1925, devolved 
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into “little short of a riot,” McDonald recalled, as “unprecedented hissing” accompanied 
recriminations between the American correspondent of Izvestia and an Irish journalist who had 
once been captured by the Red Army.84 At the meeting where Lamont declared his favor for 
fascism, the Herald Tribune reported that “the members of the audience seemed about to resort 
to fisticuffs.”85 At another, “boos mingled with derisive laughter” when a former Mexican official 
accused the State Department of promoting banditry to support oil interests.86 
Spectacle did not reduce the participants to mere spectators, then, and the most insightful 
of onlookers understood that the luncheons relied on their drama, on the way that they physically 
staged a deliberative international community, for their power. Much as serious thinkers were 
loosely associated with the Association, in its board and office meetings it initially gave little 
explicit thought to what its public ought to be, how it might appeal to that public, and how that 
public might exert influence.87 Despite consulting with editors and publicity experts, including 
the advertising maven Ivy Lee, McDonald admitted that the Association had grown through 
“trial and error,” that no “organic plan has ever been formulated for its future development.”88 
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Indeed, Kellogg had to instruct McDonald that the problem of the public was “an intellectual 
problem, a piece of technique,” and that the luncheons rose to that level. In most cases, the 
editor explained in February 1926, “you choose a subject which is up in the news; 
you pose it in the form of a debate and everybody likes a clash; you try to get people 
whose names, standing, or experience have a lure — they are your cast of characters; 
and you bring to the written words the fire of spoken delivery; you do not rest on 
securing these stars; the cross fire of questions and answers which you handle like 
an orchestra leader, with rare deftness, spreads the dramatic action out over the 
whole meeting; people at my table and the next get up, there is the inquisitiveness 
as to who that is speaking; there is the clash of wit and feeling. Besides all this, 
there is the stage setting of the speakers’ table, personalities and such; and, in the 
course of the last three years, the whole adventure has turned into a society event 
competing with the afternoon matinees. 
 
To be sure, Kellogg understood that this was a restricted clientele. “They are not the man in the 
street,” he wrote, but a community of “people with a common thread of interest,” men and 
women possessed of “as much intelligence but not so much information to the subject in hand as 
the small group of experts.”89 This community was valuable; a foreign policy elite in all but name. 
 Still, even if the Association never intended its luncheons to create the kind of mass-
membership fervor stoked by kindred spirits in Britain and elsewhere, those luncheons were not 
intended to enforce strict limits on the membership of a democratic foreign policy.90 Its 
restrictions were those of class, of cost, of capacity; it periodically, if infrequently, held free, open 
meetings at the Town Hall, whose director, Robert Erskine Ely, sat on the Association’s national 
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council. “We are confident,” the Association told prospective donors in 1925, “that the thinking 
of millions of our fellow citizens on international affairs can be so underpinned with a deep 
foundation of facts that public opinion may become a sure and constant source of strength, and 
on occasion, of sound guidance to our Government.”91 And if the “millions” were not in reach of 
cut glass and dessert, those who dined were expected to do more than eat and listen. If it was 
“our work” to reveal facts “free from the import tariff of prejudice, self-interest and narrow 
nationalism,” the Association’s secretary Christina Merriman told the members at their annual 
meeting in April 1927, it was “your work to help us get them out to a wider and wider public.”92 
Kellogg, too, instructed his flock on its “responsibility” to use what its learned, to make sure that 
diplomacy trickled down. If the members were “laboring under the illusion that your business 
with foreign policy ends when you have listened to a lively debate,” he said in 1928, they were 
wrong. “You can’t lunch your way into either the Kingdom of Heaven or a world safe for 
democracy.”93 
Could you listen your way into it? Even when it came to a dramatic new invention that 
was widely seen as having the potential to reknit the fabric of international relations, the radio, 
the Association tended not to think too much about the public it was cultivating.94 Its first 
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appearance on the airwaves came on April 2, 1923, when the WEAF network broadcast a dinner 
in honor of Lord Robert Cecil, an author of the League Covenant whose tour of the United 
States that month the Association sponsored.95 McDonald told the Hotel Astor crowd that 
evening that there were 800,000 people “reported” to be listening to Cecil’s plea for the power of 
public opinion, among them Woodrow Wilson himself. (“Applause,” the published transcript 
notes at the sainted hero’s mention; “prolonged applause; standing applause.”)96 Most luncheons 
thereafter were likewise broadcast on WEAF and some, though not all, of the stations associated 
with its growing chain, reaching as far west as Indiana by January 1928. And although the 
programs were buffeted by commercialism, they were generally protected even after AT&T’s sale 
of WEAF to RCA in 1926, not least because of McDonald’s friendships with James Harbord, 
RCA’s president and a regular golf partner, and Owen D. Young, chairman of General Electric, 
national council member, and key figure in the renegotiation of German reparations.  
Still, if the radio allowed McDonald to imagine a community of internationalists far 
beyond the walls of the ballrooms and banquet halls he usually addressed, at this point that 
community offered only a rarefied audience. Even a basic radio set cost about $20 to purchase in 
1925, and the Association hoped, at best, to append its usual techniques to the new technologies 
at its disposal. A Mrs. Walter Read of Indian Hill, New Jersey, drew praise in one Bulletin for 
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hosting her own luncheon, at which members of her local Women’s Club might listen remotely 
to the discussion across the bay. “We hope,” the Bulletin said, that “other FPA members and 
their friends will entertain at FPA radio listening-in luncheons and also that they will not forget 
to write WEAF.”97 While there were fears that the broadcasts were eating into luncheon 
attendances at the Astor by 1928, McDonald remained satisfied that the “dozens” of letters that 
listeners sent to the office showed that “there is an audience for serious discussion of 
international affairs, an audience which will listen to such discussion even in competition with 
the latest African syncopation.”98 
McDonald’s faith in the possibility of an active, if white and educated, radio public 
intensified over the following five years, even as the business of broadcasting turned in a more 
commercial direction. On the advice of Raymond Blaine Fosdick, the leading internationalist 
and advisor to the Rockefellers, Young arranged for McDonald to become one of the earliest 
commentators on foreign affairs.99 McDonald’s weekly, fifteen-minute show, The World Today, 
began in April 1928, and by its conclusion five years later it was reaching a national audience on 
NBC’s Red Network. McDonald experimented with the radio as if it were an extension of his 
usual ballrooms, a participatory democracy in waiting; his aim was to create public discussion, 
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not to instruct an audience. “Ladies and gentlemen,” he opened his first talk, “this is not a 
lecture. 
It is the first of a series of informal discussion conferences which I hope you will be 
willing to hold with me. I am convinced that my talks will have value in proportion 
only as you exchange ideas with me… My ideal is nothing less than such a mutual 
exchange of impressions and experiences that out of it may emerge for me as much 
as for you a fuller understanding of our rapidly changing world.100 
 
Taking pragmatism to the airwaves was serious business for McDonald, within the confines of 
the available technology. An advisor to the National Advisory Council on Radio in Education, 
he sought to stimulate a public, not acquire an audience.101 He therefore frequently quoted and 
answered listeners who wrote in with questions and comments, had maps and transcripts ready 
for those who wanted them, and had bibliographies sent out to thousands of schools, colleges, 
and libraries, so that the increasing number of teachers who were taking international approaches 
in classrooms could use his broadcasts as a basis for their pedagogy. And while McDonald 
initially sought what he called “quality listeners,” he proudly circulated letters from citizens who 
could put pen to paper but could not otherwise involve themselves in formal discussions, and he 
drew up maps that visualized the depth and intensity of engagement beyond the northeast.102 
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Trouble was, the mailbag held dozens of letters each week, rather than bursting with thousands 
or more. 
 One thing the radio broadcasts did do was help the luncheon idea cross the city limits, as 
wealthy listeners outside of New York started to replicate what they heard. The headline figures 
of the Association’s push out of Manhattan looked promising. New York internationalists 
initially struggled to find common ground with their brethren in Boston, and attempts at a 
merger with the nascent Chicago Council on Foreign Relations were turned down. But as 
activists settled into a less turbulent period after the Washington Naval Conference, a more 
cohesive network started to develop. First the citizens of Cincinnati asked to set up a branch, 
then Philadelphia, then Hartford. Providence and Springfield followed, then Columbus. By 
1928 there were fourteen branches, holding a total of 67 luncheons between them, with 
memberships anywhere between the 644 of Philadelphia and the 93 of Rochester. A dozen or so 
more cities seemed like immediate prospects, too.103 
 Until the Association hired Raymond T. Rich as its field director in the fall of 1925, 
these branches cropped up spontaneously, as small groups interested in foreign policy sought an 
alliance with centers of internationalism on the coast.104 And from where they cropped up is 
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crucial for understanding the nature of the public that was being created. The Boston branch set 
the tone. Although it contained within its leadership academics such as the Harvard law 
professor Manley O. Hudson, and editors including Willis J. Abbot of the Christian Science 
Monitor and Christian A. Herter of the Independent, its driving forces were women. Some were 
teachers, like the pioneering Fannie Fern Andrews; others were socialites, including Harriet 
Hemenway, whose portrait was painted by John Singer Sargent; one was Alice Hamilton, the 
Hull House social worker, first woman admitted to the Harvard faculty, and member of the 
League of Nations Health Committee; many more were active in the Women’s International 
League for Peace and Freedom, not least the architect Rose Standish Nichols. And although 
Hudson presided at luncheons and used his wide connections to invite the mostly male roster of 
speakers, the chairman was Marguerite Hopkins, a former president of the powerful Women’s 
City Club who served voluntarily until 1929.105 
  Indeed, the creation of a foreign policy public was a matter of male internationalists 
plugging into (and then rewiring) far more extensive, active, and internationalized networks of 
women dedicated to educating themselves and others to exercise the electoral power they had 
labored so hard to win.106 Addams and Catt lent their names to the Association, but more 
important in its development were the suffragists who took particularly active roles on its 
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executive committee. These included Lillian Wald, the Henry Street Settlement Founder; Ruth 
Morgan, who served concurrently as vice-chairman of the Association and chief of the League of 
Women Voters’ department of international cooperation; and, eventually, Eleanor Roosevelt. 
These were towering figures, of national reputation and more, but less heralded women took the 
initiative at the local level, too. The Philadelphia branch grew out of luncheons started by the 
city’s League chapter, with which the Association was invited to cooperate.107 When McDonald 
visited Providence and Springfield in February 1925, he was hosted by groups of women who 
sought to start Association branches, or at least to have the Association cooperate with their own 
work.108 When Rich arrived in Minneapolis in October 1926, he thought the leading activist 
there, a Mrs. McKnight, “a genius” as an organizer.109  
Women made up not just the active leadership of the Association, but its rank and file, 
too. So prominent were women in its first decade that at headquarters, the membership secretary 
Esther Ogden, who was also serving on the executive boards of the National American Woman 
Suffrage Association and the Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, actually became 
worried.110 At the executive committee meeting in January 1924, she reported that “a tally 
showed a preponderance of two-thirds women in the membership and raised the question of 
whether or not to concentrate for the future immediately on circularizing lists of men.” The 
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seven members of the committee in attendance at the Women’s City Club, numbering Wald and 
six men, vetoed the proposal.111 
The Association was fundamentally dependent on the expertise of women precisely 
because of its public nature. Education offered these women access into a new diplomatic world, 
but their organizational work was profoundly intellectual work in its own right, a daily process of 
conceiving a public, trying to create it, reconceiving it, and trying to create it again.112 Much of 
this burden fell on the speakers’ bureau, run first on a voluntary basis and later staffed by 
Elizabeth Scott and Frances Pratt. As the branch network grew, with Rich travelling tens of 
thousands of miles in search of recruits, local leaders looked to New York for help connecting 
their cities to rapidly developing networks of expertise, both domestic and international. It was 
the responsibility of the speakers’ bureau to think up topics and to find speakers who could 
adequately represent all sides of an issue. Even as early as the 1926-27 season, that task required 
hundreds of letters, telegrams, and phone calls to potential speakers and their secretaries, in the 
full knowledge that two-thirds of inquiries would be met with declinations.113 Initially working 
with other organizations and lecture bureaus, the office brought order to the teeming mass of 
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foreign policy debate by acquiring the savvy necessary to compile long lists of eminent speakers 
on both side of suggested debate questions, and by circulating lists of “foreigners in the United 
States.”114 By the spring of 1929, the speakers bureau had decided to manage speakers for itself, 
contracting with 45 experts, diplomats, and personalities to manage their appearances around the 
country. A year later, it was not only supplying multiple speakers to 92 branch meetings, with a 
total attendance of more than 37,000, but making nearly 300 engagements for outside groups, 
too. Here was the start of the foreign policy lecture circuit, with experts circulating around the 
country as never before.115 
Set aside the fear that the Association’s commitment to free speech left it “slightly tinged 
with pink,” as one conservative fretted to Lamont, and it was the place it gave to women that 
kept it disreputable in the eyes of some traditionalists and Washington officials.116 The most 
incendiary critic was John Franklin Carter, a diplomat turned journalist turned polemicist who 
rooted his disparagement of internationalism in human-nature realism. Carter’s Man is War 
savaged the Association in 1926 as promoting “foreign” propaganda, presenting the “thinking 
man” with “realists,” “scare-mongers,” and “horror-boys” under the “guise of impartiality.”117 But 
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his real issue, and by extension that of some of his colleagues, became apparent in “Foreign 
Policy on the Half-Shell,” a brutal magazine article from 1928 that took aim at a “hypothetical” 
“Foreign Relations Group, Inc., with its thirty branches, its twenty thousand members, its 
advisory committee of three bankers, two former Democratic Ambassadors, five wealthy and 
unemployed ladies, four absentee editors, and one very able publicity man.” The hypothetical 
fooled no one.118 
To Carter, the free security that happily allowed U.S. foreign policy to be “broad, diffuse 
and somewhat undecipherable,” left a “comfortable intellectual vacuum” that had been “cleverly 
capitalized by that section of the American people which really believes that after dinner 
speeches create public opinion and that it is possible to run a government by public oratory.” 
Many of their initiatives were “interesting and amusing,” he wrote, “but none approaches the 
high comedy of the food-plus-oratory formula for hampering the administration of our foreign 
policy.” The “Foreign Relations Group,” Carter quipped, wanted to “knock the arrows from the 
claw of the eagle on our coins and to substitute an oyster-fork, prefatory to changing our national 
emblem from the Bird of Freedom to a Soft-Shelled Crab.” It harassed officials with “irrelevant 
opposition”; its luncheons made sure that “hard feeling is stirred up and nobody is benefitted”; it 
“persistently, inveterately, and well-nigh instinctively” perverted the “patriotic” — that is, 
nationalist or conservative — “American side of every question that comes before it.” This was 
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no place for “impartial and disinterested inquiries into the actual character of American foreign 
policy,” he complained. 
“At bottom,” Carter inveighed, “the trouble seems to be due to the women who form 90 
per cent of the Group’s membership.” Take a look at a luncheon, Carter wrote, notably seeing 
the Association as even more gendered than it really was. “You will see more beauty than brains, 
more furs and platinum than pencils and note-books, more white kid gloves than square chins.” 
Such “plump rich women,” who craved “emotion,” wanted “a sort of moral bull-fight in which 
Error shall be slain by the Toreador of Truth.” Such women sought new foreign policies for the 
same reason they sought “new hats,” not to “protect her head but because she is bored with the 
old ones.” Advocates of government policy could hardly defend themselves, and so “the wretched 
opponents of the cause of sweetness and light are lucky if they escape without being hissed.” 
Thankfully, while such women flattered themselves “that by a slight palpitation of their emotions 
they are really contributing to public opinion,” the men they scorned knew better. “The 
Department of State, to the credit of its intelligence,” Carter wrote, “has never been worried by 
the oyster-fork type of diplomacy.” And Carter would know: after he filed his article, he left the 
New York Times to become an economic specialist back at the State Department.119 
 
* * * * * 
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In the spring of 1932, McDonald wrote to his most generous donor, triumphant. “Five years 
ago,” McDonald wrote to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., those at the State Department who knew of 
the Association had met it with “suspicion,” or “as of little consequence.” “Today,” he declared,  
the Foreign Policy Association is perhaps better known within the Department 
than any other organization; its publications are found on many desks; the 
Department as a whole is cordial and sympathetic in its attitude; many of the 
officers we regard as warm personal friends. About twenty State Department and 
foreign service officials are members of the Foreign Policy Association. Department 
officers frequently suggest topics of research, read and criticise our manuscripts, and 
provide us with valuable material.120 
 
Diplomats had passed word to McDonald’s staff that the government was relying on them to 
break down the “narrow, isolationist attitude” that had reared from economic collapse.121 Soon 
the secretary of state would tell one of them that he should regard himself as a member of the 
State Department, with all the privileges that would accompany that assumption.122 
McDonald barely knew John D. Rockefeller, who held himself aloof in a way that the 
Warburgs, the Kahns, the Lamonts did not. But he knew Rockefeller’s wife, Abby, so well that 
she had trusted him to chaperone her eldest son, John, on a voyage around the world after he 
graduated from Princeton in 1929. Back in 1925, Abby had teamed up with Fosdick, the former 
League of Nations administrator who helped the family with internationalist causes, to ask 
Rockefeller to cut McDonald a check for $10,000, to be spent on a new project.123 With that 
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money, and the $141,500 that had followed it by 1932, the Association had founded a research 
department, a unique venture that was, arguably, the first “think tank” for foreign affairs.124 In 
short order, its work was being read in banking houses, in editorial conferences, and in foreign 
offices the world over. Hjalmar Schacht, the German central banker, confronted McDonald 
about its interpretation of Hitler’s rise, in the same summer that the Indianan had audiences with 
Chancellor von Papen, Foreign Minister von Neurath, and Premier Herriot.125 The Dominican 
ambassador lodged an official protest when one of its researchers labeled President Trujillo a 
dictator, forcing Ernest Gruening, a board member and the director of the Interior Department’s 
Division of Territories and Island Possessions, to resign from the Association to avoid further 
embarrassment. The Association had become a player in international politics in its own right.126 
 How was this possible, not least during a depression? McDonald, after all, remained no 
less ardent an activist than he had been, and briefly took up the chairmanship of the steering 
committee of the National Peace Conference.127 The subordinates he hired for his research staff 
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were good liberals and more, and the board remained stocked with the kinds of progressives it 
always had been. Still, a shift took place. The word “liberal” was dropped from the constitution 
in October 1928, as the board newly declared that “the object of the Foreign Policy Association 
is to carry on research and educational activities to aid in the understanding and constructive 
development of American foreign policy.”128 Three years earlier it had already declared that “we 
believe that the growth of a wider and more intelligent public interest in foreign affairs waits not 
upon propaganda but upon facts.”129 This turn to objectivity had roots deep in progressivism. It 
had roots in the investigative journalism of the prewar era, as if trained scholars might muckrake 
the world. It had roots in the progressive impulse towards expert governance. It had roots, too, in 
the widespread horror at the extent, duplicity, and power of promotion, revealed in progressives’ 
experiences as both the creators and the targets of wartime propaganda.130 And it had roots in the 
philanthropy-funded turn to positivism, objectivism, and functionalism in the social sciences, a 
development, both structural and intellectual, that lauded the value of facts, and just the facts.131 
 What should not be forgotten, however, is that this turn to putatively objective research 
by the Association — and the Council on Foreign Relations, the Institute of Pacific Relations, 
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and the World Peace Foundation — was about more than the founding of international relations 
as an academic and semi-academic discipline, and about more than the creation of foreign policy 
professionals.132 It was about publics. It was a choice about how to create the informed, engaged, 
participating populace of progressive dreams. And that choice still led the Association to 
cultivate an elite, an elite that it still hoped would both act upon its education and act to educate 
the mass. But rather than an elite with purely social standing, the new elite that the Association 
sought was quite different, comprised of “those men and women who, through their pens and 
voices, are reaching the minds of millions of Americans every day.”133 Although there is no 
evidence that Association staffers read what little academic literature existed on public opinion, 
the assumption here, as at the luncheons, was that found in scholarship: informed public opinion 
would trickle down from an elite of editors, of professors, of experts, of diplomats, from a small, 
professional public with advanced reading skills, with access to communications technologies, 
and with influence, even with power.134 
 It was the very powerlessness of the Association in its early days, however, that prompted 
its turn to facts. It was initially set up as a committee of authorities who gathered to study and 
then to promote the League of Nations. It quickly applied the same technique to other issues. 
Lillian Wald took the chair of a committee on Russia in the summer of 1919, one that for the 
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next few years would count Adolf Berle, William Allen White, and the Rev. John A. Ryan 
among its members.135 Committees on other topics followed, all involving quiet study among the 
members and some kind of effort to sway a broader public or government policy. Acting in the 
name of public opinion, these committees were ineffective except to the extent that they created 
controversy. After publicly imploring President Wilson to resist intervention in Mexico in 1919, 
McDonald was hauled before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and ridiculed for the 
weaknesses of his sources by Senator Albert Fall, later of Teapot Dome infamy.136 McDonald 
fared no better on Russian policy, being publicly scorned by Acting Secretary of State Norman 
H. Davis, later a committed Association supporter, for falsely characterizing government 
policy.137 Charles Evans Hughes, Davis’s successor, proved no kinder upon being presented with 
a memorandum by 24 lawyers on the illegality of the U.S. occupation of Haiti, calling it “most 
inadequate and one-sided.”138 While less critical briefs on the World Court and the Lausanne 
Treaty were better-received, the wounded Association reflected that it was at least drawing the 
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State Department out in the name of “democratic control.”139 “However controversial the 
incident,” the Russia committee replied to Davis, “we believe it will be agreed that open and 
frank discussion of exactly this sort is the soundest American method of arriving at an 
enlightened foreign policy.”140 
 Only on the issue of narcotics did the Association have any success. An inherently global 
question, drug control was a symbolic issue for many internationalists, who used it to try to push 
the United States closer to the League of Nations by initially avoiding controversial questions of 
war and peace and focusing first on collaboration with the steadier, technical work of the Geneva 
agencies. Helen Howell Moorhead, a Bryn Mawr graduate and aid worker, and Herbert L. May, 
a former drug salesman and lawyer, were leading mediators in this process, and they used the 
Association’s opium committee, created late in 1922, as their base.141 They acted as researchers, 
as observers at negotiations, and even, in the case of May, as a member of the Permanent Central 
Opium Board at the League.142 They wrote the odd article in the Association’s publications, but 
their work was never central to the Association as a whole, except in one crucial way: they 
brought the Association its first contact with Rockefeller philanthropy, when the Bureau of 
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Social Hygiene twice gave it $10,000, in 1924 and 1925.143 That grant was intended to help 
Moorhead and May send information about opium directly to newspapers, which were read, to a 
greater or lesser extent, by almost all Americans.144 Word came back that sustained information 
on other aspects of international life would be welcomed, especially from editors outside the 
major cities, who otherwise struggled to piece stories together and to pay fees for wire services 
relating foreign news.145 As a result, the Association founded an Editorial Information Service in 
April 1925, funded partly by Rockefeller himself.146 
 At first, McDonald tried to hire as his research director Raymond Leslie Buell, an 
absurdly prolific, 28-year-old Harvard specialist in colonial affairs. Buell, the prototypical foreign 
policy expert, had published one book on French politics shortly after his military service in 
Europe, another on the Washington Naval Conference two years after that, and was about to 
bring out a text book, International Relations, that would define the teaching of the subject for a 
decade and more.147 Buell, however, was preparing to set off for Africa on a Rockefeller 
fellowship, to research what would become The Native Problem in Africa, a unique and unrivalled 
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study of the effects of colonialism on the colonized, running to 2,146 pages.148 With Buell 
unavailable, McDonald persuaded the Columbia historian Edward Mead Earle, who had been 
elected to the executive committee with the lawyer James T. Shotwell a few months earlier, to 
take the post part-time.149 Not as productive as Buell despite his two extra years, Earle practiced 
the activist, present-minded “New History” that he had learned from Charles Beard and James 
Harvey Robinson as an undergraduate in Morningside Heights.150 And while Earle is primarily 
remembered for his work as a theorist of “national security” and a forefather of security studies, 
his more lasting contribution may well have come earlier than World War II, when he developed 
a form of research that promised to enrich public discussion of foreign policy with a common 
currency of facts mined from international quarries.151 
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  Starting in October 1925, the Information Service claimed to offer “essential facts on 
international questions.”152  It depended on harvesting the fruits of the new diplomacy, using 
government documents, treaties, and especially the publications of the League of Nations. 
Offering basic introductions with a minimum of commentary and a maximum of quotations 
from primary sources, the unsigned, mimeographed reports initially ran to eight or twelve page, 
often including timelines, maps, bibliographies, and excerpts from treaties, a format that Earle 
and McDonald developed in consultation with the Rockefeller publicity man Ivy Lee and 
journalists including Walter Lippmann.153 The research staff, hired full-time and writing in the 
Bulletin as well as for the Service, selected and problematized particular aspects of foreign affairs, 
only some of which had obvious relevance to U.S. foreign policy. The first numbers covered 
“The Locarno Security Conference,” “The Chinese Tariff Conference,” “The Turco-Iraq 
Boundary Dispute,” “British Interests in Mesopotamia,” and “The French Mandate in Syria”; the 
second volume included “Open Diplomacy and American Foreign Relations,” “American Oil 
Interests in Mesopotamia” and “The International Credit Position of the United States,” but also 
“Colonial vs. Mandate Administration,” “The International Problem of Tangier,” and “Recent 
Legislation in Italy.” By April 1927, every daily newspaper editor in the country with a 
circulation of 10,000 or more was receiving a report, fortnightly and free, reaching a potentially 
but immeasurably vast audience. State Department press officers took personal responsibility for 
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distributing copies among Washington correspondents.154 And the publications were used. Earle 
watched in amazement as newspapers reprinted reports in their entirety, or used isolated facts 
that could only have come from reading them closely.155 Dropping in on newspaper offices on his 
tours around the country, Rich saw that editors were keeping indexes to the Service on their 
desks for “constant reference.”156  
 Why the attraction? One cause was the common, if usually anecdotal belief that there 
was a shortage of easily accessible information on international politics, the belief that “facts are 
our scarcest raw material” as the industrialist and diplomat Owen D. Young, a member of the 
Association’s national council, put it in a speech at Johns Hopkins in 1925. With wire services 
expensive, foreign correspondents rare, and no real discipline of international relations in 
academia, one could appreciate the need for facts even if one did not take the internationalist 
position, as Young did, that war could be cured by the application of scientific knowledge, as if it 
were “plague” or “yellow fever.157 Even the Chicago Tribune felt the need to subscribe to the 
Service.158 Indeed, the deeper cause of the Service’s immediate success was that it managed to 
perform objectivity to the extent that it transcended political divisions. “It seems but fair to state 
that the interest of these different groups could only have been secured on the basis of an 
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objective and well grounded program,” a staffer at the Commonwealth Fund surmised.159 
McDonald’s suspicion that promoting foreign policy after Wilson’s death required “not special 
pleading, but clear and simple fact statements,” in other words, was borne out.160 Propaganda had 
become a dirty word not only in democratic theory but in democratic life, despite the labors of 
Ivy Lee, Edward Bernays, and Harold Lasswell to secure its reputation.161 “My chief impression 
from the trip is that this country is utterly weary of propaganda,” wrote Rich after covering 
13,000 miles of railroad in fifteen weeks at the end of 1926, before he quit to become president 
of the World Peace Foundation.162 Charles P. Howland, a former State Department official who 
had run the League’s Greek Refugee Settlement Commission, similarly advised his fellow board 
members that “the general public has immunized itself to that form of exhortation which is 
known as propaganda.” But if “crusading” would be counterproductive, “fact-finding and fact-
presenting” would be “accepted at its face.”163 
 
159 The Commonwealth Fund at this point actually declined to give a grant to the Association on the assumption 
that its non-partisan, objective character would mean that it would be able to find ample funding privately. See 
“Foreign Policy Association,” October 10, 1926, Commonwealth Fund Records, Rockefeller Archives Center, SG 
1, Series 18, Box 110. 
160 McDonald to Buell, February 7, 1925, Buell Papers, Box 41. 
161 In Chicago, Harold Lasswell urged the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations to ape the Association’s program, 
but got nowhere. See “Executive Committee Meeting,” February 5, 1926, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 
Records, Special Collections, University of Illinois at Chicago [CCFR], Box 8. 
162 “Report of the Field Secretary, Raymond T. Rich, to the Executive Board,” January 5, 1927, FPA, Part II, Box 
15. Rich pushed the Foundation in the same, “objective” direction; McDonald, incidentally, had previously turned 
the Foundation down. See “Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Board,” May 28, 1925, FPA, Part II, Box 15. 
163 Charles P. Howland to McDonald, March 11, 1927, FPA, Part II, Box 9. 
  
69 
 Did this mean that the Association had set aside its most immediate goals? Some of its 
founders feared as much. McDonald noted in his diary that Carrie Chapman Catt told him one 
night after dinner that there was a “danger of organizations going in for search after truth as an 
easier way out than to fight for any given cause.”164 Norman Angell, lunching at the Harvard 
Club, granted that the Service “developed a more informed public opinion,” but asked if it was 
“not possible that unless that opinion has some sound philosophy of international relations, it 
may remain as much an isolationist opinion as at present, only more able to defend that 
 
164 “May 14, 1926,” McDonald Diaries, Box 1. 
Figure 1. James G. McDonald (l), Sir Alfred Zimmern, and Raymond Leslie Buell (r), in the lobby of 
the Hotel Astor, December 10, 1938. Source: FPA, Part II, Box 287. 
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attitude?”165 Paul Kellogg, meanwhile, challenged the board to use the supposed objectivity of its 
research as a platform to take distinct, strong positions on foreign policy, a stance that the rest of 
the directors feared would ruin the reputation that Earle’s department had quickly earned.166 
McDonald agreed with Kellogg, but told the board that “much of the recent growth of the 
Association, both in membership and in resources, has been either avowedly or tacitly on the 
assumption that the F.P.A. does not take stands,” which set it aside from the “dozens of national 
organizations actively engaged in expressing opinions on foreign affairs.”167  
Moreover, objectivity did not entail abjuring internationalism. Promotional literature sent 
out in the fall of 1926 declared, under quotations of Elihu Root and Owen D. Young, that the 
Association was trying “to promote public discussion of our foreign relations” on the basis of 
“information, not prejudice or propaganda,” which would inherently “make more Americans see 
our stake in international affairs.” Objective facts would bring home that “the interests of one 
nation are, for good or ill, bound up in the interests of all,” and that “talk of isolation is academic 
and unreal.”168 Christina Merriman, the disarmament activist and photographer who served in 
the pivotal role of secretary, told the rank and file at the annual meeting in 1927 that “the F.P.A. 
is not a propaganda organization, but if the result of less bias and more intelligence in public 
opinion is to make for a more livable world, we shall not be displeased.”169 A year later, 
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McDonald told one critical member that it was incorrect to think that objectivity was a “neutral” 
space “between right and wrong.” “Our suggestion,” McDonald insisted, “is that the facts in a 
controversy are important, and usually right has less to fear from them than wrong.”170 
If there was philosophical tension involved in the turn to objective education, that tension 
only heightened when McDonald finally got his man.171 A year and a half after Buell had 
regretfully told McDonald that he was off to Africa, he sailed back to New York on the 
Mauretania, and took lunch at the Harvard Club. “I think he can be counted upon to cooperate 
with us,” McDonald reported.172 A few months later, Buell quit Cambridge, yearning for 
something more active than life by the Charles.173 Neither the Government department nor A. 
Lawrence Lowell, the president of Harvard and an active member of the Boston branch, held 
their superstar back. “I have great respect for what they are doing, and they need a man with your 
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fullness of knowledge of what is going on in the world today,” Lowell told Buell.174 A quick 
intellect and a quicker writer, Buell was already one of the most prominent, enterprising, and 
controversial scholars of international politics in the United States, and he continued lecturing as 
a visiting professor at Harvard, Princeton, Yale, and elsewhere after his appointment in New 
York. But the Association gave him the platform to become even more so. A stubborn, 
relentlessly idealistic, but far from naïve Wilsonian, nobody more than Buell better symbolized 
the promise, and the frustrations, of that interwar creation, the international relations expert.175 
As a scholar, Buell cultivated the exact sort of detachment that his new employers prized. 
Quincy Wright, for instance, praised his African tome as a “model of objectivity,” yet one which 
nonetheless left no doubt as to the implications of its analysis.176 But Buell immediately strained 
at the tight leash on which he was kept in New York. Deeply read in the philosophy of history, 
he took a more relativist approach and insisted that his researchers ought to be able freely to state 
their conclusions, at least in the Bulletin that was sent to members, if not in the authoritative 
Service, which was renamed the Foreign Policy Reports at the behest of the Post Office in January 
1931.177 “Perhaps F.P.A. propaganda methods have been responsible for the fiction that facts 
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exist without interpretation,” Buell complained in February 1930,” but “in my opinion there can 
be no sound understanding of facts without interpretation.”178  
A year later, Buell cast fundamental doubt on the evolving raison d’être of the Association 
at the annual meeting of members. In a speech entitled “What is Research?” Buell applauded the 
fervor of a “new faith,” whose “votaries” believed that the “social good which research in the 
physical sciences has produced” could be applied to human society, to “diagnose its ills and 
prescribe remedies.” For that purpose, new means and subjects of research were “consuming 
thousands of dollars of capital and the undivided attention of hundreds of personalities.” None of 
this university work, Buell immodestly but quite reasonably thought, compared to that of the 
Association, and it was precisely because of that quality that he resented being tied to the stake of 
objectivity. Deploring the “Fact Cult” that led to letters arriving at the office “criticizing the 
writer as being ‘partisan,’ ‘propagandist’ or lacking in ‘objectivity’,” Buell declared himself a 
“heretic.” Facts, he insisted, did not speak for themselves. One needed to make a judgment to 
select them, and to make a judgment one needed “a sense of values.” Buell confessed that his 
staff “put our own interpretations in the mouths of others,” with weaselly phrases like “’it is 
contended by certain observers’,” but insisted that they did it on the road to salvation. “We seek,” 
he said, “to discover the nature of those barriers which seem to prevent international 
relationships from moving in the direction which seems to us to be right,” in the hope that “the 
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world may gradually discard the harrowed, cynically hopeless exterior in which it now lives and 
bit by bit take on the garments of Utopia.” 
For his blasphemy, Buell was publicly upbraided by the board member Eustace Seligman, 
a law partner of John Foster Dulles’s at Sullivan, Cromwell, and son of the Columbia economist 
E. R. A. Seligman, who was a direct influence on Charles Beard. Buell embraced Beard’s 
relativism; Eustace, however, was an objectivist. To abandon objectivity, Seligman sputtered, 
would be a reputational risk. And, for that matter, wasn’t “Mr. Buell being a little selfish?” Was 
it not better, in the long run, to state both sides of a problem, in good old pragmatist fashion, 
and let readers come to their own conclusions? Was the expert’s duty not to the public, rather 
than to policy?179 A gregarious host reared on academic intercourse, Seligman relished the play of 
intellects, like others at the cream of the membership. “The special studies are done with clarity, 
fairness and thoroughness so that each time I read one,” wrote Newton D. Baker, Wilson’s 
secretary of war, “I have the sensation of having read widely on the subject and made up my own 
mind on it.”180 Trained as a lecturer and prone to didacticism, Buell was not so sure as these most 
elite of his members that points could be left unmade.  
If Buell relented for the time being, he nonetheless made sure that the Reports made their 
way into the hands of those who were in a position to apply the knowledge that they contained. 
While trying to bring the Reports to a circulation that approached the higher, if more scattered, 
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readership of Foreign Affairs, Buell tweaked their intended audience, hoping to reach four main 
classes of people. The first was members of the Association, but only about a tenth of the 
membership ever paid the few dollars extra necessary to subscribe to the Reports. (If anything the 
bulk of the membership sought material simpler to read even than the Bulletin, let alone the 
scholarly, 10,000-15,000 word monographs that the Reports became under Buell.) The second 
was the traditional newspaper clientele, which Buell expanded to include reporters and foreign 
correspondents on the belief that editorial pages had little influence over public opinion.181 The 
third was his colleagues in universities, who increasingly depended on the Reports as material for 
their lectures and as set reading in history, government, and international relations courses.182 
And to these three Buell added a fourth class, “key men,” or “men of affairs” who had 
demonstrable influence in foreign policy. By 1932, the nearly 5,000 or so Reports being sent out a 
fortnight were being written to meet “the most exacting requirements of the scholar, the 
international lawyer, the educator, the administrative official, and the statesman,” the 
Association told the Rockefeller Foundation, so much so that “we envisage the possibility of 
becoming an unofficial civil service, performing for the organs and leaders of public opinion the 
same type of work that a civil service performs for cabinet ministers in power.”183 The staff’s 
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reports to their donors, and to their board, were soon replete with details about senators reading 
Reports in congressional hearings, about experts who asked for Reports before and even during 
diplomatic negotiations, and about statesmen from around the world who wrote in thanks that 
their problems and perspectives had been brought to an American, indeed an international 
readership. And if actors on both sides of an issue praised a piece of writing, that was so much 
the better to prove the objectivity and authority of the work.184 
Supplying such “leaders of opinion” with timely, accurate information, which would then 
trickle down to a broader, reading public, dictated the shape of the research staff that Buell put 
together. Buell paid much more attention than Earle had to the kinds of information that his 
researchers used in their syntheses. He insisted that a library be built up, and the way that the 
librarian, Ona Ringwood, compiled and catalogued information was crucial for the speed with 
which she and the researchers could respond to outside inquiries and piece together articles on a 
deadline. The Association subscribed to dozens of newspapers and magazines, and as the major 
European, African, Asian, and South American dailies arrived in the office they were read, 
clipped, and classified by the researchers. They received every major book and pamphlet 
published on international politics, and wrote capsule reviews of many of them for Bulletin or, 
increasingly, outside publications such as the New Republic, the Nation, and the New York 
Times.185 If the scale of that fact-finding apparatus was unique, so too was its collective access to 
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policymakers. The researchers travelled relentlessly, particularly during the summers, and they 
were able to acquire interviews with whomever they asked. While they drew authority from 
reporting back publicly on their experiences, whether in print or at meetings, this travel was also 
essential to building the contacts and insights that were valued parts of their research 
background. “As a result,” the Association told the Rockefeller Foundation, “the Reports reflect 
an understanding of the questions dealt with which could not be obtained by mere documentary 
work within a library.”186 And as international knowledge-creation networks gathered complexity 
and range, the task became less one of pushing information into the public sphere, and more one 
of making sense of the overwhelming amount of information that circulated by other means. 
Making the Association more immediately useful also required forcing it to conform 
more to prevailing social structures. Buell has acquired an historiographical reputation for being 
unusually solicitous and supportive of scholars of color, but he was not much more radical in this 
than other progressives at the Association, and certainly he never dreamed of appointing Alain 
Locke or Ralph Bunche as one of his researchers.187 A more immediate question was gender. 
Historiographically, the assumption holds that the interwar “ancestors” of international relations 
who took part in “funding committees, memorials, journals, summer institutes, research centers, 
conferences, and professional associations” were — and Robert Vitalis writes that he uses “this 
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identifier intentionally” — men.188 But even if we continue, wrongly, to write specifically female 
institutions and female scholarship out of disciplinary and other histories, this is still inaccurate, 
erasing the contingency of gender politics and underplaying the extent to which structures were 
increasingly, deliberately gendered after the first decade of the postwar period.189  
One way to show this, as we have already seen, is to look at the work involved in building 
interwar institutions that has usually been seen as less prestigious. Contemporaries did so. In 
1931, Marjorie Schuler of the Christian Science Monitor ran an article drawing attention to the 
“women workers” of the Association, specifically noting how it opened up “interesting 
professions” for, among others, the librarian Ona Ringwood, the cartographer Elizabeth 
Batterham, the assistant treasurer Carolyn Martin, and the secretary Esther Ogden, who had 
taken over from Christina Merriman. But “because the field of international politics has been 
slow to receive women,” what was “especially interesting” to Schuler was that four of its nine 
researchers were women.190 
This already represented a regression from the legacy left to Buell by Earle. Earle’s first 
hires were mostly women, all of them talented, multi-lingual scholars. His first was Elizabeth 
MacCallum, a Canadian specialist on the Near East who had trained under Carlton Hayes, the 
Columbia historian and executive board member who had also trained Earle. His second was 
Ruth Bache-Wiig, a researcher at the Paris Peace Conference and former member of the League 
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of Nations secretariat who had become assistant to Manley Hudson.191 His third was Mildred 
Wertheimer, a remarkable scholar who had studied at Vassar and the University of Berlin, had 
worked for Colonel House’s Inquiry, and volunteered for the Association while she finished her 
doctoral dissertation at Columbia.192 Promoted to the staff, she became one of the world’s 
foremost experts on Germany, warning of its rearmament and its threat until her tragically early 
death in 1937.193 Buell’s first hire was Vera Micheles, a young Russianist who had grown up in 
St. Petersburg and was finishing her doctorate at Radcliffe College.194 William T. Stone, a 
former freelance journalist, was credited as an editor, and one or two male researchers came and 
went, but as late as the spring of 1929 only one permanent member of the research staff, Buell 
aside, was a man.195 
With leading figures in the women’s movement so prominent on the Association’s board, 
perhaps this was no surprise, but the board members had no real influence on hiring decisions. 
And the role of women researchers at the Association, though it undoubtedly gave a lucky few 
exceptional access to the foreign policy world, was in fact the by-product of structural inequality. 
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Shut off from the academy, these women took refuge in McDonald’s Midtown office. Although 
they could write in the Bulletin, their major work in the Reports was unsigned until March 1929; 
the first signed Report was a Wertheimer analysis of the evacuation of the Rhineland.196 They 
had to quit if their husbands demanded it, as Bache-Wiig’s did.197 (Micheles’ did not.) There was 
little competition for them in a new, risky, and impoverished field, so they came cheap. Micheles 
was hired at the princely wage of $200 per month; even MacCallum and Wertheimer, after three 
or four years of service, were paid about $3,000 a year. Their rather less talented male colleagues 
earned $4,000-5,000, and Buell far more.198 But while the women received the compensation of 
“contacts,” McDonald told Rockefeller when asking for a three-year grant in 1929, “first-rate” 
scholars, people like Herbert Feis or Jacob Viner or Stanley Hornbeck, would want real salaries, 
and a sense of tenure.199 Buell rated Wertheimer and Micheles as two of the best scholars 
around, but he still sought academic excellence and policy relevance, which he defined in 
differently gendered terms.200 He plugged the Association into the (largely) male networks of 
applied research being promoted by foundations. Five of the six researchers who he had hired by 
1932 were men.201 Buell was delighted that he was “in a position to attract the best graduates of 
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our leading universities to our staff”; after Micheles, he never hired another woman to a 
permanent post on the research staff.202  
All this helped Buell to push the Association closer to power. “If I had my way about it, 
we would move the Research Department of the F.P.A. to Washington,” he wrote almost as 
soon as he arrived in New York.203 He settled for an office in the capital, opened in 1928 and run 
by Stone. This had two functions. One was to secure fuller distribution of the Reports, which 
Stone achieved by renting an office in the National Press Building and handing them out to 
Washington and foreign correspondents, supplementing them with press releases. The more 
important thing, from Buell’s perspective, was Stone’s remarkable ability to link the research 
department to policymakers, at a time when the foreign policy research facilities of the executive 
and legislative bureaucracies were insignificant. Senators used Stone’s services regularly, calling 
on his office to supply factual data, briefs on specific issues, and, eventually, assistance on 
particular bills.204 Secretary Kellogg told McDonald late in 1927 that his officers would “be glad 
to receive such added material as you may care to furnish, for the purpose of corroborating or 
supplementing information derived from official sources here and abroad.205 That alliance only 
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strengthened after the Association board member Joseph P. Cotton was appointed Henry 
Stimson’s undersecretary of state in 1929.206  
Lacking real research or information facilities of their own, many State Department 
officers kept copies of the Reports on file. Many, including those who were members of the 
Association, expressed their appreciation by acting, or having their staff act, as peer reviewers. It 
became departmental business to read draft Reports, and to line edit them with the ritual 
disclaimer that such edits were, of course, unofficial. Sending three pages of “factual” edits on a 
draft Report on China, for instance, one desk officer reminded a researcher that he had “not 
offered suggestions in regard to matters of opinion,” and that the comments ought to be 
regarded as “strictly confidential.”207 Stanley Hornbeck, the director of the Division of Far 
Eastern Affairs, regularly leaked information to his friend Buell, and an African specialist told 
another researcher that he never hesitated to give Stone “confidential information, knowing that 
he will never abuse our confidence.”208 Washington instructed its embassies to assist the 
researchers when they were traveling, reminding foreign service officers that it was “making a real 
contribution” toward “the development of an enlightened public opinion.”209 In return, the 
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Association not only made sure that the State Department’s views were accurately represented in 
print, but it made every effort to support the department in Washington.210 
Still, for all Buell’s energy, his enterprise, and his expertise, for all his breathless 
exhortation that such intelligence as his must be applied to politics to save the cause of peace, he 
was never quite comfortable around power. He found it hard to raise money; he found it hard to 
ingratiate himself; he found it hard to get himself heard at the highest levels. He tried and failed 
to influence Roosevelt in 1932 and in 1936; he fell over himself to get close to his tariff-busting 
hero, Cordell Hull, whom he presented late in 1934 with a theoretically clear but politically 
impossible plan to “bring the world out of chaos” through “courageous statesmanship” that 
would lead to the United States joining the League, with Germany and Japan in tow.211 
Annotating his papers thirty years later, even Buell’s wife found his “‘buttering up’ approach” 
unfortunate.212 Conceiving of politics as a matter of intelligence, of information properly applied, 
it was telling that he constantly returned to the safety of the lecture hall. A friend wrote that 
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Buell “lives in a world of documents;” he was, as one board member said, “a quite different type 
of man” to the dashing, charismatic McDonald.213 And McDonald succeeded where Buell failed. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Like so many other American internationalists, McDonald spent his summers in Europe, taking 
stock of the diplomatic scene and, often enough, heading to Geneva for the League of Nations 
Assembly. As the depression dimmed the prospects of cooperation, he spent more and more 
time in Germany, where the darkness was closing in. Protected by a press card and armed with a 
relationship with the Nazi foreign press chief Ernst Hanfstaengl, he did the rounds in Berlin in 
the summer of 1932. For the first time he understood the gravity of the Nazis’ anti-Semitism; for 
the first time he saw Hitler speak. “His reception was the most extraordinary I have ever seen 
given a public man,” McDonald noted; it was an experience that had “given me a new picture of 
him and his movement.” One of the banners read “Deutschland Erwacht”; “Germany arise.”214 
 Adolf Hitler gained power; so did Franklin Roosevelt. A few weeks before the election, 
McDonald drove up from Manhattan to Hyde Park, and came away unimpressed with Eleanor’s 
husband’s lack of interest in making foreign affairs an election issue. But his friends sensed an 
opportunity. His dream was to be the first U.S. ambassador to the League of Nations, but that 
was out of the question; another embassy would be too expensive for a family of only reasonable 
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means to take up, given the social costs. Henry Morgenthau, Sr., wondered whether he had 
thought about the State Department. “I said that, of course, the undersecretaryship would be 
excellent,” McDonald replied. But as the threat to German Jews grew, Germany called again. 
McDonald crossed the Atlantic on the spur of the moment in March, just as the Reichstag 
passed the Enabling Act. “This is a revolution in full speed,” he reported back to New York, “but 
I would not miss it for the world.” He met Hitler on April 8, and was subjected to a rant on the 
Jews. “No, the world has no just ground for complaint,” Hitler said. “Germany is not fighting 
merely the battle of Germany. It is fighting the battle of the world.” On McDonald’s way out of 
the Führer’s office, Hanfstaengl suggested that he put himself forward as the U.S. ambassador. 
“Your friend Mr. Rockefeller could arrange the finances,” the Nazi advised.215 
 Back in New York, Morgenthau actually liked that idea, as did Colonel House. Indeed, 
most of those on whom McDonald called in his relentless social schedule did. An invitation to 
the White House followed, where McDonald discussed the ambassadorship with the president 
for so long that he had to stay the night in the Lincoln Bedroom. Stone mounted a quiet 
campaign in Washington on McDonald’s behalf, but the post went to William Dodd. Still, 
having been horrified at what he had seen, and spending much of his time among the German, 
Jewish bankers he had befriended, McDonald felt it his duty to do what he could. Working with 
Wertheimer and others, he mounted a campaign for the League to take up the question of 
refugees from Germany. Another visit followed to Germany, where he and his wife, Ruth, 
visited the concentration camp at Dachau, and witnessed a rally at Nuremberg. They proceeded 
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to Geneva, where his lobbying helped to secure the creation of a High Commission. McDonald 
did not particularly want the post for himself, but by the end of October, the League Secretariat, 
ever anxious to secure American participation, had appointed him anyway. It was a weak position 
McDonald knew, but he had to take it.216 His failure was inevitable, yet tinged with valor; he 
resigned two years later, angry about inaction in the face of “impending tragedies.”217 After the 
war he feared would rage, he would become the first U.S. ambassador to Israel.218 
 Buell looked on. Unhappy that McDonald had spent a year “looking for new worlds to 
conquer,” he was also aware that his own attempts to find practical employment had failed.219 
Stone had quietly tried to have him appointed to positions in which he could use his academic 
expertise and his impulse against imperialism, whether that be as minister to Haiti, or a post for 
the League in Liberia, where Buell was a celebrity on account of his revelations about the use of 
slave labor.220 Instead, he took over from McDonald, and, in the name of “self-respect,” stripped 
his predecessor from the board position that the Association’s old guard had hoped to provide.221 
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 The Association of which Buell became president in October 1933 was in crisis. It was 
sufficiently valued among its wealthy supporters that the depression had taken time to weaken its 
operations, despite the protests of its finance chair, the banker Arthur Sachs, that it was a “luxury 
charity” and could not expect to survive.222 Only a year and a half after the stock market crash did 
the membership start to show a “disquieting” decline; before that, the budget actually grew to 
nearly $200,000, the membership to 12,500.223 “It has without doubt become the most important 
educational force in this country in the field of international affairs,” Rockefeller’s advisors wrote 
in June 1932, and, “comparatively speaking, curtailment of its income has been very slight.”224 
But even Rockefeller had to cut back on his personal contributions that year, part of a pattern 
that saw total donations drop by a third.225 By the start of 1934, the board was contemplating 
raising only half as much money as in 1930.226 Attendances and enthusiasm suffered in the 
branches; the membership dropped beneath 10,000; neither recovered until 1936.227 
 Foundations stepped into the breach. The Association had used foundation funding 
before, but the depression made it fundamentally and permanently dependent on that funding, 
and on the policies that lay behind it. Under the sympathetic leadership of Raymond Blaine 
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Fosdick, the Rockefeller Foundation was, for the time being, by far the most important of these. 
It started making an annual contribution to the research department of $25,000 in 1933, and in 
1935 accepted that “substantial support from the Foundation, now and for some years to come, 
seems essential.”228 If the Rockefeller Foundation was largely content to leave the Association 
alone, their philosophies broadly in sync, other philanthropies were not. By the force of Nicholas 
Murray Butler’s personality, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace insisted that in 
exchange for its dollars, the Association would have to take the lead in restructuring the entire 
foreign affairs infrastructure, and explore how the big six organizations — the Association, the 
Institute of International Education, the Institute of Pacific Relations, the World Peace 
Foundation, the League of Nations Association, and the Woodrow Wilson Foundation — could 
cooperate.229 If the Association was by far the most imposing of these groups by budget, staff, 
and reputation, it was also by now the one most distant from the formal peace movement. 
Although it moved into the offices these groups started to share at 8 West 40th Street, thereby 
saving on rent and library costs, it found it could only really cooperate with the World Peace 
Foundation, which under Rich’s direction had become little more than a sales agent for League 
of Nations publications. Even that collaboration was brief.230 
 What the alliance with the World Peace Foundation encouraged, however, was Buell’s 
desire to make a more explicit contribution to policy. In his personal capacity, he launched wave 
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after wave of attacks on neutrality policy, lambasting “isolationism” before it became a blood 
sport.231 Organizationally, too, Buell sought greater political commitment. “We should frankly 
realize,” he wrote in a proposed plan of action in March 1933, “that although during the last ten 
years research in facts has been of primary importance, the future will depend upon how facts are 
interpreted and policies defined.” “In short,” Buell said, “hard thinking has become more 
important than factual data.”232 With the World Peace Foundation, he sponsored a series of joint 
policy committees, on which carefully selected, male citizens made recommendations, such as on 
the eventual need for Filipino independence.233 He accepted an invitation from President 
Mendieta to “make a survey of conditions in Cuba,” putting together a mostly-academic, 
Rockefeller-funded commission that notably included only one woman, which would have been 
impossible a decade earlier.234 Its 500-page report was nicely written up in the press, but made 
little real impact.235 With the World Student Christian Federation chairman Francis Pickens 
Miller, who briefly served as the Association’s field director, Buell sought to create a network of 
hundreds of “policy groups” across the country, which would gather together leading citizens to 
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study issues, foreign and domestic, and submit ideas to the government.236 Painfully conscious of 
the interrelationship between foreign and domestic politics, Buell even proposed to convert the 
Foreign Policy Association into a Public Policy Association, one as comfortable debating the 
National Recovery Administration as the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.237 All this irritated 
the staff, but the board let that last project run as far as a conference of Southern notables in 
Atlanta in the spring of 1935. It correctly feared, however, that its purposes were being 
subverted, and forced Buell to form an independent National Policy Committee, which took up 
ever more of his time.238 
While Buell tolerated the impulse of others at the Association to educate more of the 
public, his own, exhausting initiatives betrayed the steady shrinkage of what he thought a viable, 
real public might be. At a conference of branch representatives in September 1934, Buell was 
warned by one Midwestern chairman that he had “great difficulty in imagining just what sort of 
people will be included” in the “policy groups.” Miller, with Buell’s approval, responded that 
perhaps “a dozen or two” of even a branch’s membership would “rather like to go into some 
subject a little more thoroughly and fully with men and women of other points of view than they 
can by the question method after luncheon addresses.”239 (This initiative, stripped of its pretense 
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to gender equality, found a home three years later at the Council on Foreign Relations.)240 
Despite, or even because of, their total lack of mass appeal, Buell thought that such “intellectual” 
forms of politics were a viable response to “new forms of unreasoning and unintelligent 
nationalism,” to the “demagoguery represented by Father Coughlin, Huey Long and others.”241 
Soon enough, Buell damned Roosevelt in that category, too, leaving behind his early interest in 
the New Deal to vote for Alf Landon, to work for Wendell Willkie, and, in 1942, to mount a 
laughable challenge against a fifteen-term incumbent in the Republican primary in the first 
congressional district of Massachusetts. (“A Man of Vision, Knowledge and Action,” his leaflet 
read.)242 Like many of his fellow Wilsonians, then, Buell posed the challenges of the depression 
decade as a question of expertise versus stupidity, not of interests and power. What was needed, 
he wrote in 1935, was not a “preconceived political program,” but a “coordinated intellectual 
process.”243 Peace needed people who could “intellectualize it,” he told one correspondent in 
1937.244 Increasingly defining “people” as experts like himself, Buell took the Association into the 
International Studies Conference and explored setting up a kind of international Foreign Policy 
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Association, based at the League’s Geneva Research Center. But as international cooperation 
frayed, the time for such ventures was passing.245 
Buell eventually took refuge in the business community, and later in journalism. In 
September 1938, Fortune magazine offered him the chance to edit its Round Table feature, a 
new effort to find policy agreement among suitable representatives of business, labor, agriculture, 
academia, and so on. Cloistered in the countryside for a weekend, the leaders would hammer out 
a compromise on various questions, mostly relating to domestic politics, and then announce their 
findings in a report written, by Buell, for the wealthy, corporate-minded readers of the magazine. 
An effort to rescue capitalist democracy, Fortune’s feature reduced the public of public opinion to 
few enough men that they could sit comfortably around a single table. Buell jumped at the 
opportunity. He took a leave of absence at the end of 1938, and did not return. He spent much 
of the war in the postwar department of Time magazine, not as a writer for the public, but as an 
uninfluential to Henry Luce.246 
 At the heart of Buell’s discontent was a loss of faith in the public. Buell did not abandon 
the cause of international cooperation, much as he struggled to reconcile it with a world of power 
politics at its most brutal. His most important book came out early in 1940, based on lectures 
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given at the Fletcher School in the fall of 1939. Reviewed against Charles Beard’s A Foreign 
Policy for America in the major newspapers, Isolated America was a calm, encyclopedic indictment 
of interwar diplomacy and an insistent account of the need for American responsibility within 
the world community.247 The League had failed, Buell accepted, but that did not make it a bad 
idea. “The failure of the West to rid itself of the traditional power-politics system and to take the 
League seriously,” he wrote, explained “why it is at war again today.”248 But the new League for 
which Buell provided a template was to be a quite different proposition to the old, rooted more 
in power politics, more in the need for economic cooperation, more in the name of international 
administration and expertise than Wilson’s grand design. Buell’s hopes for public opinion were 
drastically tempered. He still sought to increase popular representation in the League, but by 
having political parties or, preferably, voluntary associations nominate responsible delegates, not 
by throwing open the halls of the Palais des Nations to the masses beyond. 
 As in Geneva, so in Washington and New York: the American public did not appear to 
deserve the hopes that progressives had vested in it. “As a result of the work of such bodies as the 
Foreign Policy Association,” Buell wrote, Americans had “a knowledge of international affairs far 
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greater than at any other time in their history, and as far as information was concerned, more 
extensive than what was available to the public in any other country.” And yet politicians had 
capitulated to “pseudo-pacifism”; the “isolationists” had proven “strong enough to prevent the 
United States from accepting an international program which might have averted the outbreak of 
war.” Perhaps, Buell wondered, there was now too much information available, rather than too 
little. The “average individual,” he wrote, “is confronted with an immense number of unrelated 
facts on the one hand and untested generalities on the other.” The times belonged to those who 
could simplify, who could wield power. And in a world of power, rather than a world of 
deliberative cooperation, democracy in diplomacy was far harder to accomplish. “While every 
effort must be made to democratize the conduct of foreign relations,” Buell wrote with an 
unusually apologetic tone, “every American friend of democracy should realize that this is 
extremely difficult so long as we live in a jungle world.”249 
Buell was not the only Wilsonian to have “lost his international mind,” as Stephen 
Wertheim has written, but as president of what may well have been the world’s leading, public-
facing foreign policy institution, his unravelling might have been particularly symbolic.250 Buell, 
after all, was not alone. As we shall see, many scholars of his temperament and outlook ended 
the decade, and especially the next one, shunning mass politics and swearing their allegiance to 
expertise. They would build different kinds of think tanks, serving a different kind of state. They 
would manage the public in different ways, developing new methods of propaganda that were 
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premised on the more skeptical view of the public at which Buell had, reluctantly arrived. But 
theirs was not the only available response, nor was it even necessarily the dominant one. Others, 
including friends of Buell’s and fellow members of the Council on Foreign Relations, reacted 
differently. They sought to bolster the progressive legacy against those who abandoned it. They 










How to Teach a City to Lead the World 
 
By the coming of the New Deal, the United States was home to an elaborate infrastructure of 
research-based, non-profit, non-partisan institutions, engaged in a loosely coordinated effort to 
create and inform the publics needed to meld democracy and foreign affairs. Most of these 
institutions, however, were based in New York City, based so close together in fact that their 
staffs could hardly avoid one another at lunch, or at the club. Outside of the area bounded by 
125th Street to the north and Wall Street to the south, the reach of the foreign policy elite was 
weak. Aside from the luncheon clubs of the Foreign Policy Association branches, only a handful 
of cities had foreign policy institutions anything like those of New York. Under the energetic 
leadership of a young lawyer named Adlai Stevenson and a salaried director called Clifton Utley, 
the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations was thriving, even if it had little desire to become 
anything more than a society forum.1 A young professor of international relations, Ben M. 
Cherrington, was doing more radical work in Denver, Colorado. The leader of the Foundation 
for the Advancement of the Social Sciences, founded in 1926, Cherrington aimed to fill the city’s 
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“vacuum of reliable information regarding the contemporary world and America’s place in it.”2 
Wielding a lucrative endowment, Cherrington linked community programs and public addresses 
with the University of Denver’s curriculum, creating a program so vital that the Christian Century 
claimed he had “made that Rocky Mountain capital world-minded to a degree which cannot be 
duplicated in scores of other cities supposedly much more nearly related to international affairs.” 
But neither Chicago nor Denver was a viable model for other communities.3 
 In Cleveland, an experiment of a different order was taking place, one that would become 
the template for a national movement after World War II. The Cleveland Foreign Affairs 
Council was an explicit attempt to root discussion of foreign affairs in community life, far more 
deeply than anything attempted in New York or elsewhere. It was the brainchild primarily of two 
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men. Neither was a peripheral figure. One was Newton Diehl Baker, a progressive Democrat 
and former Secretary of War. Committed to supporting the League of Nations even when it 
torpedoed his own political ambitions, he was Woodrow Wilson’s spiritual successor. The other 
man was a young scholar, Brooks Emeny, a Republican who trained in geopolitics at Yale, and 
was steeped in the new, scientific study of international relations. Baker was an idealist, so 
faithful to the idea that public opinion could save the world that he was willing to teach classes at 
a night school to make it so.4 Emeny wore the intellectual mantle of realism, and saw the need to 
teach Americans what one historian has called “a sense of power,” and to teach them to use it 
responsibly.5 However divergent intellectually, the two men nevertheless had a few things in 
common. Both were members of the Council on Foreign Relations. Both were offered 
ambassadorships by Cordell Hull’s State Department, and Emeny served on its Advisory 
Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy.6 Both hated the New Deal, and feared the use of the 
state to police debate. Both believed in the power of public opinion. Both believed that an active, 
informed, responsible public would have beneficial effects on American foreign policy, indeed 
that without such a public, America was a danger to the world. They did not think that public 
opinion merely legitimated policy, nor that it could be ignored. Instead, they believed in the 
 
4 “Idealism” and “realism” (let alone “Realism”) are constraining categories, but also actor’s categories. Emeny’s 
realism did not bother Baker. “I am not disturbed by anticipation of the Simonds-Emeny tome,” he in 1934. “As a 
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possibility — even the necessity — of applying progressive democracy to foreign policy. They 
were prepared to invest their time and money to make the Cleveland Council the model for 
citizen education in world affairs nationwide. 
 More than the Foreign Policy Association, the Cleveland Council took strength from a 
much broader movement for adult education, which took off in the years after the Great War. An 
afterlife of progressivism, adult education promised to create what the historian Andrew Jewett 
has called a “scientific democracy.”7 Responding to an era of quickening social change, it tried to 
build an ideal political culture in which active publics participated, in which expertise was 
responsible to the electorate, in which social science was a common possession, and in which 
facts mattered more than fictions. Discussion groups swept the nation in the 1930s; public 
forums were set up in areas urban and local for citizens to debate the issues of the day; town hall 
meetings were simulated on the radio waves. This flourishing of talk was explicitly related to the 
perilous position in which democracy found itself, menaced abroad by rival ideologies, and at 
home by economic depression. And it was a development, usually ignored, that demonstrates 
how the growth of international relations as a field, as a body of knowledge, was a fundamentally 
public process. Since the end of the Great War, a network of new institutions had created a class 
of experts on world affairs, and even students of power politics could not resist a platform to 
teach the public. Idealist or realist; either way, to teach international relations in this period was 
ordinarily to teach that the United States had an inescapable role to play in international politics, 
whatever that role might specifically be. 
 
7 Andrew Jewett, Science, Democracy, and the American University: From the Civil War to the Cold War (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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 That was certainly the case in Cleveland. Although the experts brought to Cleveland held 
markedly different conceptions of world affairs and the policies that the United States should 
follow, collectively they taught the Council’s public an ample conception of America’s role in the 
world. Americans, Emeny claimed, needed to be informed about the world not because they 
faced mortal threats, but because they possessed unrivalled, ultimate influence. American power, 
in this view, was a fact, and Americans needed to get to grips with it. War, peace, and everything 
in between, depended on the capacity of Americans to talk their way into leading the world. 
 
* * * * * 
 
No man had a firmer hold on the Wilsonian spirit than Newton Diehl Baker. Baker was a 
prototypical progressive, who moved step by step from urban to national to international politics. 
At home in Cleveland, he had served as the city solicitor from 1901 to 1909, and its mayor from 
1912 to 1915. In a city renowned as a cauldron of reform, Baker was a moderate, famous for 
taking on the streetcar monopoly, for building a municipal power plant, and even for making the 
sale of fish and ice cream the purview of city hall.8 Woodrow Wilson twice offered him the 
Department of the Interior in 1913, and twice Baker declined, but when the president sought to 
make him the Secretary of War in 1916, this avowed pacifist accepted. Overseeing conscription, 
deployment, and demobilization, Baker, his biographer notes, was Wilson’s “most visible 
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lieutenant” during the Great War.9 He was also widely seen as Wilson’s natural successor, even 
as he retreated to a comfortable life in Cleveland, earning his keep by defending corporate clients 
from litigation.  
Whispered about as a potential candidate for the presidency, Baker cared far more about 
international peace than his own political ambitions. At the Democratic convention at Madison 
Square Garden in 1924, he ruined a realistic shot at the nomination by issuing a powerful, futile 
call for the party platform to include a commitment to joining the League of Nations. Baker 
invoked Wilson with “the spirit of prophecy upon him,” the New York Times recounted. “I did 
my best,” he told the late president, whom he pictured “standing at the throne of God whose 
approval he won and has received” — “I am doing it now. You are still the captain of my soul.”10 
By 1932, when he was serving as a judge at the Permanent Court of International Justice, Baker 
was the prohibitive favorite for the nomination. But while Franklin Roosevelt was willing to 
compromise his ideals, promising William Randolph Hearst that he would renounce the League, 
Baker was not. He therefore lost.11 All in all, no serious politician so relentlessly promoted the 
League. “The time has come,” Baker wrote in Foreign Affairs in 1933, “for somebody to be ‘a fool 
in Christ’ if necessary”; he was quite prepared to volunteer.12 
On his lonely quest, Baker sought community in the web of internationalist institutions 
that his progressive allies built up after the war, just as he did in legal, consumer, religious, and 
 
9 Douglas B. Craig, Progressives at War: William G. McAdoo and Newton D. Baker, 1863-1941 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2013), p. 150. 
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labor associations. One biographer recalled that he would joke “that every time he stuck his head 
out of a door or window he became chairman of three more supposedly voluntary societies.”13 At 
one point or another, Baker was a member, supporter, or director of every major international 
relations institution, as well as a trustee of the Carnegie Corporation, which helped to oversee 
the entire operation. So wide were his connections that when, in 1933, the Corporation pressed 
the Foreign Policy Association, the Institute of Pacific Relations, the League of Nations 
Association, the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, and the World Peace Foundation to cooperate 
more formally, Baker was asked to lead the discussions as the only neutral arbiter who 
understood the positions of each.14 But Baker was interested in this infrastructure not simply 
because he hoped that they were working to support his policy goals. He was interested in them, 
too, because they were committed, to a greater or lesser degree, to “education” in international 
relations, to building the democratic public opinion that he, like Wilson, sincerely believed 
would be the salvation of a warlike world. And through Baker we can understand how citizen 
education in world affairs, even if wielded by an internationalist elite, was not (or rather, not just) 
a synonym for propaganda, or manipulation, or social control.15 Rather, it could promise much to 
those hoping to remake citizens, communities, and nations in the name of saving the world. 
 
13 C. H. Cramer, Newton D. Baker: A Biography (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1961), p. 187. 
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it as opposed to progressives like Baker, and especially as opposed to adult educators. They genuinely valued the 
means as well as the ends, and, as we shall see below considered the kind of “propaganda” that Wala invokes to be 
little better than fascism, the arguments of Harold Lasswell notwithstanding. Cf. Michael Wala, “Selling the 
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* * * * * 
 
Mobilized and unified by a search for an informed citizenry, progressives had always placed 
ultimate faith in an educated public, suitably managed, to rule the society of their dreams. 
“Education,” just like “public opinion,” meant different things to different progressives, but its 
appeal had been broad enough on the eve of the war that its role as the last, best hope of 
democracy had united progressives as diverse as Jane Addams, John Dewey, and Nicholas 
Murray Butler.16 Although some progressives soured on the potential of the citizen after the war, 
particularly the scholarly progressives on whose work intellectual historians have normally 
concentrated, faith in the power of education for the most part persisted.17 
Even Walter Lippmann, who is usually presented as the most skeptical and disillusioned 
of progressives, took time to throw off his earlier convictions. Lippmann’s first two postwar 
books, Liberty and the News and Public Opinion, both saw democracy’s “supreme remedy” in 
education. To deny the power of facts, he wrote in 1920, was to claim “that the mass of men is 
impervious to education, and to deny that, is to deny the postulate of democracy, and to seek 
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salvation in a dictatorship.”18 Only in The Phantom Public, published in 1925, did Lippmann 
commit apostasy. Now he saw “the usual appeal to education as the remedy for the incompetence 
of democracy” that ended conventional works of political theory as “barren”: the public was 
simply too ignorant, too busy, too uninterested.19 For his pessimism, Lippmann feared he would 
be “put on trial for heresy by my old friends on The New Republic.”20 In fact, having used as his 
straw man a theory so idealistic that even Dewey thought it wildly impractical, Lippmann merely 
found himself invoked as a foil by progressives who kept the faith.21 Even if observers agreed 
with Lippmann’s critiques of the public, almost none accepted his conclusions. Lippmann 
himself, of course, continued to inform the public through his writing and his public speaking. 
By the time The Phantom Public was published, the old recourse to education had been 
fleshed out. This was true not only in philosophy and political theory, but in practice. Adult 
education, an afterlife of progressivism that attempted to help citizens learn outside of formal 
schooling structures, has passed largely unnoticed by historians, including historians of American 
foreign relations, who have preferred to concentrate on how international relations became a 
subject of more formal scholarly inquiry.22 But in the 1920s and especially the 1930s adult 
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education was the most ambitious and consequential attempt at once to resolve the 
contradictions of progressivism and to improve the state of American democracy.23 Part of a wave 
of attempts to popularize social science and democratize its methods, adult education initiatives 
proliferated, from the Department of Agriculture’s creation of rural study groups, to the New 
Deal’s national forum movement, to program after program on the national radio networks.24 
And adult education found a particularly welcoming home with precisely the Wilsonian, New 
Republic liberals whom Lippmann scorned.25  
John Dewey showed the way, as he consciously built on his prewar work and responded 
to Lippmann’s critiques.26 Americans, Dewey argued, were now compelled by new developments 
in communications, travel, and trade to “live as members of an extensive and mainly unseen 
society,” a society remote from their own experience and judgment. This was breaking down the 
bonds of community, and leaving nothing so valuable in their place. Modern advertising and 
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propaganda, he thought, had used this distance to create an “era of bunk, of being systematically 
duped, of undiscriminating sentiment and belief,” a time when “hokum” was “swallowed more 
eagerly and more indiscriminately than ever before.” Faced with change of unprecedented scope 
and complexity, people simply could not comprehend their world as they needed to. The speed 
of that change meant that teaching restricted to childhood, or even to college, was insufficient to 
create an adequately educated citizenry. It was no wonder that people were indifferent to or 
prejudiced about public affairs, because public policy was focused on questions that simply could 
not be understood through the education that most Americans had received. But Dewey, unlike 
Lippmann, saw no reason to mistake democracy as it existed for democracy as it could be. 
Education would bridge the chasm between theory and reality. It would have “to cultivate the 
habit of suspended judgment, of skepticism, of desire for evidence, of appeal to observation 
rather than sentiment, discussion rather than bias, inquiry rather than conventional 
idealizations.” Crucially, it would have to do so in local communities, which, even as modernity 
weakened them, offered the only hope of recreating viable democracy. Through educated, 
communicating communities, Dewey insisted, politics would be more than just voting, or 
consent — it would become “the intelligent management of social affairs.”27 
Dewey provided the intellectual grounding for the adult education movement. He offered 
no prescriptions for how people could be educated in practice, for how they could be encouraged 
to overcome the inertia and uninterest that Lippmann had taken as read. Yet Dewey was not a 
theorist in a vacuum. He operated alongside practitioners, not least his counterparts at Columbia 
 
27 John Dewey, “Education as Politics,” The New Republic (October 4, 1922), pp. 139-141; John Dewey, The Public 
and its Problems (New York: Henry Holt, 1927), p. 215. 
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and across West 120th Street at Teachers’ College. Plenty of his followers were prepared to put 
his theory to work, most importantly a former dean of Columbia College, Frederick Keppel. 
Keppel was a disciple not only of Dewey, but of Baker, whom he had served at the War 
Department in part by overseeing a Commission on Training Camp Activities, which was 
intended to provide an education to troops while they served.28 After directing the American Red 
Cross’s efforts in Europe, Keppel had become president of the Carnegie Corporation in 1923. 
Keppel immediately made adult education a primary focus of its mission, as a means for using 
social scientific knowledge, which his grants were creating at universities and elsewhere, to solve 
public problems. If public problems could not properly be solved because education had not 
prepared people to solve them, Keppel wondered, why not teach them again? After all, adults 
were being educated in all kinds of ways, informally through the press and radio and formally in 
settlement houses, night schools, and university extension classes. American history, moreover, 
provided a long tradition of what could be called adult education movements, from the hallowed 
“town meetings” of colonial New England, to lyceums, Chautauquas, public libraries, and even 
the Americanization campaigns aimed at immigrant arrivals. But these efforts were neither 
scientifically rigorous nor, often, factually accurate.29 The Corporation therefore founded the 
 
28 Craig, Progressives at War, p. 163. One of Keppel’s programs sent promising young soldiers to study on 
scholarships at universities; one of the beneficiaries was Raymond Leslie Buell. Keppel remained an adoring disciple 
of Baker’s. For his eulogy, see Frederick P. Keppel, “Newton D. Baker,” Foreign Affairs 16 (1937), pp. 503-514. 
29 Frederick P. Keppel, Education for Adults and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1926), pp. 13-
15. Keppel, like other intellectuals, made it clear that he was consciously borrowing European models, specifically 
from Denmark and Britain. For intellectual flows from Europe to the United States, see Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic 
Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
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American Association for Adult Education (AAAE) in 1926. Led by Keppel’s former assistant, 
Morse Cartwright, it had distributed $4.85 million in grants by 1941.30 
 Under the AAAE’s guidance, adult education became a sprawling, idealistic movement, 
ranging from philosophy classes and music appreciation to needlework and childrearing 
workshops. It was defined by the leading theorist Lyman Bryson as “including all the activities 
with an educational purpose that are carried on by people engaged in the ordinary business of 
life.” Political or civic adult education was marginal within this whole, but immense hopes were 
vested in it all the same.31 Its dreams of a public voluntarily educating and improving itself were 
tempered by the difficulties that Lippmann and Dewey alike knew it faced on the ground. In 
Adult Education, for instance, Bryson accepted Lippmann’s complaint that “the complication and 
formidable quantity of public business have made it very difficult for the average man, even with 
the best intentions, to keep up with public affairs.”32 Eduard C. Lindeman, whose The Meaning 
of Adult Education made him the spiritual leader of the movement, agreed with Lippmann that 
citizens had lost “the sense of active, directive participation in affairs.” But even if a layman 
might not be able to master politics, he could experience it in a more meaningful way than the 
assent to expertise that Lippmann demanded.33 “Cynics,” said Ben Cherrington of the Social 
 
30 Amy D. Rose, “Beyond Classroom Walls: The Carnegie Corporation and the Founding of the American 
Association for Adult Education,” Adult Education Quarterly 39 (1989), pp. 140-151; Morse A. Cartwright, Ten 
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Stubblefield, “Adult Education for Civic Intelligence in the Post World War I Period,” pp. 253-257. 
31 This project was inherently exclusionary. As Cartwright recalled in 1935, “such special problems as the education 
of the Negro, of the Indian, of the mountain white were set aside, perhaps to be picked up later.” See Cartwright, 
Ten Years of Adult Education, p. 14. 
32 Lyman Bryson, Adult Education (New York: American Book Company, 1936), pp. 3-4. 
33 Eduard C. Lindeman, The Meaning of Adult Education (New York: New Republic, 1926), p. 55; Eduard C. 
Lindeman, “Adult Education: A New Means for Liberals,” New Republic 54 (February 22, 1928), pp. 26-29. 
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Science Foundation in 1934, believed that “the involved questions of modern civilization are 
beyond the competence of the common people.” Cherrington earned a doctorate from Teachers’ 
College for a study that tried to quantify how far his Denver audiences learned from certain 
pedagogical methods, and he saw enough to doubt the naysayers.34 “Many of us believe they are 
wrong,” he said,  
but we do not know. That they [people] are incapable of bringing order out of the 
present confusion if properly informed and instructed is by no means an established 
fact. At least those who believe in democracy are determined that it shall have its 
opportunity to prove its capacity.  
 
With adult education, Cherrington concluded, “it is within our power to make the machine our 
slave and to set men — not some men, but all men — free to live like gods.”35 
 Linked as adult education always was to a particular conception of democracy, its stakes 
heightened as the international landscape darkened. As adult educators came to believe that 
fascism and communism preyed on the apathy and ignorance they similarly feared at home, their 
cause became as much a defensive shield as a positive force. Adult education was “fundamental to 
the defense of our cherished ideals of democracy,” wrote John W. Studebaker, whose astonishing 
success founding public discussion forums in Des Moines, Iowa, led to him overseeing a national 
chain of government-sponsored forums as the New Deal’s Commissioner of Education. “The 
enemy of democracy is civic ignorance,” he said, which could only be overcome by “full, free, 
carefully organized, and professionally and impartially managed public discussion of national 
 
34 Ben M. Cherrington, Methods of Education in International Attitudes (New York: Teachers College, 1934). 
35 Cherrington, “The Meaning of Adult Education in America,” undated speech [1934], Cherrington Papers, Box 3; 
Ben M. Cherrington, “Fascism or Democracy?” Adult Education Bulletin 1 (1937), Cherrington Papers, Box 15. 
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affairs.”36 Others recast the fate of democracy as fundamentally a matter of education. “If we 
continue to attempt to manage an adult, ever-changing civilization with the static education of 
adolescence, America will probably soon follow Europe into the tyranny of either Fascism or 
Communism,” wrote Baker’s friend A. Caswell Ellis in 1935. “It seems,” he concluded, “to be 
truly a race between adult education and disaster, and disaster seems just now to have the lead.”37 
Adult education offered a way to guarantee democracy because it promised not only to 
inoculate the public against propaganda, but to mobilize that public with scientific knowledge.38 
But was there a clear line between education and propaganda? If the basic assumption of the 
researchers producing knowledge at, say, the Foreign Policy Association, was that teaching 
people studying international relations would inevitably turn them from isolation, where, at the 
end of the day, was the dividing line? This problem was debated but never resolved. “We shall 
doubtless never succeed in unmixing education and propaganda,” Cartwright wrote in 1935, not 
least, he presciently warned, because “commonly the consumer of education is alike a willing 
consumer of propaganda — of kinds with which he happens to agree.”39 But adult educators did 
try. What counted, Lindeman wrote, was making sure that education lay in “arriving, not 
 
36 John W. Studebaker and Chester S. Williams, Education for Democracy: Public Affairs Forums (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1935), foreword. On forums, see Robert Kunzman and David Tyack, “Educational 
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Times (April 11, 1937). Most adult educators believed that the processes of adult education should be kept free of 
government control, precisely because that control had uncomfortable overtones of fascist education projects. But 
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David Riesman, “Government Education for Democracy,” Public Opinion Quarterly 5 (1941), pp. 195-209. 
37 A. Caswell Ellis to General Education Board, undated [1935], Baker Papers, Box 67. 
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concluding.”40 The process was to be slow, imperfect, diffuse, and leave room for dissent. To 
Cherrington, adult education’s voluntary quality, its focus on the individual, and its celebration 
of critical thinking distinguished “democratic” adult education from its “authoritarian” 
competitors in Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and the Soviet Union.41 Cartwright hoped that 
educators could at least teach methods, could inculcate the idea that democratic citizens should 
understand all sides of every question, should take in a diversity of information.42 What, then, 
would prevent students choosing inadvisable answers? “If we believe in democracy,” Studebaker 
wrote in Plain Talk,  
we believe that truth is the answer to error, that right triumphs eventually in a free 
market of thoroughgoing discussion and study. It seems to me that we should have 
faith in the belief that students who are taught how to think clearly and weigh all 
evidence are more likely to make good citizens, competent to express intelligent 
choices, than people who are told what to think. It seems to me they are more likely 
to choose what is ‘right.’43 
 
As such, even political adult education was not supposed to entail an uncontested conversion to a 
particular political view. Even if educators were ultimately propagandizing for democracy, the 
back and forth of process really did matter. Discussion was not a pretense, but a process.  
 
40 Lindeman, Meaning of Adult Education, pp. 77, 157, 191. 
41 “Authoritarian adult education,” Cherrington wrote in 1939, “seeks to inculcate unquestioning obedience to the 
policy and authority of the government,” but “democratic adult education supports a qualified acceptance of the 
policy and authority of government on the ground that it is temporary and always subject to revision.” See Ben M. 
Cherrington, “Democratic versus Authoritarian Adult Education,” Journal of Adult Education 6 (1939), pp. 242-245. 
42 Cartwright, Ten Years of Adult Education, pp. 54-56. 
43 John W. Studebaker, Plain Talk (Washington: National Home Library Foundation, 1936), pp. 147, 160. 
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For Dewey, because the process mattered, the nurturing of democratic publics required 
“the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion.”44 
Following his cue, adult educators spent an enormous amount of time trying to perfect the art of 
discussion. They surveyed how particular topics were best served by different methods of 
discussion, whether by lectures, by institutes, or by open forums.45 They designed new means of 
group education, such as the panel discussion, which was invented in 1932. Pride of place went 
to the discussion group, a small gathering in which, theoretically at least, everyone would speak 
and everyone would be heard. In that setting, the designated discussion leader was vital; 
educators theorized his role down to the last detail.46 Pamphlets and books advised the discussion 
leader on everything from the comfort of the participants’ chairs to the temperature of the room. 
The discussion leader was to bring sufficient factual material to the group, while remaining 
neutral. Leaders were implored not to talk too much, not to take sides, not to allow anybody to 
dominate the discussion, and not to be afraid of challenging prejudice.47 Their role was to help 
participants think about issues in the context of their own views and lives. Their duty, Lindeman 
wrote, was “not to profess but to evoke.”48  
 
44 Dewey, The Public and its Problems, p. 142. 
45Alfred Dwight Sheffield, Training for Group Experience (New York: The Inquiry, 1929); Thomas Fansler, 
Discussion Methods for Adult Groups: Case Studies of the Forum, the Discussion Group, and the Panel (New York: 
American Association for Adult Education, 1934); Mary L. Ely, Why Forums? (New York: American Association 
for Adult Education, 1937). 
46 The word “his” is used advisedly, because educators tended to forget their debt to the women’s movement, which 
pioneered much of this work, if with less explicit academic accoutrements. Cf. Dorothy Canfield Fisher, Why Stop 
Learning? (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1927); Bryson, Adult Education, pp. 19-20. 
47 Alfred Dwight Sheffield, Creative Discussion (New York: Association Press, 1927), pp. 31-46. 
48 Lindeman, Meaning of Adult Education, pp. 188-189. 
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 Given that discussion leaders were sometimes subject experts, and occasionally even 
professors, this was a difficult standard to meet, but it was an imperative one. That was because 
because discussion theory ultimately promised to resolve the core difficulty of progressive politics 
— the relationship between expertise and democracy.49  Ideal discussions would be led by 
“persons with special experience close to the matters in question,” the Teachers College professor 
Alfred Sheffield wrote, but preferably by experts who could both encourage “everyday folk to 
respect their own experience” and seriously value that experience as a contribution to expertise. 
The whole experiment, Sheffield said, sought “to use ‘authorities’ without succumbing to their 
prestige,” to set up “thought-conditions by which people will find the right ways for 
themselves.”50 It was not enough for people simply to adhere to expert views, Lindeman wrote, 
for if “the only meanings possible would be those purchasable from experts,” true democracy 
would end. It would survive only if knowledge could be democratized. Rooting expertise within 
publics would not just teach those publics, but teach experts to collaborate, to work among the 
people, not rule over them.51 
Why did this matter so much? It mattered because discussion theory was not simply 
discussion theory; it was political theory. Whether at a bar or at a union meeting, at a forum in a 
public-school gymnasium or in the United States Senate, discussion, Sheffield wrote, pooled 
thinking from “a little cross-section of the current thought” on a problem through the “face-to-
 
49 Keith, Democracy as Discussion, p. 95; Laura M. Westhoff, “The Popularization of Knowledge: John Dewey on 
Experts and American Democracy,” History of Education Quarterly 35 (1995), pp. 27-47; Tom Arnold-Forster, 
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50 Sheffield, Creative Discussion, p. 24, 48, 49. 
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face experience of an all-participant group.”52 It taught tolerance; it taught respect for the 
minority opinion; it taught the need for consensus. As the historian David Goodman has 
written, “for the Deweyans, there was no clear line between educational and democratic work.”53 
Discussion was democracy; for Cherrington, democracy was “government by discussion.”54 
Hence, to talk about foreign policy was to participate democratically in foreign policy. 
 
* * * * * 
 
The national foreign policy institutions founded after the war took time to associate themselves 
formally with the adult education movement. But Newton Baker understood better than most 
that a deficient public was a time bomb in a Wilsonian world order and through him, the two 
movements became inseparable. It was not a coincidence that he gravitated towards networks set 
up by the Carnegie Corporation, with its joint interests in adult education and internationalism, 
rather than those of the Rockefeller Foundation, which promoted a less public, more scientific 
worldview.  
 Baker laid out the connections in a number of speeches. His basic point was that the 
skeptics were wrong. Baker said in 1927 that his “very great friend” Walter Lippmann had 
“written a book in which he leaves one with the impression that public opinion does not exist.” 
In Baker’s considerable experience, that was false. “Public opinion is not always active with us,” 
 
52 Sheffield, Creative Discussion, pp. 5-6, 20. 
53 Goodman, Radio’s Civic Ambition, p. 183. 
54 Cherrington, “Adult Education in Public Affairs,” April 15, 1937, Cherrington Papers, Box 3. 
  
115 
he said, “but in great emergencies it does exist and as time goes on the need for an enlightened 
public opinion, an educated public opinion, will grow more and more pronounced.”55 This was a 
structural fact of politics, particularly in a Wilsonian world. Consider, he asked the American 
Association of Adult Education in his presidential address of 1931, a humanity fused by 
instantaneous communications, in which “the world is being governed by the spontaneous 
responses of the people of the world, simultaneously receiving and reacting to great and crucial 
ideas.” That world was “like a vast powder magazine, and when the spark of a temperish idea or 
suggestion is thrown into it, if the people concerned are prejudiced in their point of view or ill-
advised in their action, a world conflagration may blaze up.”56 Had not the League of Nations 
debacle, he asked in another speech, shown what could happen when “passionate prejudice” 
decided debate, when the facts of the modern world had been insufficiently taken in? Had it not 
demonstrated that “the nature of democracy necessitates an educated electorate in order to 
provide for its own safety?”57 If that was true, Baker told the World Conference on Adult 
Education in 1929, then “the world cannot continue to be safe if we do not have an access of 
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adult education.”58 Hence, Baker said, “we must hold a man who abstains from acquainting 
himself with public affairs, and taking a high stand on public questions, not merely as useless but 
as dangerous.”59 Baker spoke, after all, as a man who had sent other men to their deaths. 
In Cleveland, Baker was prepared to demonstrate how this more perfect democracy 
might be achieved. Others had tried. The Foreign Policy Association had had some success in 
other parts of Ohio, forming branches in Cincinnati and Columbus, but Cleveland proved 
resistant, even as its internationalists used the services of the Association. McDonald tried, but 
failed to find the right people; Rich was always frustrated.60 As elsewhere, women led activism in 
the city, and they had a pacifist outlook.61 They had set up a training program so that they could 
advocate for Liberty Loans during the war, which later turned into an international relations 
discussion group affiliated with the League of Women Voters. Its format was extraordinary: each 
Wednesday morning, one or two members of the group presented a paper on a specific problem 
which they had spent weeks researching, and submitted it for discussion by an audience of up to 
one hundred other women.62 From that group emerged a Women’s Council for the Promotion 
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of Peace, which, by 1926, coordinated the activities of over one hundred local organizations.63 
The Women’s Council brought Carrie Chapman Catt to town in 1923, and organized a mass 
parade in May 1924 that, while dubbed “unpatriotic” and likely Bolshevist by the Chamber of 
Commerce, culminated in a rally that was addressed by Herbert Hoover, William Borah, and 
James Shotwell. (As a mark of respect, the women invited Baker to march in their front ranks.)64 
Even so, having started to cooperate with libraries, schools, and churches, the Women’s Council 
wound itself up in 1929. The Pact of Paris and the imminent accession of the United States to 
the World Court, argued its president Polly Prescott, meant that a broader strategy of education 
was now called for, “which could be carried on under the leadership of Newton D. Baker 
working with men’s groups as well as women’s groups.”65 In any case, Prescott told the press, the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact rendered the Women’s Council moot, having “definitely outlawed war.”66 
By that point, Cleveland was also a national leader in community adult education. The 
city hosted a founding conference of the AAAE in 1924, and the civic leaders who ran Western 
Reserve University set up Cleveland College, a dedicated adult education campus downtown, in 
1925. With Carnegie support and under the direction of A. Caswell Ellis, the College quickly 
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became one of the more experimental ventures in the field. By 1930, it was enrolling more than 
7,000 students in over 500 formal courses, covering everything from parenting to metaphysics.67 
Meanwhile, Baker also presided over a local Adult Education Association (AEA), which took 
responsibility for coordinating local voluntary associations’ educational efforts, and for promoting 
interest in adult education through publicity.68 “Stimulating in adults the desire for study that 
will tend toward a more enlightened and unbiased public opinion,” as one report put it, became 
ever more important, as the AEA concentrated on cultivating interest in subjects that were not 
widely assumed to be relevant to everyday life.69 Foreign policy was prime among these.  
The AEA’s Foreign Affairs Committee, into which the Women’s Council folded in 
1929, tried out public forums, organized lectures by residents returning from travel abroad, and 
distributed Foreign Policy Association literature, but its centerpiece was an annual institute. 
Institutes were adult education’s equivalent of a blitzkrieg, indispensable, as the AEA put it, for 
“gaining new recruits to the army of those who ‘want to know.’”70 Reserved principally for 
political subjects, they provided a focus for the work of co-sponsoring voluntary associations, an 
occasion to invite major speakers, and an opportunity for publicity. They had the dual purpose of 
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both being news, and making news. Cleveland’s first Foreign Affairs Institute came in February 
1927. Attracting 1,500 people, it was an aimless effort with no defined topic. Addressed by the 
treasurer of the League of Nations, Sir Herbert Ames, it drew on the participation of students, 
churchgoers, the Women’s City Club, the YWCA, the Institute of Banking, and the Rotary, 
Kiwanis, and Lions.71 A second attempt drew fewer attendees for discussions of Pan-American 
issues, many of them led personally by Baker, but the organizers were pleased that they had 
“escaped the criticism of presenting our viewpoint” by balancing the “Labor view and Chamber 
of Commerce view,” and they welcomed a vigorous debate on American imperialism that made 
the front pages of the local press.72 As the Foreign Affairs Committee continued under Baker’s 
watch, its institutes grew in stature, attracting Walter Lippmann, James Shotwell, and James G. 
McDonald as speakers. 
But just as the Depression threatened to destroy the national infrastructure of foreign 
policy institutions, so it disrupted Cleveland’s nascent program. Cleveland was hit hard by 
economic turmoil, and the city’s philanthropic base contracted as the stock market collapsed, 
investments plummeted, and manufacturing suffered heavy losses.73 Cleveland College barely 
survived the crunch. Residents and local foundations dug deep to avert what one newspaper said 
would be the “community catastrophe” of its closure.74 This left little spare change for other 
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worthy causes. The AEA duly collapsed in May 1933, but not before it had spun off its Foreign 
Affairs Committee as an independent Foreign Affairs Council, devoted to “an intelligent and 
informed public opinion in international affairs by providing opportunities for study and 
discussion as an effective means of promoting peace through understanding.”75 Its activities 
centered on its annual institute, its speakers service, its Wednesday women’s forums, and its 
biweekly meetings of sixty men who had taken a night course on “Current International 
Problems” at the College, which Baker had helped to teach.76 With the revival of neutrality 
debates and the return of the peace movement, by 1935 its members were pushing “to do 
something constructive for the preservation of peace,” Baker wrote.77 Cashless and confused, 
however, the Council was not a promising concern. Baker persevered. Why? Because four years 
earlier, in December 1931, he had met a visionary graduate student from Yale. 
  
* * * * * 
 
Brooks Emeny hailed from Salem, Ohio, a small town on the train tracks from Cleveland to 
Pittsburgh. His grandfather was Joshua Twing Brooks, an industrialist who was general counsel 
and vice president of the Pennsylvania Railroad when it was the largest private corporation in the 
world. Joshua’s daughter, Elizabeth Miller Brooks, married the engineer Frederick James 
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Emeny, and gave birth to three sons. Brooks was the eldest, born on July 29, 1901. After his 
mother died in 1915, Brooks was cared for by his extended family, including a cousin, Theodate 
Pope Riddle, an architect who had survived the sinking of the Lusitania to marry John Wallace 
Riddle. As a former envoy to various Balkan states and, at one point, the U.S. ambassador to 
Russia, Riddle became a crucial influence on the young Brooks. But, despite being an Eagle 
Scout and a proficient debater, Brooks was an unengaged student. He was sent to Mercersburg 
Academy, a boarding school in southern Pennsylvania. As a high school student during the war, 
Emeny later wrote, he “developed an intensive admiration for Woodrow Wilson.” He resolved to 
study international politics, and turned down his father’s Cornell to attend Wilson’s Princeton.78 
 Emeny’s career progressed steadily through the infrastructure that internationalists like 
Baker were building to train and professionalize experts in the scientific study of international 
relations. In 1922, Emeny started a round table within the university’s International Relations 
Club, funded by the Carnegie Endowment, and drew notice for working to “disturb 
undergraduate lethargy toward the affairs of the world,” as The Daily Princetonian put it.79 A year 
later, Emeny attended the Institute of Public Affairs at Williamstown, that mecca for aspiring 
international relations thinkers.80 The following year, he won a scholarship in international law 
from the Carnegie Endowment, granting him three years of the European travel vital to creating 
an aura of expertise, and guaranteeing admission into the transnational network of elite 
 
78 Emeny, “Autobiography of Brooks Emeny: The International Phase,” April 1975, Brooks Emeny Papers, Public 
Policy Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Box 1, p. 6. 
79 “On the Threshold,” The Daily Princetonian (March 1, 1923), p. 2; “Elections Are Held For Round Table 
Committee,” The Daily Princetonian (May 9, 1923), p. 1. 
80 On the importance of the Williamstown institutes to the international relations infrastructure, see Vitalis, White 
World Order, Black Power Politics, pp. 73-79. 
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internationalists. Emeny studied at the Sorbonne’s Institute des Hautes Etudes Internationales, 
the London School of Economics, and the Konsular Akademie in Vienna. More important than 
any academic experience, though, were his experiences at the League of Nations. In Geneva, he 
hung around the Rockefeller-funded library and snuck his way into sessions of the League, 
cannily disguising himself as a delegate with the simple costume of a briefcase. Each summer 
from 1925 to 1927, Emeny made what he called the “pilgrimage” to Geneva with hundreds of 
other Americans, enrolling in the plethora of institutes and schools that cropped up in the Swiss 
city to instruct amateur and scholarly travelers alike in the true nature of internationalism.81  
Emeny’s career turned back to the United States in 1927, after he met another young 
scholar in Geneva, Nicholas Spykman. Spykman was a former journalist and sociologist whose 
doctorate on Georg Simmel had landed him an assistant professorship in international relations 
at Yale.82 In time, Spykman became the driving force behind the Yale Institute of International 
Studies and a forefather of realist theory, but there was little indication when Emeny met him 
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a Geneva School of International Studies (founded 1924) and a Geneva Institute for International Affairs (founded 
1927), as per Daniel Gorman. See Kuehl and Dunn, Keeping the Covenant, p. 82; Daniel Gorman, The Emergence of 
International Society in the 1920s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 193-194. Gorman’s “Geneva 
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International Relations, which took place during the Assembly and was run by the British League of Nations Union 
in collaboration with the American League of Nations Association. On Zimmern, see Paul Rich, “Alfred Zimmern’s 
Cautious Idealism: The League of Nations, International Education and the Commonwealth,” in David Long and 
Peter Wilson (eds.), Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995), pp. 79-99. 
82 Spykman seems to evade historians, leaving only traces of his activities before the mid-1930s. For more, see Perry 
Anderson, “Imperium,” New Left Review 83 (2013), n. 15. 
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that he would become a transformative figure.83 He seemed a keen supporter of international 
institutions, even if he was skeptical of international law and already insistent that the logic of 
geography was the key factor in world politics. Spykman offered Emeny a position in New 
Haven as his assistant, as a graduate student, and as a lecturer.84 In the seven years before Emeny 
earned the first doctorate that Yale ever bestowed in international relations, he became Spykman’s 
“ardent follower.”85 
A student with Emeny’s background might ordinarily have written a thesis on the 
workings of the League, on the functions of international law, or on colonial administration. 
What interested Emeny, however, was power. Planning his dissertation at the end of 1932, 
Emeny imagined his thesis, “Geographic Location as a Factor of American Foreign Policy,” as 
just one aspect of a much broader study, “The United States as a World Power.” Legislators, let 
alone the people they represented, did not understand the sheer reach of the United States, he 
argued, which had an “influence co-extensive with the furthest range of the World Society in 
which it operates.” So Emeny proposed an ambitious assessment of American power in its 
totality, and how that power necessitated a new foreign policy. Pre-empting Spykman’s later work, 
Emeny attacked the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Emeny insisted that in any analysis of 
state power, “physical geography” was paramount, for natural resources “form the basis of 
 
83 On the later Spykman, see Paulo J. Ramos, “Role of the Yale Institute of International Studies in the construction 
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85 Emeny to “Nick,” 1934, qu. in Ramos, “Role of the Yale Institute of International Studies,” p. 164; Emeny, 
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concentrated power as well as defining its extent and possible limits.” Since Mahan’s time, Emeny 
argued, the position of the United States had been transformed by industrialization, the 
construction of the Panama Canal, and “the rise of the Pacific in addition to the Atlantic as a 
center of international commerce and possible conflict.”  
With the closure of the frontier, the United States had become a coherent land power 
precisely when “the day of World Power based predominantly on land mass has arrived” and 
“World Power based predominantly on control of the sea” was “on the decline.” Now the greatest 
powers required both maritime strength and immense territory. “Where land mass predominates 
as a geographic factor it is the most important element of World Power,” Emeny argued, “but if 
through ideal location it enjoys free access to the sea, its possibilities are thereby enormously 
enhanced.” In an unassailable strategic position, unconquerable, unmatched in resources, and 
historically prone to expansion, the United States was “the only Power so situated.” Geography 
granted it global “predominance.” American global power was a fact, but one that was not 
sufficiently appreciated by its people.86 
Emeny’s ambitions outran his abilities, and his completed dissertation dug into only one 
part of his much wider theme. Published in 1934 by Harvard’s Bureau of International Research 
as The Strategy of Raw Materials, Emeny’s influential work argued that ultimate power was not 
simply determined by territory, population, or wealth, but by industrial capacity. The unequal 
 
86 Brooks Emeny, “An outline of a study on ‘The United States as a World Power” in which is contained an outline 
of another study (Division V) on ‘Geographic Location as a Factor of World Power,” undated [after October 1932], 
Emeny Papers, Box 1. Emeny’s dissertation prospectus was avowedly materialist, sketching a world of great powers 
competing for resources, in which economic and military might were the key drivers of history. Slyly, its epigram 
came from Zimmern: “We must take the world as we find it and adjust ourselves and our programmes of action as 
best we can to the changing circumstances which result from its infinite motion and variety. See Brooks Emeny, 
“Geographic Position as a Factor of American Foreign Policy,” undated [1932], Emeny Papers, Box 1. 
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distribution of raw materials limited the number of possible great powers, and the basis of 
international relations was how far any given power would be self-sufficient in war. Of the seven 
imperial powers — the United States, Germany, Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, and Japan — 
one clearly stood out. “We enjoy,” Emeny wrote, “a unique superabundance in the foodstuffs and 
materials essential to the development of national power, in the pursuits of peace and war.” 
Unlike Britain, moreover, the United States would always have ready access to auxiliary materials 
because of its imperial hemispheric dominance. “The formidable character of our inherent 
national strength, derived from our raw material position,” he concluded, “must give pause for 
thought on the part of any nation contemplating the risk of hostilities with us.”87 This was not an 
unchallenged view. Emeny’s advisor, for one, thought that the United States was insecure and 
needed “a great offensive across the oceans.”88 While Emeny saw security in America’s position, 
he saw too that its power was so great that it could not help but be an influence on the world. 
 Public opinion was not Emeny’s concern in The Strategy of Raw Materials, even if in his 
dissertation planning he saw that it had not kept pace with the revolution in America’s place in 
the world. Only in The Great Powers in World Politics, co-authored in 1935 with the columnist 
Frank Simonds, did his views on that topic take shape. The Great Powers was marked by bleak 
realism, describing a world of “nation states” jealous of their sovereignty in “international 
anarchy,” a system of “Haves and “Have-nots” all competing in an unending battle for resources.89 
 
87 Brooks Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials: A Study of America in Peace and War (New York: Macmillan, 1934), 
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Harcourt, Brace, 1942), pp. 477, 457. 
89 For the new “realism,” see Vitalis, White World Order, Black Power Politics, pp. 85-90.  
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Nations had specific policies not because of their wisdom, their language, or their ideology, but 
because of their geography. “If the Frenchman and the German changed places they would 
exchange policies,” Emeny and Simonds wrote. 
What counts is whether peoples live on islands or continents; whether their 
countries are situated in Europe, Asia, or America; whether they have natural 
resources to supply their industry and food supplies to feed their populations. If 
their title to these advantages is undisputed, they will also have security. Otherwise 
they will seek that security. 
 
“To know the physical circumstances of a state is therefore to understand its national policy,” the 
authors concluded. Emeny and Simonds rubbished international organizations, international law, 
international morality, and much else that the likes of Baker held dear.  
 Geopolitical or not, the world of Simonds and Emeny was still one in which public 
opinion, and specifically American public opinion, mattered. The United States was firmly a 
“Have” power. It had “attained absolute regional and territorial security,” and European and Asian 
powers were no more likely “to attempt imperialistic adventures in the Americas than in the 
moon.” But there was a mismatch between capabilities and reality. “Public opinion in the United 
States,” Emeny and Simonds wrote, “has not kept pace with the physical change in the 
circumstance of the nation.” While outside observers should have expected the United States to 
involve itself in European and Asian politics so as to remove even distant threats, America was 
not playing to form. Americans responded alternately “to the inspiration of Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points and to the admonition of Washington’s Farewell Address,” but tended to revert to the 
latter “when the question of assuming foreign responsibilities is raised.” This failure to decide 
upon a “viable compromise between tradition and actuality” was intolerable, even dangerous. Just 
like Baker, Emeny therefore thought that an under-educated American public opinion was 
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inimical to global stability and world peace. The young scholar, however, came to the conclusion 
from a wholly different perspective.90 
How, then, could Emeny help put public opinion on a firmer foundation? Writing 
scholarly books seemed insufficient. Entering the Foreign Service would be boring. But a 
conversation with another Ohio Republican kept returning to his mind. As a student in Paris, he 
had met Myron T. Herrick, twice Ambassador to France and a former governor of Emeny’s home 
state. Herrick, Emeny later recalled, “told me that if he had it to do all over again he would go to 
some community, identify himself there, and become interested in the instruction of public 
affairs.”91 So Emeny gravitated towards foreign policy institutions, helped by connections forged 
upon a whirlwind marriage to Winifred Rockefeller in 1928. Emeny’s main interest was the Far 
East. He turned down an offer to teach at Tokyo’s Imperial University, but toured Asia under the 
auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations early in 1935. He sailed in part to escape family 
tragedy, having learned that both his mother-in-law and his eldest daughter were terminally ill. 
They passed away on his return. So too did Winifred’s father, Percy A. Rockefeller. Bereft, but 
now the inheritors of unfathomable Rockefeller riches, the Emenys left Washington for a new 
home in the Midwest.92 
 
* * * * * 
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128 
Emeny first outlined his plans for community foreign policy education in 1931, while still 
lecturing at Yale. “We are in complete agreement,” he wrote, having met Baker and Ellis that 
Christmas, “as to the need which exists in every community for making available education in 
World Problems particularly as regards their relation to the United States.” It was imperative that 
Americans “be awakened to the profound change which has come about in the World Position of 
the United States bringing in its train a new set of interests as well as obligations.” Geography 
meant that the United States “is in the most strategic and in a sense the most vulnerable position 
of any nation today.” Public “instruction” needed to focus on this relationship, yet such education 
was not meant to “propagandize by means of emotional appeal, high-powered salesmanship or 
lobby methods.” Instead, it would “provide facilities for the presentation and free discussion of 
the basic factors of the problems involved which will enable the educated public to come to an 
intelligent and just decision on questions of International Policy.”  
Emeny proposed a Cleveland Institute of International Relations. It would have an 
auditorium, seminar rooms, a library, and offices for local representatives of national groups. It 
would provide lectures, forums, and study groups, while offering speakers to schools, clubs, and 
associations. It would be funded, like Cherrington’s outfit in Denver, by an endowment, 
supplemented by admission and membership fees. The aim was the “development of interest in 
World Affairs and the creation of a feeling of need for more adequate facilities and organization 
in public instruction.” Before Cleveland’s people could be educated, in other words, they would 
  
129 
have to understand that the world and America’s response to it was of personal importance to 
them — and the impetus would have to come from the community.93 
While Emeny got on with this writing, Baker kept pondering the situation, and delved 
deeper into it as a trustee of the Carnegie Corporation. The problem was not, he wrote, “a lack 
of knowledge of the kind which research produces.” That knowledge was being churned out by 
scholars who were “working in the best research spirit,” whether in universities or in institutions 
like the Foreign Policy Association. “The thing that neither they nor any of the rest of us have 
yet discovered,” Baker averred, was the way “to make their knowledge a common and therefore 
an effective possession in America.” But now that such knowledge was available, it could be put 
to work. What was required was “popular adult education,” an education  
so consecutive, continuous, and disinterested as to make the whole people of 
Cleveland conscious at the same time of the same set of facts and offer a sufficiently 
wide factual basis to enable these people, upon the occurrence of a new fact in the 
international situation, to digest it without hysteria and guide their own emotional 
responses by this well cultivated background more than by the irritation of the latest 
isolated fact.  
 
Baker rooted this optimistic vision in his political memory. He recalled the tent meetings of Tom 
Johnson, his predecessor as Cleveland’s mayor, who had set up public forums to discuss and 
resolve pressing municipal issues. What difference could there be between urban and foreign 
policy, Baker wondered? He hoped for “a situation in which it could be said that every man, 
woman, and child in Cleveland understood the large outlines — economic, racial, social and 
political — of modern international relations.” If that became true, if his project should succeed 
 
93 Emeny to Ellis, January 23, 1932, qu. in Emeny, Cleveland Council, pp. 3-8. 
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in Cleveland and then nationwide, Baker concluded, “instead of having the life of our nation 
imperiled by the possibility of emotional response to inflammatory impulses, we would have that 
ideal of democracy, an informed public opinion.”94  
 To Emeny, Cleveland seemed the perfect place to try this “experiment in democracy.”95 It 
was the fifth or sixth largest city in the nation, with a population in its greater metropolitan area 
of about 1.2 million.96 Built on a massive influx of semiskilled immigrant labor from Central and 
Eastern Europe around World War I, as well as the beginnings of northward movement from the 
South, Cleveland was one of the “big eight” industrial cities that led the United States’ increasing 
dominance of the global economy.97 In steel, iron, and coal it had long been a powerhouse, and as 
the postwar period went on it became dominated by automobile production, electrical appliances, 
and chemicals. Corporate growth fostered a strong financial sector — a Federal Reserve bank 
came to town in 1914 — and service communities in accountancy, law, and higher education. To 
Emeny, its growing professional class therefore had a stake in international politics and trade. 
And he was impressed by the city’s strong civic spirit, noting its Community Chest, and 
especially its philanthropic response to the Depression, which, along with local unemployment, 
unleashed crime waves, homelessness, and migration from the east.98 Beyond its educational 
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ventures, not least Cleveland College, the community had built an enviable cultural life. They had 
founded the Cleveland Orchestra in 1918 and built it an expensive home, Severance Hall, in 
1931. Since 1916 the Cleveland Museum of Art had become widely renowned. The 
Metropolitan Opera visited every spring. Easy rail connections to the governing centers of New 
York and Washington, crowned by the Union Terminal completed in 1930, meant the city’s 
citizens might quickly be brought into a closer relationship with policy networks and 
discussions.99 
 Why Cleveland, rather than a city with stronger historic tendencies towards 
internationalism, like Boston, or another industrial metropolis connected to global trading 
networks, such as Pittsburgh?100 As an Ohioan, Emeny had personal reasons. But, sitting right on 
the edge of the Midwest, Cleveland potentially made for the most susceptible and attractive 
beachhead in a fight against a perceived regional preference for “isolation” in world affairs.101 
Emeny was not alone in this belief. For ten years the Foreign Policy Association was urged to 
spread its influence into the Midwest, not least by Franklin Roosevelt, who believed the area to 
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be the pivot of public opinion. Raymond Leslie Buell offered Baker assistance with founding an 
Association branch in January 1934, but Baker declined.102 Now, as historians have demonstrated, 
and as was increasingly known at the time, Midwestern isolationism was as much fiction as 
fact.103 It confused the politics of the Senate with public opinion in the field, and relied on tropes 
of backwardness, ethnicity, ignorance, and insularity. It collapsed urban-rural divides and ignored 
more pertinent differences between the north and south.104 It erased disparities in views caused 
by education and party allegiance, and it obliterated vast differences in policy outlooks, from a 
William Borah to a Gerald Nye, to a General Robert E. Wood.105 But “Midwestern isolationism” 
was a powerful element of the mental map of the foreign policy elite both before and after World 
War II. It was an element resistant to contradictory evidence. The common stereotype was best 
put, long into the Cold War, by Selig Adler, who saw the roots of a continuing “midwestern 
isolationist complex” in populism, in free silver, and in the conspiratorial tendency of western 
 
102 Baker to Raymond Leslie Buell, January 23, 1934, Baker Papers, Box 99. 
103 Warren F. Kuehl, “Midwestern Newspapers and Isolationist Sentiment,” Diplomatic History 3 (1979), pp. 283-
306, which demonstrates that the picture was far from settled. The Midwest was marginally less interventionist than 
the rest of the country before Pearl Harbor, but not as dramatically as the popularity of the America First 
Committee in the region would suggest. Regional differences quickly diminished once the war had begun. For 
contemporary challenges to the idea of Midwestern isolationism, see W. W. Waymack, “The Middle West Looks 
Abroad,” Foreign Affairs 18 (1940), pp. 535-545; “Isolationism is Losing its Hold on the Voters of the Middle 
West,” New York Times (October 19, 1941), p. E7; Robert J. Blakely, “The Midwest and the War,” Foreign Affairs 
20 (1942), pp. 635-649; George Gallup, “Report of Isolationist Swing In Midwest Disproved By Poll,” Washington 
Post (May 19, 1944), p. 9; “Myth of Midwest Isolationism Exploded in National Survey,” Washington Post (April 11, 
1945), p. 7 (which calls the idea “one of the great American delusions”); Frederick S. Williams, “Regional Attitudes 
on International Cooperation,” Public Opinion Quarterly 9 (1945), pp. 38-50; Ralph H. Smuckler, “The Region of 
Isolationism,” American Political Science Review 47 (1953), pp. 386-401. 
104 During the interwar period in particular, there was considerable cultural confusion as to whether the major 
regional metropolises — Chicago above all, but Detroit and Cleveland too — could even be classed as Midwestern, 
given their profound differences in outlook from the rural areas that surrounded them. See Shortridge, The Middle 
West, pp. 39-66. 
105 Justus D. Doenecke, Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939-1941 (Lanham: Rowman 




progressives to attribute wars to banking and armament monopolies. “A certain inner security,” 
Adler wrote,  
came from having thousands of miles of land, in addition to the oceans, act as a 
buffer to the outside world. In western communities, there were fewer people who 
had become aware of an Atlantic world united by trade, travel, and cultural contacts. 
War cries, so it seemed, always came from down east.106 
 
Other postwar writers went even further, including Richard Hofstadter, for whom Midwestern 
isolationism was the uncle of pseudo-conservatism, know-nothingism writ global.107 Such views 
were commonplace once “isolationism” had ahistorically been pinpointed as the primary cause of 
World War II, as during the war policymakers and intellectuals rewrote the past to blame the 
American people for the rise of Hitler, guilting them into support for armed world leadership.108 
But similar sentiments existed long before the war, before that founding myth of supremacy came 
about. Since the fights over the entry into the Great War, and the ratification of the Treaty of 
Versailles, the Midwest’s reputation as what the historian Thomas A. Bailey called “the backbone 
of American isolationism” had been pervasive among the northeastern policy elite.109 
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 Emeny himself rarely talked in these terms, despite his interest in geography. In his grant 
proposals and his invitations to speakers, he talked about the importance of an informed public 
opinion, not a crusade against isolationism. But he knew and used the general attitude that he 
was working with, and the possibilities it offered. Any national effort to replicate the Cleveland 
model, he told the Carnegie Endowment in 1943, “should be concentrated upon the American 
industrial Ruhr, located in the area bounded by Buffalo, Pittsburgh, St. Louis and Chicago.” The 
mention of the Ruhr was deliberate: if the fulcrum of world politics had previously been the 
space around the Rhine, it was now the minds of the American heartland. This, Emeny said, was 
“not only the most important area in America from the point of view of public opinion, but the 
success of the project here would guarantee its success elsewhere.”110 
 
* * * * * 
 
Succeed it did, although Baker’s death at the end of 1937 meant that he did not see his pet cause 
flourish.111 Given an associate professorship at Cleveland College, Emeny took over the Foreign 
Affairs Council in October 1935. By 1947, when Emeny left to run the Foreign Policy 
Association, he had hosted the “Report from the World,” a Time-sponsored institute which 
ended with a mass meeting of 10,000 Clevelanders, was addressed by Secretary of State James 
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Byrnes and Senator Arthur Vandenberg, and had an estimated radio audience of 15 million 
Americans.112 The Council’s membership grew from 440 in October 1935 to 3,588 in 1942-43. 
Its income increased from $17,085 in 1936 ($27,000 or so in 1947 dollars), to over $60,128 in 
1947 (about $700,000). Total attendance at Council events went from 9,847 in the 1935-36 
season to a peak of 74,206 in 1944-45. By the 1946-47 season, Emeny had twelve members of 
staff overseeing legions of volunteers.113 Of course, there was a general and dramatic rise in public 
discussion of foreign policy throughout the war emergency. But that had to be harnessed and 
guided towards specific institutions. This was a public that was built. 
 How? Emeny’s first task was to assert his authority over foreign policy discussion in town. 
He quickly found a permanent home for the Council on the ninth floor of the Society for 
Savings Building, a grand structure overlooking the city’s public square. As soon as he arrived, 
Emeny deployed his expertise, freshly embossed with his doctorate and the national newspaper 
reviews of The Great Powers. He filled his schedule with addresses to women’s clubs, men’s 
dinners, and parent-teacher meetings. He taught twice weekly at Cleveland College, and lectured 
for the public at the Museum of Art. He came armed with maps and statistics, many of them 
taken from The Strategy of Raw Materials.114 Crowds thronged to hear reports of his travels, 
particularly his involvement with the Institute of Pacific Relations. He brought friends and 
acquaintances to Cleveland to speak, drawing from internationalist networks. Developing 
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audiences at their speeches meant he could expand the Council’s programming, adding dinner 
meetings, a library, and a revitalized speakers’ bureau. Members of the women’s discussion group 
volunteered in a program for settlement houses; members of the men’s discussion group started to 
broadcast lectures over the city’s radio station, WHK. All told, the Cleveland Plain Dealer wrote, 
Emeny became “quite the rage here.” “He speaks language that many women’s clubs never heard,” 
the newspaper said, “and he speaks it well.”115 Scholarly, public analysis of foreign affairs was a 
novelty, and a welcome one at that. 
Who did Emeny imagine his public to be, ideally? He often talked as if it had no limits. 
Emeny gave the Council a motto, “Foreign Affairs Are Your Affairs,” that was deliberately 
inclusive, and Baker was not joking when he had written that he wanted “every” Clevelander to 
be informed. The Council’s formal principles were capacious, too. A statement of purpose issued 
in 1936 declared it to be a “non-partisan organization of men and women formed to provide 
information and open discussion,” aimed at “a serious and honest understanding of the world 
position of the U.S., particularly in relation to its national security and economic interest.”116 But 
while Emeny kept no statistics on his membership and commissioned no surveys of its 
composition, in practice it was predominantly middle- and upper-middle class. It was certainly 
very white. The Council wholly ignored the city’s growing black community — less than a tenth 
of the population in 1930 but 16% in 1950 and 34.4% by 1965 — even if the black community 
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could not quite ignore the Council.117 David H. Pierce, a writer for the local black newspaper, the 
Call and Post, was unimpressed by Emeny, dubbing him “Cleveland’s synthetic authority on 
international problems” and noting that he “furnished information known to every intelligent 
fifteen year-old child.” Still, the Call and Post encouraged black women to join the discussion 
groups and reported favorably on speakers who promoted anti-colonial positions.118 
Emeny’s strategy for growth initially relied upon class-based, racialized notions of what a 
respectable, serious institution should look like. Gendered, too In the early days, the Council’s 
activities had been dominated by women, who made up 90% of its members in 1935. What press 
coverage the Council received was to be found in the society pages of the local press, a situation 
that was also true in Chicago, to Adlai Stevenson’s displeasure.119 To Emeny, as to his friend 
Raymond Leslie Buell, the success of his institution, and especially its financial stability, 
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depended on putting male faces on work that relied on and was defined by women.120 He was 
trying to plug the Council into a network of institutions that was, by the mid-1930s, increasingly 
academic, high political, and male. Hence, he later criticized the Association’s branches for being 
the province of “an over-worked, badly-paid lady secretary who in many cases will cause the male 
population to fight shy of meetings unless dragooned to attend from the social rather than the 
educational angle.” Rather, he conceived of a “man’s task — one which should rank with a full 
professorship in a University or with the secretaryship of the local Chamber of Commerce.”121 In 
turn, his earliest initiatives in Cleveland were aimed at men of means. While he acknowledged 
the contribution of women to the Council’s progress, and aimed for no more than a gender- 
balanced membership, he otherwise effaced that contribution. 
 If Emeny’s definition of “every” American turned out be limited in practice, there was a 
more difficult paradox at the heart of his Council. By virtue of its history, and as was usual for 
most voluntary associations, the Council was a membership institution. But membership implied 
a special status, as opposed to the apparently limitless pretensions to adult education that were 
the Council’s core mission. Membership granted people entry into the world of information and 
opinion that was circulated in the products of the Foreign Policy Association and the Council on 
Foreign Relations. It gave a certain class of people access. In part, this was what Emeny, like the 
vast majority of foreign policy educators, wanted. Not discernably influenced by contemporary 
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political science, which imagined opinions moving through “opinion leaders” at every level of a 
public, Emeny sought above all a “leadership of informed opinion,” meaning community leaders, 
influential citizens in positions of power.122 He claimed, in a letter to the Carnegie Endowment, 
to be searching for “leaders from all walks of life” as a way of accessing a wider public, but went 
little further. Like his counterparts at the Foreign Policy Association, he thought remarkably little 
about how public opinion operated, or who it was important to reach.123 
 Creating a local foreign policy elite was also the only means available for improving the 
Council’s finances and standing in the community. Cities of comparable stature such as Boston, 
Philadelphia, and New York all supported Foreign Policy Association branches or affiliates of at 
least 1,000 members, and through standard organizing techniques such as telephone campaigns, 
press articles, and circularization of mailing lists, Emeny was able to increase the Council’s 
membership quickly. What he sought above all were members who would be both active in 
participation and generous in funds. Deploying traditional internationalist arguments about the 
global economy’s increasing interconnectedness, Emeny enlisted the leadership of the city’s major 
banks in the city in January 1937, and cajoled their senior executives into affiliation with a new 
International Finance Committee, which studied trade patterns in cooperation with the 
Chamber of Commerce. Industrial corporations were a much tougher sell. By April 1938, the 
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Council had only 1,443 members, a figure around half that counted by the older but less 
ambitious Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.124 
 Such a modest increase in membership had eye-watering financial consequences for an 
institution not yet strong enough to appeal to foundations. “There seems to be a permanent 
discrepancy,” noted the Council’s annual report in 1938, “between the amount of money which 
can be raised through memberships and the actual amount necessary to run an educational 
organization such as the Council.”125 The Emenys’ vast personal wealth therefore stood in for 
grant money or an instant outpouring of community support. In their first year, they underwrote 
a deficit of around $7,000; in their second, they pumped in $8,577 to cover expenditures of 
$14,065; in their third, their burden was $9,570 for outgoings of $21,550, a rise in budget driven 
by staff increases.126 Salvation, of a sort, came only from a compromise with a much more 
exclusive, entirely male vision of what community education in foreign policy should look like. 
 
* * * * * 
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The Council on Foreign Relations had always had non-resident members outside New York, but 
in 1937 it began to replicate itself in communities across the country.127 For the most part 
targeting cities where the Foreign Policy Association did not have a significant presence, the 
Council founded seven satellite Committees on Foreign Relations in 1938.128 The idea came 
from Morse Cartwright and the Carnegie Corporation, rather than the Council itself or the 
government. Without attempting “any of the dramatic conversion of opinion to particular ends” 
such as was “indulged in by the dictatorial governments,” Cartwright hoped for a national series 
of symposia, led by the Council, designed to bring home “the need for American collaboration in 
the solution of world problems.”129 Allen Dulles and Whitney Shepardson, the Council’s research 
directors, were unenthusiastic about this, even as their plans shifted — in consultation with the 
State Department — towards discussion meetings in “much more highly selected group[s].” But 
the Corporation insisted.130  
Walter Mallory, the Council’s executive director, therefore proposed “popular education,” 
by which he meant the “dissemination more widely in the United States of factual information 
 
127 Even scholars specifically of the Council tend to overlook the Committee program, considering it a minor part of 
the Council’s work overall; this tells us much about the Council’s approach to outside public opinion, even when it 
came to those involved in its own work. See, e.g., Schulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs, pp. 56-57. 
128 The Council’s history of the Committees is Joseph Barber, These Are the Committees (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1964). 
129 Cartwright to Keppel, September 27, 1939, CC, Box 127; Keppel, Russell C. Leffingwell, and others, Record of 
Interview, September 3, 1937, CC, Box 127; Keppel and Edward Mead Earle, Record of Interview, September 14, 
CC, Box 127. The Committees were not (or not simply) a nefarious attempt “to mobilize bias behind a particular 
conception of America’s role in a new world order,” as Parmar has argued. Cf. Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the 
American Century, pp. 87-90. 
130 Keppel to Leffingwell, October 12, 1937, CC, Box 127; Arthur Page to Keppel, October 15, 1937, CC, Box 127; 
Keppel, Leffingwell, Cartwright, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Allen Dulles, Walter Mallory, Whitney Shepardson, 
Record of Meeting, “Peace Plan,” October 26, 1937, CC, Box 1937 
  
142 
concerning international problems.” Yet he defined the limits of the “popular” with surpassing 
hauteur. To the Council, “the most effective form of adult education” would come “by working 
with selected leading individuals and trusting that these will be assisted to right decisions 
themselves and will in turn, through their influential positions, affect the opinion and action of 
the masses.”131 Deliberate elitism here melded with a skeptical assessment of the public’s ability 
to learn. “All I think you can hope to do is interest small selected groups in the study of foreign 
affairs,” the J.P. Morgan partner and future Council president Russell C. Leffingwell told Keppel, 
but it would be valuable, he thought, to have “several (and not merely one) foci of knowledge and 
understanding among the people of the United States.”132 Reserving such “knowledge and 
understanding” to itself, the Council acquiesced to an experimental project, funded with $37,500 
of Carnegie support, and hired Francis Pickens Miller, a former field director of the Foreign 
Policy Association and chairman of the World Student Christian Federation, to run it.133 
The Committees were technically autonomous, but were supervised by the Council’s 
powerful research committee, which supplied an agenda and a list of available speakers. Members 
were sent subscriptions to Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Policy Reports.134 Exclusively white, 
male, and well-heeled, the Committees of around twenty to thirty chosen notables met for secret 
dinners at gentlemen’s clubs, between five and ten times a year. Miller found it easy enough to 
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select interested people “identified with the principal interests of their local community,” and 
brought to the table members representing business, law, education, church, journalism, local 
government, farming, and — in places where a “responsible” unionist could be found — labor.135 
These provincials were thought insufficiently elect to be automatically worthy of full Council 
membership, but the Committees drew internal criticism for being upper-crust social gatherings 
rather than real discussions.136 They took occasional votes and wrote reports that were passed 
along to the State Department, reports which revealed that the members were predominantly 
internationalists and even interventionists, although plenty dissented from that view even after 
Pearl Harbor.137  
The Committees proliferated quickly, numbering thirteen by the winter of 1940-1941, 
with 403 total members, and twenty by 1944, with 859 members. Dulles thought that they were 
performing a useful, consensus-building service, and Miller even surmised that “some of the 
discussions were first class demonstrations of the democratic process of formulating public 
policy.”138 Nevertheless, even some of the Committees’ own chairmen grumbled that meetings 
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were stilted and fell short of genuine education. They complained that the New York office was 
not able to provide experts who were prepared to facilitate opinions without imposing their own 
views. And even within this minuscule, comfortable elite, interest was hard to maintain. 
Attendance was often sporadic.139 Mallory had no interest in continuing the program for its own 
sake, and feared it would disintegrate “without central direction and some outside assistance” to 
maintain momentum.140 The Carnegie Corporation wondered at the end of the war if its total 
grants of $145,730 had done anything to create more than a “superficial” interest, especially as it 
was paying for the education of those who could afford it for themselves.141 
Outside the rhetoric of its grant reports, the Council never quite understood what it — or 
anybody else — gained from its Committees, nor what their purpose was. The aim, Nathaniel 
Peffer wrote for the Corporation in 1942, was the “filtration [of opinions] down from above or 
radiation from what used to be called key-men.”142 Several Committee members were journalists 
or publishers, and the information and opinions expressed in discussions often informed their 
editorials. But otherwise, it was not clear how opinions were trickling down. The Council hoped 
that its Committee members would spread the results of their discussions “in daily contact with 
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scores of their fellow townsmen,” or through “friendly conversation.”143 But it refused to allow 
them to do anything collectively, and without a structure of institutional relations, this was too 
subtle a process even for most members to notice. The Louisville group’s secretary, for instance, 
relayed “some twinges of conscience from time to time” that his group was not doing more in the 
community.144 Others, particularly in New York, took solace in the fact that the Committees 
provided a talent pool for government service: several members ended up working for the State 
Department, or elsewhere in Washington. State, too, valued the insights into elite opinion its 
officers gained when addressing the Committees, and viewed the Committees as a potentially 
useful “instrument.”145 When a Council special committee led by Dulles discussed dropping the 
venture in 1949, the State Department vouched for it. Dulles, who was once considered for the 
presidency of the Foreign Policy Association, let the program continue.146 
 
* * * * * 
 
In the Council’s black-tie brand, Emeny saw an opportunity to turn trickle-down diplomacy into 
a flood. A Committee would appeal to local elites not already in his purview, and he saw a 
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chance to divert their attentions, through some creative accounting, to his own work.147 Founded 
in 1938 as one of the first Committees, the prestigious Cleveland group in its earliest iterations 
hosted multiple corporate executives, bank presidents, and lawyers. The political leaders involved 
included the mayor, future Ohio senator, and eventual Supreme Court justice, Harold H. 
Burton, as well as Chester C. Bolton, the congressman from the city’s wealthy university 
district.148 The presidents of Oberlin College and Western Reserve University sat in, alongside 
many of their faculty, as did Thomas L. Sidlo, a law partner of Newton Baker’s who served as 
the Council’s president for a time. Emeny also invited the editors of the Cleveland Plain Dealer, 
Cleveland News, and Cleveland Press, which, while drawing no attention to the confidential 
Committee, led to increased press support of the Council. That press coverage, in turn, improved 
as the standard of speakers coming through town increased. Emeny convinced those experts who 
were willing to travel to Cleveland at the behest of the New York Council to add a few other 
activities, and even to address a full meeting for hundreds of attendees. In the Committee’s first 
year, Arnold Wolfers, Samuel Flagg Bemis, and Jan Masaryk were all dragooned into giving a 
second speech; before the summer of 1942, so too were Sumner Welles, Raymond Leslie Buell, 
William Elliott, Clarence Streit, Edgar Ansel Mowrer, Carl Hambro, and even Vera Micheles 
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Dean, an interloper determined, as she put it, to show the men of Cleveland that they need not 
“share the views of Council House regarding the participation of women in discussions of 
international affairs.”149 All these drew unusually large crowds to the Foreign Affairs Council’s 
events, bolstering general attendances, memberships, and income. Through the elite, Emeny was 
able to get closer to the mass. 
Over time, forming a Committee helped to put the Council on a more settled financial 
basis. In 1942-1943, the Committee had 75 members, double that of most of its peers. For 
access to an unusually long season of 13 meetings, the majority of them paid $100 — twenty 
times the basic cost of Foreign Affairs Council membership, and several times the dues of 
Committees elsewhere.150 As Percy Bidwell noted from New York, the Cleveland Committee’s 
“high annual dues” ruled out “certain able but impecunious citizens, labor members particularly, 
who might make its composition more representative.” True enough, but Emeny used the 
portion of those dues that was not spent on dinners and speakers by the Committee to support 
the Foreign Affairs Council’s broader programming.151 From 1942 to 1947, direct income from 
the Committee totaled 20 to 30 per cent of the Council’s total receipts. Moreover, the 
businessmen who sat on the Committee — from the American Steel & Wire Company, M. A. 
Hanna, Standard Oil and more — purchased industrial memberships for their executives and 
other employees, and made significant corporate and personal donations. By fusing a Council on 
Foreign Relations initiative with his own Council, Emeny skillfully maintained a monopoly over 
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foreign policy discussion, giving a single focus to public attention. The Cleveland Committee 
directly, enthusiastically, and consistently supported Emeny’s broader efforts, which seemed far 
too populist and independent from the plush confines of New York’s Council House. In 1944, 
the Council started to consider withdrawing its cooperation from its Cleveland affiliate, and 
later, in 1947, cut its offshoot loose.152 
By then, Cleveland was a changed city. World War II rescued the local economy, which 
had recovered even more slowly than other industrial metropolises under the New Deal. 
Manufacturing jobs nearly doubled from 191,000 to 340,000, as existing works retooled to 
produce essential military supplies, and vast new factories sprang up on the city’s outskirts, 
including a General Motors plant that built B-29 bombers. Flush with employment, Cuyahoga 
County residents bought $2.5 billion in war bonds, tying themselves to the state and the 
financing of its global project. But the same pressures for defense production also started to 
industrialize cheaper, less unionized workforces south and west, setting up conditions that 
would, in coming years, haunt the city. And as Cleveland welcomed the predominantly black, 
Southern migrants who powered its wartime boom, city planners took more careful notice of 
suburbanization. After 1945, with the removal of wartime restrictions on private housing 
development, the flight of the white middle- and upper-class rapidly intensified.153 The prospects 
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for an adult education movement that declined to shift its focus away from the wealthy, white 
population that was leaving the city were unclear to contemporaries, but bleak in retrospect. 
 It is not clear how the Council partnered with the rash of industrial boards, relief drives, 
and so on, that connected the city’s residents to the war effort. Emeny was certainly involved. In 
a May 1942 article written for the Ohio Office of Civilian Defense, he repeated that as 
“geography, industrial might, transportation and modern warfare have sealed forever all avenues 
of escape from our obligations as the major power among the nations,” now “no higher duty 
exists upon every citizen than to familiarize himself with these realities of America’s world 
position.”154 And the war appeared to drive up interest in foreign policy, mostly through the 
vigorous discussions of postwar planning that almost predated American entry into the conflict. 
National foreign policy organizations reached out ever more to the public. In most cities, this 
meant educational overkill. Nationwide, Emeny alone was able to centralize discussion in a 
single institution. By the end of the war, his Council was one of eight Carnegie Endowment 
“centers”; a partner of the Council on Foreign Relations by virtue of its Committee; an outpost 
of Clark Eichelberger’s Commission to Study the Organization of Peace; an affiliate of the 
Foreign Policy Association; and a division of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It had even 
moved closer to the state, creating a division for study of hemispheric issues that at the request of 
Nelson Rockefeller’s Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, which claimed to 
promote “international understanding,” but in fact, especially when acting abroad, was a rank 
 




propaganda agency.155 All of these services were combined in the Council’s structure, but they 
did not really drive public growth. The Council’s membership hit 3,588 in the 1942-43 season, 
and was only 300 stronger in 1944-45. Attendance at luncheon events held steady, except for a 
1944-45 season dominated by discussion of the United Nations. A threshold had been 
reached.156 
 It took another graduate of Yale’s doctoral programs to break through, shifting the 
emphasis to a much more open approach. After Yale, Shepherd Witman combined his teaching 
in Nebraska and New Jersey with an interest in adult education, and became a national field 
representative for the Office of Civilian Defense in 1942.157 As Emeny retreated to a less 
demanding, emeritus role, he hired Witman to be the Council’s director in 1944. Two shifts of 
emphasis followed. For one, Witman was far more an evangelist than Emeny for the discussion 
method, in all its Deweyan glory. To Witman, discussion was “the most effective device toward 
sound democratic action,” the “essence of democracy in the intricate, modern world.” Indeed, it 
was the only possible response to a modernity that was taking decision-making away from 
communities, which led to “the development of citizen lethargy, a sense of personal inadequacy 
and a consequent sense of political futility.”158 Second, Witman brought to Cleveland a desire to 
serve the community as well as lead it. When he rewrote the Council’s “guiding principles” in 
1945, the old progressive urge “to make available without prejudice all facts and evidence needed 
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for the study and evaluation of world affairs” was still there. But Witman wanted to raise the 
general level of debate not just in the Council, but in the public sphere more widely. He insisted, 
therefore, “upon the methods of informal adult education in the belief that some skilled 
leadership is required to extract the maximum value from public discussion.” That could be done, 
now, by “directing our energies toward employing our resources to assist study groups and civic 
organizations.” Ideally, the Council would “assist the community leaders to carry on under their 
own momentum.”159 
 Witman’s Community Education Program was the result. It was an ambitious affair that 
began in 1945, running alongside the Council’s usual program of lectures, discussion groups, and 
radio shows. At the core was a Neighborhood Discussion and Forum Program, in which the 
Council trained fifteen to twenty community leaders per month, who fanned back out to their 
libraries, their church groups or their other civic organizations. 7,000 people attended over 100 
meetings directly sponsored by the Council in the first season, and far more went to meetings 
that benefitted from its programs. Witman operated World Affairs Clinics, which were study 
courses for interested citizens on specific problems, such as the role of the United Nations. 
Program Planning Clinics offered voluntary organizations assistance in better defining their 
foreign policy work. 78 such groups asked for help in the first season, including the Cleveland 
Church Federation, the Knights of Columbus, Crile General Hospital, and multiple Rotary 
clubs.160 The Council ran general sessions on the discussion techniques, and sent the best 
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students statewide through the speakers’ bureau. It was an enormous undertaking. That season, 
Emeny, Witman, and other members of the Council’s staff spoke to a combined audience of 
more than 30,000 at 157 public meetings.161 By 1951, Witman’s Council was presenting 1,200 
programs a year, with training courses, discussion groups, radio shows, film screenings, lectures, 
high school programs, after-school activities, program planning clinics, weekend institutes, 
winter institutions, workshops, model United Nations Assemblies, a foreign students’ program, 
and more.162 
In turn, this expansion bolstered the Council’s reputation. Businessmen became more 
amenable to Council programming. Corporations previously uninterested in matters of foreign 
policy, or at least claiming to be when asked for donations, now flooded his coffers.163 Ministers 
began to gather under Council auspices in 1940 for a Church Discussion Group, which 
continued throughout the war as a Ministerial Committee designed to help churches understand 
the problems of peace and coordinate their programs. Although the war disrupted the Council’s 
operations as staff members were drafted and rationing hit gasoline and paper supplies, returning 
veterans flowed onto the membership rolls. Perhaps most encouraging was the growing interest 
of high school students and their teachers. From 1939 onwards, the Council held Student 
Institutes in cooperation with the County Board of Education and the Public Library, usually 
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drawing about 800 youngsters. In 1940, it opened up its membership to students, drawing 472 
by the 1942-43 season, and founded a Junior Foreign Affairs Council at the request of teachers. 
Eventually operating with the support of the Cleveland Foundation and a network of teachers 
trained in Council programs, the Junior Council had chapters in 16 schools in 1941, in 28 by 
1948, and in every high school in the city shortly after that. It held conferences and discussion 
groups, along with special events, such as a model peace conference in 1945. As well as 
benefitting from the Council’s pedagogy at an early age, it was hoped that students would 
eventually feed into the main Council as adults, and, with luck, bring their parents too.164 
By the time American troops were advancing through Europe, the Council was operating 
an enviable array of programs. Sumner Welles, fresh from the State Department, held out the 
Council as “doing an outstanding piece of work in helping to make democracy work” in a 
nationally syndicated column.165 The standard of speakers was maintained despite the pressure of 
war work, with Welles, John Foster Dulles, Walter Lippmann, Nelson Rockefeller, and Manley 
Hudson all visiting Cleveland before the enormous spectacle of 1947’s “Report from the World,” 
which brought to town Byrnes and Vandenberg, foreign ministers like as Alcide de Gasperi, Jan 
Masaryk, and Eduardo Larreta, and domestic notables including Francis Cardinal Spellman, 
Henry Van Dusen, James Forrestal, Omar Bradley, and Henry Luce. The “Report from the 
World” capped the 1946-47 season, by which point Emeny had built a Council with nearly 
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4,000 members. Well over 60,000 Clevelanders attended Council-sponsored events that year; 
many more listened in over the radio; still more were the direct beneficiaries of Council 
programs. Emeny had created an institution that had, unusually for a community group, 
attracted foundation support, and that ran a surplus on a budget of $60,000.166  
Luce’s interest and sponsorship was emblematic of Emeny’s national reputation. Aware 
that communities as far afield as Indianapolis, Seattle, and San Francisco were looking to 
Cleveland as a model of what could be done, Emeny instituted an in-service training program for 
foreign policy educators, chiefly to host young, potential leaders of Councils elsewhere and to 
give them the tools to replicate his success.167 A Carnegie Corporation grant of $10,000 in 
March 1947 enabled him to continue training two fellows, one of whom was Howard Cook. 
Cook was sent from San Francisco to train with Emeny, later became director of the World 
Affairs Council of Northern California, and ended up the chief of the State Department’s 
Division of Public Liaison.168 A more permanent program, again funded by the Corporation, had 
trainees earn an M.A. in international relations or “Citizenship and World Affairs” at Western 
Reserve University, in order to gain the credentials necessary to speak with authority in a 
community, while also serving time at the Council to learn the techniques of administration. 
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Several graduates went on to staff projects across the country, forming an advance guard in 
Emeny’s later efforts to take the Cleveland model nationwide.169 
 
* * * * * 
 
What, by 1947, would an engaged member of the Council — most likely a wealthy, white 
woman — have learned? If she had attended every event in the Council’s core program from 
Emeny’s arrival to his departure, what would she have been exposed to? At root, she would have 
seen the world primarily through a tour of its states and empires, a geography of discussion that 
implied that there was no part of the world, Africa excepted, about which responsible Americans 
did not need to be aware. More than anything else, she would have heard her president preach 
his gospel of American power. The titles of some of Emeny’s annual speeches to the Council’s 
public meetings are indicative, a story of power urged, and power taken up: “The Price of 
Power,” “America Faces a New World” (1936); “The Realities of the Present Crisis” (1938); 
“Now America Must Decide” (1939); “Frontiers of National Defense” (1941); “Winning the 
War,” “Winning the Peace,” (1942); “America’s New World Position” (1943); “America in the 
Role of Super Power” (1946). In each of these lectures, Emeny not only asserted the power of 
the United States, but repeated his concern with what that fact entailed for individual 
Americans. But while speakers including John Foster Dulles, Nicholas Spykman, Arnold 
Wolfers, and Sumner Welles gave speeches specifically on American foreign policy, formal 
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discussion of that topic was surprisingly rare. Rather, the Council put forward a broad agenda for 
general knowledge, taught by a class of experts who increased their authority simply by appearing 
on the Council’s stage.  
 Even so, the Council had its priorities. Europe took up only around a quarter of its time 
from 1935 to 1947, albeit more than that between the Munich crisis and the fall of France. In 
that pivotal time, Council crowds heard from major personalities on European issues, most 
notably Bertrand Russell (“The Taming of Power,” January 1939), the socialist and future 
minister for Free France André Philip (“France and the European Crisis,” March 1939), and Jan 
Masaryk (“Democracy in Peril,” January 1939), just three months after he resigned to protest the 
German occupation of the Sudetenland. More often, though, the Council’s members were 
lectured to by scholars, including the Foreign Policy Association’s Vera Micheles Dean, and a 
procession of historians including Bernadotte Schmitt, Frederick Schuman, and Veit Valentin.  
Strikingly, both within and without those moments of chaos, European politics tended to 
be discussed as European politics, its link to specific U.S. foreign policies left implicit. U.S. 
interests were much more explicitly presented in discussions of Asian politics. Perhaps 
surprisingly, given Cleveland’s role in Atlantic trading networks, Asia was covered almost as 
much Europe, although the flow events meant that the peak seasons came in 1937-39, 1941-42, 
and 1944-45. Cleveland’s taste for Pacific affairs was the result of Emeny’s commitment to the 
Institute of Pacific Relations.170 The Institute’s promotion of India as a future, independent 
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player in the region, for instance, explains why the subcontinent was talked about fairly often.171 
But the battle between Japan and China dominated discussion. Japan was presented largely as a 
menace, (nationalist) China as a darling.172 Hu Shih, the noted linguist and diplomat who served 
as China’s ambassador to the United States from 1938 to 1942, paid three visits, speaking on 
“China’s Reconstruction,” “China’s Struggle for Freedom,” and “China Fights for Freedom.” 
Sinologists, notably Owen Lattimore, chimed in on similar themes, presenting China as both an 
honorable victim and on its way to modernity, while the Council also sponsored performances of 
Chinese drama and music. Japanese representatives were thin on the ground, and Japanese policy 
was therefore analyzed, rather than represented. Long before 1941, Japanese policy was discussed 
as a peril, a direct line drawn by figures such as Upton Close, Nathaniel Peffer, No-Yong Park, 
Walter Judd, Admiral Harry Yarnell, and the chair of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Edward 
C. Carter. American interests were at stake here, far more so than in Europe: if a crisis was 
coming, it was coming from the Far East. 
Monroe Doctrine matters persisted even as the United States took up the burden beyond 
the Western Hemisphere. Discussion of the Soviet Union was remarkably rare, even as late as 
1946 and 1947, and the Council’s programming betrayed little sense of either an emerging threat 
or an important ally. World trade and international economics popped up from time to time, but 
in no sustained way. And, again reflecting Emeny’s own concerns, internationalism of the 
institutional variety was remarkably absent. The League of Nations had almost no reach here, 
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despite Baker’s commitments. The Council’s concentration on the harder sides of power meant 
that, until the debate over the Dumbarton Oaks accords, only Clarence Streit, speaking on 
“Union Now,” and Manley Hudson’s reflections on the World Court received a hearing. Even 
after the autumn of 1944, the United Nations was approached skeptically, from a power-political 
perspective, in stark contrast to the national picture. In the following two seasons, not a single 
major Council meeting was devoted to international institutions. If the foreign policy elite had 
been interested in a genuine back and forth, one would surely find its elements in the Council’s 
programs, but we do not. What we do find is the relentless presentation of an implicit case for 
the inescapability of American power. 
 What the Council put on is one thing, but which of its offerings was popular? The 
Council’s staff kept statistics for its main events only until 1941, and while they show a very 
gradual uptick in average attendance from 200 or so towards 300 at a set-piece speech, the 
Council quickly became capable of putting on headline events drawing large crowds of three or 
four times that. As far as crowds went, fame mattered, and topic did not. Least interesting to 
Cleveland audiences were the academic experts and journalists who provided the bulk of the 
Council’s programming. In the 1940-41 season, for instance, newspapermen such as Hanson W. 
Baldwin (New York Times), Carroll Binder (Chicago Daily News), William Henry Chamberlin 
(Christian Science Monitor), and Rey Scott (Life) all drew mediocre attendances. Herbert Bolton, 
a University of California historian, John McCullogh of the Foreign Policy Association, and 
even Jacob Viner, the Chicago economist, scarcely performed any better. 
What mattered that year, as every other, was notoriety, and in particular proximity to the 
diplomatic action. Sumner Welles, speaking on “Defense and American Foreign Policy” in 
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September 1940, drew close to the largest crowd, followed by the Assistant Secretary of State 
Adolf Berle, the Pulitzer Prize-winning correspondent Edgar Ansel Mowrer, and the former 
Belgian Prime Minister Paul van Zeeland. All, however, came off second best to a perpetual star 
of the lecture circuit, immensely popular with the wealthy women who had time to attend 
Council events: Vera Micheles Dean, the Foreign Policy Association researcher, who discussed 
“America’s Choice Today” before a thousand Clevelanders.173 Cleveland’s preference for foreign 
policy celebrities worked well enough while major figures were available to speak, especially from 
the State Department. But if expertise of the practical kind became less approachable, trouble 
was sure to follow.174 
 
* * * * * 
 
Was the Cleveland Council a success? It was seen that way. At a farewell dinner when Emeny 
left Cleveland for New York and the Foreign Policy Association in September 1947, tributes 
were read from John Foster Dulles and James Shotwell.175 Realpolitikers like Allen Dulles and 
Edward Mead Earle expressed their admiration at one point or another.176 Even Whitney 
Shepardson, who was constantly irritated by Emeny when he worked for the Council on Foreign 
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Relations, slyly noted in the fall of 1946 that “other people, as well as Emeny himself, feel that 
the Cleveland Council has developed in a remarkable way.”177 But on what were such 
assessments based? There was a good amount of confirmation bias, to be sure. Emeny’s reports 
to his donors and especially the Carnegie foundations were full of membership and attendance 
figures, the latter always suspect as statistics because they counted the total attendance at Council 
activities, eliding the fact that many went to multiple events in a season. Were even those 
inflated numbers impressive? To an extent, they were. It was one of the paradoxes of adult 
education that it appealed everywhere to the already educated, particularly people with high 
school diplomas and college degrees. In the 1940 census, 340,421 of the 755,292 residents of the 
Cleveland Metropolitan District who were aged over 25 had at least one year of high school 
under their belts, and just 42,605 had graduated from a four-year college.178 Membership in the 
Council, purchased by 2,919 people in the 1940-41 season, was the province of a minority. On 
the most charitable reading possible, the inflated attendance of 22,771 that year might have 
represented half of Cleveland’s fully educated audience. By 1947, the proportion of Cleveland’s 
population being reached was much higher. 
But Emeny, Witman, and others associated with the Council never ventured to gauge the 
educational impact of their program. Adult education as a discipline had few ways to measure its 
own success, even if anecdotal evidence suggested to the prominent Iowan editor W. W. 
Waymack that organized discussion had had its role in changing foreign policy views in the 
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Midwest.179 As one theorist put it, adult education had multiple objectives, from “an increase in 
the individual’s store of knowledge,” to “the stimulation of a desire for further study,” from “the 
development of critical judgment” to “the critical analysis of self.” But the adult education leader 
had “to depend almost entirely upon his subjective judgment as to whether a method works or 
does not work.”180 Cherrington, in Denver, had tried to apply common tests to his Foundation’s 
methods, but found them insufficient.181 All that was left was inference from growing demand, 
which was analytically impossible to separate from the supply of information about world events. 
Emeny was impressed by the claims on the Council’s services in the aftermath of World War II, 
but, in his annual report for 1945-46, he noted honestly that “there is no way to accurately 
evaluate the ramifications of this influence.”182  
Whether the Council had expanded because of a growth of interest in foreign policy or 
because of its institutional skill was hard to say, although its failure to grow its membership 
beyond a certain level pointed more to the former than the latter. Nobody looked, at this point at 
least, to opinion polls, or to community surveys. Nor did anybody confidently draw a direct line 
from educational efforts on the local level to the monumental shift in the United States’ world 
role, or vice versa: there was a correlation, to be sure, but the causation was unclear. All that 
could be said was that in the Midwest, apparently against the odds, the Council had prospered. 
The Council had become a model for how an expert could transform a community’s efforts to 
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understand its world. It was a model that, in short order, would be replicated with varying 
success across the country.  
 
* * * * * 
 
“Outsiders frequently wonder why Cleveland is more international-minded than most Midwest 
cities,” TIME magazine wrote in March 1943. For an answer, it suggested, Clevelanders pointed 
to the Council, which had brought a “Who’s Who of international affairs” to town. The “slender, 
dark-haired Brooks Emeny’s restrained manner conceals a burning intensity of purpose,” the 
writer claimed, and “firmly believes that 40 councils like Cleveland’s could knock isolationism 
into a cocked hat.” It was, after all, a “powerful educational instrument.”183 Luce’s writer did not 
ask what or whom the Council was an instrument of, but, by 1947, the Chicago Tribune certainly 
knew. Upon the festivities of the “Report from the World,” the chosen daily of the America First 
Committee blasted the “lickspittle members of the Cleveland Council” for “war mongering and 
America Last.”184  
Indeed, it is tempting simply to see the Council as a vehicle for a hegemonic elite, using 
support from the state, and the foundations that served it, to manipulate public consent for 
globalist ends. It was not, at least not quite. As we have seen, unlike the major national 
institutions it associated itself with, the Cleveland Council depended not simply on top-down 
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coercion, but on bottom-up energy, too. It relied on volunteers, on donations, on goodwill. 
Perhaps those energies were the result of the elite’s control of ideas, which filtered down into the 
population and resulted in action that merely reinforced those same ideas, as Inderjeet Parmar 
might claim?185 But this is a narrow view of activism, for one thing. For another, it underestimates 
the room for disagreement that was deliberately left even by people like Emeny, who, let us recall, 
was a Yale-trained geopolitical realist, Council on Foreign Relations member, and State 
Department advisor — and should, by all accounts, have been a rank publicist for intervention. 
 There can be no doubt that the Cleveland Council’s programs had a political direction. 
The core claims being presented implied a profound shift in American foreign policy, even if 
Emeny always phrased his policy vision in a conservative language of duties. Receiving 
information about the world, in this view, would lead Americans to understand that America was 
in the world, and had responsibilities by virtue of its power. Even so, Emeny protested any 
suggestions of bias. In one December 1939 radio address, delivered during a “Foreign Affairs 
Week” that was proclaimed by the city’s mayor, Emeny declared that the Council had no 
“official policy or program of action,” and that it was “the very essence of democracy as opposed 
to a dictatorship that all policies should be based upon the friendly exchange of ideas and 
convictions leading to workable compromise.” Yet, like all social scientists concerned with 
education, Emeny had conviction in his facts. Every Council member could hold his own views, 
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he said, although “if he is intellectually honest such views will naturally be altered from time to 
time under normal processes of education.”186 But because adult education subjected the fruits of 
social science to public test, education did not always work out as planned. Sometimes, indeed, 
the students got ahead of the teachers. 
 Given Emeny’s trenchant belief in the fact and range of American power, we might 
expect him to have joined the interventionist cause after the outbreak of European war. Was this 
not the moment for the United States to realize the destiny of its power, to take up the 
responsibilities it had declined so painfully two decades prior? For some it was, but Emeny was 
not so sure. Unlike his teacher, Spykman, Emeny’s scholarship granted him faith in the United 
States’ ability to ride out general war, a widely-held position as late as 1939 that came under fatal 
attack from strategists after the fall of France. Emeny believed that the U.S. would be secure even 
in the event of a Nazi Europe; others, in more powerful positions, redefined U.S. security in the 
face of that treat.187 Moreover, Emeny’s understanding of public opinion and, importantly, the 
authority that his success in Cleveland bestowed to talk about it, cautioned him against a rush 
even to aid the allied democracies. In his view, the rancorous debate between the Committee to 
Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDAAA) and the America First Committee obscured the 
deeper educational task that needed to be done. World leadership would come, he knew, but he 
was not comfortable with a quick, cursory discussion about how, when, and why. 
 
186 “Address by Brooks Emeny – WHK – December 15, 1939,” CCWA, Box 1. 
187 Wertheim, “Tomorrow, the World,” pp. 83-181. For a retrospective evaluation of Emeny’s arguments and 
statistics compared to Spykman’s, see Robert J. Art, “The United States, The Balance of Power, and World War II: 
Was Spykman Right?” Security Studies 14 (April 2005), pp. 364-406. 
  
165 
 Like many Americans, Emeny feared involvement in another world war. In 1936, he told 
Baker that if the Cleveland Council could assist “the concerted efforts of responsible citizens to 
insure the guidance of reason as opposed to passion,” surely the country might be “saved from the 
disasters of involvement.”188 Emeny disparaged the inflexibility of the Neutrality Acts, but in 
speeches between Munich and Pearl Harbor he made clear that he thought the United States 
could and should stay out of any future war.189 In a speech to the Council in October 1939, 
entitled “Now America Must Decide,” he declared that “‘consciousness of power’ denotes not 
only the ability to utilize that power but also the wisdom to know when to withhold its use,” and 
that “our duty as well as our national interest lies in the preservation of our power and reason in a 
world gone mad to the end that we may perform effectively our most important future role 
which lies in the period of reconstruction.” “Economically, strategically and politically,” he 
concluded, “it is to our interest to remain aloof.”190 Fear of further war was not unusual among 
interwar internationalists, and a preference for an America that kept to itself was common even 
among a new breed of realists. Even William Allen White, the old Midwestern progressive who 
was the CDAAA’s figurehead for a time, declared that “the Yanks are not coming.”191 What 
distinguished Emeny from his peers was the strength and longevity of his convictions. 
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 Emeny’s was not simply a strategic argument. He knew that the United States had 
responsibilities in the world that it was not properly taking up. He knew, too, that if the United 
States entered the war, as was likely, it would win and win easily. Never a member of the America 
First Committee, despite invitations and a basic agreement on policy, to call him an “isolationist” 
would be absurd, and his views show that adopting such binary language obscures far more than 
it reveals. For Emeny, the question was whether people were ready for what would have to come 
after the war. Were they ready finally to resolve the tension he had identified in The Great Powers 
between Wilson’s Fourteen Points and Washington’s Farewell Address? Emeny thought not, and 
it was precisely for that reason that his Council existed. “Unless it is America’s intention to 
become henceforth a permanent and dominant part of the political systems of Europe and Asia,” 
he said late in 1939, “it is sheer folly to participate in their wars.”192 Even as Paris capitulated, 
Emeny held strong. On an airplane from Hong Kong to San Francisco, he made a note that he 
later read to the Council: 
While the Atlantic and Pacific provides ready highways for travel and the transport 
of our naval and military supplies abroad, they have served in the past as an 
insuperable barrier to our effective participation in the political systems of extra-
American regions. The American situation is such as to make us apparently 
incapable of functioning in time of peace as though we were a part of the European 
and Asiatic regional political life. The paradox of our position arises thus from the 
fact that our impulse to achieve goals, realizable only through trans-oceanic 
crusades, cannot be justified unless we have previously determined to remain after 
such wars the dominant power in the regions to which we have gone to fight to 




192 Emeny, “Now America Must Decide.” 
193 Brooks Emeny, Frontiers of National Defense (Cleveland: Foreign Affairs Council of Cleveland, 1941), pp. 10-11. 
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Despite his service as a foreign policy advisor to Wendell Willkie in the 1940 campaign, these 
were words that Emeny invoked repeatedly, including to the American Political Science 
Association in December. The public, he said, was not yet ready for such commitments. 
Emeny held his views so strongly that he testified against the Lend-Lease Bill in January 
1941, on the same day as Lindbergh appeared before the House. Congressmen in Emeny’s own 
party used his research against the Roosevelt administration, and Emeny agreed with them that 
there was nothing “outside of this hemisphere that is so vital to us that we have to go fight for it, 
in the way of raw materials.” But that was not the principal reason for his reluctance. “We waged 
the last war, and we lost the peace,” he told his own congresswoman, Frances P. Bolton, who 
voted against the bill. “What is so very overwhelming about it,” he said, “is that it has to be our 
peace that has to be waged, and imposed; and I am not so sure that we have made up our minds 
as to what our peace has to be.” Materiel could not be granted to Britain without taking sides in 
the war, and to take sides in the war was to take sides in a future peace. The smaller issues of aid 
therefore mattered less than the fundamental stakes of the decision. “We are faced now,” he told 
Karl Mundt, 
with the question of whether we are going to extend the periphery of American 
power across the seas to Europe and to Asia, and maintain them there, not only in 





If Americans did not understand this, then entry into the war would be an active threat to future 
world peace.194 Emeny’s views found favor with the editors of the Chicago Tribune, but he faced 
severe disapproval from his friends, and the bill passed regardless.195 
 Even after Lend-Lease became law in March, Emeny still believed that the larger 
problem had not been solved. It was in May that he lost his audience. In a set-piece speech to the 
Council, “Frontiers of National Defense,” Emeny continued to insist that “if there is to be an 
Anglo-American ‘New Order’ as opposed to an Axis ‘New Order,’ there must not only be full 
American participation in the machinery of peace, but likewise in the maintenance of peace.” 
And now he accused the president and his interventionist supporters of duplicity. The CDAAA, 
he said, was launching “continental crusades,” and by continuing to say that aid was a means of 
avoiding war, it was “deceiving the American public by intriguing their acceptance of programs of 
action whose ultimate consequences would prove entirely different from what was claimed.” 
Citing six years of history, from the Neutrality Acts to the verge of war, Emeny argued that  
a nation which has passed through so many gyrations of opinions and has been so 
easily swayed emotionally from one side to another, is not a nation which has 
reached as yet an emotional and rational stability sufficient to enable it to meet with 
unflinching purpose the problems inherent in commitments already made. 
 
This was dangerous, for “in the long run the most important factor in world relations is not the 
military power of Germany, is not the naval power of Japan, but the actual and potential power of 
 
194 Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-Seventh Congress, First Session, on 
H. R. 1776, January 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 1941 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), 
pp. 465-477. 
195 Emeny, “The Defense of America: A Critique of Our Policy,” Chicago Tribune (January 26, 1941), p. 14. This 
was a reprint of Emeny’s address to the American Political Science Association, but the article had a slight tweak. 
At APSA, Emeny had said that permanent commitments were “a policy which geography and tradition have thus 
far not permitted.” In print, they were a policy which geography and tradition “do not permit.” 
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the United States.” Roosevelt was not being honest; the paradox of The Great Powers was still at 
play. And the American people, he concluded, “must fast come to the decision that if it is again to 
fight a war and to win a war, it must this time win the peace.”196 
 The problem was that many of Emeny’s members had become staunch interventionists, 
even members of the CDAAA itself. Their reaction was visceral. “Has Hitler Done Nothing?” 
steamed Emeny’s friends on the editorial pages of the Plain Dealer. The newspaper assailed him 
as an appeaser who failed “to take account of the nature of totalitarianism,” who did not 
understand that “the United States would be committing national suicide if it failed to recognize 
this threat to the hemisphere.” Emeny’s argument about the inherent security of the United 
States, in other words, had lost. Contrary to Emeny’s claims that Americans had been duped, or 
at least not fully informed, the newspaper insisted that  
the American people may not at the moment see the full consequences of the course 
on which they are embarked, but they pretty thoroughly realize the consequences 
to them of a Hitler victory and their failure to do anything. All Europe stands as a 
tragic warning. 
 
What Emeny had called “hard-boiled realism” was nothing more than opportunism, as amoral as 
the foreign policy of the dictators, and in truth the editorial had a point: for Emeny, ideology was 
never a driving force for policy. “Continued indifference and complacency would be more 
dangerous to the future of America that the so-called ‘emotionalism’ which Dr. Emeny deplores,” 
the paper wrote. On that basis, what Emeny wrongly deplored was a valid response to Hitler.197 
 
196 Emeny, Frontiers of National Defense. 
197 “Has Hitler Done Nothing?” Cleveland Plain Dealer (May 12, 1941), p. 6; “Mrs. Fuldheim Raps Emeny 
‘Confusion’,” Cleveland Plain Dealer (May 15, 1941), p. 18; “In Support of Emeny,” Cleveland Plain Dealer (May 18, 
1941), p. 21. 
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  A letter to the Plain Dealer, published a few days later, surely stung still more. Josephine 
Irwin was a noted local suffragist, a distinguished member of the Council, a leader of its women’s 
discussion group, and a convert to the CDAAA’s cause. She was, she wrote, a devoted follower of 
Emeny’s. But she was repulsed by Emeny’s claim that the CDAAA was “motivated either by 
‘ignorance or dishonesty.’” Surely, she wrote, she could not be ignorant. After all, she had learned 
from a scholar. Of what, then, did her “dishonesty” consist? Listening to Newton Baker? 
Preferring world organization to world anarchy? Deploring neutrality and isolation? All this she 
was taught. “My dishonesty,” she continued, “is composed further of a belief that where power is, 
there also is responsibility, and, that until the United States assumes a role in world politics 
which is commensurate with its vast power, there can be no peace!” And last, she concluded, her 
deceit was 
comprised of a knowledge that until the ‘ignorant and dishonest’ in America uphold 
these simple and incontrovertible facts, war is inevitable. Until these facts are 
accepted, the combined programs of our dearest enemies cannot save America. Our 
dearest enemies: the America First Committee, the Communists, the Bundists, the 
Social Action Committee of the Northeast Ohio Synod of the Evangelical 
Reformed Church, a young man who has become a profound authority on 
international relations because he had the wind at his back when he flew the 
Atlantic in 1927, the United Mothers of America who are having such a gloriously 
exciting time aiding Hitler with their martyrdom, and Dr. Emeny.198 
 
Yet still Emeny did not recant.  
 Emeny was not willing to sacrifice his belief in the need for an informed public in order 
to secure a policy that he, fundamentally, agreed with. The trade-off was too dangerous. Being 
the “military, naval, and air ‘Arsenal of Democracy’,” he told a Connecticut Foreign Policy 
 
198 “Education for What?” Cleveland Plain Dealer ( June 1, 1941), p. 21. 
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Association branch as late as October, America “became likewise committed to the task of 
assuming the role of the world’s economic and political arsenal.” History therefore risked 
repeating itself, as while Hitler had a plan for world domination, the United States had none. 
“We don’t know what we are going to do when Hitler is destroyed,” Emeny pointed out. “Unless 
we free ourselves from the misrule of pressure groups by intelligent study of our problems,” he 
concluded, “we will again lose the peace, even though we win the war.”199 The American people 
were not yet sufficiently informed, sufficiently educated, to take up their burdens, he said. Of 
course, this was a position that justified the continuing necessity of his Council and the 
movement he hoped it would lead, and it was one that he continued to hold; others would return 
to it in time. But if such convictions were quite rare among internationalists like Emeny in 1939, 
they were vanishingly so by 1941. Sensing their opportunity, internationalists at the Foreign 
Policy Association and elsewhere weakened their commitment to education in pursuit of the 
policies and ultimate goals they sought; Emeny shared the goal of a responsible United States, 
but feared a war that would come all too quickly to make that possible. For a crucial period of 
time, he dissented; for all he had done to create a public in Cleveland, he feared he had not done 
enough. It was a fear for which he withstood extreme public criticism. 
These were questions that went to the heart of the internationalists’ progressive 
inheritance. Should the public come first, or the policies? What should happen if experts and the 
public diverged? What was the duty of the educator to present all sides of a problem, if one side 
 
199 “Excerpts from Speech delivered by Brooks Emeny Before the Foreign Policy Association, Hartford, October 29, 
1941,” Emeny Papers, Box 39; “Mustn’t Lose Peace Again, Says Emeny,” Hartford Courier (October 30, 1941), p. 
19; Emeny to Nelson Rockefeller, October 11, 1941, Emeny Papers, Box 39.  
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became widely seen, even morally sanctioned, as right, and the other as wrong? The democratic 
character of American world leadership would depend on the answers. 
 Emeny was right about one thing: war came. On December 6, Cleveland hosted the 
second conference of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations to take place in 
Ohio. Five Republican members of Congress were there, led by Frances Bolton. So too were a 
hundred or so other delegates. On the first day, the consensus appeared to be that Japan would 
continue its “fence sitting” policy as long as possible.200 Conflict appeared distant. But at lunch on 
the second day, Emeny was called to the telephone. Quietly, he silenced the Country Club’s 
radios, gathered the delegates, and asked Edward C. Carter, the secretary-general of the Institute, 
to tell the audience what had happened. As the Plain Dealer reported with a rare clarity of simile, 




200 “Holds Allies Now At War With Japs,” Cleveland Plain Dealer (December 7, 1941), p. 8. 





The War for a Democratic Foreign Policy 
 
On the first Tuesday in February, 1943, the board members of the Cleveland Foreign Affairs 
Council gathered for a meeting. News had probably not yet reached them that Red Army troops 
were accepting the surrender of the German Sixth Army that day, ending the Battle of 
Stalingrad and setting in train an arduous drive west that would bring the Soviet Union into the 
heart of Europe. Either way, the trustees were concerned with another, parallel revolution in 
international politics. America was ascendant, America was in the world, and Brooks Emeny 
wanted to his Council to reflect that.  
Gone was the Foreign Affairs Council of old, founded in a time when the outside world 
had seemed distant and forbidding. In its place stood the Cleveland Council on World Affairs. 
What did this rebranding matter? As Emeny wrote to Raymond Fosdick of the Rockefeller 
Foundation, perhaps it made “no difference what title a local organization might assume, 
whether it was a Foreign Policy Association, a World Affairs Council, or a Foreign Affairs 
Institute,” if its programs had similar aims.1 After all, although the phrase “world affairs” was in 
wide use to describe America’s relationship with the outside world by this point, “foreign affairs” 
and “foreign policy” were much more so. But the idea of “world affairs” at least nodded to the 
burst of global thinking that Americans had embarked upon. While intellectuals debated what a 
 
1 Brooks Emeny to Raymond Fosdick, April 3, 1943, CCWA, Box 1. 
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postwar world could and should look like, ordinary citizens bought maps by the million, maps 
redrawn by cartographers to make visible the perceived insecurity of the United States.2 Books on 
international relations became bestsellers, and One World, written by Emeny’s idol Wendell 
Willkie, became the fastest-selling non-fiction book in history. It was a craze that testified, one 
reviewer wrote, to a feeling “of a world opening up.”3 Radios brought the world into American 
lives like never before, and if foreign policy was now a matter of hearth and home, a Foreign 
Policy Association staffer said, “there can be nothing foreign about that!”4 Many Americans, too, 
came to understand that the power to reshape that world was theirs. As the geographer Matthew 
Farish has written, “the entire planet became an American strategic environment.”5 
Renaming the Cleveland Council acknowledged that. As the Cleveland Plain Dealer 
reported, the revised title was considered “in keeping with the change which has taken place in 
the foreign relations of the United States with respect to the world as a whole.”6 But the new 
name was not only descriptive, but normative. If America held new responsibilities, Americans 
themselves had to be convinced that they held new responsibilities, too. Gone was the Council’s 
old slogan, “Foreign Affairs are Your Affairs”; now it read “World Affairs are Your Affairs.” 
 
2 Or Rosenboim, The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the United States, 1939-1950 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017); Susan Schulten, The Geographical Imagination in America, 1880-1950 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), pp. 204-238; Timothy Barney, Mapping the Cold War: Cartography 
and the Framing of America’s International Power (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), pp. 25-60. 
3 Samuel Zipp, “When Wendell Willkie Went Visiting: Between Interdependency and Exceptionalism in the Public 
Feeling for One World,” American Literary History 26 (2014), p. 485; see also John M. Jordan, “A Small World of 
Little Americans: The $1 Diplomacy of Wendell Willkie’s One World,” Indiana Magazine of History 88 (1992), pp. 
173-204; Samuel Zipp, “Dilemmas of World-Wide Thinking: Popular Geographies and the Problem of Empire in 
Wendell Willkie’s Search for One World,” Modern American History 1 (2018), pp. 295-319. 
4 Memorandum from Helen M. Daggett, June 18, 1948, Emeny Papers, Box 40. 
5 Matthew Farish, The Contours of America’s Cold War (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), p. 1. 
6 “Foreign Council to Change Name,” Cleveland Plain Dealer (February 3, 1943), p. 15. 
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* * * * * 
 
The United States ended World War II as the world’s supreme power, its military dominion 
crowned by an atomic monopoly and clothed in international institutions. It was the only state to 
fight a genuinely global war, and yet the only power to escape the ravages of destruction at 
home.7 Even so, the war tied Americans to the foreign policy exercised in their name in wholly 
new ways. Millions donned uniform and traveled the world to fight and die. Many left the shores 
of the United States for the first time, and saw the world afresh when they did. Those who 
stayed at home necessarily had a certain distance, sensory and emotional, from the conflict.8 But 
they were told that their labor on the home front matched the ultimate sacrifices made on fronts 
faraway, as if America’s was the same total war waged to the death elsewhere. It was not. The 
economy boomed as the United States deployed the colossal productive capacity long feared by 
its adversaries and trusted in by its friends. The war cost the United States about $350 billion, or 
north of $4 trillion today, but it was able to fund a significant proportion of its borrowing 
through war bonds, which were bought by almost every family in the nation. Others paid for the 
fight in income taxes, filing with the Internal Revenue Service for the first time in their lives, or 
 
7 Dennis Showalter, “Global Yet Not Total: The U.S. War Effort and Its Consequences,” in Roger Chickering, Stig 
Förster, and Bernd Greiner (eds.), A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937-1945 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 109-133. Of course, this statement ignores the war as fought 
in America’s colonies, but then, many Americans ignored that war, too. Cf. Daniel Immerwahr, How to Hide an 
Empire: A History of the Greater United States (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2019). 
8 Mary L. Dudziak, “You didn’t see him lying … beside the gravel road in France”: Death, Distance, and American 
War Politics,” Diplomatic History 42 (2018), pp. 1-16; Mary L. Dudziak, “Death and the War Power,” Yale Journal 
of Law & the Humanities 30 (2018), pp. 25-62. 
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at much increased rates. The taxpaying citizenry thereby acquired a direct financial stake in the 
foreign policies of their government, and started to pay the costs of world leadership.9 
Surely developments like these inculcated what Elizabeth Borgwardt has assumed to be a 
new “cosmopolitanism” within Americans, who inevitably and actively supported the militarily 
dominant role in the world that the foreign policy elite had planned and executed since the fall of 
France?10 We might assume so, but it is not necessarily the case. Certainly, policymakers at the 
time made no assumptions, and in fact they were so concerned that, in the absence of serious, 
future foreign threats, they located the primary threat to their new world order in the minds of 
the American people. “The real battleground of this war is the field of American opinion,” said 
Archibald MacLeish, the poet who led the government’s information agencies and became the 
first assistant secretary of state for public affairs.11 Franklin Roosevelt learned from Woodrow 
Wilson’s perceived mistakes, defining war aims early, settling postwar planning during the war, 
and ensuring bipartisan support. Under wartime conditions and with technologies that Wilson 
lacked, the administration was able to set the terms of the debate, and to tailor its propaganda to 
a more precise estimate of public moods.12 
 
9 James J. Kimble, Mobilizing the Home Front: War Bonds and Domestic Propaganda (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 2006); James T. Sparrow, Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 114-115, 122-127, 261-264; Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New 
Deal and the Origins of Our Time (New York: Liveright, 2013), pp. 345-346.  
10 Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), pp. 76-86. 
11 Qu. in Justin Hart, Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 83. 
12 Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and the War Against Nazi Germany 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Michael Leigh, Mobilizing Consent: Public Opinion and American 
Foreign Policy, 1937-1947 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976). 
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 The public already seemed to be supportive of a world role in the months before Pearl 
Harbor, as Stephen Wertheim has argued; the administration therefore just had to make the 
public sure of its convictions.13 Events played a role. So did the unanimity of the mass media and 
the political parties. Binaries finished off the job. The most important was that between 
“internationalism,” its meaning vague but tending towards global military predominance, and 
“isolationism,” cast as an immoral desire to return to the failed policies of a rewritten past.14 
Polling encouraged people to think of the debate in stark terms, and framed the nation’s destiny 
as a simple, obvious choice: 
Which of these two things do you think the United States should try to do when 
the war is over: stay out of world affairs as much as we can, or take an active part in 
world affairs? 
 
Albeit a false dichotomy, this question became the standard measurement of public opinion, and 
a steady three in four respondents answered positively, or thereabouts, between roughly 1940 and 
1973, numbers that to pollsters implied unanimous consent.15 With political opposition muted, 
the take-it-or-leave-it offers presented to Congress passed easily. “We shall have to take the 
responsibility for world collaboration,” Roosevelt told Congress on March 1, 1945, “or we shall 
have to bear the responsibility for another world conflict.”16 
 
13 Wertheim, “Tomorrow, the World,” pp. 227-270; Jerome S. Bruner, Mandate From the People (New York: Duell, 
Sloan, and Pearce, 1944), pp. 30-63. 
14 Historiographical revisionism was a process that the Foreign Policy Association supported, especially in Thomas 
A. Bailey, America’s Foreign Policies: Past and Present (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1943). 
15 Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 176. 
16 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Address to Congress on the Yalta Conference,” March 1, 1945, American Presidency 
Project, presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16591.  
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 The comfort of this apparent consensus worried experts. “Let no one assume,” wrote 
Jerome Bruner, the deputy chief of Princeton’s Office of Public Opinion Research and a 
consultant for the Office of War Information, “that because opinion is favorable to 
internationalism today, there are no worries for the future.”17 After all, “public opinion frequently 
abates in the face of a fait accompli,” and foreign policy remained “notoriously impersonal to John 
Citizen.”18 Even Percy Bidwell, ensconced at the Council on Foreign Relations, worried after the 
end of the war about a “great gap between the ideal of a public sufficiently well informed to 
influence foreign policy effectively, as it should in a democracy, and the actuality of a public 
largely indifferent to critical situations in our foreign policy.”19 The Office of War Information 
and the State Department promoted the ideal of an “engaged citizen who advocated 
internationalism” throughout the war, but while internationalists could be found everywhere, 
citizens sufficiently engaged to satisfy scholars and statesmen apparently could not.20 
 The policy goals of the Foreign Policy Association appeared to have been achieved. The 
United States was in the world; the United Nations was a reality. “No people are now as a whole 
better informed on world affairs than is the case with citizens of the United States,” the 
Washington Post had supposed even a year before war broke out in Europe.21 Information about 
 
17 Bruner, Mandate from the People, p. 223. 
18 Jerome S. Bruner, “Public Opinion and America’s Foreign Policy,” American Sociological Review 9 (1944), pp. 50-
56. 
19 Percy Bidwell, “Introduction,” in W. Harold Dalgliesh, Community Education in Foreign Affairs: A Report on 
Activities in Nineteen American Cities (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1946), pp. vii-viii. 
20 Susan A. Brewer, Why America Fights: Patriotism and War Propaganda from the Philippines to Iraq (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 129. 
21 “The F.P.A.,” Washington Post (December 8, 1938), p. 10. 
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the world circulated in the public domain as never before, raising the question as to whether 
there was any need for the Association to exist at all. But the same argument could be made that, 
as one Rockefeller Foundation official said, it was “harvest time” for the Association, an 
opportunity to make the democratic foreign policy it had always hoped for a reality.22 As 
historians have asked, was the war not just a “triumph of internationalism,” but a triumph of 
internationalists?23 Surely the nation’s most esteemed foreign affairs group would prosper? On 
some levels, indeed, it did. Its membership doubled, to 31,103 in 1945; its subscriptions rose; it 
sold publications like never before.24 Superficially, it might look like the war made the Foreign 
Policy Association, just as it made the Council on Relations. But not all was as it seemed. Crisis 
streaked through its success, and in that crisis lay trouble for the democratic foreign policy that 
the Association sought for the first democratic superpower. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Just two months after the debacle at Munich, the Foreign Policy Association celebrated its 
twentieth anniversary, an occasion that attracted a chorus of praise, front-page news stories, and 
editorials in newspapers nationwide. It found “its membership at the highest point in its history 
 
22 Joseph H. Willits, “General Frank R. McCoy,” August 28, 1945, RF, Box 334, Folder 3979. 
23 See, e.g., Robert A. Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II (New 
York: Atheneum, 1967); Dorothy B. Robins, Experiment in Democracy: The Story of U.S. Citizen Organizations in 
Forging the Charter of the United Nations (New York: Parkside Press, 1971); Andrew Johnstone, Dilemmas of 
Internationalism: The American Association for the United Nations and US Foreign Policy (Farnham: Palgrave, 2009). 
24 “Informal Report of the President for the Year 1945,” Emeny Papers, Box 39, pp. 2-3. 
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— over 17,000 members in forty-eight states and fifty-five foreign countries.”25 It had 17 
branches, led by men like the future attorney general and Nuremberg judge Francis Biddle, and 
the future special assistant to the secretary of war, Harvey Bundy. Its National Council counted 
Carrie Chapman Catt, Manley Hudson, Thomas W. Lamont, Owen D. Young, and William 
Allen White among its members. It had a staff of 47, including a research department of 11.26 Its 
Reports and its other publications were listed on syllabi at 76 universities.27 Its scholars were 
warmly greeted for private interviews from the halls of 10 Downing Street to the hills of Yenan.28 
It received birthday greetings from the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and the United 
States, as well as Henry Wallace, Henry Stimson, and John Foster Dulles. Walter Lippmann 
sent a telegram; so did John Dewey. “I know of no organization,” the philosopher wrote in 
perhaps the most revealing praise of all, “which has combined more effectively than the F.P.A. 
research work and dissemination of the results of its own studies.”  
There was no institution quite like the Association anywhere else in the world.29 “Today 
all foreigners who travel through the United States are surprised to see how wide the interest is 
 
25 “F.P.A. Celebrating 20th Anniversary,” Foreign Policy Bulletin 18 (December 2, 1938), p. 2. 
26 “Report on the Work of the Foreign Policy Association, January – September 1938,” October 1938, CC, Box 147. 
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28 T. A. Bisson’s trip to visit Mao Zedong, which was paid for by the Rockefeller Foundation, informed T. A. 
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1937 (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, 1973). 
29 Twenty Years of the Foreign Policy Association (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1939), pp. 17-31; Sonia 
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in international questions,” the war correspondent Sonia Tomara wrote, and it was “newspapers, 
the radio and the Foreign Policy Association” that were responsible for having made Americans 
‘foreign minded’.”30 Even skeptics of American power had to admire it. Take Charles Beard, who 
at the time was decrying the “huge vested interest” that had developed in foreign affairs, making 
“frenetic preoccupation with foreign quarrels” a “heavy industry in this country”:  
Hundreds of professors, instructors, and assistants, sustained by endowments, 
lecture to students, forums, women’s clubs, academies, and dinner parties on their 
favorite theme—the duty of the United States to set the world aright. Peace 
societies, associations for the ‘study’ of foreign affairs, councils, leagues, and 
committees for this and that, with millions of dollars at their disposal, are engaged 
in the same kind of propaganda, openly or under the guise of contemporary 
‘scholarship.’31 
 
But Beard was still paying membership dues. He praised the Association for “the exacting care 
which marks its publications and the catholicity of opinion displayed at its public discussions.”32 
 The Association was not yet a vehicle for internationalism alone. It hosted Nazis and 
fascists on its stage, as well as those whom its researchers derided as “isolationists.”33 And that 
 
30 “Foreign Policy Group Birthday Is Hailed by Hull and Halifax,” New York Herald Tribune (December 4, 1938), p. 
A1. 
31 Charles A. Beard, “Giddy Minds and Foreign Quarrels,” Harper’s (September 1939), p. 338. 
32 Twenty Years of the Foreign Policy Association, p. 28. For Beard’s 1936 praise of adult education, specifically in 
foreign affairs, see Charles A. Beard, “Preface,” in Mary L. Ely, Adult Education in Action (New York: American 
Association for Adult Education, 1937), pp. vii-x. On the shift in Beard’s political thought from the end of World 
War I to the start of World War II, see David Milne, Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy (New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), pp. 123-167; Richard Drake, Charles Austin Beard: The Return of the Master 
Historian of American Imperialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018). 
33 Cf. Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the 
Rise of American Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), p. 83. In January 1939, the Nazi Colin Ross 
appeared on the Association’s New York stage alongside a former German diplomat and John deWilde. Ross, who 
declared that “nothing could shake my faith in this man Hitler, whom I love, whose genius I admire,” was booed 
and laughed at. Members of the German-American Bund were present, as well as its leader Franz Kuhn, who a 
month later rallied 20,000 fascists at Madison Square Garden. See “Divergent Views on Germany Given,” New York 
Times (January 15, 1939), p. 30. In terms of American foreign policy, see also a meeting two months later, at which 
three completely different visions of American power were heard from Lewis Mumford (an interventionist), the 
  
182 
reflected the open nature of the American debate. Not even the Association’s own researchers 
agreed on America’s course.34 Buell was a forceful advocate of cooperation, but his deputy, Stone, 
was far from convinced. As director of the Washington bureau, Stone was friendly with 
policymakers of all sorts, but influential only among anti-interventionists. He had assisted the 
Nye Committee’s investigation into role of munitions manufacturers in Wilson’s declaration of 
war in 1917, and had reported so favorably on the findings that DuPont, the armaments giant, 
threatened to sue for libel.35 He had mortally offended the Association’s most generous donor, 
Thomas W. Lamont, with a pamphlet, described as “isolationist” by one board member, that 
excoriated the importance of banks in the slide to intervention. Lamont had almost withdrawn 
his support entirely.36 Stone had helped with the drafting of the neutrality legislation that Buell 
scorned, and had sought permission to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as 
a representative of the National Peace Conference.37 Indeed, Stone had become so visible in the 
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peace movement that The Nation had named him “quarterback” of “the isolationist team” in 
March 1938.38 Stone had protested, but still told the New Republic in three months later that he 
would never advocate loans to the British Empire, as the notion of an alliance of democracies 
was “disingenuous and illusory.”39 And Stone was not alone. Other members of the staff had 
served in the National Peace Conference in their personal capacities, and some of its junior 
researchers, including the Europeanist John C. de Wilde and the Harvard valedictorian David 
H. Popper, had held distinctly narrow views of American interests.40 
Such sentiments did not last long. Although the Association declared that it would 
continue to with “objectivity” after war broke out in Europe, diversity of opinions narrowed 
quickly.41 Vera Micheles Dean had never been a friend of the “fallacy” of neutrality, and told 
readers that the destruction of Europe would shake “the foundation on which millions of 
Americans had built their way of life and their hopes for the future.”42 Stone fell in line, Popper 
too.43 As soon as April 1940, Lamont was happily praising the staff for making Americans 
“acquainted with the facts of life, so to speak,” and for showing that “we may have a peaceful 
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world only if we are willing to pay a part of the price for it.” As Lamont was already acting as an 
intermediary between the White House and interventionist forces, such views carried weight.44 
At the top of the Association, however, there was a vacuum of intellectual leadership. 
Buell resigned in April 1939.45 Three months later, the board replaced him with Frank Ross 
McCoy, a retired major-general and a soldier-diplomat of considerable repute.46 A protégé of the 
former secretary of state and war, Henry Stimson, McCoy had spent his career on the frontiers 
of America’s empire. Trained as a colonial administrator in the Philippines, he had served as 
Theodore Roosevelt’s military aide in the White House, and had commanded infantry on the 
Western front. After another spell in Manila, McCoy had become a troubleshooter, deploying 
Marines to supervise elections as “the Mussolini of Nicaragua,” and adjudicating a border dispute 
between Bolivia and Paraguay. He was Stimson’s representative to the Lytton Commission, 
making sure that the League of Nations’ inquiry into Japan’s invasion of Manchuria reflected 
American interests, and had served out his military commission on Governor’s Island, becoming 
a fixture at the clubbable Council on Foreign Relations. A Washington denizen even after his 
retirement in 1938, during the war McCoy would consult for the Office of the Coordinator of 
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Information and serve on the Roberts Commission to investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor. He 
was a personal friend of the Roosevelts. 47 
McCoy was not a man who needed to be convinced of the necessity of using American 
power. An establishment man, he was trustworthy, responsible, and not smart enough to cause 
trouble. He never wrote a Foreign Policy Report, never opined in the Bulletin, indeed never seems 
to have been inclined to express many thoughts at all. He had neither James G. McDonald’s 
charm, nor Raymond Leslie Buell’s creativity. As his biographer Andrew Bacevich has politely 
put it, McCoy was a man “lacking intellectual originality,” to whom “eloquence never came 
easily.” He was a follower, and he followed loyally.48  
As such, McCoy let the research department off its leash in the debates over neutrality 
and intervention, and the staff quickly came around to agreement. Stone embraced the cause 
with the zeal of a convert, first supporting Lend-Lease and, by September 1941, calling for 
Americans to “prepare to assume a new and responsible role in a world that will not be the 
familiar, secure world we have known for the past hundred years.”49 Dean wrote much the same, 
arguing as early as January 1941 that even if American support for the Allies went no further 
than Lend-Lease, “we shall be called on by the British to guarantee the negotiated peace,” for “a 
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great power cannot indefinitely avoid responsibility.”50 After the Association hosted a nationally-
broadcast address by Henry Wallace that April, in which the vice-president urged Americans to 
take their “second chance to make the world safe for democracy,” Dean said that Americans were 
faced with the “acceptance of Hitler’s plans for a ‘new order’,” or a “‘newer order,’ with the world-
wide aid of all forces opposed to Nazism.” And she left no doubt that America would have to 
 
50 Dean, “Is A Negotiated Peace Possible?” Foreign Policy Bulletin 20 (January 10, 1941), pp. 1-2. 
Figure 2. Frank R. McCoy looks up to former Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles at a luncheon on 
"Today's War — Tomorrow's World," October 16, 1943. FPA, Part II, Box 285. 
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“determine the character of the new world order.” Six months before Pearl Harbor, she published 
her plans for that new world.51 
 What kind of objectivity was this? The Association had put physical distance between 
itself and the interventionists of the new Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies 
(CDAAA) by leaving the shared office space of 8 West 40th St, but it left no doubt where it 
stood. When government officials took the stage, they spoke unchallenged.52 The branches were 
told firmly to avoid “violent conflicts,” and the two-speaker rule was weakened to the extent that 
branches were encouraged to follow a single address with a panel of local discussants, or abandon 
balance entirely if the speaker was a member of the research department.53 An objectivity defined 
as balance would surely mean that members of the America First Committee would be invited 
speak to branches after its formation in September 1940, but the speakers bureau declined to 
diversify its roster. When America First asked if the Association’s staff might address its chapters 
on “purely objective” questions like the balance of raw materials, McCoy refused.54 
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 After all, did the facts not speak for themselves, did right not have little to fear from 
wrong? A few board members asked for an accommodation with America First, but most 
involved with the Association had no problem, intellectually, with what they were doing. Dean 
was trained in the relativism of contemporary historiography, and found it obvious that “every 
writer of integrity has a point of view toward his material — otherwise he would be merely a 
well-articulated robot.”55 The Rockefeller Foundation official Tracy Kittredge thought it 
inevitable that the Association would make “certain assumptions as to the foreign policy and 
interest of the United States, both in the choice of the subject of their Reports, and in the 
collection and analysis of the materials available.”56 As the board concluded the previous 
October, there was “nothing in the facts presented which would make people form an opinion 
inimical to a sound foreign policy for the United States.”57 Needless to say, the entire foreign 
affairs infrastructure was ultimately premised on the idea that the “facts presented” had a well-
known internationalist bias.  
None of this was enough, but the opposition to the Association’s strident interventionism 
came not from American First, as we might expect, but from more strident interventionists. They 
voted with their wallets. As soon as the debate over intervention began, the Association was 
forced to use its cash reserves to cover increasing competition, as attendance at branch meetings 
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went down.58 But in the midst of the most sustained foreign policy debate for years, the 
Associations membership ticked up barely at all, rising from 17,857 in March 1939 to 18,833 in 
March 1942, and McCoy actually feared that the numbers would go down.59 The CDAAA at 
one point had that many members in New York alone.60 As one board discussion concluded, “it 
was much easier to sell the White Committee [the CDAAA] at the moment.”61 While the 
Association sold its publications to such people, it struggled to convert interventionist pressure 
group activity into a more sustained internationalism, at least while keeping its tax-exempt status 
as an educational group.  
It took war to break down the constraints for good. By September 1941, the United 
States was more in the war than not. A special board committee agreed that month that “within 
our framework of objectivity we can be forward-looking along the line of settled American policy 
and not add confusion to confusion by useless discussion and re-hash of policies.”62 A few days 
after Pearl Harbor was hit, the Association constrained open discussion, resolving that “meetings 
ought to be informative at this time rather than argumentative.”63 What debate, after all, was 
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there to have? The Association declared that it would work in “close cooperation with 
government and private agencies,” and  
endeavor in every way to assist in the task of rebuilding world order which, 
according to the President’s broadcast of December 9, must be begun ‘by 
abandoning once and for all the illusion that we can ever again isolate ourselves 
from the rest of humanity.’64 
 
It was now free to promote internationalism in whatever way it chose. Rarely, if ever, again 
would the Association make sure to give space to those skeptical of U.S. power. 
 
* * * * * 
 
The Council on Foreign Relations and the Institute of Pacific Relations, the Association’s peers 
and partners, thrived during the war. Historians have demonstrated how both effectively became 
instruments of the state, in the Council’s case through its influential War and Peace Studies 
committees, which took on postwar planning for the State Department, and in the Institute’s 
case through other forms of research.65 But the Association was much more vulnerable. As it 
wrote in the summer of 1941, it had two tasks: “first, objective and careful research into the 
problems of international relations, especially as they affect the United States; and second, rapid 
dissemination of the results of research among broad sections of the American public.” Both of 
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these roles were at risk, the first by the expansion of the wartime state and the knowledge on 
which that expansion depended, the second by government propaganda and wartime restrictions 
on speech.66 
 Take research first. Both the Council and the Institute conducted research, but they 
mostly relied on outside, academic authors or temporary fellows, rather than research staffs of 
their own, and their primary function was as forums for the policymaking elite, which extended 
the capabilities of a small, weak bureaucracy by bringing in outside perspectives and expertise.67 
The Association was not a convening group but, as one internal report put it, a “college 
faculty.”68 Its researchers possessed doctorates from top history and government departments. 
They were used to coming to reliable judgments on the issues of the day, and offering potential 
policies. They had spent time abroad, benefitting from Rockefeller Foundation fellowships, and 
they had language skills. And because their work was read by statesmen, by financiers, by 
lawyers, they were held to high standards. With the State Department small, with government 
wages low, and with the Association offering a platform, book contracts, and travel, there had 
been no real pipeline for its researchers to join the government before the war emergency began. 
The turning point was a decision taken in Washington in the days after Germany 
invaded Poland. The State Department wanted to begin postwar planning as soon as possible, 
but, lacking a planning staff of its own and unable to tip its hand in case forming such a staff 
upset non-interventionists, it was forced to outsource the work. Here it had a choice, a choice 
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that would say a great deal about how democratic and participatory its planning for primacy 
would be. 
On September 3, 1939, Buell wrote to McCoy. Buell understood the stakes of the fight 
immediately. “As I see it, the problem is not only to defeat Germany,” the former president 
wrote, “but to see to it that this war will not have been fought in vain, which I am convinced is 
the task of the United States.” America would end the war the dominant power in the world, 
Buell knew, for it had “become the world’s greatest power without knowing it,” as he said in a 
speech a few weeks later.69 The risk was that it would enter the war, or even just end it, “lacking a 
program for future world organization.” Buell wanted to learn from the past. Wilson’s Inquiry 
had been set up too late and with too little expertise, and, as “a government commission financed 
by government funds,” it gave the public ‘no opportunity to discuss adequately the problems 
involved in the peace treaty.” Now there was an opportunity for a private, public group “having 
general government approval” to do the work. It would gather data and bring together groups to 
“formulate suggestions” on everything from colonies to frontiers to “the necessary changes in 
American economic and foreign policy.” Especially important would be to avoid “the ultimate 
shock which would be created if the United States should resume a foreign lending program 
without assuming the responsibilities of a creditor nation,” as it had before. The Association was 
the obvious candidate, but McCoy had to move fast. “Time is of the essence,” Buell warned, for 
“other organizations or universities may get the same idea.”70  
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On September 10, the Council on Foreign Relations founder and Foreign Affairs editor 
Hamilton Fish Armstrong called the State Department to make much the same argument to 
Assistant Secretary of State George Messersmith as Buell had to McCoy. On September 12, 
Armstrong and the Council staffer Walter Mallory earned same-day approval from Messersmith, 
Sumner Welles, and Leo Pasvolsky to start what became the War and Peace Studies program, 
which over the next six years churned out nearly 700 memoranda at a cost to the Rockefeller 
Foundation of $300,000.71 On September 14, Stone reported to McCoy that he had failed so far 
to see Secretary of State Hull alone, but that those to whom he had spoken about a “commission 
of inquiry” had said that they had “not yet had time to give any serious thought” to the matter, 
even if they “felt that it would be most useful for competent research bodies like the FPA and the 
IPR Council to initiate something along this line.” Stone would see “Messersmith and several 
others tomorrow.” It was too late.72 The Association missed its opportunity, and quickly lost its 
place as first among research equals. 
Postwar planning became fashionable in the prewar United States, finding a home at 
everything from the Time empire to the Federal Council of Churches, but the decision to do the 
planning that really mattered in secret, rather than in public, was a monumental one. It was more 
than a quirk of the diary, and less than destiny. Messersmith and Welles were Council men, to be 
sure, but both were also advocates of the Association.73 State Department officials still provided 
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confidential information to the research staff, reviewed the Foreign Policy Reports before they were 
published, and took great pains to correct any misunderstandings.74 Still, the way that 
Messersmith talked about the planning effort was telling. Proposals beyond that of the Council, 
he told Rockefeller officers, were not of “quite the same caliber,” and some were “such to cause 
the Department considerable concern.”75 The department, he wrote to Hull and Welles after 
seeing Armstrong and Mallory, would find it valuable to have “confidence that groups of men 
with the proper background and understanding in the country” were undertaking the task.76 Best 
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to avoid anything too radical, best to leave it to men who could be trusted and who would not 
publish their findings, rather than leave the fate of the world to progressive thinkers debating in 
open forums — let alone, one might plausibly speculate given Dean’s relationship with the 
Council, to a group whose research director was a woman. Messersmith’s decision avoided the 
messiness of World War I, with its torrent of peace proposals, and left the government, 
eventually, with a program that could be sold over minimal objections. But it also set a pattern, 
one in which policies would be made behind gilded doors, rather than in the rough and tumble of 
public discussion. McCoy and McDonald took part in the Council’s discussions, but the 
Association was otherwise shut out. Kittredge reported two years later that the staff “rather resent 
being completely ignored in the work which they know to be under way under the auspices of the 
CFR.”77 Dean was particularly unhappy.78 
The War and Peace Studies made the Council on Foreign Relations. But while the 
Association’s Reports remained in widespread use before the government’s research facilities were 
fully up to speed, its lack of a role in official postwar planning broke it as a serious research 
organization, especially after Pearl Harbor.79 Without a special role, the Association simply could 
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not keep its staff, as the state commandeered every last researcher it could, to create the 
knowledge it needed to fight a global war. Charles A. Thomson had been the first to leave, when 
the Latin American expert took up a position as Ben Cherrington’s deputy in the State 
Department’s Division of Cultural Relations in October 1938. His departure was initially a point 
of pride, but pride soon turned to worry.80 Thomson’s replacement, Howard Trueblood, left early 
in 1940, as did Frederick Merrill, a narcotics specialist.81 An editor, Varian Fry, quit that 
summer too, rushing heroically to Vichy France to extract thousands of Jewish refugees from the 
clutches of the Gestapo.82 “We must work out some way of not being crippled by losing our staff 
to the government services,” McCoy told the board in May 1941, and by October, Stone was 
warning that the “every government agency is looking for research people and can offer from 
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$500 to $1500 more.”83 James Frederick Green, an expert on Britain trained at the Yale Institute 
of International Studies, departed in the months before Pearl Harbor, and once the United 
States declared war, there was no way to stop the exodus.84 T. A. Bisson, who had been hired by 
Buell in 1929 and since become “one of the leading American authorities on East Asia,” left 
immediately for Henry Wallace’s Board of Economic Warfare.85 So too did John C. de Wilde, 
who had spent a decade at the Association, and Louis E. Frechtling, a Rhodes scholar who lasted 
not even a year before joining Green at the Office of Strategic Services.86 The most devastating 
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loss was Stone. The Association’s liaison with the government, his departure to work for Wallace 
in November 1941 left the Washington Office empty and in disrepair.87 
After Pearl Harbor, it got worse. “It seems impossible to get any young men at the 
moment,” Dean said in the days after America entered the war.88 “Government agencies have 
already made such forays into university and journalistic circles that only second and third-rate 
people are available,” she complained the following May, and the pipeline for creating young 
scholars broke down as men were drafted.89 David Popper remained until that summer before 
reporting to Fort Dix.90 Howard P. Whidden, fresh from a doctorate at Harvard, lasted 
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months.91 William P. Maddox, a distinguished politics professor and Rhodes scholar, was briefly 
McCoy’s assistant until he joined the OSS.92 A Swiss economist Ernest Hediger, formerly of the 
International Labour Organisation, left for Mexico in August 1943. Lawrence K. Rosinger, who 
stayed until 1948, was a decent enough China scholar, but decent enough neither to enter 
government employ or a university faculty lounge.93 Rosinger and the few others Dean kept hold 
of were not the kind of talent to which the Association had become accustomed. 
Women held everything together. “We have been able to carry on at least within the 
framework of the women in our organization,” McCoy reported in May 1943.94 A couple of 
young women were hired as researchers. The secretary, Dorothy Leet, the ad hoc Washington 
representative, Delia Goetz, and the speakers bureau stalwart Florence Pratt became ever more 
crucial.95 Even so, Dean was put in an impossible position personally. She was without question 
one of the nation’s most insightful writers on foreign affairs, of either sex, and she was prominent 
enough among women to be offered the presidency of her alma mater, Radcliffe College, early in 
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1943.96 She declined what she called “the best opportunity in the country for the advancement of 
women’s education,” however, citing her “dominant passion” of writing and her “equally 
overwhelming desire to participate, in some small way, in the tasks of post-war reconstruction.”97 
That desire was not fulfilled. Much as she hoped that women might play a role in postwar 
planning, and much as her peers hailed her as particularly qualified to play that role herself, she, 
like so many other qualified women, was cut out.98 Her direct policy input was limited to a 
consulting role for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), one 
found for her by Philip Jessup, the international lawyer who became an Association board 
member during the war.99 Meanwhile, spending more time writing to cover for male departures 
from the research staff meant that she could spend less time lecturing, which was a lucrative 
pursuit for Dean on account of her popularity with the educated, wealthy women who made up 
 
96 Dean nevertheless barely appears in any historiography whatsoever; part of the reason for that is that much of the 
scholarship on women in world affairs has concentrated on activists networks, in which Dean, as a scholar and 
educator, herself played little role. See Valeska Huber, Tamson Pietsch, and Katharina Rietzler, “Women’s 
International Thought and the New Professions, 1900-1940,” Modern Intellectual History (2019), doi.org/10.1017/ 
S1479244319000131. 
97 Dean to George H. Chase, April 7, 1943, FPA, Part II, Box 91. 
98 For Dean’s hopes that women might play a part in postwar planning and reconstruction, see Dean, “Over 
European Horizons,” Independent Woman (February 1940), pp. 41-42, 62-63, reprinted in Judy Barrett Litoff and 
David C. Smith (eds.), What Kind of World Do We Want? American Women Plan for Peace (Wilmington: Scholarly 
Resources, 2000), pp. 37-43. Dean was more than likely named among the 260 women qualified to aid in shaping 
postwar policies at Eleanor Roosevelt’s White House Conference on “How Women May Share in Post-War Policy 
Making” in June 1944. Although Dean was not personally at the forefront of any of the activist efforts to include 
women at Dumbarton Oaks and after, she was repeatedly named as among the ten or so most qualified women, 
alongside Reps. Edith Nourse Rogers and Mary T. Norton, Florence Jaffray Harriman, Dorothy Thompson, and 
Anne O’Hare McCormick (who actually served secretly on the State Department’s postwar planning committees). 
See, e.g., Ann Cottrell, “56 U.S. Women Nominated for Peace Parleys,” New York Times (August 31, 1944), p. 6. In 
fact, in a poll of readers of the Sunday Women’s Page of the New York Herald Tribune, Dean ca,e joint first among 
women who could serve on the U.S. delegation to a peace conference, with O’Hare McCormick (and far ahead of 
Eleanor Roosevelt and Frances Perkins). See Dorothy Dunbar Bromley, “Poll Shows Growing Sentiment For 
Woman at the Peace Table,” New York Herald Tribune (September 10, 1944), p. A4. 
99 “Minutes of a Meeting of the Board of Directors,” April 29, 1943, FPA, Part II, Box 15. 
  
201 
the bulk of the active world affairs public. A widowed mother of two, Dean could not afford to 
lose the fees — $400 in a normal month, $1000 in a busy one — that made up for her salary.100 
What, then, to do? Whether the research staff could be rebuilt after the war, when it was 
assumed that the wartime bureaucracies would be dismantled, remained an open question. To 
borrow the typology of the historian David Engerman, it was not yet clear whether a tipping 
point had been reached in how far an institution like the Association could create knowledge 
“for” American power. What was left was the second of the Association’s two tasks, the creation 
of knowledge “of” American power.101 And in truth, this function had been on the rise for some 
time. As Tracy Kittredge of the Rockefeller Foundation noted before Pearl Harbor, with Dean 
as the primary intellectual force at the Association, it “looks upon its own work, even in the 
research field, as part of its program of popular education.”102 
 
* * * * * 
 
The Foreign Policy Association had been part of the same developments in adult education as 
had the Cleveland Council on Foreign Affairs, but it never went quite so far. Buell came around 
to a more expansive program in the depths of the depression, just as Adolf Hitler was running 
for the presidency of Germany.103 “For me it is very discouraging, after our over ten years of 
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work, working on people at the top, to see that the public is more irrational,” Buell told the 
board in February 1932. “That has led me to believe that where we have failed is at the 
bottom.”104 Buell might well have wondered whether trickle-down processes were viable at all, 
but by “bottom” he did not mean the ordinary, let alone poor, citizen, rather only the less 
educated and less engaged members of the already educated and engaged elite. He therefore 
joined with the World Peace Foundation and the League of Nations Association to commit to a 
cooperative program, led by the Carnegie Endowment, in which “primary emphasis should be 
placed upon a program of adult education.”105 That foundered, too, so the Association, at the 
insistence of Stone, struck out on its own.  
In May 1935, Buell asked the Rockefeller Foundation to bankroll an experiment. Under 
Stone’s leadership, the Association created an Education Department parallel to its Research 
Department. It would convert expert knowledge into “popular form,” aiming to bring home to a 
wider, reading audience “the significance and complexity of world interrelationships.”106 Buell 
asked for $25,000 a year to hire new editors, writers, and designers.107 In September, the 
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Association inaugurated its Headline Books, short works of fewer than a hundred pages, pitched 
at the 25 cent market. Carefully edited to make sure that the prose was simple, and illustrated 
with maps, charts, and cartoons, these books, as the name implied, were designed for readers 
who wanted to learn more about the facts behind the news. In time, five or six Headlines would 
come out a year, written by members of the research staff, by education department editors like 
Fry and Goetz, or by outside authors, including Clark Eichelberger and Shepard Stone. In the 
next ten years, the Association would distribute over 2,500,000 books.108 
 Creating a paperback public for foreign affairs was not easy. The United States was not a 
nation of bookworms, for one thing. Few Americans had high school diplomas, let alone 
advanced degrees, and literacy levels were far lower than they would be in just a few years.109 The 
Association estimated, accurately, that there were probably only 600 bookstores in the country in 
1935, of which 200 were major outlets.110 Books were not popular possessions but luxury goods, 
the majority costing $2 or more. Cheap books had a cheap reputation, and inexpensive formats 
were reserved for mysteries, comedies, and tales rather racier than the distribution of naval forces 
in the Far East. There were thousands of public libraries across the country, and library 
circulation was on the up, but until World War II a nationwide sales network for books simply 
did not exist.111 As the Atlantic Monthly wrote in a laudatory review of the first Headline Books, 
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early sales were slow “principally because the publishers have undertaken a type of book unusual 
for them, one which their ordinary system of promotion and distribution is not geared to 
handle.”112 Even if foreign policy was knowledge that could be taught to the masses, an unproven 
proposition, the technologies which might make that possible were not available. After a year, 
115,000 Headlines had been printed, but only 5,500 sold in shops.113 
 Instead, the Association had to make a paperback public through intermediaries, above 
all voluntary associations. While the Headlines proved a hit with teachers and libraries, sales to 
the League of Women Voters, the American Association of University Women, the YMCA, 
and so on, wildly exceeded expectations.114 Such groups used the Headlines in their education 
programs, situating the texts in the back and forth of discussion, a process that the New York 
office helped by making study kits, reading lists for women’s clubs, and even writing scripts for 
mock trials, in which participants played judge and jury on the topic, for instance, of “Who is 
Guilty in Europe?”115 Rockefeller officers were quite pleased with the half million texts that had 
been distributed by the end of 1938, although they doubted whether the Headlines were “the 
type of material really needed by the opinion forming groups in this country.”116 Their popularity 
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with the Association’s members, who received them free and appreciated the readability that the 
dense Bulletin and Reports lacked, suggested otherwise. Either way, as Buell told the Carnegie 
Corporation in 1938, helping “the man or woman in the street” to “form intelligent opinions 
concerning America’s interest in the outside world” was crucial given the likelihood that “during 
the next few years America will undoubtedly be called upon to make grave decisions affecting its 
national life.”117 
 Was a text of any kind really the best way to reach the masses, though? To Buell, the 
most important thing was to take the Association back onto the radio waves. Himself a regular if 
uncomfortable commentator, Buell believed that radio was “literally shriveling up the world,” 
capable of bringing home to Americans how “what happens in the little kingdom of Albania” 
should interest “housewives in Montana.” The trouble was that most radio commentary was too 
superficial. “The day-by-day reporting of aggressions and revolutions overseas,” he told the 
annual luncheon of the Women’s National Radio Committee in April 1939,  
gives the American public a series of sensations; but if our public understood the 
deep-seated historical, psychological and economic reasons for these events, it 
would be less emotional and more constructive in its attitude toward world affairs.118 
 
With Sumner Welles’ backing, Buell negotiated with broadcasters throughout 1938 to set up a 
series that would take the research staff itself onto the airwaves, and finally won a contract with 
the Blue Network of the National Broadcasting Company in the fall of 1939.119 Rotating 
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through their topics of expertise, the research staff spoke for fifteen minutes each Sunday on a 
program called America Looks Abroad.120 Each broadcast promoted the Association as a 
nonpartisan organization, and declared that “foreign affairs are your affairs.”121 
If anything had a chance to prove Brooks Emeny’s motto true, radio seemed to. In the six 
years since the Association had last been represented regularly on the airwaves, radio had turned 
into a means of genuine mass communication. 51 million radio receivers were in use by 1940, in 
nearly 90% of the nation’s households; only 3 million sets had been sold when the Association 
started to broadcast its luncheons.122 Although ownership and listening tastes were still stratified 
by class, education, and geography, radio reinforced the idea of a single, national polity. 
Suddenly, as the historian Bruce Lenthall has written, “ordinary Americans found the public 
arena expanding and growing more pervasive in their daily lives.”123 And if hearing Franklin 
Roosevelt prompted Americans to rethink their relationship with the federal government, as it 
surely did, then hearing Edward Murrow’s reporting from the Blitz, for instance, likely did much 
to force them to confront the world.124 
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 The crucial question in the broadcasting industry the world over was whether radio could 
in fact create a public — or a “two-way instrument of democracy,” as McDonald put it in 1942 
— or whether it would create only an audience.125 None other than John Dewey himself called 
radio “the most powerful instrument of social education the world has ever seen,” one that might 
contribute to “the formation of that enlightened and fair-minded public opinion and sentiment 
that are necessary for the success of democracy.”126 In that spirit, adult educators rode the 
airwaves, trying to turn the country into a “Town Meeting of the Air,” as one popular show 
called itself.127 They were not content for Americans to listen; they sought to create an active, 
rational public of listening, democratic citizens. They replicated discussion formats in their 
programs, as in the Chicago Round Table, and they instructed listeners to respond to broadcasts, 
whether by writing in to engage with the authorities who were now talking “in” their homes, or 
by forming listening groups in their own front rooms, so that they could discuss what they heard 
with friends and neighbors.128 The Association did the same, encouraging listeners at the end of 
the broadcasts to write letters to the research staff, or request transcripts.129 
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 And Americans responded. By October 1941, 72 stations carried America Looks Abroad, 
reaching every state in the union, and up to 350 listeners a week were responding with letters to 
New York.130 As one summary in February 1940 put it,  
enthusiastic letters and post cards — from American and Canadian working people, 
farmers, lawyers, students, men’s and women’s clubs, high school and college 
teachers, and professional people generally — stress the fact that the Association is 
reaching a public it has never contacted before and probably never would reach 
except through the radio.131 
 
Cranks aside, most of these letters paid tribute to the idea of a democratic foreign policy. “We 
live out on the Arizona desert, the radio playing a major part in our daily life,” wrote one 
correspondent in April 1941; “I listen to all your broadcasts and like them very much.” Another 
from California wrote that “these programs are of great public interest and serve as the ‘meat’ of 
the news for those who can’t read the news.”132 The Association took particular interest in 
listeners who used the broadcasts to stimulate further discussion, as evidence of their trickle-
down effect.133 “While we receive only about 200 requests weekly for the broadcast copies,” its 
radio secretary noted in October 1941, “the quality of the comments, and the fact that many of 
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the requests come from teachers in schools and colleges, would indicate the usefulness of the 
program.”134 From Salem, Kentucky, a “pastor of two rural churches” wrote to explain his “keen 
interest” in the programs, because he tried “to guide the thinking of my people on such matters 
into current channels.”135 
 Until the broadcasts stopped in July 1942, by when the research staff was too small to 
produce them, the Association assumed that they were reaching “millions” of Americans.136 But 
it had no real way of knowing how successful its shows were. Its only data was the size of the 
mailbag, and by February 1941, after 64 broadcasts, 11,401 letters had been received in New 
York. Yet, somehow, only 82 members had been added to the rolls as a direct result of the 
broadcasts, earning the Association a paltry $492.137 McCoy asked Paul F. Lazarsfeld, a political 
scientist and pioneer in audience research, to analyze the letters to get a better sense of the 
people that the Association was reaching, but no answers were forthcoming.138 Lazarsfeld’s 
research, not that McCoy read it, suggested in any case that radio programs tended to reach only 
those who were already interested in their subject matter.139 So it seemed. Evidence grew that 
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even branch members were citing the radio broadcasts as a reason not to attend meetings, 
preferring to stay at home rather than actively participate in foreign policy discussions.140 
 Even so, the radio experience did not convince the Association that a mass market for 
foreign affairs was an illusion. Indeed it doubled down. Politically to Buell’s left, Dean was even 
more worried about the reach of social scientists than her mentor had been. Too often, she said 
in May 1939, social scientists had been content to reach “a pitifully small group of educated men 
and women, on the theory that leaders would leaven the masses.” But modern democracy 
demanded more, and to avoid handing the nation to demagogues, scholars needed to “abandon 
their scholarly formulas” and learn to “speak the vernacular” directly to storekeepers, farmers, and 
housewives.141 “The FPA and similar institutions should not address themselves to the 4 per cent 
who, in any case, have other opportunities for obtaining information,” she pleaded in 1942, “but 
to the 96 per cent or so who do not receive college education.” Its work “among the ‘elite’ groups 
from which we have recruited our audiences in New York and in the Branches has reached 
saturation point,” she said.142 Others agreed, seeing subscriber-members as, in effect, providing a 
subsidy that enabled the Association to run programs that went far beyond them.143 As McCoy 
put it in April 1942, “our most important work is not significant through national membership, 
but our radio reaches millions of people and our Reports, as well as Headline Books in schools 
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and camps, have a large spread.”144 Recalling the World War I experience, the old progressives at 
the Association thought that this would be particularly important during a war, for “the task of 
educating American public opinion cannot be left to the government alone without inviting 
regimentation and dangerous restrictions on traditional democratic freedoms.”145 As Dean put it 
after Pearl Harbor, Washington thought that the Association “can be the hiatus between the 
government and public opinion,” separating tyranny from democracy.146 
During the war, the very act of reading became a symbolic defense of liberal values, and 
books themselves became weapons of war.147 Foreign affairs had their place in a booming market. 
Superficially the Association seemed to be part of that boom. One of its most popular wartime 
publications was a lavish United Nations discussion guide that Dean wrote jointly for the U.S. 
Office of Education and the Office of War Information. Reader’s Digest, TIME, and Newsweek 
sent out 300,000 copies for free.148 The Association distributed 1,645,106 Headline Books from 
1941 to 1945. But that figure obscured more than it revealed. 257,000 were bought by the War 
Department, practically keeping the Association afloat in the early years of the war, before it 
began to find its instructional literature for troops elsewhere.149 544,431 books were sent gratis to 
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the membership. The proportion of books distributed beyond the membership plummeted. 
292,278 Headlines went to non-members in 1942, but only 101,052 in 1945.150 
Perhaps the problem was that the Association had printed itself out of a job. Certainly 
competition for the foreign affairs market vastly increased during the war. News bulletins and 
commentary became common on the radio for the first time; newspapers reported breathlessly on 
every aspect of the war; news magazines stationed correspondents across the globe; voluntary 
associations started to develop their own world affairs programs; propaganda agencies published 
in every medium. Although the Association argued that its work usefully clarified this flood of 
information, and successfully for a while at that, its benefactors became skeptical.151 Joseph 
Willits of the Rockefeller Foundation wrote in July 1943 that  
there are a hundred sources which are engaged today in adult education in 
international relations in this country for every one there was when FPA started in 
1918. The Government, the political parties, the press, the radio, the magazines, 
the colleges and universities, and the numerous books from scholars and men of 
affairs such as Willkie and Lippmann, — all testify that the effort in which the 
FPA pioneered has now permeated the educational media of the country.152 
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The Foundation’s staff seriously considered whether it should continue playing “Santa Claus,” as 
one trustee complained.153 But if the Foundation pulled out, Raymond Blaine Fosdick averred, it 
would surely be attacked for abandoning the ideals of a democratic foreign policy. “We can’t do 
it in the midst of a war,” Fosdick told Willits, privately.154 
 
* * * * * 
 
What the Association could do was what it had always done; grow its own strength. Its 
membership remained stable between 1938 and 1942, despite the broadening of its program and 
the immense amount of discussion of foreign affairs taking place, as President Roosevelt put it, 
“over the cracker-barrel.”155 As the war continued, the Association’s membership rolls steadily 
thickened. With 19,540 members at the end of 1942, the Association numbered 22,296 at the 
end of 1943, 27,726 in 1944, and 31,103 in 1945. Almost all of that growth came in the 
branches.156 
The Association had 17 branches at the start of World War II. The majority were 
clustered in the old internationalist heartlands, from Boston, Worcester, Springfield, Hartford, 
and Providence in the east, to several small towns in upstate New York, and Philadelphia and 
Baltimore further south. Twice the Association had hired a field secretary before the war, and 
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they made progress further West, encouraging groups in Columbus, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, and 
Detroit, although nothing had been possible further into the heartland than Minneapolis and St. 
Paul, and the South had proven solidly resistant. The branches that the Association did have, 
however, were for the most part flimsy. Several lost members in 1939 and 1940, and most 
reported worsening attendances well into 1943, as tires and gasoline were rationed and local 
activists turned their attention to civil defense, first aid-training, and relief.157 They held fewer 
meetings, because it became harder to find speakers at home and abroad. Several lost their 
chairmen as they headed to Washington to become policymakers.158 And war work exhausted all 
but those excused from it. At the first branch conference for eight years, held in New York in 
May 1942, representatives from Providence reported that “financially we are broke all the time,” 
and that their branch was nothing more than a “moribund mutual admiration society of old 
fogies.”159 Attempts to rectify this situation, as Brooks Emeny urged whenever he found himself 
with other members, existed, but failed. Baltimore’s delegates reported in October 1943 that they 
had found no way reach beyond “the ‘stuffed shirt’ crowd who simply want to come to dinner.”160 
The White House and the State Department saw none of the weakness that was so 
apparent to the activists struggling to fill hotel ballrooms, however. When McCoy was in 
Washington in the summer of 1942, sentencing six saboteurs to death in a military tribunal, he 
talked with “high government officials” who asked him to “reach the great mass of American 
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people rather than only the groups which are already aware of international problems.”161 What 
both President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull meant by that, it turned out in McCoy’s 
later meetings with them, was that the Association should set up more branches, especially 
outside the Northeast.162 “The more you spread,” Roosevelt told McCoy over dinner before 
addressing the Association in a nationally broadcast election speech in October 1944, “the better 
it will be for our general work in foreign affairs.”163 Although McCoy was prepared to help the 
government in any way he could, this did not seem wise even to him, in light of the trouble 
attracting wealthy, heavily-taxed businessmen to charitable causes, and the continuing expense of 
getting speakers to travel outside the area around Washington and New York.164 Despite its own 
doubts, the Rockefeller Foundation put its foot down, one of the very few occasions on which it 
forced the Association to do its bidding. Rockefeller officials, McCoy told the branch chairmen, 
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“expressed a wish for more branches, and, in spite of the very fine results of our other policy, 
which had been effective, we followed their wishes.”165 
By the end of 1945, the Association had 32 branches. The northeast still dominated, but 
there had been real progress in the South, Midwest, and even, two thousand miles from home, in 
the far West. Plenty of places proved resistant to the Association’s efforts, most disappointingly 
Kansas City, Nashville, and Dallas, but the remaining blank spots on the map were mostly the 
result of poor transport links or deliberate coordination with other agencies. The Pacific coast 
was left to the Institute of Pacific Relations. The Association had an informal agreement with 
the Council on Foreign Relations, too, although there were still ten cities where branches 
overlapped with Committees on Foreign Relations, for the most part with different audiences, 
not least in terms of gender. Even so, the Association now covered 18 states, and in 1945 the 
branches held 188 meetings with a total attendance of 60,743. Branch membership climbed from 
8,946 at the end of 1942 to 14,459 at the end of 1945.166  
This, too, was the work of women. As the Association had no field secretary, the 
responsibility fell to its secretary, Dorothy Leet. Leet had graduated from Barnard College in 
1917, and was close to the College’s dean, Virginia Gildersleeve, who was the only woman on 
the U.S. delegation to the San Francisco Conference. She made her name as the director of the 
American University Women’s Club in Paris, an outpost later known as Reid Hall that hosted 
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tourists, students, and lecturers. When the Association hired Leet late in 1937 it gained a 
secretary at the heart of the internationalist women’s movement, one who would later serve as 
the president of the International Federation of University Women.167 And for the two years 
following the spring of 1943, Leet crossed the country trying to find the civic leaders who could 
be the keystones in a national public for foreign affairs, built one city at a time. She was armed 
with letters of introduction from board members, and, often following in the wake of a public 
address by Dean, she used her own contacts among educated women. Lunches, teas, dinners, 
private interviews, everything was an opportunity to understand a community and its dynamics, 
to build lists of those who might have the visibility and clout to build a branch that would 
endure.168 
 The work was intense. Take a successful new branch in New Orleans, a target because of 
its port and its ties to international trading networks. Dean had given a nationally-reported 
speech to the National Conference on Social Work there in 1942.169 During Leet’s first visit, in 
April 1943, she used a letter from McCoy to the president of Tulane University to set up a lunch 
with faculty. They suggested she see a rabbi. She visited an old Parisian friend, a sculptor who 
hosted a tea for twenty more women, including the head of the public library. One antiracist 
female contact was ruled out, “because of the pressure which she is using on the colored 
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question.” Corporate bigwigs were not keen. A banker, Rudolph Hecht, would only support the 
venture if a “big business man or important lawyer” were involved, but businessmen already had a 
foreign trade committee to attend at the Chamber of Commerce. Everyone said that the branch 
had to be cleared with Edward Rightor, legal counsel to the mayor, who made a point of 
involving local Catholic leaders at Loyola University. Leet used the bona fides of Dave Hennen 
Morris, a New Orleans native who was an Association member and Roosevelt’s Ambassador to 
Belgium, to contact editors at the Times-Picayune, who offered support.170 The Secretary of State 
got involved, telling a potential branch chairman, the journalist Walter Parker of  “my high 
appreciation of the past achievements of the Association in creating a wide public understanding 
of international problems.”171 By April 1944, Leet was introducing William K. Jackson, vice-
president of the United Fruit Company and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, at the branch’s 
first public meeting.172 With support from women’s groups, a history professor as the program 
chair, and a local banker as finance chief, by October 1945 the group had about 400 members.173 
Success in New Orleans was replicated elsewhere, particularly in cities where bankers and 
businessmen were brought on board, like Houston, Omaha, and St. Louis, and where editors 
guaranteed favorable press coverage, like Indianapolis. The leadership was often academic, with 
many committee chairs taken by historians like Julian Park in Buffalo, Arthur O. Lovejoy 
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Baltimore, and Dexter Perkins in Rochester. For the most part the men who served were 
lawyers, journalists, financiers, businessmen, and clergy, although everywhere women, usually 
members of the League of Women Voters, did the spadework.174 Moreover, many of the 
Association’s branches took heart at the vitality they saw elsewhere, and began to innovate. In 
Detroit they used the support of Senator Homer Ferguson, who bought memberships for 25 
high-school students every year, to run competitions to find the most active schoolchildren in 
contemporary affairs; in Philadelphia, they started a committee involving public, private, and 
parochial schools that selected students to attend Saturday morning forums.175 
What bears repeating, however, is just how hard it was to get people to participate 
actively in foreign affairs, even during a war. One issue that vexed Dean was that “women, labor 
and the Negroes” were “usually left out and remembered at the last minute”; Southern branches 
could not invite interested African-American students to meetings that took place in segregated 
hotels. Branch chairmen often could not afford to travel to New York, a problem that was 
nowhere near as consequential as the difficulties faced in luring prestigious speakers out of the 
policy centers of the northeast. Kenneth Holmes, a history professor at Macalester College in St. 
Paul, told the branch representatives that he had previously been active in the Boston branch. 
“Now I am out where the Indians are,” he said, “I can realize how difficult it is in the East to 
picture the conditions in the Far West.” Speakers had to be found locally, where experts were 
few. All this before one even considered the content of the public opinion that the branches were 
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trying to create. “There are so many present problems where opinion needs to be guided,” 
Holmes said, “especially when focused on the United States as a world power.”176 
Therein lay another, world-defining difficulty. At the local level, national foreign affairs 
institutions competed for the allegiance of the tiny number of Americans who were interested in 
world affairs activism. And as Leet travelled the country, one competitor loomed large. “We are 
finding a new difficulty in forming branches at this time,” she told the board in February 1945, 
“due to the fact that the groups working for United Nations plans are anxious not to have other 
organizations interested in international affairs established at this time.” Much as it supported 
the founding of the United Nations, the Association could not make overt alliances with the 
chapters of the American Association for the United Nations that were cropping up nationwide. 
“We are trying to develop the idea that the F.P.A. is a long-range organization with an 
educational program not only for the immediate future,” Leet said, “but for the long continued 
interest of Americans in the foreign policy of their country.” More people were responding to 
what seemed to be the more urgent work going on elsewhere.177 
 
* * * * * 
 
What kind of public did President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull want to create? Was it a 
permanent public, ready to deliberate every aspect of American primacy? Was it a public for a 
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more specific purpose, for the passage of certain plans? Should a public exist to respond to what 
the state sought to promote? Or should it exist to participate on a more profound level? Only the 
government could answer that. 
The State Department faced a real choice. How would it reconcile diplomacy with 
democracy? How would it set about involving the public in the primacy it sought? None other 
than the secretary of state went as far as to define foreign policy in avowedly democratic terms. 
Foreign policy, Hull said in April 1944, was “the task of focusing and giving effect in the world 
outside our borders to the will of 135 million people through the constitutional processes which 
govern our democracy.”178 Others agreed. “No argument is necessary to support the proposition,” 
wrote Adlai Stevenson to Archibald MacLeish on the day that the United States unleashed the 
atom bomb on Hiroshima, “that the Department’s and the Nation’s interest will be best served 
by a public opinion as well informed as possible about foreign affairs.”179  
As usual, Dean Acheson went further. “The Department of State believes in the 
cooperative method of making foreign policy,” the undersecretary of state told a Carnegie 
Endowment conference in Washington in November 1945, indeed in “two-way communication 
with the American people,” which was “the essence of the democratic process.” John Dewey 
might have been proud. But what the department considered to be sound attempts to engage the 
public, Acheson said, had opened it to criticism. 
If we have a program for giving out information, we are propagandizing. If we don't 
give out information promptly and systematically we are cynically denying your 
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right as citizens to know what is going on behind those musty old walls. Servicing 
the public with facts is apparently a dangerous business. The Department is damned 
if it does and it’s damned if it doesn’t. 
 
Which way should it turn?180 
 Part of the problem was that compared to the rest of the New Deal state, which put  
unprecedented effort into manufacturing popular consent to smooth the expansion of its power, 
the State Department came late to the cause of public relations.181 Lacking the need to imprint a 
particular conception of American foreign relations on the public mind, it had left the cultivation 
of the international mind to the press, to trusted voluntary associations, and to the good sense of 
the foundations.182 When postwar planners settled on their vision of the future, however, the 
urgency of public support became palpable. As one May 1943 memorandum put it, the people 
needed to “be convinced, while the lessons of war are still before them, that they have global 
interests and responsibilities.”183 After Edward Stettinius, a former U.S. Steel chairman versed in 
corporate marketing, replaced Sumner Welles as undersecretary of state in October 1943, the 
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department embarked on a series of administrative reorganizations to sell its peace and to 
rehabilitate its “aloof,” striped-pants image.184 By December 1944, MacLeish had moved, not 
without controversy, from the Office of War Information to become the first assistant secretary 
of state for public affairs, with responsibility for propaganda foreign and domestic.185 
 MacLeish and his assistants unleashed a vast crusade to gain popular and political 
consent for the United Nations. Even the staunchly internationalist New York Herald Tribune 
thought it was all a bit much, deriding it as “a first-class publicity campaign, thoroughly 
streamlined,” borrowed from the selling of “breakfast foods, B-29 bombers, laxatives, war for 
democracy, automobiles, nail polish, blood banks, dress fabrics and gyro-controlled tank 
turrets.”186 Certainly it surpassed anything previously attempted in foreign affairs in size and 
sophistication. There was an NBC radio show, Our Foreign Policy; an Alfred Hitchcock film, 
Watchtower Over Tomorrow; a speaking campaign involving 254 public addresses in six months; 
and a publications blitz, including the printing of 1.75 million copies of the Dumbarton Oaks 
agreement and 250,000 wall charts.187 With the eager assistance of all kinds of voluntary 
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associations and media outlets, it appeared to work. Surveys found that 19 out of 20 Americans 
had heard or read about the San Francisco Conference, and polls showed support for joining the 
United Nations hovering at 80 or 90 per cent.188 By then, snarked Vera Micheles Dean, “to say 
that one believes in international collaboration” was “like saying one believes in the Rockettes.”189 
 Often looked back upon as the glory days of the State Department’s relationship with the 
public, the United Nations campaign set a pattern, one that historians have shown was followed 
later in efforts to sell the Marshall Plan, NATO, and NSC-68.190 And it would be easy to think, 
as historians have, that given the role of MacLeish and his successor, the marketing pioneer 
William Benton, and given the way in which President Truman handed the remnants of the 
domestic branch of the Office of War Information to the State Department at the end of the 
war, that the pattern was set permanently and inevitably. But that was not the case. All kinds of 
ideas about how to reconcile diplomacy and democracy were being put into action. And that, in 
part, was because many of the State Department officials involved had already experienced less 
pressured ways of promoting foreign affairs.  
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Foreign Policy Association members, who were perfectly well aware of the dangers of 
propaganda, played a significant role. The first man Hull appointed to oversee the domestic 
campaign was John Sloan Dickey. A lawyer, Dickey was a protégé of Francis Sayre, who, as well 
as being a former assistant secretary of state and Woodrow Wilson’s son-in-law, had been a 
board member of the Boston branch. Charles A. Thomson, who had been the Association’s 
Latin American researcher, was one of Dickey’s advisors.191 After Dickey left late in 1945, the 
OPA was led by Francis H. Russell. Russell was an old Wilsonian who recalled hiking two miles 
to school every day during the Versailles fight, arguing with classmates “of the Lodge 
persuasion.” Head of the Boston branch of the League of Nations Association, and prominent in 
the highly interventionist American Union for Concerted Peace Efforts, Russell was “a member 
of other groups interested in foreign policy,” according to the Boston Globe. Given his affiliations, 
Russell was almost certainly an Association member.192 And Russell spent the seven years in 
which he was in charge of OPA perpetually afraid of what he once called “high-pressuring, 
button-holing, trick persuasiveness and mere slogan-thinking.” He constantly tried to limit the 
use of unrestricted information warfare against the American people, even as he waged it.193 
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 Inside the State Department, indeed inside its small Division of Public Liaison, differing 
approaches to engaging the public were reflected in institutions.194 Closest to taking a traditional, 
Deweyan approach was the Group Relations Branch. Its leader, and the assistant chief of the 
division as a whole, was Chester S. Williams, a prominent adult educator who had been John 
Studebaker’s assistant at the U.S. Office of Education in the days of the Federal Forum 
Project.195 More comfortable than many to see adult education develop under government 
auspices, Williams spent part of the war as chief of educational programs for UNRRA. And 
when he moved to the State Department, Williams tried to apply Deweyan democracy to foreign 
affairs. He praised the processes developed at San Francisco, for which 187 representatives of 42 
voluntary associations were made consultants to the official delegation, as showing how formal 
diplomacy itself might take on a more democratic air. But his main concern was opinion at 
home.196 
 In a July 1946 statement of the Group Relations Branch’s philosophy, Williams accepted 
that what he called the “one-way media of communication,” such as press, radio, and cinema, 
“perform an important function in the development of enlightened public opinion and in the 
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fashioning of democratic policy.” They provided facts, interpretation, and opinion. “But the 
strength of a self-governing society,” Williams argued, “depends on more than reading, listening 
and looking.” To avoid the perils of propaganda, “people must manipulate ideas in their own 
minds and try them out on their own tongues.” Discussion, after all, was democracy. “The 
ancient two-way media of communication,” Williams wrote, “is still the dynamic of a free 
society.” In their “organization meetings, forums and discussion groups,” even in the unique way 
in which they set up the public platform through lecture tours and speakers bureaus, Americans 
enacted their freedom, for “the weighing of conflicting opinions, the testing of facts, the 
questioning of conclusions and the rephrasing of the argument elevates the individual from the 
position of mere spectator to participant.” And participation was what the State Department 
should seek — a public, not an audience.  
The State Department could serve its aims, in Williams’ view, through “liaison with 
organizations, institutions of public enlightenment and the public platform.” This should be 
purely voluntary in every respect, unlike the United Nations process, in which voluntary 
organizations had essentially been given their orders at the State Department. “We should deal 
with organizations as separate entities not through leaders attempting to organize them for 
cooperative activities or pressure propaganda,” Williams wrote, and “our policy should be to help 
each one on request to do its work of enlightenment in its own way.  Crucially, Williams 
insisted, it was not his “purpose or function to secure public support for the Department’s 
policies.” Instead, a truly democratic State Department would “help the public understand what 
the policies are and why the Department projects them, inviting critical examination of them.” 
And then it would listen. “In addition to facilitating the flow of information from the 
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Department to the public,” Williams concluded, “we should actively promote the practical 
expression of representative opinion to the Department.”197  
 How could the State Department make that work? Williams could think of eleven 
possible means, many of which reiterated things the department was already doing, such as 
hosting conferences with voluntary association leaders in Washington, sending liaison officials 
and speakers around the country, reading the mail, and so on. Williams also wanted to set up 
formal advisory committees on specific areas of policy, and to stage regional conferences in 
cooperation with voluntary associations, both of which the State Department did. But the first 
item on Williams’ list of ways to “bring the views of the public to bear on Department policy,” 
and indeed on almost every similar list that the department compiled, was opinion polling. And 
that, ultimately, gave the game away.198 
 Opinion polling was a Trojan horse. Welcomed by some traditionalists and seen by most 
historians as making public views legible for the first time, it in fact heralded the victory of an 
understanding of democratic governance as a communications problem rather than a 
participation problem. At the time, polling was a novel and deeply controversial technology, 
subject to endless political criticism and beset by methodological attacks, particularly from 
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scholars who argued that it misrepresented attitudes by taking a snapshot of public sentiment 
before deliberation could turn views into opinions.199 Scholars who dealt with surveys, moreover, 
could hold completely antithetical views about public opinion and democracy.200 George Gallup, 
for instance, believed that polling could allow the public to speak for itself, in a great “town 
meeting” for the twentieth century that would finally allow for government by the people.201 
Other survey experts agreed that polling would make voters more articulate, increasing their 
knowledge and interest in policy, making democracy more effective.202 But for others, especially 
propaganda specialists, surveys were useful because they exposed public ignorance and gullibility. 
Polls would improve the efficiency of democracy by moving the balance of power in favor of 
elites trying to manipulate consent.203  
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Surveys gained traction because they were useful to a wide variety of powerful actors, and 
had the backing of the Rockefeller Foundation.204 But their future was secured because of the rise 
of the national security state, as the war emergency led to the deployment of what became a 
cutting-edge tool of public management and propaganda planning. Gallup himself predicted 
this. If America ended the war needing to recast the world, and if “the nation’s leaders turn to 
the people for the kind of guidance Woodrow Wilson wanted,” Gallup wrote in The Pulse of 
Democracy in 1940, “the will of the people will be articulated for them.”205 But policymakers, in 
practice, would flip this around. Polls, in this view, would not change the minds of experts about 
policy, but they might be used to change the minds of those in whose name it was made.  
This view was most associated with Harold Lasswell. The intellectual father of a strand 
in progressive thought that celebrated propaganda as a means of democracy that secured expert 
rule, Lasswell saw opinion data as a tool to manipulate consent through propaganda.206 Even in 
his most Deweyan book, Lasswell argued that in a “two-way” democracy the task of 
communications specialists was not to simulate participation, but “sharing the insight of the few 
with the many.”207 At his darkest, Lasswell went much further, painting a “picture of the 
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probable” in his famous 1941 essay, “The Garrison State.” In a future, militarized state, Lasswell 
wrote, “decisions will be more dictatorial than democratic,” and the masses would be controlled 
by ruling elites through “a monopoly of opinion in public,” maintained through propaganda. 
Deferring the garrison state, as Lasswell hoped that “the friend of democracy” would, might 
involve borrowing some of its methods.208 
Lasswell became the dominant figure in wartime Washington when it came to 
information policy, as his students and adherents populated information agencies across the 
government. Most major polling operations contracted with MacLeish’s Office of Facts and 
Figures and the Office of War Information. Many were embroiled in morale-monitoring 
programs at home and abroad, from the Army’s Division of Morale to the Office of Strategic 
Services, the Department of Agriculture to the Strategic Bombing Survey. Hadley Cantril, the 
president’s pollster of choice, was working for 22 government and private agencies by 1943, 
including State.209 By the end of a war which seemed to prove the utility of social science 
generally, survey data and administrative government appeared to pollsters and policymakers 
alike to go hand in hand.210 One opinion analyst noted that while 63 percent of executive-branch 
administrators thought polls to be “helpful,” “among the warmest supporters of government 
participation in polling” were officials from the State Department.211 
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Both of these visions of “two-way” democracy existed at the State Department, but as 
policymakers sought to sell specific policies, that of Lasswell slowly overtook that of Williams. 
H. Schuyler Foster encapsulated this tension perfectly. On the one hand a propaganda specialist 
trained as a political scientist by Lasswell at the University of Chicago, on the other Foster had 
become the chairman of the Foreign Policy Association’s Columbus branch while teaching at 
Ohio State.212 Hired at State in 1943, he was the driving force in the Division of Public Liaison’s 
Public Attitudes Branch, later known as the Office of Public Opinion Studies, which promised, 
to “bring the ‘common man’ — millions of common men — right into the Department.”213 
Foster and his staff collected opinion data from public sources like the Gallup polls, and it 
contracted to receive further, confidential data from the Office of Public Opinion Research until 
1945, and the National Opinion Research Center thereafter. Additionally, they harvested 
opinions from their subscriptions to hundreds of newspapers and magazines, from daily 
transcriptions of radio commentary, from constant scouring of the Congressional Record, and from 
information passed along by hundreds of voluntary associations. All this was filed in a vast 
repository of information and collated into a torrent of daily summaries, weekly reports, trend 
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analyses, and estimates of information policy effectiveness, as well as special reports on particular 
matters, like the views of labor or women’s groups. Surveys remained the stars.214 
The State Department kept this data not to influence policy, but to refine publicity. As 
Dickey later admitted, “we were using the polls to find out the level of information of American 
public opinion during the war and on post-war planning and the areas of ignorance, in order to 
help us develop more effective public information programs.”215 Polls “are of value not only as 
comprehensive, balanced and reasonably prompt evaluations of current American opinion,” 
Foster told the American Political Science Association in March 1946, but they were “of evident 
utility in the formulation of the Department’s information policy,” particularly when “it is 
apparent that there is considerable public confusion or ignorance.” After all, why would the 
department consider opinion polls a useful input into policy itself, when those opinion polls 
provided plenty of evidence that the public had few useful opinions? “People are not only 
uninformed about some of our foreign policies,” Foster conceded, “but they frankly say that they 
haven’t attempted to follow them.”216 Participation was never truly the aim. “Do you have any 
evidence,” Benton asked Russell, rhetorically, “to indicate that the policy officers are really 
making any use of these “Public Opinion Reports’?”217 
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Polling offered the State Department a means of simulating participation while also pre-
empting it, making it less necessary.218 As the political scientist Benjamin Ginsberg has written, 
“polls served to pacify or domesticate opinion, in effect helping to make public opinion safer for 
government.”219 The State Department demonstrates this not in theory, but in fact. The Office 
of Public Affairs made the image of opinions so that it could improve the department’s ability to 
set the national agenda. Polls, as Susan Herbst has noted, help “to shape the contours of the 
public sphere,” forcing public opinion to dance to a specific tune, set by those in power.220 “If the 
American people are to have a will which can be focused and given effect,” Russell said in 
September 1946, “there must be not only a thorough-going program of providing essential 
information but, even more important, there must be continuous, purposeful, constructive 
thinking upon these questions by, as nearly as may be possible, all of the people of the land.” The 
“will,” in other words, was to be created.221 
The State Department had made its choice, or at least it would. After the successful 
passage of the United Nations Charter in the Senate, the Office of Public Affairs found itself 
with little to do, without a specific foreign policy to promote. “May I say that you stay out from 
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underfoot absolutely wonderfully,” Benton wrote to Russell. Two days later, Truman stood 
before Congress to talk about a pressing situation in Greece and Turkey.222 
 
* * * * * 
 
The Foreign Policy Association looked at the new State Department, and its apparent 
responsiveness to public opinion, with great pride.223 “In many ways,” the Association’s new 
Washington representative Blair Bolles wrote to Secretary of State Hull in March 1944, “the 
State Department and the Foreign Policy Association work toward the same goal, and I hope 
that I, in my new position, will be able to assist the department indirectly in informing the 
American public of the nature of the problems which confront the conductors of foreign policy 
in these days.”224 Dickey met with the Association’s board in December 1944, hoping for its 
assistance with a “cooperative foreign policy” that required both “a more workable procedure for 
the democratic review” of its results, and a “different information policy” to create a “sustained 
public opinion at several stages.”225 Although the board declined formally to support the United 
 
222 Benton to Russell, March 10, 1947. 
223 Like Chester Williams, Vera Micheles Dean offered proposals for how Deweyan principles could be translated 
into State Department institutions. Dean thought that the State Department needed to do more to help people 
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Nations, it more than did its part.226 McCoy was a consultant to the delegation at San Francisco, 
and both Dean and Bolles were accredited members of the press pool.227 
 But because the Office of Public Affairs had taken on so many of the duties which the 
State Department had previously left to the Association, the Association was put in a difficult 
position. State now wrote its own publications, which could stand in for the Bulletin or Reports. 
It liaised with voluntary associations itself. It supplied department handouts and press briefings 
to editors. It put diplomats on the airwaves. It created its own knowledge. And it even started to 
distrust the public that foreign affairs institutions had worked to create. As one Public Liaison 
official wrote,  
there is an inertia and an exhausted enthusiasm among people who have worked in 
the international affairs field for the last twenty-five years that makes it difficult for 
them to view the world, the community, and themselves with unjaundiced eyes. 
They have too much scattered knowledge and too little understanding, and the time 
has come, we believe, for us to plow new fields. 
 
Much as State Department officials would still speak in the branches, its information officers 
would look elsewhere to innovate.228 
This new reality was reflected at the foundation level, too. By 1945, the Rockefeller 
Foundation had moved decidedly away from its older programs, which implied a progressive, 
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transnational, popular solution to pacifying international relations, and towards the funding of 
scholarly, university-based research about the national interest, a shift already presaged by the 
support of the Yale Institute of International Studies, and intensified by the increasingly 
powerful vision of university-educated citizenry, capped by the G.I. Bill.229 Joseph Willits, in 
other words, ground Raymond Fosdick down. “RF’s first responsibility,” Willits had written in 
1943, was not “merely to bring the mass up to a still low level; we need to discover higher levels.” 
The Foundation would “enter a new period after the war,” and “the general international 
relations agencies ought to come to be established on their own feet, so that RF can be free to 
strengthen the centers of advanced, and undergraduate, training.”230 Willits assumed that groups 
like the Association could stand on their own feet, given that it was thought that discussion of 
foreign affairs was more widespread than ever, even in the atmosphere of demobilization. After 
all, the Association’s receipts had increased from $167,286 in 1941 to $215,200 in 1944.231 
Willits offered a five-year grant at the Foundation’s usual $50,000 per year for the first three 
years, but tapering in the last two towards a permanent termination.232 
 
229 Nichols Guilhot, After the Enlightenment: Political Realism and International Relations in the Mid-Twentieth 
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 This was a profound blow to the Association. Having negotiated the terms, McCoy 
resigned to chair the ill-fated Far Eastern Advisory Commission.233 He left in March 1946, 
followed quickly by his assistant, Sherman Hayden, a former lecturer in government at Columbia 
who had joined the Association in August 1942, departed briefly for the Office of Naval History 
in 1944, and finally joined the faculty of Clark University.234 Neither McCoy nor Hayden was 
immediately replaced, leaving board members temporarily in charge, and weak ones at that. 
Jessup resigned; McDonald was away, serving on the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on 
Palestine, a prelude to his appointment as the first U.S. Ambassador to Israel; Buell was dead, 
struck down by a brain tumor.235 John McCloy, scion of the establishment and the assistant 
secretary of war, agreed to be elected to the board, but never attended a meeting. Instead, the 
Association was in the hands of its old progressives, including William Lancaster, Florence 
Lamont, Paul Kellogg, and Herbert May, as well as newer blood such as the Harpers’ editor 
Frederick Lewis Allen and a perceptive lawyer, Eustace Seligman, the son of the Columbia 
University economist and historian E. R. A. Seligman, and a senior partner at Sullivan & 
Cromwell, the law firm of both John Foster and Allen Dulles. Temporarily, Dean was the 
Association’s de facto leader, and her elevation and personality led to a number of  
staffers leaving.236 
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The Association dreamed big, wondering whether it might lead the creation of an 
International Foreign Policy Association, and launching a national membership campaign 
fronted by James Byrnes, John Foster Dulles, Harold Stassen, Virginia Gildersleeve, Warren 
Austin, and Herbert Lehman.237 Eager to make hay while the sun appeared to shine, the 
Association looked to double or even triple its membership quickly.238 With demobilization the 
order of the day, however, the membership rolls only held firm, improving from 29,461 at the 
end of March 1945, to 32,765 in 1946, and 31,510 in 1947.239 The board increased its income 
targets to $246,500 in 1946, and $268,000 in 1947, but rampant inflation drove costs higher, the 
staff union insisted that wages must rise, and publication sales dropped away.240 By the end of 
1946, the Association was using its reserves to pay up to a tenth of its operating costs.241 Several 
of the 32 branches were worryingly weak by the start of 1946, with five of them having fewer 
than 100 members and a further seven not meeting the 200 members mandated by their 
charters.242 Moreover, their complicated dues system and failure to raise money made the 
branches a financial drain overall. “Up to the present time,” Lancaster told the branch chairmen 
late in 1946, “I think our budget has been made up of something like 92% from New York and 
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from the New York area.”243 As a generation of earlier donors passed away, foundations seemed 
to be the only recourse. With Rockefeller resources running dry, Carnegie monies were the only 
alternative, but despite the State Department urging the Corporation to support the Association, 
it would not grant significant funds while the Association’s presidency was vacant.244 
The search for a new president was long, tortuous, and unhappy. Different presidents 
implied different visions for the Association, and for the cultivation of public opinion as a whole. 
Old networks could not provide a suitable candidate. Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who had 
proffered McCoy in 1939, suggested several old State Department hands, including Hugh 
Gibson, Joseph Grew, and Herbert Feis, as well as James Grafton Rogers, a former assistant 
secretary of state and deputy director of the Office of Strategic Services.245 Rogers, indeed, served 
as the Association’s director-in-charge in the autumn of 1946, without success. Allen Dulles was 
a prime candidate, but not interested.246 Adlai Stevenson declined two separate offers, just as he 
also declined overtures for the presidency of the Carnegie Endowment.247 Alger Hiss, the 
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secretary-general of the San Francisco Conference who was another candidate, took the 
Endowment post instead, although not before he had given Undersecretary of State Dean 
Acheson a list of names for the Association that ran from the scholar Edward Mead Earle to the 
broadcaster Edward Murrow.248  
These were serious men, names that signaled how important and prestigious a force the 
Association still was. A younger man was agreed to be the way forward, one with energy, 
ambition, and administrative ability. Stevenson had fit the bill, as had Hiss. So too did Chester 
Williams. Each implied different ideas about propaganda, education, and the Association’s 
relationship to the state. Stevenson, though he had spent years at the luncheon banquets of the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, promised the use of modern informational techniques; 
Hiss was an establishment man; Williams was still a warrior for adult education.249 But there was 
no agreement among the board on which direction would be best. The situation worsened until 
the early days of March 1947, by when the staff union was threatening to strike and the finances 
were darkening. The board scraped the barrel, and, two weeks after the announcement of the 
Truman Doctrine, met with a candidate Hiss had proposed — an outside shot, a visionary with a 
reputation for irritating people. It was a decision that the board made “with much trepidation.”250 
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* * * * * 
 
Brooks Emeny could have ended the war a Stevenson, or a Hiss, but he spent much of the 
conflict in Cleveland, frustrated. Like most international relations scholars, he served in the 
government, but only as an occasional outside expert on the State Department’s secret, postwar 
planning committees.251 Before Pearl Harbor, Emeny had been offered the post of Director of 
Education in Nelson Rockefeller’s Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, but, 
fearful of government opinion management, Emeny turned the role down, thinking that better 
opportunities would be on offer. They were not.252 
Emeny instead devoted himself to his vision for a national movement of community 
World Affairs Councils. Its purest expression came in a plan offered to Nelson Rockefeller two 
months before Pearl Harbor. “For the first time in history,” Emeny wrote, “the preservation of 
our democratic way of life depends upon the willingness of responsible citizens to take an active 
part and assume responsibility in the determination of the basic principles of our foreign 
relations.” Either the Coordinator must “establish an elaborate system of Federally financed 
bureaus of education throughout the country as a means of distributing desired information,” or 
he must work “through efficiently organized private groups in communities throughout the 
 
251 While serving at State, Emeny implored Sumner Welles to appoint an assistant secretary “in charge of public 
relations.” “The Department,” he wrote, “may in its wisdom arrive at decisions which will be incontrovertibly in the 
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the determination of these policies, if the leaders of public opinion, no matter how difficult they may be, are made to 
feel that the nation’s Foreign Office is truly ‘foreign’ so far as they are concerned, the struggle for a people’s peace 
may well be lost.” Emeny to Welles, March 3, 1943, Emeny Papers, Box 2. 




nation, groups which unfortunately, with few exceptions, do not exist at present.” The second 
path, “the democratic way,” was the only possible one. It required that “in every important 
community of the country a local Foreign Policy Council organized and supported by the leaders 
among the citizenry” be built. As the creation of “a sense of private obligation for underwriting 
the continuance of such work” was the prime aim, an umbrella group, Foreign Policy Councils 
Associated, would in time “become a self-liquidating institution.” Before that, however, Emeny 
asked for $700,000 to spend over a three-year period.253 
Emeny would spend the next decade trying to gain support for this project, both trying to 
enlist philanthropists and trying to attach it to an institution. He went about it through a critique 
of current practice. Shortly before meeting with Nelson Rockefeller in the late summer of 1941, 
Emeny lambasted the Association’s branches for their dullness and femininity in a letter to 
McCoy. “The branch work has been a failure,” Emeny wrote, to which the New York Office 
inevitably took offense, particularly its women.254 “The Emeny plan seems very elaborate,” 
McCoy told the board, and so it seemed to the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie 
Corporation, and the Carnegie Endowment, each of which turned down Emeny’s overtures in 
turn. Even foundation trustees who told Emeny they were supportive of his ideas did not, 
privately, want to be associated with “any such grandiose scheme.”255 
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So Emeny tried the Council on Foreign Relations, of which he remained an active 
member. In March 1942, he wrote to every member of the Committees on Foreign Relations 
nationwide, asking if they would be in favor of instituting “a wider program of public education 
in American foreign relations in their respective communities.”256 Nothing could have irritated 
the Council’s dons more than such an impertinent subversion of its hierarchy. “I have been 
getting any number of communications from him,” the J. P. Morgan partner, Carnegie 
Corporation director, and Council grandee R. C. Leffingwell sputtered, for “Mr. Emeny is 
evidently one of those live-wire people who judge every effort numerically.” Leffingwell, a 
founder of the Committee program, aristocratically told Walter Mallory that “miscellaneous 
chatter about foreign affairs is likely to do more harm than good.”257 In private conversations 
with the foundations, Council leaders made it clear that more expansive visions of public opinion 
were improper, if not dangerous.258 
Emeny held his plans in abeyance until victory was in sight in the summer of 1944. That 
June, the Council announced that it had received the gift of a lavish permanent home, as well as 
donations from John D. Rockefeller and others, which it hoped would total $300,000.259 Emeny 
was incensed that money could be raised for the entertainment of Council members in New 
York, but not to fulfill what he saw as the Council’s real duties. “You mention in your letter,” he 
fumed to John W. Davis, the former Democratic presidential candidate and Council founder, 
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“that, with the outbreak of World War II, the Council had ‘come of age’,” that the directors “‘are 
conscious of the tremendous responsibilities which the Council should shoulder in helping to 
prepare the American people for the expanded role which their country must play in the world.’” 
But the Committee program through which these responsibilities were affected was pathetically 
inadequate. “I recognize,” Emeny snapped,  
that the New York Council on Foreign Relations is not intended to be a popularizer 
of international affairs, nor is it interested in a large and comprehensive 
membership. But there is a very decided danger that the members, while enjoying 
their new and luxurious surroundings, may become unmindful of their deep moral 
obligation to aid in every way possible the extension of general public knowledge 
and understanding of world affairs.260 
 
But what Emeny saw as the complacency of the Council was impregnable.261 It considered 
retaliating by removing Emeny’s Cleveland outfit from its association with New York.262 
When Emeny circulated the letter to Council members, again irritating the hierarchy, he 
found widespread support. Even if nothing could be done, Raymond Fosdick of the Rockefeller 
Foundation told John D. Rockefeller, Jr., “what this country needs is more Emenys.”263 Owen 
Lattimore, the scholar of Asia, agreed that “however expert an expert may be, he cannot function 
efficiently unless he represents a society, or community which as a whole is well-informed,” and 
hoped that Emeny succeeded.264 Clark Eichelberger of the American Association for the United 
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Nations thought that the Council was incurable, writing that “I cannot imagine its developing a 
program for labor, or the average school teacher, or the people who reach the great masses of the 
American people.”265 Philip Jessup warned that there was not “the slightest possibility of the 
Council on Foreign Relations taking that kind of position.” He had “given up hope.”266 
 Emeny had not. In March 1945, he summarized the correspondence he had received, in a 
letter to the board members of every major foreign affairs group and hundreds of other members 
of the foreign policy elite. “Communities throughout the land seek guidance and help in the 
accomplishment of these ends,” he wrote, “which the New York organizations alone can make 
possible.”267 Emeny told McCoy that “you and the Board are fast approaching the moment when 
you will either have to seize upon the opportunity of becoming the great central agency for the 
advancement of knowledge and understanding,” or “continue under a more limited role as an 
institution of research with a scattering of a few and generally and ineffective Branches.”268 
McCoy was annoyed, not least because Emeny underestimated the difficulties of founding 
branches in practice.269 “But civic leaders in several cities started to get in touch with Emeny, 
forcing the Association to fight off his ideas as he appealed directly to its branch chairmen.270 
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 After the triumphant festivities of Cleveland’s “Report from the World,” the Association 
finally caved, probably with a nudge from the Carnegie Corporation. Emeny met with the board 
on March 18, 1947. They were by now perfectly aware of what he proposed. “Members of the 
Board of FPA must fully recognize the need of drastic reorganization,” the minutes recount 
Emeny saying. A national foreign policy required a national public, one that needed forward 
under the steam of local interests.271 Two days later, the Carnegie Corporation made its views 
clear with a check for $20,000, in support of a “thorough-going reorganization.”272 A week later, 
Emeny was appointed the Association’s fourth president.273 
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World Affairs Are Your Affairs 
 
The secretary of state stepped towards the podium on a sunlit afternoon in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. The speech that he gave to members of the Harvard Alumni Association that day 
was innocuous enough on a first hearing, but to those who knew what to listen for, it heralded a 
dramatic shift in American foreign policy. The secretary declared that the United States was 
prepared to fund a plan to rebuild Europe, if Europeans could come up with one for themselves. 
This was an act of humanitarianism, yes. “Our policy,” the secretary said, “is directed not against 
any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos.” But it was an early 
salvo of the cold war, too. Any country that stood in the way faced enmity. “Governments, 
political parties or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom 
politically or otherwise,” he warned, “will encounter the opposition of the United States.” 
 What is usually remembered about George Catlett Marshall’s speech that day in June 
1947 is what Benn Steil has, tellingly for the in-house historian of the Council on Foreign 
Relations, called its “substance.”1 Its purely diplomatic content was indeed momentous. The 
European Recovery Program would fire up Western Europe and freeze out the Eastern bloc — 
eventually. In the meantime, State Department policymakers intended Marshall’s speech to rally 
public opinion from its supposed postwar lethargy. 
 
1 Benn Steil, The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018), p. 113.  
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 And when it came to public opinion, Marshall in fact had a theory, like so many other 
policymakers and intellectuals concerned with foreign policy in a democracy. “I need not tell you 
gentlemen that the world situation is very serious,” he began his speech, for “that must be 
apparent to all intelligent people.” But the “very mass of facts presented to the public by press 
and radio” nowadays made it “exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear 
appraisement of the situation.” Americans were “distant from the troubled areas of the earth,” so 
it was “hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering 
peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection with our efforts to 
promote peace in the world.” And so, Marshall said at the end of his speech, the question of 
public opinion was, itself, foreign policy. “An essential part of any successful action on the part of 
the United States,” the general said, “is an understanding on the part of the people of America of 
the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied.” Americans must “fact up to the 
vast responsibility which history has clearly placed on our country.”2 
 So read Marshall’s prepared remarks. And after the end of the written speech, he went 
even further. He ad-libbed, and not about diplomacy, but about the public. He was “sorry,” he 
told his audience, for giving a political speech on such an occasion. “But to my mind,” he said, “it 
is of vast importance that our people reach some general understanding of what the 
complications really are, rather than react from a passion or a prejudice or an emotion of the 
moment.” He reiterated the problems of distance, something that could not be overcome merely 
by “reading, or listening, or even seeing photographs or motion pictures.” And yet, Marshall said, 
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“the whole world of the future hangs on a proper judgment,” indeed, “to a large extent on the 
realization of the American people, of just what are the various dominant factors.”3 Fitting 
words, from a man who had been offered the presidency of the Foreign Policy Association just a 
few months earlier.4  
Clarity, Marshall said Americans needed, for the fate of the world weighed on their 
shoulders. Over the next few years, policymakers provided plenty of that, just as they had done 
during World War II. They spoke privately about the need to “shock,” to “electrify,” to “scare the 
hell out of” the American people.5 Dean Acheson, Marshall’s deputy and eventually secretary 
himself, later wrote in his memoirs that “we made our points clearer than truth.” And for 
Acheson, too, that impulse relied on a theory of public opinion.6 In April 1951, he revealed 
himself to be a Lippmannite, asking a meeting of foundation officials at the State Department to 
guess how much time an “average citizen” spent thinking about foreign affairs. 
If you take the time when a man wakes up in the morning and then deduct: he now 
shaves; he is now taking a shower; he is now getting dressed; he is now having 
breakfast; he is now on the subway; he is now sitting down — how much time does 
he think about this? I’ll bet it will be not over five minutes. Now, maybe he will 
listen to a speech for half an hour. I am talking about thinking about the thing. I 
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movements and previous though now uncertain commitments.” See Frank R. McCoy to W. W. Lancaster, October 
11, 1946, Frank R. McCoy Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Box 73; McCoy to American 
Embassy, Nanking, December 6, 1946, McCoy Papers, Box 73; Marshall S. Carter to McCoy, December 10, 1946, 
McCoy Papers, Box 37. 
5 Respectively, Will Clayton, John Hickerson, and Arthur Vandenberg, most famously, qu. in Melvyn P. Leffler, A 
Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1992), pp. 145-146; Fredrik Logevall and Campbell Craig, America’s Cold War: The Politics of 
Insecurity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 79. 
6 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), p. 375. 
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am not talking about just listening to somebody say something. How much time 
does he think, discussing it with somebody else or just thinking about it? If it 
averages five minutes a day I think we are on the long side. And that is dealing with 
problems which have to do with the survival of our country.7 
 
Strong leadership of public opinion, in this view, was necessary not just because of the nature of 
the Soviet threat, but because of the nature of the American public.  
 Strong leadership was given. Yet for all policymakers’ inclination towards overselling the 
cold war, towards threat inflation, it would be a mistake to be too cynical about their sincerity 
when they instructed the American people to start thinking about foreign policy as they never 
had before. Cold war policymakers drew on a common language that had developed to reconcile 
diplomacy and democracy. Take Harry Truman. After the war ended in 1945, he told one forum 
that “there is, in my opinion, no more urgent task before us at this time than the building of an 
informed public opinion on the problems of foreign policy.”8 The president repeated that view to 
newspaper editors five years later, telling them that “there never has been a time in our history 
when there was so great a need for our citizens to be informed and to understand what is 
happening in the world,” even as he was increasing official secrecy and clamping down on leaks.9 
To be sure, when Truman, Marshall, and Acheson urged the public to inform themselves about 
foreign policy, they had certain publics, certain information, and certain foreign policies in mind. 
 
7 “Consultative Conference with Representatives of Foundations on Problems of Information and Education on 
Foreign Affairs,” April 18-19, 1951, pp. 59-60, RG 59, National Archives and Records Administration, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, Public Services Division, Subject Files 1945-1952, Lot File 56D33, Box 133. 
8 Harry S. Truman to McCoy, October 13, 1945, Department of State Bulletin 13 (October 28, 1945), p. 678; 
“World Interests Urged By Truman,” New York Times (October 21, 1945), p. 22. 
9 Truman, “Address on Foreign Policy at a Luncheon of the American Society of Newspaper Editors,” April 20, 




But they and other policymakers who were “present at the creation” went beyond a simple selling 
of the cold war. They told the American people that foreign policy was theirs, that it was 
democratic, that it was now part of their lives as citizens. They sold not just a foreign policy, but 
the very idea of foreign policy. 
A new kind of global primacy, a democratic primacy, required a new kind of citizen. 
What did a citizen need to know? What did he need to do? One State Department official 
offered an answer to the American Political Science Association in 1953. “The citizen needs the 
general background, he needs to know what the problems are and how to approach the 
problems,” said Howard A. Cook, so that he could “evaluate the views of his fellow citizens” and 
“judge the catch-phrases and slogans which so often substitute for hard facts and mature 
judgment.” The “man in the street” needed to know that “the essence of foreign policy is choice, 
choice between often unpalatable alternatives,” that there were “limitations on our foreign policy 
actions.” That was the goal, Cook said. The State Department would leave the question of how 
actually to “develop such citizens” to others, political scientists above all.10 
Brooks Emeny was a political scientist, and he had an answer. To Emeny, Americans had 
to be made ready to lead the new world order, for they yet were not. In the interventionism 
debates he had drawn ire for warning that Americans were unprepared to take up the burdens 
that war would create. In the early cold war, he warned against what he called “the educational 
unpreparedness of America for world leadership,” for a world leadership it had now taken up.11 
 
10 Howard A. Cook, “Keeping the Public Informed on Foreign Policy,” September 11, 1953, FPA, Part II, Box 99. 
11 Brooks Emeny, “America’s Role As Super Power,” September 30, 1946, qu. in Brooks Emeny, A History of the 
Founding of the Cleveland Council on World Affairs, 1935-1948 (Cleveland: Council on World Affairs, 1975). 
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The stakes were higher in the atomic age. “The revolutionary impact of the split atom on all 
phases of life, domestic or international, cannot be escaped,” he wrote in Vogue in April 1947, 
and under its threat “either means must be devised whereby an organization of world peace shall 
be assured, or we have only to contemplate the inevitable destruction of civilization through 
World War III.” America, ultimately, was responsible for this, and as America was a democracy, 
the American people, ultimately, were responsible. “Community education in world relations is 
the most challenging and important task of the political life of this nation today,” Emeny wrote. 
“Every town and city should have its International Center at the service of its citizens,” he 
continued, carrying his progressive into a new age. “Every medium of education through lectures, 
study groups, and published information should be made available.” The aim? “Every American 
must learn to analyze international events as a special obligation and privilege of citizenship.” 
An editor at the Kiwanis Magazine summed up the ideal, and the task, in a headline: 
“every citizen a statesman.”12 
 
* * * * * 
 
The Foreign Policy Association was still a major institution in American life in 1947. It was a 
trusted partner of the State Department. It attracted greetings on its thirtieth birthday from 
Harry Truman, George Marshall, John Foster Dulles, Trygve Lie, Eleanor Roosevelt, Arthur 
 
12 Emeny, “ ‘Freedom from thought’… the immediate danger,” Vogue (April 15, 1947), pp. 120-121, 167-169, 
Emeny Papers, Box 1; Emeny, “Every Citizen a Statesman,” The Kiwanis Magazine (November 1946), pp. 7, 30-31, 
Emeny Papers, Box 1. 
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Hays Sulzberger, and Walter Lippmann.13 It had Marshall and Dulles speak from its stage. It 
was the kind of vehicle through which Emeny might realize his dream of creating a hundred or 
more World Affairs Councils, the instruments of a democracy fit for a democratic superpower. 
Yet at this crucial hinge point in history, at this moment when America’s relationship 
with the rest of the world was being defined and with it the nature of citizenship in a democratic 
superpower, the Association foundered. By the time Emeny left the Association late in 1952, 
exhausted and dismayed, its membership had nearly halved. Less than half a dozen new World 
Affairs Councils had opened their doors, not enough to offset the closure of thirteen branches. 
Its finances were in a dreadful state.14  
Why? Why did the leading institution of citizen education in world affairs struggle at this 
crucial moment? Why did this vision of democratic citizenship seem to peter out even before it 
got going, despite the support it received?  
One reason was that there was not a single vision at all, or at least not a single institution 
through which to pursue it. Americans who were actively interested in world affairs had created 
an array of different outlets for their enthusiasm. Detroit, Michigan, was hardly a hotbed of 
internationalism, for example, but a Council on Foreign Relations survey published in 1946 
revealed that its citizens could avail themselves of a Committee on Foreign Relations, an Inter-
American Center, the Foreign Affairs Committee of their Board of Commerce, a Foreign Policy 
Association branch, a Foreign Trade Club, an Institute of Pacific Relations outpost, an 
 
13 “National Leaders Write for 30th Anniversary,” attached to Emeny to Joseph H. Willits, April 12, 1949, RF, Box 
334. 
14 “Foreign Policy Association, Inc.,” December 9, 1952, Rockefeller Brothers Fund Records, Rockefeller Archives 
Center [RBF], Box 344. 
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International Relations Club, an East and West Association, a Women’s International 
Education Committee, a World Study Council, and a chapter of Americans United for World 
Organization.15  
True, this sprawling network of voluntary associations might be (and was) seen as 
representing the uniquely democratic nature of American foreign policy, even if the Council 
restricted itself to a narrow definition of what “world affairs” meant and erased non-white 
engagement.16 But to Emeny, at the local level this sprawl actually just split a small number of 
active internationalists into rival factions, weakening the overall effort. To avoid that, the 
Cleveland Council had formed region- and subject-specific committees within its own structure, 
each affiliated with like-minded national groups, and acquired a central position over world 
affairs activities in the city even though it represented a diversity of interests. 
So, if the Cleveland model showed that rivalries could be overcome locally, could they be 
overcome nationally? Foundation officials had tried, in order to promote efficiencies. Citizen 
educators had tried, too, in part because several of them sat on the boards of two or more groups, 
and were members of even more. Emeny was among them. Immediately after the war, for 
instance, he was concurrently the chairman of the Cleveland Council and the treasurer of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, while also holding memberships of the Foreign Policy Association 
 
15 W. Harold Dalgliesh, Community Education in Foreign Affairs: A Report on Activities in Nineteen American Cities 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1946), pp. 19, 24. 
16 For postwar black engagement with world affairs, see Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and 
U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Mary L. Dudziak, Cold 
War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Jonathan 
Rosenberg, How Far the Promised Land? World Affairs and the American Civil Rights Movement from the First World to 
Vietnam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 131-234; Sean L. Malloy, Out of Oakland: Black Panther 
Party Internationalism during the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017). 
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and the Council on Foreign Relations and attending the branch meetings of both. And Emeny 
saw that this was wasteful. No community wanted merely to be an outpost of some New York 
group, he argued, and no community could tolerate national groups competing for its small 
number of world affairs devotees. “Manhattan can afford the luxury of multiplicity,” Emeny 
wrote to a friend, “but no other American communities, with the possible exception of Chicago, 
can do so.”17 
All the better, then, to unite the various national groups into a single institution, call it 
the Foreign Policy Foundation. With a shared library, staff, and facilities near the United 
Nations, Emeny hoped that this would be the focal point to which a national network of locally-
funded, independent community groups, each with its own special interests, could appeal. $30 
million ought to make it possible, he told those at the philanthropies who were prepared to 
listen.18 One Association trustee drily called this “ambitious,” but Emeny took steps to test its 
feasibility throughout 1947.19 He conspired particularly closely with the Carnegie Endowment, 
finding a fellow-traveler in its new president, Alger Hiss, but the idea went nowhere.20 
One avenue that did seem promising was to achieve closer cooperation or even union 
between the Foreign Policy Association and the Institute of Pacific Relations. These institutions 
had always been close, swapping researchers, renting office space, and sharing board members. 
 
17 Emeny to Alger Hiss, May 27, 1947, CEIP, Series I, Box 48. 
18 Record of Interview, Devereux Josephs, Whitney Shepardson, and Emeny, February 13, 1947, CC, Box 127; 
“Special Meeting of the Board of Directors,” March 18, 1947, Emeny Papers, Box 39; “Minutes of Executive 
Committee Meeting,” April 28, 1947, McCoy Papers, Box 73. 
19 William W. Lancaster to McCoy, April 29, 1947, McCoy Papers, Box 73; Record of Interview, Josephs and 
Emeny, August 26, 1947, CC, Box 147. 
20 Edward C. Carter to Herbert S. Little, May 6, 1947, Emma McLaughlin Papers, Bancroft Library, University of 
California at Berkeley, Carton 4; Hiss to Emeny, May 16, 1947, CEIP, Series 1, Box 48. 
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They had discussed a merger before the war, and started discussing it again one the war ended.21 
And the idea seemed viable, in part for financial reasons, and in part, too, as a way of responding 
to what Emeny called “the revolt of the Hinterland against the Manhattan complex.”22 For while 
the Institute was most renowned for its research and its international conferences, it also had a 
number of local affiliates, many of which served similar, or in some cases more expansive, 
functions to Association branches.23 Those affiliates, especially those on the West Coast that not 
unreasonably thought they had a strong claim to setting the priorities of a Pacific-facing group, 
resented the iron control wielded by the Institute’s New York headquarters. After the war they 
sought more autonomy.24 
As Emeny traveled the West coast promoting the World Affairs Council model, Institute 
officials in San Francisco and Seattle threatened their Eastern bosses with a breakaway.25 One 
way to avoid that, those officials said, would be for the Association and the Institute to merge 
 
21 Philip C. Jessup to Carter, June 9, 1947, IPR, Box 101. 
22 Emeny to Hiss, May 27, 1947. 
23 For the international aspects of the Institute’s work, see especially Tomoko Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific: 
The United States, Japan, and the Institute of Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919-45 (London: Routledge, 2002); 
Michael R. Anderson, “Pacific dreams: The Institute of Pacific Relations and the struggle for the mind of Asia,” 
PhD dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 2009; Priscilla Roberts, “The Institute of Pacific Relations: Pan-
Pacific and Pan-Asian visions of International Order,” International Politics 55 (2018), pp. 836-851. 
24 For regionalism within the American Institute, see John N. Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations: Asian 
Scholars and American Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), pp. 30-34, 57-61. 
25 For San Francisco, where the process of forming a Council started in March 1946 and was completed by March 
1947, see “Progress Report of the Exploratory Committee,” July 30, 1946, IPR, Box 207; “Report of Joint 
Committee to International Center and Bay Region Institute of Pacific Relations,” April 21, 1947, Ray Lyman 
Wilbur Papers, Library and Archives, Hoover Institution, Box 37. The situation developed much more slowly in 
Seattle, but see “Report of the Bureau of International Relations Coordination Survey to the Steering Committee of 
Seattle International Relations Agencies,” February 1947, World Affairs Council of Seattle Records, Special 
Collections, University of Washington Libraries, Box 1; “Memorandum of the Meeting of the World Affairs 
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into a single, national institution, which would then devolve power to communities.26 But at an 
Institute conference in April 1947 in the resort city of Coronado, California, delegates batted 
away a proposal from San Francisco officials for “organic union.”27 The Bay Area group left in 
protest, collaborating with other local activists to form the World Affairs Council of Northern 
California which was presided over by a former assistant secretary of state, Henry F. Grady.28 
Emeny and Hiss continued to negotiate with the Institute’s New York chairman, Edward C. 
Carter, up to a summit at the Rockefeller estate at Overhills, North Carolina, early in 1948. The 
atmosphere was “relaxingly country-house,” the Rockefeller Foundation’s representative at the 
meeting reported, but a gentlemanly agreement was out of reach. Backing off, Emeny concluded 
that community education would have to be pursued through the Association alone.29 
 
26 The San Francisco group’s grandest plans were certainly made in dialogue with Emeny’s, but there were some 
differences. Admiral John W. Greenslade, a Vice Admiral who had helped to formulate plans for Japanese 
internment during World War II and served as a San Francisco official after his retirement in 1944, had similar 
ideas for a single national institution, but doubted that local Councils could survive on an autonomous community 
basis. As he wrote to Emeny, the Cleveland model “does not strike me as one which can be applied to all large 
communities inasmuch as it requires — or seems to — the leadership of an outstanding individual and the 
availability of means other than those normally obtainable through gifts and various classes of membership.” In that, 
Greenslade was proved right. See Admiral John W. Greenslade to Emeny,  April 5, 1945, Institute of Pacific 
Relations, San Francisco Bay Region, Records, Library and Archives, Hoover Institution [IPRSF], Box 3. 
27 Carter to Members of the Board of Trustees of the American Institute of Pacific Relations, April 16, 1947, IPR, 
Box 101; Thomas, Institute of Pacific Relations, pp. 59-61; “Memorandum to Dr. Robert Gordon Sproul,” May 27, 
1947, McLaughlin Papers, Carton 3. 
28 “Minutes of First Meeting of Board of Trustees,” June 3, 1947, CEIP, Series 6, Box 266; “Minutes of the Second 
Meeting of Board of Trustees,” June 19, 1947, CEIP, Series 6, Box 266; “World Affairs Groups Formed in 
California,” New York Times (June 22, 1947), p. 23. For Staley’s research, which contradicted Emeny’s, see Eugene 
Staley, Raw Materials in Peace and War (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1937); Eugene Staley, “The 
Myth of the Continents,” Foreign Affairs 19 (1941), pp. 481-494. 
29 Bryce Wood, “The Future of FPA,” February 4, 1948, RF, Box 334; Bryce Wood, “Amalgamation of FPA & 
IPR,” January 13, 1948, RF, Box 334; Carter to Donald Tewksbury et al, January 12, 1948, IPR, Box 232; Clarence 
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What both the Association and the Institute were responding to was a fundamental shift 
in the ways and whys in which knowledge about world affairs was produced. Adapting to these 
new structures of knowledge production, and to the broader rise of what Daniel Bessner has 
called the “military-intellectual complex,” was a profound challenge for the Association.30 As 
Bessner and others have argued, the structures built to support the exercise of American power 
were founded on a profound distrust of democratic politics, one that was out of step with the 
(more) democratic structures built to support the rise of American power by a previous 
generation of intellectuals. Emeny understood the threat, and mounted a progressive, Deweyan 
defense against it. “Hundreds of thousands of dollars are to be put annually in the universities 
and colleges of the country for the financing of international studies in general and regional 
research in particular,” he wrote in April 1948, a project that had the side benefit of “providing 
manpower for Government service, business careers, teaching and advanced research.” But by 
abandoning public-facing research, Rockefeller was abandoning the responsibilities of social 
scientists and those who funded them. Expertise without democratic control, as adult educators 
had worked to guard against, would be lethal. “This is obviously not an age in which 
international scholars can be permitted to retreat solely to the company of their colleagues,” 
Emeny wrote. “More and more they must be brought into closer touch with the average citizen 
and the products of their research made more widely available in understandable terms.”31  
 
30 Daniel Bessner, Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the Defense Intellectual (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2018), p. 4. 
31 Brooks Emeny to the Board of Trustees, “Tentative Memorandum,” April 1948, McCoy Papers, Box 73. See also 
a proposal to the Carnegie Corporation later that year, in which Emeny wrote that the Council program was a way 
of reconciling both the rise of “specialized research in universities and other endowed research institutions in the field 
of world relations” and “the conscious awakening on the part of a large portion of American citizens to their own 
stake in foreign policy.” As Emeny wrote, “the pouring of money solely into institutions of advanced research and 
for the training of specialized scholars will prove of little avail in the development of sound democratic thinking 
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“Academicians do not rule the world,” Emeny had once huffed to Nelson Rockefeller, 
but Rockefeller Foundation officials were never convinced.32 Ironically, it was the very official 
who traveled to Overhills, Bryce Wood, who had redrafted the Foundation’s program and made 
funding not just adult education, but non-university research unlikely. As Wood noted in August 
1947, “support to non-partisan informative agencies in the field of foreign affairs has been a 
continuing feature of RF policy since the mid-1920s.” But those days were gone. “Informing a 
world public would probably be a task in which RF’s contribution would be small and 
unnoticed,” Wood wrote.33 And although Wood left room for a change of heart if a “less 
internationalist Administration should take office,” he insisted “that the facilities for adult 
education in this field are now greater than ever before, and that RF support to these facilities 
would be unimportant when compared to other activities to which assistance might be 
provided.”34 As the Foundation abandoned its forays into adult education and turned to area 
studies and the servicing of experts to teach in a booming higher education sector, the $852,000 
that it had given the Association over the years would only be added to with a small emergency 
 
about foreign policy unless the products of such research as well as the trained scholars who are engaged in research 
activities can be brought into closer touch with the public as a whole. This is essentially the problem of community 
organization.” See “Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated, to the Carnegie Corporation of New York,” 
December 31, 1948, CC, Box 147. 
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donation in 1950.35 Emeny responded to the Foundation’s intractable stance by trying to disband 
the research staff in 1948, a strategy which the research director, Vera Micheles Dean, saw as 
“wrecking the accomplishments” of the Association.36 In the end, only half of the staff left, 
mostly for the State Department.37 
These were deep, structural shifts in the relationship between knowledge and power as it 
related to American foreign relations, and they were shifts that had their roots dating to the war 
and even before it, not the cold war, and that were reflected the United States’ rise to primacy, 
not its need to contain the Soviet Union.38 Indeed, they were reflected in the very nature of the 
postwar order. Skepticism about the power of public opinion had helped make the United 
Nations a much more power-political institution than the League.39 But these shifts played out 
in the context of the cold war. For if the war changed how and why knowledge about the world 
was to be produced in the United States, it was the cold war that policed the content of that 
 
35 Emeny’s one success came in May 1950, with a supplementary grant of $20,000. See “Excerpt from Minutes of SS 
Staff Meeting #73, May 24, 1950,” RF, Box 335. For the Association’s failure to acquire new grants, see Emeny to 
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knowledge in a way that had never been true before. Combine institutional pressures with 
ideological force, and the citizen education infrastructure was put at serious risk. 
 
* * * * * 
 
As one of the United States’ most popular and respected speakers on world affairs, Vera 
Micheles Dean was the face of the Foreign Policy Association, and she spoke with a Russian 
accent.40 Born in 1903 to a Jewish businessman and a mother who translated Peter Pan, Vera 
Micheles spent a prosperous childhood in St. Petersburg. She was schooled at home. Her 
favorite teacher was a man who, she later wrote, “embodied the most ardent and inspiring 
qualities of the Russia spirit.” He joined the Bolsheviks in 1917. The Micheles were no friends of 
the Communist Party, and the five members of the family left Petrograd just before the October 
revolution for their summer home, thirty miles away in the frontier town of Terijoki, Finland. 
The revolution came to them all the same. In Terijoki, the Micheles hid as the Red Army 
scavenged for food and searched for opponents; in Petrograd, looters robber their home. Still, 
Vera would come to look back happily on these years. “The Bolshevik revolution left no residue 
of bitterness or resentment in my life,” she later wrote; in fact, she had “benefited” from it.41  
 
40 On the new historiography on the international thought of women, see Glenda Sluga and Carolyn James (eds.), 
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 As the Micheles family moved to Paris and then London, Vera was sent to New York 
City. She arrived, alone, aged just 16. She worked as a stenographer and eventually went up to 
study at Radcliffe College. With profound gifts as a linguist, she embarked on graduate work, 
first, with the help of a Carnegie Endowment fellowship, at Yale, and then back at Radcliffe. 
Her doctorate was an intense analysis of the law relating to governments de facto, with a special 
focus on the recognition of the Soviet Union.42 A few days after she had completed her thesis 
Buell hired her to his research staff at the Association, primarily as a Russianist.43 In New York, 
she met and married an attorney, William Johnson Dean, but he died unexpectedly, and she was 
left alone with their two children, one of whom was born five weeks after her husband passed 
away. Her family’s breadwinner, Dean earned enough to support her children by embarking on a 
remarkably successful speaking career, by freelancing for the Nation, the New Republic, and other 
publications, and by publishing serious works of contemporary history.  
As a Russianist, her views of the Soviet Union were rosy, but far from unusually so 
among her peers. She was prone, for instance, to downplaying political repression and the extent 
of the police state in the name of praising the dramatic pace of economic development that her 
former home was achieving.44 She loved her homeland and her adoptive home alike, writing in 
1942 that, “the Russians resemble the Americans more than any other people.”45 She effectively 
 
42 Vera Micheles, “Governments de facto with special reference to the Soviet government,” PhD thesis, Radcliffe 
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celebrate the wartime alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union, including in 
pamphlets commissioned for troops by the War Department.46 “In spite of setbacks and 
mistakes,” she wrote as late as 1947, “Russia is traveling in a direction that will eventually bring it 
out on the high road of spiritual and political, as well as material, progress.”47  
Such views rapidly became the subject of controversy, but it was a controversy that Dean 
actively courted.48 She saw little that satisfied her in American foreign policy, in part because she 
so strongly believed that the Soviet Union was not all bad. “The kind of society the Russians are 
striving to create in the USSR,” she wrote in a direct critique of Winston Churchill’s “iron 
curtain” speech at Fulton, Missouri, “is a society to which masses of people in other, even more 
backward, areas of the world have been aspiring.”49 She understood quicker than many that the 
“global conflict of interests between the United States and Russia” was indeed a global one, and 
that the United States could only hold its own by offering more than its competitor, morally and 
economically, to the downtrodden of the world, and by embracing the leftward turn she saw in 
Europe and elsewhere.50 But her fears that the United States would sully its potential by allying 
 
46 American Historical Association, Our Russian Ally (Washington, D.C.: War Department, 1945). 
47 Dean, Russia: Menace or Promise, p. viii. 
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itself with colonial powers, expediently endorsing repressive rule, and expanding white 
supremacy at home were borne out.51 Even the European Recovery Program, which she admired 
so much that she wrote a sixteen-page supplement for the Washington Post that the Committee 
for the Marshall Plan reprinted 100,000 times, disappointed her.52 After all, there was no 
prospect of it being worked out through the auspices of the United Nations.53 
Present at San Francisco and a diligent reporter on deliberations at Lake Success, Dean 
was a committed internationalist as a matter of principle, but a key part of her internationalism 
was a statement about American power.54 As she relentlessly argued during the war and after, a 
genuine internationalism on the part of the United States would guard against the two fatal 
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tendencies of isolationism, on the one hand, and imperialism, on the other.55 And yet a genuine 
internationalism was not forthcoming, as the United States started, in her view, to treat the 
United Nations as just another theater for a cold war. As early as the announcement of the 
Truman doctrine, Dean warned that American involvement in world affairs might “assume the 
character of what we once denounced as imperialism.”56 
It was for that reason that Dean inveighed so strongly against containment. Containment 
was misconceived in its own right, because the Soviet Union was never going to convert to liberal 
capitalist democracy. Dean feared that it would be counterproductive, for the Tsars had “sought 
again and again to break through the containment levees thrown up during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries,” and Stalin was certain to follow suit if faced with a “hostile bloc.”57 So he 
did, in Czechoslovakia and Korea.58 But to Dean, what containment really did was to underline 
the hypocrisy and sterility of American foreign policy. Russia undermined the Yalta agreements, 
but “it would be well to bear in mind that Russia — if perhaps less concerned with the niceties of 
diplomatic usages — is not essentially different in its great-power manifestations from Britain 
and the United States.”59 Russia promoted violence in Eastern Europe, but “we forget that both 
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we and the British passed through revolutions and civil wars before we succeeded in establishing 
stable democratic institutions.”60 Russia had interfered along its border, but the United States did 
the same in Latin America, and sought bases worldwide.61 Russia, Dean insisted, was not solely 
to blame for the crisis. The world was not black and white.62 
Predictably, Dean was assailed in the pages of anti-communist bulletins like Plain Talk 
and the New Leader, and the zealous Red-baiter Alfred Kohlberg, a textiles exporter who 
mounted a lurid campaign against the Institute of Pacific Relations, accused her of “treason.”63 
Otherwise, the public criticism of her was rather mild, not least because her views were fairly 
common among the educated women with whom she was so popular, particularly members of 
the League of Women Voters and the American Association of University Women.64 Even the 
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Federal Bureau of Investigation did not think much of her, concluding after an investigation as 
late as 1954 that while she had “been pro-Soviet in her writings and has apparently been an 
apologist for the USSR,” she had never “engaged in any form of subversive activity in the past.”65 
Her views did not stop her taking up visiting positions at Barnard, Smith, and Harvard. But 
within a struggling Association, Dean came under increasing attack. One board member feared 
that the Association “has ceased to be solely an objective fact-finding organization, and has 
become the vehicle for the expression of a certain point of view upon a controversial issue.”66 The 
Milwaukee branch reported in September 1947 that it could not “retain all its members at a time 
when terms like ‘red-baiters’ and ‘fellow-travelers’ are tossed about so indiscriminately.”67 A 
member from Philadelphia, a Mrs. Percy Madeira, spent months working on a 27-page critique 
of one contrarian pamphlet, Russia – Menace or Promise?, declaring it “simply confusing” at a time 
when Mr. X was warning of an “implacable challenge.”68 A board member from the Hartford 
branch told Emeny that Dean was his “office Kerensky,” and that the “curious pinkish aura” of 
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the Association made it impossible to raise money.69 By 1951, several branches were refusing to 
give Dean a platform to speak.70 
What made this especially difficult for Dean was that the cold war seemed to threaten the 
kind of democratic foreign policy that adult educators had worked for. She feared that the 
uniformity of media opinion and the government’s “reiteration of dramatic appeals to stave off 
impending catastrophes” had created a “‘wolf, wolf!’ attitude” and “a wall between the people and 
the government.”71 She criticized the “secrecy surrounding top policy decisions,” which gave 
“even well-informed and civic-minded individuals a sense of fatalism which paralyzes the sense 
of personal responsibility.”72 Americans needed to learn that diplomacy meant “gradual, 
sometimes imperceptible, adjustments and readjustments, a little progress here and some backing 
down there,” she wrote, but instead they had been taught a cold war, which had “encouraged the 
erroneous idea that ‘our side’ must register continuous clear-cut ‘victories’ — otherwise our 
opponent will be victorious, and we shall suffer ‘defeat’.”73 That had led to McCarthyism, to a 
search for scapegoats, to threats to civil liberties, to an America left in “grave peril.”74 
Indeed, the cold war chilled all kinds of institutions that had previously promoted open 
debate, however much that debate had been constrained in practice. Communists, fellow-
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travelers, and mere experts on Mao Zedong left the Institute of Pacific Relations vulnerable to 
zealotry, and the Institute became the vehicle for a broader attack on internationalist world 
affairs groups and the foundations that funded them.75 The Association for the most part 
avoided the worst, and those of its former staffers who were hauled before loyalty boards and 
congressional committees were damned mostly for their connections with the Institute, rather 
than the Association. The FBI looked into the Association all the same in the summer of 1950, 
despite assuring Association officers that it was not under suspicion.76 Investigators found 
nothing to be seriously amiss despite using testimony from the famed informants Louis Budenz 
and Elizabeth Bentley to level minor accusations against some of the office staff, which went 
nowhere.77 
 Even so, not falling into line with the cold war was bad for business. The Association’s 
membership plummeted back down to prewar levels, even as inflation drove its costs far higher. 
Evidence suggested that even those who kept up their subscriptions valued them less, as they 
acquired their information from elsewhere. A survey taken in 1950 revealed that only one in 
eight members considered the Bulletin, Reports, or Headlines to be their “most valuable” source of 
information on foreign affairs; many got what they needed from Time or the New York Times. It 
was no surprise that the members were an academic elite, 80% of them being college graduates at 
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a time when just 6% of all Americans had degrees.78 But perhaps most troubling, the average age 
of a male member was just under 50, of a female member just under 60. One in ten members was 
over 70.79 
So as the Korean War broke out, the Association faced a mortal crisis. There was no 
market for its publications. There was no market for events in New York, as the throngs who 
had massed even ten years earlier now longer came. Board directors were as hard to attract to 
younger members, and older trustees turned up at meetings in fewer and fewer numbers, leaving 
a devoted hard core of aging progressives. Only the Emenys were prepared to donate to any 
considerable degree. By the winter of 1950, the Association faced insolvency.80 
Eustace Seligman, the treasurer, offered a way out that would solve both the structural 
and the ideological problems: the closure of the research department, the shuttering of the 
Washington bureau, the outsourcing of all publications, and the creation of a committee that 
would consider “how the F.P.A. can become a more effective medium for the dissemination of 
objective information in the field of foreign affairs to a wider group of readers.”81 The committee, 
which included Alger Hiss’s replacement at the Carnegie Endowment, Joseph E. Johnson, and 
Thomas S. Matthews, the editor of Time magazine, advised that the Association should end the 
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Reports, curtail the Headlines, and make the Bulletin a forum for outside authors.82 All involved 
assumed that Dean would resign, but she did not. Unable to fire her without risking the ire of 
members who still supported her, the board in May 1951 allowed her to carry on editing an 
expanded, biweekly Bulletin, albeit one dominated by outside authors.83  
This was the end of an era, if an unceremonious one. While the Association’s research 
program had been undermined during the war, it had not been clear then whether it might 
recover once the war was over. The Association had its answer. It could not escape through 
cooperation. It could not escape shifts in philanthropy. It could not escape the cold war. The 
think tanks that were already taking the Association’s place, whether university institutes at 
MIT, Princeton, and Columbia, or policy shops like the RAND Corporation, had a wholly 
different ethos. They worked towards the state, rather than out from it; they stood in for public 
opinion, making no effort to try to cultivate it; they were interested in globalism and in “national 
security,” not in peace and in international cooperation. The building of the cold war state, 
institutionally and ideologically, involved declaring derelict an institution that most within the 
foreign policy elite had thought essential only a few years prior. 
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 The only remaining question was whether the Association would be torn down. Unable 
to stop the slide, Seligman asked the board seriously to consider liquidation in October 1951.84 
The Association needed a savior. 
 
* * * * * 
 
What was the Ford Foundation going to do with all that cash? For its first twelve years, since its 
founding in 1936, the Foundation had been little more than a local charity, giving away small 
amounts of money to causes around Detroit. But shortly after the death of Henry Ford in 1947, 
the Foundation found itself with stock worth nearly half a billion dollars. Such a sum made it the 
wealthiest philanthropy in the world, endowed with capital far beyond the wildest dreams of any 
Rockefeller or Carnegie grant officer. How to spend it was a question left to a small committee 
led by a Californian lawyer, H. Rowan Gaither, Jr. Gaither’s study group interviewed a thousand 
notable Americans, before reporting to the trustees in November 1949. 
 The Gaither Report, which was released publicly a year later, promised to make the Ford 
Foundation an active combatant in the cold war, a soldier on behalf of democracy against the 
“tide of communism.” As history taught that “the position of the United States is crucial,” that 
nations could no longer “retreat into self-sufficiency,” the Foundation would help the United 
States promote a peaceful, prosperous, democratic world order. The best way for a foundation to 
“make its entrance into human affairs,” the committee argued, would be through “a reaffirmation 
 




of democratic ideals and with the expressed intention of assisting democracy to meet that 
challenge and to realize its ideals.” That required strengthening democracy at home, not least in 
the face of those who “imperiled” it by trying to “stamp out dissent and measure loyalty by 
conformity.” And the committee saw democracy not as a set of “rigid rules,” or as inhering in 
institutions or values, but as a lived freedom. “When the democratic spirit is deep and strong in a 
society it animates every phase of living,” they wrote, and the “the real meaning of democracy” 
for people was therefore “how it is interpreted in action, how it is applied in their daily lives.”85 
Gaither and his colleagues therefore ended up in the same position as so many of their 
peers: seeking an informed public to save the world. They feared that “widespread apathy, 
misunderstanding, and ignorance concerning political issues, personalities, and public needs” 
posed “a great danger to self-government,” and to peace. Overcoming that apathy was an 
imperative of American power, to be sure, and even specifically the cold war. Under the 
Foundation’s Area I programs, which would become its International Affairs division, Gaither 
wrote that Ford should support “independent and nonpartisan” ways to get the “relevant facts 
and judgments” to the “electorate at large,” on the understanding that “our Government and the 
United Nations cannot effectively formulate or execute policy in international affairs without 
public understanding and support.” But the fight against apathy was not simply instrumental. 
Under the Foundation’s Area II programs, which sought “the strengthening of democracy,” 
Gaither wrote that Ford should “encourage people to become better informed about, and to 
participate in, the solution of the different types of problems they share.” Indeed, one such way 
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might be “the ‘community workshop’ in which scientists or educators act as social engineers, in 
communities of manageable size, to stimulate and mobilize an interest in public affairs.” Either 
way, there was a tension to be resolved here, one we have seen before. Simply put, what was this 
public for? Was it to give Americans what they needed just to “support” a foreign policy made by 
policymaking elites, as implied by the Area I rubric? Or was it to give Americans something 
more, to give them the power to make that policy for themselves, as implied by Area II?86 
Of course, there was no bright line between these choices, but for the time being Ford 
chose the second course.87 Like the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation before 
it, the Ford Foundation saw adult education as one way of achieving a more perfect democracy. 
As soon as Paul G. Hoffman, a cold warrior brought in from the Economic Cooperation 
Administration, became the Foundation’s president in 1950, he created a quasi-independent 
Fund for Adult Education (FAE). Over the next decade the FAE would spend $47 million. Its 
leader was C. Scott Fletcher, who had little background in adult education, but had worked for 
Hoffman as the vice-president of sales at Studebaker, and for William Benton, the second 
assistant secretary of state for public affairs, at both the Encyclopedia Britannica and as executive 
director of the Committee for Economic Development. Fletcher turned the FAE into what one 
historian has called “a laboratory for democratic citizenship,” fusing marketing techniques with 
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mass media and “face-to-face” group discussion to “improve the public’s opinion-making 
skills.”88 As Fletcher put it, he sought to create “mature, wise, and responsible citizens who can 
participate intelligently in a free society,” who would “bring to bear upon public questions their 
best understanding and judgment after free study and free discussion.” And he would do it 
through the community, where “the exercise of mature and responsible citizenship must have its 
base and its initial point of impact if the free society is to survive and flourish.”89  
 There was no personal connection between the Foundation or the Fund and the Foreign 
Policy Association. None of the members of the Gaither Committee was yet involved in the 
movement for citizen education in world affairs. None of the leaders of the Foundation of the 
Fund had been a key figure, although Hoffman had spoken to World Affairs Councils. But there 
was a real affinity of aims, and one that Emeny saw immediately. “We believe that the Ford 
Foundation will have an especial interest in the work of the Association,” Emeny wrote as soon 
as the Gaither Report came out, “because our aims and purposes so closely parallel the objectives 
of the Ford Foundation as expressed in its statement of policy.”90 At one point, Emeny felt the 
match so close that he asked for $3 million over ten years.91 The fact that Ford had come to the 
conclusion that something like Emeny’s program was in the best interests of the nation was a 
sign that his was no esoteric, nor unworkable pursuit. 
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Not that the vision was working out. What Emeny called his National Program, the 
Association’s effort to foster World Affairs Councils on the Cleveland model, had started slowly, 
operating in a kind of permanent transition. There were early successes in San Francisco, 
Philadelphia, and Boston, places where internationalists of various commitment saw the benefits 
of pooling their efforts, and those Councils benefitted not only from Emeny’s advice and 
encouragement, but from graduates of his Ohio training program. But it took time to move the 
Association as a whole away from what Emeny called “small lectureship societies and the 
distribution and sale of a limited number of world affairs studies.” The shift in vision was 
dramatic, forcing a recognition that “the knowledge and judgment of a few citizens on foreign 
policy do not automatically filter down through the mass of the population,” requiring primarily 
lunch groups, appealing above all to wealthy women, to convert into full educational institutions, 
complete with corps of trained speakers headed out into the community, with total geographical 
and thematic coverage, and with ample funding.92 And it therefore raised hackles. The first 
National Program Director, Clarence Peters, was fired by the board; the second, Thomas Power, 
made little headway. For all Emeny’s enthusiasm, he lacked the managerial skills to build a 
foreign policy public at scale, meeting by meeting. 
 Even so, the vision was appealing, and widely regarded as sound. Carnegie certainly 
thought so, and as well as making special grants to the new Councils, it stepped up its support 
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for Emeny himself.93 On the basis of tours around the country and apparent expressions of 
interest from 84 communities in addition to his own branches, Emeny asked Carnegie for 
$150,000 to help found a hundred “self-supporting” Councils overseen by trained, paid directors 
with doctorates in international relations. The funds, he hoped, would go towards the salaries of 
field men and a flock of trainees, taken straight from graduate school to New York for a few 
months, swept off for work experience at an established Council, and then dropped into a 
community as executive directors paid to create a public for themselves.94 Carnegie officials, 
including the president Charles Dollard and the former Council on Foreign Relations staffer 
Whitney Shepardson, were enthused by the idea.95 Despite their personal distaste for Emeny and 
their rather loftier vision of the public desirable for foreign affairs, even Shepardson’s former 
colleagues proved enthusiastic when he asked for their views. They thought that aiming for a 
hundred community groups was “utterly fantastic,” implying “a gross exaggeration of the degree 
of latent interest in international affairs in the country generally.” But given that they feared that 
even the ultra-elite members of their own Committees on Foreign Relations were turning away 
from world affairs, and that “the government was “getting way out ahead of the people in the 
obligations which it is taking abroad,” though thought that Emeny ought to be given a shot at a 
 
93 “Carnegie Corporation Interest in World Affairs Councils,” April 9, 1952, CC, Box 374. Despite his past work 
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“miracle.”96 Carnegie agreed early in 1949, although it cut the target to twenty new Councils, and 
the grant to $93,000.97 
 That was far beyond the capacity of an Association close to the brink. It could barely 
spend Carnegie’s money at all.98 By August 1951, only eight of the Association’s 32 affiliated 
branches and Councils had paid directors, and only three had more than 1,000 members.99 The 
graduate students who applied for the training program tended to lack the necessary charisma, 
but few cities were able to raise enough money to employ those who passed muster anyway. The 
National Program’s emphasis on community development sapped the branches of their esprit de 
corps, and the services offered by New York comprised little more than occasional visits from 
Emeny and his deputy, Thomas Power.100 Much as the affiliates continued to innovate, as with 
forums in Pittsburgh, television shows in Milwaukee, and even local opinion polls in Rhode 
Island, the picture overall was poor.101 Carnegie lamented late in 1952 that just one new Council 
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of any size had opened its doors that year, in Dallas, and even considered asking for its money 
back.102 “In looking back over the text of our initial request,” Emeny conceded in his final report, 
“it is evident that the Foreign Policy Association has not achieved in specific terms much of what 
it hoped.”103 
 Still, in the chaotic early days of the Ford Foundation, the Association appeared to be the 
ideal vehicle for a crash program. Even the State Department thought so. At the unprecedented 
private conference of foundation (including Ford) officials held by the Office of Public Affairs in 
April 1951, John W. Gardner of the Carnegie spoke about the Corporation’s sponsorship of the 
World Affairs Council project, and figures such as the former special assistant to the secretary of 
war and Boston branch chairman Harvey H. Bundy praised Emeny’s turn away from “luncheons 
for the widows of the founders.”104 A month later, the assistant secretary of state for public 
affairs, Edward W. Barrett, told Ford that if it was interested in helping extend the reach of the 
department’s domestic information programs, the Division of Public Liaison suggested it should 
fund World Affairs Councils so that they could “bring in sufficient new members to make the 
community organization a real contributing part of the community as a whole.”105 The only way 
to do that at scale, at least without founding an entirely new institutions, was through the 
Association. State even offered its views on cities suitable for community development, although 
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the Association staffer sent to coordinate with the Office of Public Affairs, a young graduate of 
the training program named Alexander Allport, was less than impressed with Foggy Bottom’s 
knowledge of, and appreciation for, community life.106 In any case, in December 1951 the Fund 
for Adult Education gave $355,000 over three years to the Association’s National Program.107 
 Was the Association, and with it the Ford Foundation, therefore just acting as a kind of 
front organization for the State Department? After all, the State Department was supporting the 
World Affairs Councils far more than it had even the old Association branches, as it sent 
speakers out for their big-ticket dinners, used their pamphlet shops as distribution centers for its 
publications, and collaborated with them to hold regional conferences at which policymakers 
appeared before the public. And the fact that the Association hired its new National Program 
Director, Chester S. Williams, straight from the department makes the argument tempting.108 
As we have seen, Williams, the former assistant to John Studebaker and the architect of the 
Federal Forum Project, had found a home in the State Department’s Division of Public Liaison 
at the end of the war. But Williams’ vision of a foreign policy public built through voluntary 
associations and adult education left more room for debate and dissent than most policymakers 
were prepared to countenance. Exiled from Washington to New York, Williams became deputy 
director of public information at the U.S. Mission to the UN in 1946. As his New Deal work 
showed, Williams was more willing than many of his peers to implicate adult education in 
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government service. Reporting to President Truman, in 1949 Williams organized the World 
Town Hall Seminar, a three-month tour to thirteen capital cities that saw voluntary association 
leaders — Emeny included — fly 34,000 miles around the world to promote the conference, 
roundtable, and town meeting techniques of the “democratic method.” It was propaganda for 
democracy, to be sure, but propaganda for a participatory, progressive kind of democracy.109 
  In the Foreign Policy Association, Williams seems to have seen a similar opportunity. 
Aiming to “develop a sense of self-confidence in large numbers of citizens concerning their 
ability to influence the direction of world affairs,” he set out a bold plan in June 1952, a “fresh 
start” for the Association.110 Some places, Williams thought, would be ambitious enough to 
support a full World Affairs Council. Others might find it better to set up a World Affairs 
Forum, run by volunteers who would set up public discussions. Others still might only support a 
World Affairs Committee of about thirty to a hundred interested citizens, who would discuss 
foreign affairs among themselves. Either way, these groups would send delegates to an annual 
World Affairs National Assembly, explicitly supported by the White House and the State 
Department as an “expression of views from the ‘grass roots’ of America.” All would be served 
with program assistance, speakers, discussion guides, and so on, by an Association operating six 
regional offices.111 Translated into a further request for $491,500 from the FAE, Williams 
 
109 “Voice of America Broadcast,” undated [1948], Emeny Papers, Box 42; “Report to the President of the United 
States from the Members of the World Town Hall Seminar Meeting,” October 18, 1949, FPA, Part I, Box 54. 
110 Chester S. Williams, “Detailed Outline of Report and Recommendations of Acting Director,” April 24, 1952, 
FPA, Part II, Box 87; “Executive Committee Meeting,” June 11, 1952, FPA, Part II, Box 16. 
111 Williams, “Report on FPA and Community World Affairs Education,” June 12, 1952, FPA, Part II, Box 39. 
“Minutes of a Meeting of the Board of Directors,” June 19, 1952, FPA, Part II, Box 16 
  
283 
envisioned founding “40 to 60 new community organizations” in 1953 alone, helped along by an 
initial $250,000 in seed grants to be used to help communities pay for Council directors’ salaries. 
He would hold a World Affairs National Assembly in January 1954 to announce the success of 
the project. And Williams made it clear to the FAE that the Association would be back for up to 
$2 million to make the project work.112 
If the Ford Foundation had any doubts, the need for community education was brought 
home by a surge of McCarthyite nationalism in its own backyard. From its office in the hills of 
Pasadena, the Foundation watched as the Los Angeles Board of Education became embroiled in 
a bitter fight over the teaching of international cooperation. Assailed by an alliance of the 
Knights of Columbus, the American Legion, and a number of conservative women’s groups, the 
school board spent 1952 debating whether using UNESCO materials in the classroom was a 
subversive act of unpatriotic internationalism. In August, Hoffman himself took the stand, 
“interrupted repeatedly by shouts and boos,” to defend “world understanding and peace” from 
those who would erect an “Iron Curtain within these United States against freedom of inquiry, 
discussion and debate.” Hoffman’s testimony failed; the internationalists lost.113 But the debate 
provided further context for Ford’s commitment to Emeny’s vision. With the help of other local 
Republican internationalists, including the future Atomic Energy Commission and Central 
Intelligence Agency director, John McCone, Hoffman set out to found a World Affairs 
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Council.114 And by October, the FAE had given the Association nearly a million dollars in just a 
few months.115 
In truth, it was too much for the Association to manage. Williams certainly thought so, 
and resigned in September. The Association had a commendable reputation, he explained, left 
over from its publications, its radio shows, and its allure to big names. “Only a few leaders in the 
field know the inside facts,” Williams wrote. While from the outside the Association might 
occupy a prestigious position, it was beset by an arcane internal structure, a poor staff, a weak 
board, a tendency to financial impropriety, an anemic approach to fundraising, and a lingering 
addiction to an outdated membership. Councils young and old took a “dim view” of the 
Association, and many chose to remain independent from it. Unless there was dramatic change, 
Williams wrote, “there is no future for the organization.” Williams wondered if community 
education should not just be attached to a university, or handed to the Chicago Council on 
Foreign Relations, which was stronger than ever under the leadership of Louise Leonard Wright, 
the wife of the scholar, Quincy. Drastic action could be staved off, Williams concluded, only if 
the Association found new leadership.116 
Emeny resigned. He had struggled against structural issues, as we know. But for almost 
the whole two years that the Ford program had taken to come together, he had struggled 
personally, too. His wife, Winifred, had depression, and spent months at a time in a sanitorium. 
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One afternoon in March 1951, she took two of their three daughters into the garage of their 
Greenwich, Connecticut home. She locked the doors; she turned on the engines. The governess, 
the chauffeur, and the neighbors noticed only when it was too late.117 The deaths hit Emeny 
hard. Already a poor manager who found fundraising unpalatable, Emeny was rarely in the 
office, and left executive responsibilities to his deputy, Power, who was always skeptical about 
community education. Emeny put on a brave face, so much so that there were acquaintances who 
were surprised by his departure, thinking that he was handling his grief well. He was not.118 
Personal tragedy was never far away from Brooks and Winifred, but their tragedy was 
woven into the fate of the citizen education movement to a remarkable extent. It was the death 
of Winifred’s parents that had given them the wealth that they had used to move to Cleveland. It 
was that money that had paid off the debts incurred in building the Cleveland Council. It was 
that wealth, too, that had prevented the bankruptcy of the Association. Together, the Emenys 
had donated $120,000 or thereabouts to the Association in five years. Emeny never took a salary; 
there was always money at hand to quietly set the books right.119 This, it bears stressing, was a 
secret. If the extent of the Emenys’ personal investment — particularly in Cleveland — had 
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become common knowledge, it would, rightly, have threatened the viability of the whole 
movement. Only they knew the full extent to which they had personally kept citizen education in 
world affairs going. So, if Emeny’s resignation left the Association free to find an executive 
actually capable of executing his vision, it also left the Association free to find out whether that 
vision could work in towns and cities where there was not a Rockefeller on hand to bankroll it. 
 
* * * * * 
 
On a Thursday evening in March 1952, the auditorium of the WHK radio station on Euclid 
Avenue, Cleveland, held an unusual kind of ceremony. It opened with a processional, the flag of 
the United Nations parading down the aisle. The Cleveland Heights Little Symphony played; 
the Case Western Reserve Glee Club sang; there were remarks from local dignitaries. The lights 
went down, and a show reel clicked on. 
 The film that those Clevelanders saw that night has been lost, but it can be reconstructed 
using draft scripts that survive. One version of the film started with the screen showing a family 
of five, watching television news. “The United States is pursuing a foreign policy whose primary 
aim is the achievement of an enduring peace,” a narrator said, and it was “being felt more and 
more by every man and woman in the land.” A young man told his parents he wanted to be a 
doctor, but feared being drafted; a factory owner told a sales manager that he could not get hold 
of aluminum; a farmer told his county agent the army was taking his farmhands. “Although both 
their every-day lives and the futures are being shaped by the policies and decisions of their 
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government,” the narrator said, “nationwide public opinion surveys reveal that a large percentage 
of U.S. citizens are not conversant with the vital issues of the day.”  
The film cut to a shot of downtown Cleveland, with Terminal Tower in the background, 
and panned to the ninth floor of the Society for Savings Building. “In Cleveland, Ohio,” the 
narrator said, “the Council on World Affairs is but one example of community action which is 
aiding and encouraging the citizen to make his own decisions about the problems arising in the 
relationship of the United States to the rest of the world today.” There were shots of a busy 
office, of the pamphlet shop, of secretaries banking membership renewals. It showed how 
members of the Fortnightly Club, a group of citizens that gathered in a restaurant, could go to 
the Council to train themselves in discussion leadership, so that they, in turn, could speak about 
world affairs in the community. “Are there any set rules to follow” in discussions, asked one of 
those trainees? “Yes, indeed,” the instructor said; “in fact, they’re the rules of democracy.” A few 
minutes later, Mrs. Thompson was shown as a panel member on a Council television program, 
talking about the virtues of foreign aid. As a globe spun and the film concluded, the narrator said 
that “in the months and years to come decisions will be made on problems of great complexity 
and appalling importance.” And, he said, “nobody is in greater need of help, nor does help to 
anyone count more, than to the plain citizen.”120 
Involving more than 200 Clevelanders, World Affairs Are Your Affairs! was produced by 
Louis de Rochemont, the most famous and certainly the most watched documentary filmmaker 
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of his day.121 Pioneer of the March of Time newsreels, de Rochemont’s news films had been seen 
by tens of millions of Americans since 1935. He had just started working, secretly, on an 
animated version of George Orwell’s Animal Farm for the Office of Policy Coordination, the 
CIA-housed psychological warfare workshop.122 But World Affairs Are Your Affairs! was not 
meant for mass distribution. Rather, the Fund for Adult Education gave de Rochemont $65,000 
for his movie as part of a campaign to market a democratic foreign policy on the Cleveland 
model, one that also included a glossy brochure written by the advertisers Fuller & Smith & 
Ross.123 The film was used at the end of the Fund’s packaged study-discussion program, also 
called “World Affairs Are Your Affairs,” in which participants read short essays, partly prepared 
by the Foreign Policy Association, and watched films created by March of Time, Encyclopedia 
Britannica, and even British Information Services. People who took part in these discussion 
groups, it was implied, would find a natural home at a Council.124 And having stoked demand, 
the Fund and the Association also used the film to create supply, screening it for civic leaders, 
the kinds of people who might have the power to help found a Council in their own community. 
What did these citizen educators mean by a “community?” In other words, how did they 
conceive of their target? On one level, a community was a spatial concept, defined by the limits 
of a town or a city. On another, though, it was a psychological concept, built of the structure of 
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social ties and, ultimately, political power.125 Academics had been writing theories of community 
since at least the urban activism turn-of-the-century progressivism, theories that were intended 
to inform choices made in day-to-day community organization, particularly in social work.126 
After the war, community studies took on new urgency as scholars refined ideas about political 
structure and mass communications. The defining work came from a former social worker, Floyd 
Hunter, whose Community Power Structure was published in 1953. Relying on interviews, Hunter 
pictured his subject city, Atlanta, as a pyramid, one in which most aspects of life were presided 
over by a corporate and banking elite, a handful of relatively isolated white men who were 
“named as influential and consequently able to ‘move things’.”127 While other social scientists saw 
voluntary associations and formal institutions as the primary means of local control, Hunter saw 
them as “subordinate” to a “power group,” one that made policy and outsourced its execution to 
an “under-structure.” To organize a community effectively, one needed the consent (and cash) of 
this elite, even if it was unlikely to do any visible organizing itself. Hunter quoted the social 
worker Arthur Hillman, who noted that even if one understood that “community action in a 
practical, democratic sense is more than a matter of selling key leaders who in turn will influence 
the bulk of the people,” it was “somewhat inevitable under urban conditions” that one would 
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need elites all the same.128 One could therefore hold the view, as Emeny and the Association did, 
that opinions did not automatically “trickle down” from an elite to the mass, and yet still by 
necessity hold what Hillman called a “‘trickle down’ theory of community action.” That meant 
working from the top down in the name of working from the bottom up.129 
Building a World Affairs Council took more than just elite buy-in, however. Building a 
donor network, building a board, building a team of volunteers, all this took more than that. As 
the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations put it in 1953, “finding the people who care enough 
about world affairs education in the community to undertake responsibility for a segment of it is 
the key factor in the Council’s growth and future.”130 Contemporary social science called such 
people “opinion leaders,” politically-alert and active people who took responsibility for trying “to 
influence the rest of the community” through “person-to-person influence.” Opinion leaders, in 
the theories of Paul Lazarsfeld and his team at the Bureau for Applied Social Research at 
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Columbia University, were thought to be more educated than the norm, and served the crucial 
communications function of taking ideas from mass media and passing them on to those who 
were less informed. And opinion leadership was not, Lazarsfeld and his collaborators argued in 
their pioneering The People’s Choice in 1944, “identical with the socially prominent people in the 
community or the richest people or the civic leaders.”131 It was exercised horizontally within 
social strata. As Lazarsfeld told a meeting of Association branch representatives in 1949, “it is 
false to assume that opinion percolates down from the banker or other big-wig,” and in fact “an 
active union leader or a loquacious barber are much better spreaders on a horizontal plane.” An 
academic description of how opinions were thought to move thereby became the intended public 
that activists sought to build on the ground.132  
If actually identifying opinion leaders was difficult, identifying opinion leaders who held 
both interest and influence in matters of foreign policy was even harder. Lazarsfeld’s partner at 
Columbia, the sociologist Robert K. Merton, made a distinction between two types of 
“influentials,” the “local” and the “cosmopolitan.” Only cosmopolitans, Merton argued, thought 
in national or international terms; only cosmopolitans joined voluntary groups for anything more 
than social status; only cosmopolitans read newspapers with foreign news, so that they could 
form and then pass on opinions.133 How many of them there were would vary from community 
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to community, but there was already evidence that they were few and far between. Only through 
what one theorist called “detailed person-by-person tracing of influence paths” would anyone 
find out.134 Operating on tradition and instinct rather than a close reading of sociology, this was 
how the Foreign Policy Association had worked in the past to build its branches, and it was how 
it would scope out communities to build World Affairs Councils. Activists borrowed academic 
language, without yet situating themselves fully in academic networks and findings. 
As the Council effort picked up pace, Allport sketched out the tools of community 
development as the Association saw them. The first step was to learn about the “market,” for 
while the “entire population” was the “logical” target, target cities had to be prioritized according 
to their “potential,” which included their past community activities, the availability of financial 
support, and their “strategic location.”  Then the regional staff had to “discover” the parts of the 
community leadership that might be interested. It had five main methods for this, to be used in 
various combinations. A set-piece speech by a prominent outsider was usually involved, as was a 
series of interviews with citizens assumed to be part of the power structure of a city, from 
businessmen and politicians to professors and ministers. The local representatives of national 
organizations might be drafted, especially from the League of Women Voters and other women’s 
groups. That would be particularly effective if they were brought into a special event, whether a 
particular local project, or an area conference that would bring together already active or 
interested citizens. All this should be backed up by national activities, including efforts to involve 
State Department, UN, and congressional officials, who would “demonstrate [the] effect of 
 
134 Frank A. Stewart, “A Sociometric Study of Influence in Southtown,” Sociometry 10 (1947), pp. 11-31, at p. 28; 
Frank A. Stewart, “A Study of Influence in Southtown: II,” Sociometry 10 (1947), pp. 273-286. 
  
293 
public opinion on policy decisions.” Meetings would be held, local leaders would decide what 
kind of world affairs group would best suit them, from a university affiliated service bureau to a 
full-blown, membership-supported Council.135 
 Although this process played out in myriad ways, in Nason’s final report to the FAE he 
constructed a composite narrative for an imaginary but representative community, Middletown. 
Association staffers had picked Middletown as a priority target, and the vice-president of a local 
bank, coincidentally, had written to New York wondering about the possibility of forming a 
Council, “about which he had read in a national magazine.” A field representative started a 
community survey, interviewing editors and broadcasting directors, as well as professors, 
politicians, businessmen, labor leaders, and so on. It took him six months to present his findings 
to a small, core group of 14 people. At that meeting, “massive disapproval” was voiced by the 
treasurer of the Middletown Manufacturing Company, who preferred to back “loftier forums for 
the intelligentsia,” but was eventually convinced to chair a luncheon for businessmen. It took 
another five or six months of preparatory work to confirm the support of community leaders, 
raise money, and hire a director, for which the Association provided a seed grant from the 
Community Investment Fund (CIF). Once the Council started work, it partnered with the 
public library to maintain a stock of books, pamphlets, maps, and so on, and obtained State 
Department and United Nations documents from an older, larger Council a few hundred miles 
away. It set up a speakers bureau to fill requests for both local and visiting speakers. It supported 
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discussion series. It got half an hour of public service time from a radio station, and rebroadcast 
its show to schoolchildren, who participated in an annual Model United Nations.136 
What was unusual about the fictional Middletown Council was that Middletown was a 
blank slate. Most communities were not. And if the aim, as the Association later put it, was to 
develop “a new pattern of American behavior in which more people consciously allot interest and 
time to preparing themselves for their role in the final determination of foreign policy,” then it 
made sense first of all to team up with other groups which sought the same.137 While there were 
a few places, notably San Francisco and Seattle, where a merger among “objective” educational 
groups proved possible, more often it involved forging alliances with political “action” groups. 
Philadelphia, which was formed in 1949 out of an old Association branch and a United Nations 
Council, was the most immediately successful example of this. Under the leadership of executive 
directors Elizabeth Hallstrom and Ruth Weir Miller, it made spectacular progress, with its 
junior education programs, its neighborhood town meetings, its pioneering legislative 
committee, and its partnership with the State Department on regional conferences.138 The 
Council’s sometime president, the Swarthmore College president John W. Nason, was made 
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Brooks Emeny’s replacement in New York on the back of this performance, and charged with 
executing the FAE grant.139 
 Elsewhere, the transition was harder. In Baltimore, a World Affairs Council was founded 
by the board of the local United Nations Association in 1952, but only as a subsidiary which 
other voluntary associations in the city could join if they preferred not to be associated with an 
action group. While the United Nations Association itself was strong, the regional director wrote 
in 1956 that there remained a “difficult and unsolved problem” for broader education initiatives, 
although one with which New York made its peace.140 In Boston, the World Affairs Council was 
initially called the United Council on World Affairs, and despite a large initial membership of 
2,500, it struggled in its early years to generate coherence from its origins in the Association, the 
United Nations, and a Joint Council for International Co-Operation.141 
The problem was a familiar one, about how far internationalists ought to declare their 
allegiances. United Nations Day celebrations, municipal United Nations weeks, trips to the 
United Nations headquarters, United Nations essay contests, Model United Nations Assemblies, 
all these were the bread and butter of plenty of Councils, ways of catching the interest of people 
who might then be convinced of the need of a broader or deeper education. Despite exceptions, 
the kinds of people who could ran Councils or volunteer at them tended to see the world less 
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through cold war, power-political terms than more traditionally internationalist ones. They 
tended to advertise their Councils not by playing up the threat of communism to the United 
States, but by playing up the threat of the cold war to world peace. With membership of the 
United Nations a fact of life in a way that membership of the League of Nations had never been, 
reconciliation with these realities was easier to contemplate. As Nason put it in reflections on the 
Boston situation, “support of the UN is a less controversial position than the advocacy of some 
particular proposal or piece of American foreign policy.”142 As well as moving the Association’s 
offices into headquarters just across from United Nations Plaza, the board therefore acquiesced 
in February 1955 to a working agreement with the American Association for the United Nations 
and the U.S. Committee for the United Nations.143 
 Even without this collaborative background, the Middletown Council would have ranked 
as relatively strong, had it been real. Note, however, how it had been built. It was a bottom-up 
group built from the top-down, as the Association accessed the community through its elites, 
through its leadership, through its wealthy. It was a group that operated primarily through the 
cooperation of other voluntary associations in town, and that would appeal primarily to the kinds 
of citizens who joined those voluntary associations. It was a group that, philosophically, 
understood that to leave adult education to the mass media was insufficient, and yet left the 
education of those who did not come to meetings or sign up for a discussion group to radio and 
television. It was a group that, despite the prominence of the politics of race in the city, assumed 
that its audience was white, assumed that to the point that it never even thought to discuss the 
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matter. It was a group, too, that was part of a national network that was presumed to be thriving. 
And yet it still had tremendous problems. Its leaders spent more time trying to raise money than 
anything else, and struggled to get grants from local philanthropy or gain the acceptance of all 
but the most liberal of businessmen. It depended on the generosity of one or two wealthy 
enthusiasts, and once the Association withdrew seed money it had to cut back an already paltry 
budget of just $14,000. Even if it faced no competition, matched its programs to the community 
adequately, and maintained excitement among its earliest backers, it remained weak. 
 By 1957, Nason could correctly claim that “the present ‘network’ of world affairs 
organizations is larger and stronger than at any time in the past.” Thousands of Americans 
responded to the call to create a world affairs group in their own community, helped by staff 
members in new regional offices in New York, Cleveland, St. Louis, San Francisco, and New 
Orleans. When Brooks Emeny departed New York in November 1952, the list that the central 
office kept of Association branches, Councils, and similar groups, ran to 29 organizations, half of 
them in the Northeast.144 By the time the Association made its final report to the FAE, after a 
further, brief grant that was designed to tide the Association over before responsibility for it was 
transferred to the Ford Foundation proper, another 41 Councils had been formed, as well as 106 
short-lived, purely informal World Affairs Committees. Across the whole of the Council 
network, total budgets had doubled from 1952 to 1955, from $434,300 to $843,035.145 
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Few of these new Councils were completely new endeavors. Indeed, a decent part of the 
$223,000 handed out in CIF grants, allocated by a committee made up of directors of relatively 
successful Councils, went towards strengthening old, rebranded Association branches in the 
Northeast, such as Albany, Poughkeepsie, and Hartford. Much of it, too, was given to 
subsidiaries of broader adult education institutions that were being revived or directly set up by 
the FAE in cities like Akron, Chattanooga, and Kansas City. A tenth of the fund went to Los 
Angeles, a city close to the heart of the Ford Foundation but a city thought to be problematic on 
account of its sprawl and its strident conservatism.146 All that left little financial support to be 
given to truly brand new Councils, which were founded, however tentatively, in Toledo, 
Syracuse, Cedar Rapids, and elsewhere. Three of the pre-1952 Councils or branches were dead 
by 1957. Only one of the new Councils could compete with established groups, and eight of 
them were Councils in name only, running no programs. Six folded completely.147  
And where there had been success, there were potentially worrying signs. President 
Eisenhower sent a telegram of congratulations when the Dayton Council on World Affairs 
received an award at the end of 1954 for its television programs at a gala dinner in New York, 
one accepted by the local business leader John D. Yeck. The three programs the Council 
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broadcast over local television were thought to reach 100,000 people, and took 69 volunteers and 
three staff members to produce.148 And, relying mostly on the mass media and a thriving network 
of Junior Councils in the public schools, the Dayton outfit had gained a reputation in its 
community remarkably quickly since its founding in 1947.149 48% of local residents sampled in a 
community survey conducted in 1953 claimed to have heard of it, even if only 4% of those 
answering turned out to be members. 79% of respondents said the Council was a good idea if it 
helped “people in this city get the facts about world affairs,” and a decent 49.5% of respondents 
agreed that it was “absolutely true” to say that “world affairs are your affairs.” The authors of the 
survey wrote that “these responses are like being against sin and supporting the virtues,” which at 
least put citizen education on the side of the gods, but that the Council either way appeared “to 
have had a very general, if not intense, impact upon people in Dayton.” A series of other 
questions, however, revealed the limits of that impact. To reach a quarter of the population, even 
in a passive sense, would be “the Utopian goal for an agency like the Council,” the survey 
concluded. And utopias, by their nature, are always out of reach.150 
 
* * * * * 
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In May 1954, barely a year after the Foreign Policy Association’s Council project had started up 
in earnest, the president of the San Francisco outfit, Henry Grady, wrote to Fletcher in 
Pasadena. The World Affairs Council of Northern California was a kind of hybrid, halfway 
between a Council on the Cleveland model and a gender-balanced Council of Foreign Relations 
for the West coast. It concentrated on setting up study groups, in which citizens who had the 
time and energy would study a problem in depth in order to write a report, and it had slowly 
gained the prestige that had been lost in the controversy over the Institute of Pacific Relations. 
But Grady, an economist and shipping magnate who had served as an assistant secretary of state 
and an ambassador to India, Greece, and Iran, had become conscious of “certain restricting facts” 
that the Council movement was having trouble with. One was that a Council “was almost 
inevitably the latest comer in communities already over-organized,” communities in which there 
was already far too much for active citizens to do before they got to foreign policy. And when 
such organizations stepped up their world affairs programming, something that the Council of 
course applauded, they stepped up their demands on the Council’s services while also adding 
competition for its audience. Another issue was the seeming impossibility of “finding programs 
which will appeal to new, different sectors of the population” than the “infinitesimal” public that 
even a council like Grady’s served, tiny compared to the population of the city at large.151 
 Grady was not the only citizen educator to see that there were problems inherent in the 
attempt to promote the Council model at scale, in the effort to create a national foreign policy 
public through a single organizational technique. Cleveland turned out to be less a model and 
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more an outlier. “Experience suggests,” the Association told the FAE in September 1955, “that 
most cities under 100,000 in population lack the financial and human base for supporting a real 
Council,” and Councils were “not normally effective in rural areas and small towns where the 
heart of America still beats.”152 In response, the Association sometimes stretched the definition 
of a “community” to cover an entire state. In Vermont, for example, Ambassador to the United 
Nations Warren Austin played an honorary role in founding a Council, which was eventually 
housed at the state’s land-grant university and run part-time by a Yale-trained international 
relations scholar, George Little. Briefly energetic, particularly around an annual Warren Austin 
Institute, it could neither raise more than a few thousand dollars a year, nor translate the state as 
a space into a state’s worth of activities.153 
At the same time, the Association was slow to grapple with the changing makeup of the 
cities on which it had previously depended. As the regional staffer Richard Rowson told one 
meeting in February 1955, another main problem — particularly east of Chicago, but elsewhere 
too — was “to deal largely with a number of metropolitan complexes, where the idea of a 
community is on the decline.”154 By this, Rowson meant not simply urban sprawl but the rise of 
the suburbs, which manifested itself in the flight of several Councils’ wealthy, white audiences 
away from urban centers and their earlier patterns of living. Several Councils tried to serve 
outlying towns, most notably the San Francisco group, which in 1953-54 had seven all-volunteer 
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affiliates putting on monthly speeches and roundtables as far north as Sacramento and as far 
south as Fresno.155 The Rhode Island Council received a small CIF grant to try to build on two 
branches it had started in the environs of Providence, but neither the central Council nor the 
affiliates were strong enough to maintain the experiment for long.156 But the Committee on 
National Program passed on the only proposal it received for an explicitly suburban program, 
from Boston. “It is clear,” wrote the Boston Council’s director in September 1954, “that most of 
those actively interested in world affairs education live in the suburbs and desire an active 
program in their own communities,” particularly commuter towns like Arlington, Lexington, and 
Concord. Despite support among directors from Chicago and Cleveland, who were already 
facing similar problems, the request was turned down on the grounds that too much money had 
already been spent in the Northeast. The problem did not go away.157 
 Nor did the question of regionalism more broadly. Although no Council came close to 
the accomplishments of the Cleveland Council at its peak, the model worked relatively well in 
the Northeast, at least in terms of finding the audience that they set for themselves. Beyond that, 
while the Association claimed that it become a genuinely national agency, that was not exactly 
the case. Only in December 1954 was a regional office in the South provided for by the FAE, 
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and its regional operative, Charles Bushong, was based in New York and served concurrently as 
the director of the Association’s film programs. By the end of 1955, there were no recognized 
world affairs groups in South Carolina, Florida, Mississippi, Arkansas or New Mexico. It took a 
great deal of effort to prop up moribund branches in New Orleans and Shreveport, Louisiana, to 
provide any base whatsoever for regional work. The one Council in Texas, that in Dallas, 
vigorously defended its independence so that it could counteract the Association’s leftover 
reputation for subversive activities.158 In the Western states the situation was hardly better, as 
Nevada, Arizona, Utah, Wyoming, and Montana remained untapped, although the Council on 
Foreign Relations had some presence in a couple of major cities. Moreover, as one critic pointed 
out, the Association’s board remained a Yankee affair, with almost all of its members living and 
working in New York City or nearby.159 What minimal regional representation there had been 
on the board thinned out. While its Committee on National Program had initially been made up 
of half a dozen representatives of successful Councils, by the summer of 1955 not one of those 
committee members still remained in their local posts.160 And at the staff level, the Association 
had tried to put professionals in charge of citizen education in world affairs, but had not made a 
profession of it. It was hard to keep many staff members for long.161 
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 Even though the Association accelerated its Council project at nothing like the rate that 
Chester Williams or Brooks Emeny had imagined, it started wondering whether it was receiving 
diminishing returns for its efforts remarkably quickly. So, too, did the Fund for Adult Education, 
which, despite its continuing faith in the Association and its readiness to recommend that the 
Ford Foundation itself take over funding, had by the end of 1954 begun to think about moving 
away from its grant-making model, and towards running its own programs.162 The Committee 
on National Program debated whether the Association ought to concentrate on strengthening 
the network it had built, but decided not.163 Part of its reasoning was that many of the Councils 
it had built were too weak to operate through, although even if the Councils were perfect, they 
would still not necessarily be the most effective way of reaching the public.164 But part of it, too, 
was that the whole idea of citizen education in world affairs was being put in doubt. 
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David Brinkley looked into the camera. It was an “astonishing” fact, the nation’s foremost 
newscaster instructed his primetime audience on May 20, 1963, that in only “fifteen years” 
Americans had gone “through a deep, basic, and profound change of attitudes to the rest of the 
world.” This was now taken for granted, he said, “but seen in any perspective at all, it is 
remarkable.” Look to Southeast Asia, Brinkley said, and to the news of developments in 
Vietnam. Not so long ago, Brinkley said, if anything had happened there, “most Americans 
would a) not have known where it was, b) cared, or c) had the faintest thought it was up to us to 
do anything about it.” Today things were different. “We are concerned,” he said, “with what 
happens everywhere, and not only willing, but anxious to do something.”  
Was this really true? Was this vision really rooted in a universal “we”? It was, Brinkley 
insisted. “Not every RFD [Rural Free Delivery] box-holder is waiting impatiently for the paper 
to come so he can read Walter Lippmann, and the circulation of Foreign Affairs quarterly is not 
as big as Capper’s Farmer,” he admitted. Still, even in “out-of-the-way places” world affairs were a 
popular concern. “Across the country,” Brinkley said, “there are groups of people who meet 
regularly in living rooms, union halls, school buildings, and even in laundromats while the 
clothes are drying, for organized discussions of American foreign policy.”  
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Take Klamath Falls, Oregon, a place of “duck-hunting, lumbering, and farming,” with a 
population of 17,000. It was entirely beyond the reach of most foreign policy institutions, even of 
major newspapers, but within its limits lived Robert ‘Ben’ Kerns, a veteran who had worked for 
the United Nations in occupied Germany and graduated from Georgetown with a major in 
international relations.1 This farm-equipment store owner consciously played the role of the 
town’s opinion leader. Each morning, he read classified ads over a radio that he had wired into 
his loft. He ran a local chapter of the Great Books club. And Brinkley’s cameras caught him 
leading a lively conversation on the United States’ interests in Vietnam.  
 “Why,” Kerns asked, “is Dean Rusk making statements about these countries halfway 
around the world?” 
Around Kerns was a small group of friends, including the county librarian, a physician, an 
elementary-school janitor, a junior-high math teacher, and a farmer’s wife. There were 
lumberjacks — “not the roughnecks they used to be,” said Brinkley — in plaid shirts, and older 
women wearing pearls. 
“I think that if we pull out or are pushed out,” one participant offered, “our prestige as a 
world leader will suffer immensely, that we will never gain the trust of an Asian, nor probably an 
African nation for quite some time.” 
“We’re in so deeply now,” another said, “and our prestige is so involved, that I’m afraid 
we’re gonna have to stay there. Personally I think it’s quite unfortunate that we’ve got ourselves 
in this situation.” 
 




“I don’t think that we’ve been allowed to have the information that we need to make 
decisions ourselves,” a third complained. “We were kept in the dark all the time, and then these 
things are popped open to us, all of a sudden.” 
“I just wonder if our policy in the whole Southeastern Asia has been right,” the second 
speaker concluded. “From the time of the finish of the French-Indochina war, it seems to me 
something has been dreadfully wrong, that we didn’t need to be in the mess we are in” 
“If you were Dean Rusk, you’d have to make a decision now,” noted a fourth. 
“Thank God I’m not,” she laughed. 
Brinkley’s cameras were showing the deliberations of a home discussion group, a little 
ideal of democracy. “There are about 15,000 of them across the country,” Brinkley said, “with a 
membership of about 300,000 people.” They met once a week for two months each spring to talk 
about world affairs. All of them came prepared, to whatever extent, having read a fact sheet 
bought for a buck and a half. Some might have listened to a local radio program dedicated to the 
question of the week, or seen an article in the local press. This was the Great Decisions program, 
run by the Foreign Policy Association to bring foreign affairs to the masses. And to Brinkley, it 
was working. It showed, he claimed, that “very large numbers of people do use their spare time to 
learn about and argue about the great issues of foreign policy.”  
After a brief trip to “cattle and sheep country” in Montrose, Colorado, the broadcast 
visited a third city. Little Rock, Arkansas, was “trying to forget the notoriety of 1957,” Brinkley 
said. His cameras filmed an antebellum mansion, a setting of “magnolia, wisteria, and white 
columns.” The group, as white as the masonry, included a state highway department lawyer, a 
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Catholic priest, a retired Air Force officer, and the editor of a labor newspaper. As elsewhere, the 
discussion dealt mostly in first principles, but it was freer, more prone to grandstanding.  
Vietnam was at issue again. The hostess, Didi Perry, was a to-the-death anticommunist. 
“We had better make up our minds that we are going to win,” she said. “It seems to me that we 
are in a fight to the end with this Russian situation, this communist situation, and we’d better be 
prepared anywhere that communism raises its head and finds anything desirable, we had better 
be prepared to get in the game.” 
 The priest, who taught philosophy, took the view that communism was a “theoretical 
advance” in Vietnam, as communists were “guaranteeing these people equal rights.” Hence, the 
North would be defeated only if the poverty that it fed on was overcome. After all, democracy 
was not necessarily applicable everywhere. 
 At this, the retired Air Force man could take no more. “I think in South Vietnam we 
ought to stay there,” he blustered. “In fact I think we ought to extend it. We ought to carry the 
war to North Vietnam, and land our own guerilla forces up there, maybe throw a few bombs in a 
Hanoi café. A bomb-of-the-month club or something.” The others in the room murmured, but 
he kept going. “If we have to go so far as to take ‘em over, I think we should go that far, too. I 
think we should fight to win. We can win, we should win in South Vietnam. We should stay 
there, and win.” As the picture faded, it settled on a portrait hanging over the discussion, an oil 
canvas of one of Perry’s ancestors — a Confederate officer, feted still for valor in a losing cause. 
 Network television during the cold war was hardly a model of objective, investigative 
journalism. Brinkley’s reporting followed a line well marked by politicians’ constant assertions of 
the uniquely democratic nature of America’s power. If he offered a gentle critique by averring 
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that “people, generally, are better informed and willing to support more advanced policies than 
the State Department and the government generally think they are,” then the critique was 
helpful, rather than genuinely challenging.2 The Foreign Policy Association looked on with 
pleasure. It had had no control over Brinkley’s show, and worried that the discussions he had 
broadcast were less than theoretically ideal, but it welcomed publicity all the same. It needed it.3 
 Great Decisions was by far the most ambitious, most popular, and most enduring adult 
education program ever attempted in foreign affairs. It coordinated home discussion groups with 
saturation mass media coverage and widespread voluntary association collaboration. It was the 
Association’s — and hence the foreign policy elite’s — bid for the mass. It offered its subscribers 
a way to learn, a way to create and refine opinions, a way to express policy preferences, a way to 
participate as political leaders asked — a way to lead the world from their living rooms. By 
domesticating and simplifying foreign policy, the Association hoped to demonstrate that an 
intellectually dominant conception of the American public as ignorant, uninformed, and 
apathetic was wrong. It did so by putting forward a specific, demographically limited vision of 
citizenship, of engagement. Whether people took it up would finally answer, in the Association’s 
eyes and that of its supporters, whether it was possible to build a democratic foreign policy fit for 
a democratic superpower. 
 
* * * * * 
 
2 Recording of David Brinkley’s Journal, NBC, May 20, 1963, FPA, DC 774. 
3 Samuel P. Hayes to Foundations, “Report on Program Activities of the FPA, July 1, 1962–June 30, 1963,” July 24, 
1963, FF, FA732C, Grant 56-117, Reel 4159. 
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Viewed from the faculty offices of the Ivy League, the prospects of a democratic, participatory 
foreign policy seemed less promising than they might have done from the kitchens of Oregon. 
By the time Ben Kerns had brought his neighbors over to chew over Vietnam, academics had 
concluded that participatory democracy in foreign policy was unwise, impossible, and dangerous. 
As the United States exerted global supremacy in the name of democracy, that very supremacy 
seemed to require that the ideas about democracy held by citizens like Kerns be radically recast. 
“Modern international politics,” wrote the political theorist Robert A. Dahl in 1950, “is a 
rigorous testing ground for the classic instruments of government in a democratic society.”4 And 
those classic instruments, Dahl and his colleagues came to believe, were not up to the test. They 
sacrificed normative conceptions of democracy, believing that if international politics could not 
easily be made safe for American democracy, so American democracy would have to be made 
safe for the world. Whether inside the national security bureaucracy or on its borders at think 
tanks, new institutions enclosed ever more of their advice behind a fence of secrecy.5 Their 
research universities competed for federal research funding and increasingly tried to produce 
knowledge useful to the state’s imperial vision.6 They abandoned the ideals of participatory 
 
4 Robert A. Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), p. 3. 
5 See, e.g., Michael Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States Since the 1930s (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1995); Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-
1954 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: 
America’s Anti-Statism and its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
6 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1997); Ron Robin, The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-
Intellectual Complex (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); David C. Engerman, “Rethinking Cold War 
Universities: Some Recent Histories,” Journal of Cold War Studies 5 (2003), pp. 80-95; Bruce Kuklick, Blind Oracles: 
Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); David Engerman, 
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International Security 36 (2012), pp. 107-141; Joy Rohde, Armed With Expertise: The Militarization of American Social 
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democracy, placing elites at the heart of government, and teaching politics as a limited, 
procedural system that resolved interest-group tensions.7 They rapidly recast ideas about the role 
of the citizen, the duties of the expert, and the function of public opinion. This “elitist theory of 
democracy,” as one critic called it, was not just exported as part of modernization theory, as 
historians of American foreign relations have often recognized.8 American democracy as 
theorized at home influenced American democracy as practiced at home. 
 The debate after World War II reprised the debate after World War I — except this time 
Walter Lippmann won. While Public Opinion and The Phantom Public were now re-read and 
taken as fact by most academic observers, Lippmann waded back into the fray with his Essays in 
the Public Philosophy, published in 1955. His earlier books had retained a sympathy for the 
common man’s plight, but no more. Half a century of violence, in Lippmann’s view, had 
conclusively demonstrated that the public mortally harmed a rational appraisal of its own 
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interests. “Where mass opinion dominates the government,” he wrote, “there is a morbid 
derangement of the true functions of power,” bringing about “the enfeeblement, verging on 
paralysis, of the capacity to govern.” It was an active danger as the “master of decisions when the 
stakes are life and death.” It required “impassioned nonsense” to rouse it from its apathy, and the 
truth inevitably suffered “a considerable and often a radical distortion.” As before, Lippmann saw 
no easy remedy. Although he considered public enlightenment to be a journalist’s duty, the 
structure of the mass media meant that “the audience, tuning on and tuning off here and there, 
cannot be counted upon to hear, even in summary form, the essential evidence and the main 
arguments.” Nor could the executive govern alone, for even the military-industrial state was not 
strong enough to withstand the irresponsibility of elected representatives. All that was to curtail 
the very idea of public participation, leaving a hoped-for return to liberal reasons to the few. A 
citizen could vote or not, Lippmann said, but “a mass cannot govern.”9 
  America’s most celebrated diplomat, George F. Kennan, embraced much of Lippmann’s 
pessimism about the public, just as he came to agree with Lippmann’s critique of cold war 
strategy. A member of the venerable school of strategists who believed that diplomacy should be 
left to the diplomats, Kennan’s American Diplomacy, published in 1951, was an unrestrained 
attack on Wilsonian progressivism. The public had proven “uncomfortably similar to one of 
those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this room and a brain the size of a pin.” Like 
Lippmann, Kennan bewailed the “histrionic” tendencies of the legislator, and decried a mass 
media churning out the “trivial, superficial, and sensational trash that is permitted daily to flow 
 
9 Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955), pp. 14-15, 20-25, 128-129; 
Steigerwald, Wilsonian Idealism in America, pp. 200-203. 
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out and to inundate the public attention.” As such, history demonstrated that “people are not 
always more reasonable than governments; that public opinion, or what passes for public 
opinion, is not invariably a moderating force in the jungle of politics.” A democratic foreign 
policy was best conceived as a representative one. 
 Unlike Lippmann’s cynicism, however, Kennan’s pessimism was balanced by a lingering, 
if souring, attachment to the fantasy of an America full of trustworthy citizens. He supported 
early cold war mobilization efforts, including covert ones, in the belief that the American people 
could be mobilized behind good sense. Even in American Diplomacy, Kennan emphasized that he 
did not “consider public reaction to foreign-policy questions to be erratic and undependable over 
the long term.” (Indeed, for his career after he left the State Department he depended on the 
public, to buy his books.) Rather, “what passes for our public opinion in the thinking of official 
Washington” could be “easily led astray” by special interests, commentators, and “publicity-
seekers of all sorts.”10 This extended to the politically active of all kinds. Kennan had no time 
whatsoever for the organized world affairs audience that had been built up before the cold war, 
suspecting it of being too friendly to the Soviet Union. After a tour of world affairs institutions 
in 1946, he complained to the State Department’s Office of Public Affairs that the  
women’s clubs and organizations devoted to the study of international problems 
have a large percentage of members for whom ‘foreign affairs’ are apparently a form 
of escape from the boredom, frustration and faintly guilty conscience which seem 
to afflict many well-to-do and insufficiently occupied people in the country.11  
 
 
10 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 61-62, 66, 93. 
11 Kennan to Francis H. Russell, August 23, 1946, George F. Kennan Papers, Public Policy Papers, Seeley G. Mudd 
Manuscripts Library, Princeton University, Box 298.  
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Kennan was frankly irritated by citizens who felt themselves “under an obligation to hold and 
voice opinions about questions of international affairs,” he said in a speech in 1953, finding them 
“pontifical and opinionated, inclined to place the utterance before the thought, prone to hold 
views on inadequate evidence and then to be sensitive and stubborn in the exposition of them.” 
Not so the “common man,” who rested “under no obligation to act as a spokesman for anyone or 
to come up with answers at all about public matters.”12 Yet it was hard to see how that public 
could ever be reached, if it was valued for its lack of interest in politics.  
Kennan, like Lippmann, was therefore seen as one of the most caustic critics of a 
democratic foreign policy.13 Nor was it surprising that Kennan, like Lippmann, came quickly to 
define the national interest against public opinion, rather than as a product of it.14 As historians 
have noted, Lippmann and Kennan inspired a generation of experts, supported by the major 
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philanthropies and by federal funding, who attempted to run American foreign policy with as 
little reference to the public as possible. They founded a postwar generation of think tanks — 
RAND, MIT’s Center for International Studies, and a host of others — that were of value 
because of their service to the state through classified research, not, as had been the case in the 
interwar period, because of their influence with the public.15  
Yet it is crucial to remember that while these new structures of knowledge creation were 
undeniably influential and constituted drastically altered understandings of the uses of research, 
the roots of authority, and the role of the people, Lippmann, Kennan, and their followers by no 
means killed off more traditional views of democracy. It was precisely because their views were so 
drastic, so far outside the political mainstream, that they had to deploy such polemical force in 
advocating them. And as thirty years earlier, plenty of their readers mounted a counter-attack on 
what seemed to be anti-democratic views. While none had the intellectual swagger of a Dewey, 
nor the prestige of a Baker, the critics’ critics marshalled understandings of democracy that were 
much more commonly held in political life. 
That State Department officials rubbished such critiques, however much they agreed in 
private, was indicative of this. “Foreign policy isn’t just something that’s conducted by secretaries 
of state and by ambassadors in different parts of the world,” said John Foster Dulles in a televised 
address six days after taking office; “every one of you has got a part in making a successful foreign 
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policy for the United States.”16 The department’s publications explained in detail how public 
opinion made a positive contribution to foreign policy, and how certain forms of participation 
were beneficial.17 Two assistant secretaries of state for public affairs, Edward Barrett and Andrew 
Berding, wrote books after they left the department that urged readers to inform themselves, 
making explicit that it was possible and valuable to understand and contribute to foreign affairs.18  
Perhaps the most sensitive rebuttal from former diplomatic officials came from Dorothy 
Fosdick, a political theorist who ended up working for Kennan on the department’s Policy 
Planning Staff. In Common Sense and World Affairs, Fosdick insisted that “foreign policy is the 
business of every American,” and she provided a number of handy aphorisms to help her readers 
understand it. But Fosdick feared that even those who were already interested in foreign affairs 
might all too easily fall prey to disillusion. “Wanting to contribute to a sensible foreign policy, 
many of us are at a loss what to do about it,” she wrote, for “with big decisions made in 
Washington, D.C., what can a mere individual in Oshkosh achieve?” Fosdick urged her readers 
to refuse to ignore foreign affairs, to have empathy for officials and their dilemmas, and to 
recognize that everyone had limited knowledge and understanding — even policymakers.19 
 There was plenty of dissent to Lippmann and Kennan’s views elsewhere in the foreign 
policy elite, too, even among higher-ups at the Council on Foreign Relations. In Diplomacy in a 
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Democracy, the Council president and former Brown University chief Henry Wriston complained 
that “the discussion has led many to feel that we are a nation, if not of morons, at least with 
moronic tendencies.” If the public’s “ignorance, disinterest, and incompetence” was simply 
assumed, he wrote, “we arrive at a dim outlook upon democracy in general and our governmental 
procedures in particular.” As an educator Wriston naturally believed that education could bridge 
the gap, archly admitting that it “may seem not only inadequate but pitifully so” to a “time-weary 
columnist” or a “professional diplomat.” But if the public needed only to “respond to situations in 
clear and simple terms,” rather than “deal in nuances, in procedures, in techniques,” it could be 
trusted. Trying to work outside of these channels was in any case ridiculous. “Schemes for the 
elimination of political forces in diplomacy are simply efforts to evade the facts of life,” Wriston 
wrote, obviously thinking of Kennan, Lippmann, and others. “It is absurd to find men arguing 
for such a utopian program while pretending to deal realistically with world problems.”20 
Meanwhile, intellectuals who did not have the critics’ animus towards the broad 
trajectory of American foreign policy tried to dismantle their arguments in detail. The most 
prominent was Dexter Perkins, the president of the American Historical Association in 1956 
and, importantly, a Council member, Association branch chairman and board director, and State 
Department planner and historian.21 Perkins spent a good deal of the 1950s fending off 
Lippmann and Kennan’s writings, and, rather like Dewey three decades earlier, he granted the 
critics their terms.22 Like Lippmann, he accepted that “the mass of men are unschooled in the 
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details of foreign policy; they have neither the time, the inclination, the special knowledge to 
study these questions in detail.”23 Like Kennan, he knew that “bold and sweeping assertions of 
general principle are likely to be characteristic of American foreign policy.”24 After all, he wrote, 
“a diplomacy that rests upon the people must speak to the people.”25 But Perkins refused to 
accept that the public had really done so badly. If public opinion controlled government policy, 
had it not actually achieved quite a lot? “Foreign policy under popular government is by no 
means more susceptible to error than foreign policy under different types of regimes,” he said in a 
lecture given for the Fund for Adult Education, and “the record of the United States over the last 
few decades is not one to blush for, and certainly not one which need diminish our faith in 
popular government itself.”26 In a review of Kennan’s American Diplomacy, Perkins noted that it 
was “easy to be captious, and hypercritical, with regard to the American record,” and a “mistake 
to go to extremes.”27 Even if it were not, the solutions on offer were no better. After all, “folly is 
not confined to a democratic electorate,” and no elite community had a monopoly on wisdom.28 
As after World War I, after World War II adult educators initially took the critique as a 
challenge, not a defeat. On the ground, the Foreign Policy Association made short work of it. 
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Bill Cowan, an Association regional representative in the Midwest, found that local voluntary 
association leaders responded winningly to calls to “prove the Hamiltons, the de Tocquevilles, 
and the Lippmanns wrong!”29 The Association’s whole task, one staffer wrote, was that of 
“demonstrating the workability of the democratic process in the world affairs field,” in 
“contradiction to Mr. Lippmann’s ‘public philosophy’.”30 Like previous adult educators, however, 
they took useful parts of the critique on board. Lippmann’s “‘public be damned’ approach,” said 
Nason, was incorrect, but there was enough truth in it to prove that a competing idea, an 
“intuitive theory of democracy” in which people “automatically” responded to issues “without 
prodding, encouragement or help,” was wrong too. Nason’s Association was as needed as ever, to 
train them in “the frame of reference within which specific policies are then determined.”31 
So precisely because this argument was a reprise of the debates that had taken place after 
World War I, it was easy enough in public to deploy old arguments in defense of the traditional 
order. It was less easy, even impossible, in academia, where Lippmann had finally eclipsed 
Dewey. A small number of leading political thinkers started questioning the basis of 
participatory democracy during the depression. The president of the American Political Science 
Association called in 1934 for “the ignorant, the uninformed, and the anti-social” to be stripped 
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of their franchise; his successor called for the overthrow of prevailing ideas about popular 
government.32 While most political scientists tempered their criticism as war threatened 
democracy’s end, their undermining of its traditional assumptions continued unabated. Joseph 
Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, for instance, branded the “typical citizen” as a 
“primitive,” indeed “infantile” in politics, and wondered how it was “possible that a doctrine so 
patently contrary to fact should have survived to this day,” when its “theoretical basis, utilitarian 
rationalism, is dead.” People, Schumpeter argued, would never feel “immediate responsibility” for 
problems beyond their daily lives, so they could not “be carried up the ladder” even by “the 
meritorious efforts that are being made to go beyond presenting information and to teach the use 
of it by means of lectures, classes, discussion groups.”33 And attacks on normative democratic 
theory inevitably led to attacks on those trying to bring democracy up to scratch. 
“It is hard for people like ourselves, in the educated upper middle class, to imagine the 
extent of the willingness of people to forget, to fail to register, to distort, and to overlook,” the 
Harvard University sociologist David Riesman wrote in 1959.34 What had made it easier was a 
relentless accumulation of statistical evidence about just how far most Americans were from what 
Lippmann had called the “omnicompetent” ideal of democratic theory. And although various 
fields contributed to this, including intelligence testing, it was opinion polling that gave the 
critique real force. While polling had been promoted by George Gallup and others as the final 
step towards true democracy, postwar social scientists used the sample survey to show how ill-
 
32 Qu. in Purcell, The Crisis of Democratic Theory, p. 109. 
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equipped the populace was to govern. Polling was, to be sure, still a controversial technology, 
certainly in politics, but also in academia. John Ranney charged pollsters with taking snapshots 
on issues before discussion and participation could turn inklings into opinions.35 Herbert Blumer 
saw that surveys made no distinction between respondents active on an issue or not, and ripped 
opinions out of their social context.36 But as survey specialists steadily became more respected in 
psychology, sociology, and political science, it became impossible for other scholars to avoid the 
weight and consistency of the data they produced. 
This was particularly true when it came to public opinion and foreign affairs, over which 
pollsters had peculiar authority because of early alliances they made with first the Rockefeller 
Foundation, then the wartime information agencies, then the cold war national security state.37 
The National Opinion Research Center (NORC), for instance, could not have operated without  
its secret contracts with the State Department from 1944 to 1957; the Survey Research Center 
(SRC) took 99% of its funding from the federal government in its first year of existence at the 
University of Michigan in 1946-47, and more than 50% after that.38 Academic surveyors needed 
money as they moved out of the wartime propaganda apparatus and attached themselves to 
universities; the state still needed knowledge about publics foreign and domestic, to cement its 
new position abroad and at home. The relationship was more than financial, however, but 
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intellectual. Inside and outside government, communications specialists, as psychological 
warriors called themselves, shared assumptions, shared data, and shared conclusions. Their 
intellectual heritage and their institution position meant that their aim was not to empower the 
people they studied, but rather to affect behavior from the top down in the name of strategy.39 
However much ordinary Americans had the opportunity to contest what surveys told them about 
their buying habits, their sex lives, their racism, or their faiths, the nature of knowledge about 
world affairs and the ways in which surveys were used meant that public opinion on foreign 
policy was now partly constructed by experts who set the questions, who provided answers 
through an information apparatus with extraordinary influence over the mass media, and who set 
the definitions as to what citizen statesmanship looked like.40  
Surveys, in other words, made certain forms of participation in public policy legible and 
appropriate — and others not. Pollsters set extraordinarily high standards, noted David Riesman 
and Nathan Glazer in 1948, treating all their subjects as if they were a “responsible citizen” who  
considers the world in terms of ‘issues’ and considers these issues in the terms in 
which they are discussed in the press and on the radio, holds a position in a political 
spectrum which runs in such single dimensions as left-right, or Republican-
Democrat-Progressive, and feels it his duty to take sides on public issues both when 
polled and when called upon to vote.41 
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It was a shock to most academic observers that so few Americans had the capacity, or at least the 
willingness, to think this way. A majority of Americans, one 1948 report discovered, did not 
know who the secretary of state was; a third could not give “even the simplest answer” when 
asked what the United Nations was for.42 An Office of Naval Research-funded study of 
Minnesota found that three-quarters of rural people, two-thirds of those who lived in small cities 
and half of big-city folk could not name George Marshall. Far fewer had any recognition of his 
Soviet counterpart.43 Even those able to answer poll questions, the SRC reported, tended not to 
“understand the issues well enough to know exactly why” they approved a given policy.44 So 
although foreign policy opinions might have some structure, George Belknap and Angus 
Campbell wrote in 1951, “relatively few people have a logic of foreign affairs so well organized 
and so inclusive as to permit one to predict any specific attitude.” Americans knew so little about 
foreign affairs that to think of them as “isolationists” or “internationalists” missed the point.45 
Instead, survey experts constructed hierarchies that, while facially neutral, could all too 
easily come to define who among the public mattered, and who did not.46 Reducing the value of 
an attitude to the extent to which it was supported by pertinent information, surveyors made 
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factual recall the basic measurement of a citizen’s worth, an approach that the State Department 
favored. In one representative report, the SRC gave a rating of “low” to those who seemed 
unfamiliar with the United Nations or the atomic bomb; a “high” rating to respondents to those 
who could give “places where recent events of importance have occurred,” name “persons 
prominent in world affairs,” or describe issues like the Baruch plan; and left everyone else in the 
middle. A third of Americans was assigned to each group. Rating adequacy in this pop-quiz way 
naturally effaced other forms of engagement, privileging the political forms of those who looked 
and talked most like the surveyors themselves. And although the constructions of the public were 
essentially arbitrary, they inevitably showed correlations with the power structures that correlated 
with information intake. Men were more likely to be better-informed than women. 62% of 
professionals were well-informed, but just 28% of semi- or unskilled workers. 24% of those 
earning $5,000 qualified, while just 1% of those earning under $500 counted. Education, 
circularly, was always regarded as the best guide. 62% of those respondents who went to college 
proved to be highly informed, but only 13% of those who did not complete grade school.47  
Foreign affairs, it appeared in cross-tabulation after cross-tabulation, was the preserve of 
an educated elite. For some, like the SRC’s consultant to the Council on Foreign Relations study 
group on public opinion in 1947, this meant that a massive propaganda campaign was in order, 
to “bring light into the areas of ignorance” and make foreign policy “democratic in concept and 
effective in action.”48 For others, the tiny number of Americans — perhaps only a tenth — who 
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engaged in “active” citizenship put inherent limits on any such program.49 As many as five in six 
Americans opened a newspaper, but far fewer read the news pages and a minuscule number read 
any foreign news.50 Plenty of Americans were members of voluntary associations that fostered 
discussion of world affairs as part of their broader programs, but only a few actually recognized 
them as such. 47% of Cincinnati adults were members of at least one voluntary association 
(defined to include unions and church groups) in 1947, but only 15% said they belonged to “any 
groups or organizations or attend any meetings where they talk about world affairs.”51 (National 
surveys put this number anywhere between 10% and 16%.)52 As it was not the case that such 
groups lacked world affairs programming, one academic surmised, “most people simply do not 
participate in the world affairs discussions of any of the groups to which they belong.”53 
Indeed, the very ideal of democratic participation was held strictly by a few, at least as 
applied to foreign policy. A confidential report from the SRC to the State Department in 1948 
found that “relatively few people are politically active” among even the best-informed third of the 
nation, with voting their only real political activity.54 The SRC found that only 43% of 
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respondents to an Albany survey believed that the government ought to pay attention to public 
opinion, while 41% said it should just do whatever it pleased. 31% of respondents said that there 
was “nothing a citizen can do” to influence foreign policy, while 40% thought that there might 
be something, but they had not bothered to do it. Whereas commercial pollsters promoted the 
idea that opinion polls were inherently and usefully democratic, academic surveyors therefore saw 
stark implications in their work. “A democratic society,” the SRC researchers concluded in 1949, 
“implies an informed and active electorate, but studies in the field of foreign affairs have revealed 
large numbers of people who have little information and few opinions about international 
events.”55  
What kind of democracy would be possible when it came to foreign affairs, then? 
Classical assumptions were now untenable. “If we accept the Greek’s definition of an idiot as a 
privatized man,” wrote the sociologist C. Wright Mills, meaning men without concern for public 
affairs, “then we must conclude that the U.S. citizenry is now largely composed of idiots.”56 
What this meant, Mills concluded in The Power Elite in 1956, was that “the images of the public 
of classic democracy which are still used as the working justifications of power in American 
society” were no more than a “fairy tale,” for “the public of public opinion is recognized by all 
those who have considered it carefully as something less than it once was.”57 Mills may have been 
an intellectual radical in some ways, but in this regard his views were wholly mainstream. It 
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would be better, many therefore agreed, not to pretend that the public could or should have the 
all-conquering role that traditional theory assigned it. McCarthyism seemed anyway to hint that 
the United States might not escape the fate of other mass societies, which were prone to 
totalitarianism, as émigrés like Hannah Arendt, Theodore Adorno, and Erich Fromm taught.58 
If surveys showed that the people were not up to the task of democracy, and if mass politics was 
anyway to be feared, why should political scientists keep telling the fairy tale? 
Claiming to describe American democracy as it truly was, postwar behavioralists stripped 
away the normative concerns of their predecessors. After all, democracy worked, even in the 
absence of properly informed, reasoning publics.59 Political indifference became not a danger to 
the system, but that system’s guarantor. Indifferent citizens could be left to their own devices, for 
they had no power in a centralized, administrative system anyway. Social scientists, who had the 
expertise that the public lacked, would stand in for the people, advising elites who could and 
should be trusted to lead.60 Political theorists may have differed on how society was actually 
structured and on how influence and power were distributed within it, but they came slowly to 
agree that ordinary citizens had, and should have, a limited role in their democracy.61  
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* * * * * 
 
Visions of democracy that warned against the wisdom of popular participation found a natural 
welcome among students of international politics. This was not true just of a new breed of 
international relations theorists, cultivated by the Rockefeller Foundation, but of scholars who 
tackled the problem of public opinion directly.62 Ironically enough, a diminished place for the 
public emerged principally from the Yale Institute of International Studies, where Brooks Emeny 
had studied and taught. Three scholars there did the most damage to Emeny’s project, the most 
sympathetic of whom was Robert A. Dahl.  
In Congress and Foreign Policy, Dahl found himself stuck between prewar Deweyanism 
and postwar pluralism. “How,” Dahl asked, “can the ordinary citizen — or even the highly 
educated citizen who is not a specialist — hope to possess an intelligent judgment on techniques 
for atomic energy control?” He obviously could not, and so it was no surprise that so many 
Americans rejected any such responsibility. The problem was how to prevent authoritarianism, 
including “expert authoritarianism,” to “enable the citizen to discard some of his burden and yet 
render meaningful his power to determine the basic preferences pursued by the nation.” 
Although Dahl thought that traditional remedies might work to reconcile these competing 
imperatives, he concluded, too, that foreign affairs groups reached “too restricted a clientele to be 
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more than pitifully inadequate.” With no personal history as a communications specialist, and no 
faith in the idea of expert rule in an age of total war, Dahl was stuck.63 
The future of theory belonged instead to the psychological warriors. Drawing on wartime 
assumptions, datasets, and service, they militarized democratic theory for the purposes of a cold 
war. The line between what was acceptable in war and what was not in peace, so bitterly fought 
over after World War I, was obliterated after World War II. Postwar textbooks and anthologies 
with names like Process and Effects of Mass Communications and Public Opinion and Propaganda 
ignored distinctions between civilian and military techniques, domestic and foreign audiences, 
democratic and totalitarian methods.64 Social scientists freely applied insights from the study of 
Nazism, indeed the Soviet Union, to their theories about the people at home. Wartime 
emergency measures bleached into peacetime democracy. And, just as in a war, the public was to 
be managed in such a way that it would serve strategic aims. When in government, psychological 
warriors saw public opinion primarily as a resource for policymakers; when out of government, 
psychological warriors theorized public participation as if it related and could only ever relate to 
policy. Public opinion, as the head of the Council on Foreign Relations study group on the topic 
put it in 1949, was merely an “instrument.”65 
Gabriel Almond was the crucial figure who turned the theory of public opinion from one 
of public deliberation to one of policy processes. A doctoral student of Harold Lasswell’s at the 
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University of Chicago, Almond had been a wartime propaganda analyst at the Office of Facts 
and Figures and the Office of War Information, and a member of the Morale Division of the 
Strategic Bombing Survey. He moved to Yale in 1947, where he was Dahl’s colleague until a 
blockbuster, front-page defection to Princeton in 1951. Fully minded that social scientists could 
and should serve the state, Almond consulted throughout the national security bureaucracy, 
including the State Department, the Office of Naval Research, the Psychological Strategy Board, 
RAND, and the Air Force. A protégé of John Gardner, another wartime psychological warrior 
who took up a perch at the Carnegie Corporation and used his grants to promote a Lasswellian 
view of the world, Almond’s work was also supported, as Lasswell’s had been, by Rockefeller. 
Almond had the experience, contacts, and intellectual firepower to make his research stick.66 
 After its publication in 1950, Almond’s The American People and Foreign Policy became 
the textbook treatment of the topic. Almond’s aim was to assess the “psychological potential” of 
American people in a cold war, and on these grounds, it took him just a few introductory pages 
to shred classical theory. Mass democracy, he wrote, “obviously” made impossible “a direct and 
literal control of public policy by public opinion. To think otherwise, to believe that “any people 
in the mass and in the modern era” could make foreign policy reflected assumptions that were 
“inherently unrealizable,” and which were a distraction from “the kind of popular control over 
public policy which is possible today.” If anything, those who took the democratic “myth” 
literally, those who put forward “moralistic exhortations to the public to inform itself and to play 
an active role in policy-making” were anti-democratic. The layman “in most cases and in good 
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sense” rejected such a role, responding to foreign policy with “indifference.” It was therefore 
pointless to try to make statesmen out of citizens. The nature of foreign policy was far too 
complex, let alone military or security policy.67 Intellectually unwise, the idea was practically 
impossible. Experiments had demonstrated that, outside a laboratory setting in which it was 
feasible to alter opinions, in the general public there was a “mass immunity to information on 
foreign policy problems.”68 The same advertising techniques that sold household goods had failed 
time and again to sell foreign policies. “The point seems to be,” Almond argued, “that the masses 
are already predisposed to want automobiles, refrigerators, and toothpaste, but they are not 
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predisposed to want information about the United Nations or the control of atomic energy.” 
Such information, he concluded with the SRC, “has no immediate utility or meaning.”69 
A new vision of what it meant to craft a democratic foreign policy was therefore in order. 
Almond erected a hierarchy of control in the wreckage of the participatory polity. Making up a 
vast majority of the citizenry was a mass, little more than a dormant mob. Its attitudes ranged 
from “unstructured moods in periods of equilibrium to simplification in periods of crisis.” Its 
constituents had not opinions but attitudes, lacking “intellectual structure and factual content.” 
They looked to their leaders for cues and listened for tone and emotion rather than facts. They 
were ripe, in other words, for manipulation by those trained in the ways of mental warfare. As 
Almond put it, the “superficiality and instability of public concern places enormous power in the 
hands of the policy and opinion elites.” The masses had, in their wisdom, simply accepted a 
division of labor, in which “mass inattention to problems of public policy” had been balanced by 
the “accentuation of elite attention.” Elites would debate policies “before” — in front of, not 
among — a public comprised of the “college-trained, upper-income, ‘mental-worker’ stratum of 
the population,” to which there was a standing, open invitation to others “ready to make the 
essential sacrifices of time and energy.” The policies that won out would then be sold, with 
difficulty, to the volatile, ignorant mass. Unlike more radical social scientists who hoped to seal 
off the public as much as possible, Almond understood the need for a minimally participatory 
foreign policy, for if there was no real policy competition, or if elites chose to exclude the public 
entirely, “elite biases will obscure significant security interests.” He simply feared that the general 
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public’s incompetence meant there was “no corrective available in matters calling for immediate 
action if serious miscalculations are made at the elite level.”70 This, experts would discover in 
short order. 
 Almond’s theory at once restricted the foreign policy public, then, and left room for those 
who still believed that it needed educating. Yet his was a propagandist’s construction of the 
public, designed to make clear the need for the techniques he himself had mastered. He had a 
personal and professional stake in finding acceptance for his view of the polity, and his means of 
managing it, competing as he was for foundation funding and government contracts. For that 
reason, he specifically addressed his book to “those responsible for the formulation and execution 
of public information programs in the foreign policy field” and launched a slashing attack on 
those who adhered to outdated models.  
The Foreign Policy Association offered an easy target. There were, Almond insisted, 
definite limits on the kinds and numbers of people who would likely be interested in foreign 
affairs, imposed by wealth and education. He lambasted those who would “make experts and 
specialists of laymen.” More cuttingly, he preached that “little more than self-intoxication results 
from a grass roots campaign in Middletown, Ohio, ‘to relate Middletowners to the world in 
which we live.’” (The choice of Ohio was surely not a coincidence.) There was no point in trying 
to create a “democracy of participation and opportunity” where it was neither wanted nor viable, 
among the “poor and ignorant of the cities and the countryside.” While slower processes of 
formal education worked their way through the social structure, foreign affairs groups could help 
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to build “audience depth,” taking a “selective and qualitative” approach to “enlarging the attentive 
public and training the elite cadres,” while confronting “the common man continually with 
opportunities to be informed and involved in foreign policy decisions.” But they should be under 
no illusions. “If we shout at the wall,” Almond wrote, “we can take a certain satisfaction in a 
ringing echo.” Better, Almond, said, to “come up closer,” to “find openings through which a 
quiet word might reach a listening ear.”71 
While Almond was widely read by practitioners and in universities, he was not as 
influential on grass-roots activism as a student he shared with Dahl, Bernard C. Cohen. An 
Army veteran, Cohen received his doctorate from Yale in 1952, by which point he had already 
been lured to Princeton with Almond, as a lecturer at the Center for International Studies. 
Funded by a special grant from the Carnegie Endowment and indirectly by the Rockefeller 
Foundation, Cohen explicitly applied the latest research on public opinion to the foreign affairs 
infrastructure, combining it with interviews and data provided by the Endowment, the 
Association, the World Peace Foundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, and five World Affairs Councils or equivalents.72 First submitted as a brutal 
confidential report to the Endowment in December 1951, even before the Association had 
received its full grant from the Fund for Adult Education, Cohen’s made vivid what many of its 
participants already feared when it was published in 1953. It remained a defining analysis.73 
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Cohen’s basic insight was that a fundamental clash of democratic theories was now at 
work, one normative, the other based on a statistical construction of reality. The world affairs 
groups adhered to a classical view. “The objective,” he wrote in his 1951 report, 
of an informed and alert citizenry dispatching with acumen the complex problems 
of foreign policy has its roots in a traditional democratic theory, a theory which 
implies that democracy functions only through the motive participation of all 
citizens, and that political apathy is one of the worst sins against democracy. 
 
And yet it was clear to Cohen as it was to Almond and others that “in the world in which we live 
today, a functioning democracy operates without the active participation of large numbers of 
politically apathetic citizens.” Polls had revealed “with the utmost clarity and consistency” that 
much of the population was “totally without interest in the subject matter of foreign affairs and 
foreign policy, and has no opinion on any aspect of it.” This situation, Cohen argued, was likely 
to endure, “short of sweeping social and psychological changes in the population at large.” Mass 
education would always fail, for foreign policy groups “confront a population that accepts 
political apathy as the prerogative of any citizen.” Democracy as traditionally conceived would 
endure, but only among the interested and articulate. 
What then would this mean for institutions dedicated to the vague if lofty ideal of a 
democratic foreign policy, institutions at once failing to expand their audience and to have much 
influence on policy? “It is not to be expected,” Cohen admitted, “that organizations having a 
solidly-rooted democratic tradition as well as a lively faith in democracy would give up the 
democratic aspects of their goals and concentrate only on the instrumental.” They would be 
disturbed, as well as inconvenienced, “to discover that reality does not conform with time-
hallowed theory.” And yet, Cohen believed as did a generation of his peers, “it is far easier to 
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change theory so that it conforms to reality than the other way around.”74 It was not necessarily 
easier, however, to do so in practice, and Cohen knew that changing the underlying aspirations 
of the foreign affairs groups to bring them more in line with the expert-led, elitist democracy 
that scholars now constructed would be hard. Their leaders “dare not talk in terms that may be 
construed as ‘undemocratic’,” in the old-fashioned sense of the term, Cohen wrote, but unless 
they did, their objectives would remain unfulfilled.75 
The Councils already appealed to an elite, but the wrong one. Their audiences were 
highly educated, probably older, certainly wealthy, usually made up of professional men and 
politically active housewives, and likely, at a good guess, to be internationalist Republicans. 
Attendance from lower income groups, or from labor, agriculture, and “ethnic and racial 
minorities” was slim, if not completely absent. Even if “sparse representation is not due to a 
widespread conspiracy or even desire to exclude,” Cohen noted, the forms in which the groups 
sought participation presumed a certain kind of person would get involved. Lectures were 
delivered at luncheons, which had to be paid for if attendance was possible; seminars took time, 
preparation, and access to literature; study groups required commitment. Not only was this a 
forbidding, costly routine to many, it also meant that, even among actual members of the groups, 
energetic participation was limited. 
This would not necessarily have mattered if the foreign affairs groups were reaching 
particularly influential citizens, Cohen thought, or if they were bringing into their fold the 
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mystical “opinion leaders” that Lazarsfeld and others had shown operated horizontally across all 
levels society, rather than solely from an elite vertically down. But now almost nobody needed to 
join a World Affairs Council, either to express their interest in foreign policy or to get 
information about it. It might be true that the Association and its brethren had “fostered both 
the increased popular interest and the availability of information,” Cohen wrote, but “the very 
argument itself bears witness to the fact that their original function has been realized to a degree 
far exceeding the wildest hopes of even fifteen years ago.” At the same time, the Councils’ 
audiences were inherently limited. Even if “the facilities at their disposal were of the first 
magnitude,” Cohen argued, Councils and their like “could still reach only some of the people, 
since all the people are not attentive to foreign policy communications.” If they went through the 
mass media, only the interested would listen; if they went through other voluntary associations, 
only a few were eager to talk about foreign policy even there; if they took a direct approach, they 
would be wasting their time.76 
Cohen’s insistence that foreign affairs groups necessarily had a small audience, let alone 
an active public, dictated the kinds of things he thought that they should do. “The prospect is 
not one of replacing an educational, social and financial elite with a policy and opinion elite,” he 
wrote, knowing that the groups could not afford to alienate their existing members, “but only of 
supplementing the former with the latter.” Councils should try to reach individuals with specific, 
demonstrable influence on policymaking, or, if they could find them, opinion leaders on various 
 
76 Cohen, Citizen Education in World Affairs, pp. 73-99. 
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issues. Whereas they had once worked to set the public’s agenda for discussion of foreign affairs, 
now they should follow the lead of the state, for 
so long as organizations continue to discuss ‘foreign affairs’ that may be unrelated 
to problems facing American policy-makers, or to discuss American policy after 
unknown alternatives have been discarded by official policy-makers, this kind of 
effective contribution is made more difficult. 
 
Even Cohen, like his advisors, did not go so far as to belittle the absolute need for such 
institutions. They were useful as a way of reinforcing the mass media, as a physical invitation to 
the foreign-policy world, as places for the training of public officials, as non-partisan sites for 
policy statements, as an outlet for women. But these activities were to be restricted to those few 
Americans properly interested in foreign policy already. Councils could do an important job by 
helping to “develop among the foreign policy public a capacity to approach and understand 
problems of foreign policy with the casual expertise that many Americans now apply to labor 
policy, inflation control, or even baseball.” Even that, Cohen understood, was a severe restriction 
of activists’ wildest hopes.77 
The thinking of most world affairs organizations bore “the stamp of the years when social 
science research had neither insights nor methods that could be brought effectively to bear on 
questions involving this measurable behavior,” Cohen wrote in 1951, but when his report was 
published in 1953 this changed.78 It set off a lasting engagement between social scientists and 
practitioners that had serious, lasting consequences. Cohen’s final text came out on October 1, 
1953. By the end of that month, he, Almond, and Hadley Cantril had promoted its results at a 
 
77 Cohen, Citizen Education in World Affairs, pp. 127-143. 
78 Cohen, Private Organizations and Public Education in World Affairs, p. 50. 
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global Conference of Leaders of Institutes of World Affairs held at Princeton.79 The 
Association’s board received Cohen’s report in November 1953. The staff, later that month, 
unsuccessfully asked the Fund for Adult Education for $50,000 a year to “be spent in study to 
find some of the answers to what determines public opinion in a democracy.”80 By June 1954, the 
Association was holding a conference called “Reaching the Wider American Audience,” and 
featuring as speakers the pollsters Elmo Roper, William Scott, and William Lydgate, a Gallup 
associate who joined that Association’s board that year.81 The conference’s bibliography included 
not only the usual books on community organizing and adult education, but texts on propaganda 
techniques, sociology, group dynamics, and advertising.82 
 Intellectual history is not often a simple translation of theory into practice, however. Just 
as there was room for policymakers not to listen to experts, so too was there room for activists to 
listen creatively.83 The results of this engagement were not preordained, particularly as the social 
scientists were challenging not just the educators’ methods, but their fundamental assumptions, 
their entire way of being. Those educators who read the research could choose simply to ignore 
it. Brooks Emeny, for instance, invited Almond to serve on the Association committee that 
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curtailed its publication program in 1951, and he praised Cohen’s report.84 In a speech in 1955, 
however, he argued that their work simply showed that “only a beginning had been made toward 
the broader public of the land.” Cohen had not sufficiently taken note of the Councils that had 
seen success, so the creation of still more Councils was easy to justify.85 
Emeny’s successors at the Association took Cohen’s challenge much more seriously. 
Nason’s rapidly expanding staff read voraciously, grappling with social scientific critiques, 
compiling bibliographies. In April 1954, they invited Cohen and his boss, the Center of 
International Studies chief Frederick Dunn, to address the National Program Committee at 
Emeny’s Princeton home. Cohen made a poor personal impression, and was found to be too 
pessimistic, “operating in the abstract with obvious weaknesses.”86 Even so, Eustace Seligman, 
John Foster Dulles’s law partner and the chairman of the board, told Nason that while Cohen’s 
“whole approach is unduly theoretical, nevertheless some of his other ideas are constructive.”87 At 
a board meeting in May 1954, Cohen’s work was greeted as a welcome chance to clarify the 
Association’s policies, to once again question the balance between serving the interested and 
interesting those who needed better to be served. While the board agreed with Cohen that too 
few Americans were being reached, they did not agree with Cohen that few Americans could be 
reached at all. Anna Lord Strauss, a powerful figure on the boards of the Association and the 
Fund for Adult Education who had been the president of the League of Women Voters and a 
 
84 “Main Conclusions of Ad Hoc Committee on Publications of the FPA,” March 21, 1951, FPA, Part II, Box 15. 
85 Brooks Emeny, “Non-Governmental Organizations in International Affairs,” Social Science 30 (1955), pp. 239-
243. 
86 “Minutes of the Meeting of the FPA Committee on National Program,” April 2-3, 1954, FPA, Part I, Reel 4. 
87 Eustace Seligman to Nason, May 24, 1954, FPA, Part II, Box 25. 
  
341 
delegate to the United Nations, thought that the Association had barely tried. If Cohen had 
demonstrated foreign affairs groups were only appealing to an already converted elite, she said, 
they could now afford to start working “from the bottom up.”88 
 The fact that there was no such thing as “the” American public was perhaps the most 
obvious and consequential lesson that the Association, and Nason in particular, learned from this 
new class of experts. Before engaging this literature, Nason had, like his predecessors, thought 
primarily of the “American people” as a whole, or at least as rooted in their communities. The 
aim, he wrote in a reflection on the Association’s program in October 1952, remained to extend 
knowledge and understanding to “the great majority of the American people who have not by 
custom and circumstance been accustomed to think in international terms.” In his early speeches, 
he displayed no sense of targeting a particular audience, nor how to reach them except through 
particular technologies.89 After reading Cohen, however, Nason started constructing hierarchies 
that reframed theory to match his vision, at once using it to cut out of operational discussion tens 
of millions of Americans, and to reject the academic conclusion that tens of millions more were 
probably beyond reach. 
At a conference of world affairs educators in December 1953, Nason split Americans into 
three groups, the categories for which he actually took not from Cohen or Almond, but a report 
that he received around the same time from consultants at McKinsey & Company.90 At the top, 
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there was the 15% of the population at the top who were well-informed and probably influential. 
Foreign affairs groups, despite their small memberships, had long reached people from this 
group, Almond’s elite and “attentive public” wrapped into one. But Nason did not cast aside the 
rest as a moody mass. At the bottom, he thought there was a 35% who likely did not vote, who 
were “politically inert,” who were completely unaware of foreign affairs even in crises, and could 
be written off as “beyond the pale,” as he once put it elsewhere. In the middle was a 50% who 
were marginally informed, “intermittently interested,” and “capable of casual exposure and 
comment.” Nason’s audience of educators split over whether this group was capable of “learning 
enough for sound judgments,” and how best to reach them. And Nason, too, understood that a 
shallow education was probably the best that could be hoped for. “All we can hope to do,” he 
said in 1955, “is to increase the amount of exposure that they get to these issues and then trust in 
the best democratic sense that with a better exposure they will come to the right decision.”91 
Even the Ford Foundation was willing to go along with the Association’s creative 
reading. The Foundation took over the Association’s funding from the Fund in 1956, placing it 
alongside the Council on Foreign Relations within its International Affairs program. The 
Association’s first grant proposal reflected the influence of social science, but rejected its most 
pessimistic conclusions. It made clear that it thought it had already “converted” the ten to fifteen 
percent of the population who it believed were “actively interested in foreign affairs and 
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reasonably well informed on the major issues.” At least a third of the people were “completely 
apathetic,” “for all practical purposes unreachable, and all preaching to them is a waste of breath.” 
In the middle were found “citizens who may not be eager to learn about international affairs, but 
who are capable of taking an interest and forming judgments of their own.” These were the 
people whose attitudes structured the boundaries of the politically possible, and although they 
primarily thought in attitudinal terms, they were far more competent, rational, and promising 
than Almond and others were prepared to allow. The minimum that should be accepted from 
this “largest circle of potential audience” was  
the broadest possible awareness, not necessarily verbalized, about the fundamental 
changes in the nature and cause of war and peace; of the organic bonds by which 
our fortunes are united willy-nilly with the fortunes of our fellowmen all over the 
world; and of the democratic principles which are the true sinews of our national 
power both to produce and to persuade. 
 
This, the Association admitted, was “an uncomfortably large group for an educational venture,” 
but the “crucial group in our democracy.”92 It believed that they could be won en masse even with 
the calming of the cold war.93 
 
92 “Proposal to the Ford Foundation from the Foreign Policy Association,” January 23, 1956, FF, FA732G, Reel 
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Ford’s outside consultants remained somewhat skeptical, including those who were part 
of the citizen education movement. Howard Cook, the former World Affairs Council of 
Northern California director who had just left the State Department’s Public Services Division, 
thought that any bid for the mass would only function marginally to expand the already-
interested elite.94 Most of the people that the Ford staff talked to, including officials at the State 
Department and the United Nations, thought the Association served a useful, necessary role and 
that it had made a marked improvement since the Emeny years.95 Ford’s own staffers agreed, 
calling the Association’s activities “central to the interest of the Foundation in the field of public 
education in international affairs.” Even so, their own doubts resulted in a much smaller grant 
than the Association had hoped for. Nason had asked for $10.75 million over ten years, 
projecting that at the mid-point of the grant, Ford would be responsible for over two-thirds of 
his budget.96 This was “out of this world,” the Ford International Affairs head and former New 
York Times journalist Shepard Stone told an officer at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.97 (The 
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Council on Foreign Relations, for comparison, was given $1.5 million over ten years in 1954.)98 
Reflecting its own ambivalence, Ford granted $1.5 million for core projects over five years.99  
How, then, could a mass public be reached? For an answer, the Association struck West. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Roger Mastrude arrived in San Francisco in November 1952. Born a month after America’s 
entry into World War I, the director of the Association’s new outpost was a Westerner, a 
Quaker by inheritance and a graduate of a small liberal arts college in Tacoma, Washington. 
Fluent in multiple languages, he had served as an Army intelligence officer on General Patton’s 
staff, and had overseen sixty refugee camps as UNRRA’s regional director in Bavaria. He spent 
four years in New York in charge of education at International House, before moving West — 
and it was really “the West” to which he moved.100 As the head of the Association’s Region IV, 
Mastrude, his deputy, and one secretary had responsibility for a third of the continental United 
States, an area covering the entire Pacific coast, Idaho, Nevada, Montana, Wyoming, Utah and 
Arizona. Mastrude traveled 25,000 miles in his first year on the job, scouting the territory for 
prospects for World Affairs Councils. They did not seem strong, and indeed revealed the stark 
regional limits that had constrained world affairs education to that point. “The Western States,” 
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Mastrude wrote in one early report to the 
Fund, “have very few cities the size 
traditionally thought of in terms of a 
world affairs council.” As Mastrude drove 
around the West, fruitlessly towing a 
trailer so weighed down with world affairs 
literature that his small car’s clutch often 
gave out, he wondered if there was 
anywhere at all that might give him 
enough of a success story to make the 
idea of world affairs catch on. “We must find our way experimentally as we go,” he said, “in 
terms of techniques, organizational framework, and even educational materials.”101 
 Mastrude did find some sprouts at the grass roots. In Portland, Oregon, a city of just less 
than 400,000, they had germinated slowly. The city was one of the first to create a Committee 
on Foreign Relations in 1938, and its roster in 1945 included the editors of both major 
newspapers, as well as local academics, ministers, and other civic leaders.102 Reed College had 
staged a Northwest Institute of International Relations annually since 1935, with co-sponsorship 
by the University of Oregon and the city’s public schools. By 1948 it lasted two weeks, replete 
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with lectures, forums, and roundtables. After visits by Brooks Emeny and Thomas Power, the 
directors of the Institute incorporated the World Affairs Council of Oregon in late 1950.103  
The Oregon Council’s first president and dominant figure was Frank Munk, a rare 
émigré scholar who declared to see a cautionary tale about public opinion in the rise of 
totalitarianism. A leader of the Czechoslovak League of Nations Association, delegate to the 
League, and friend of the former president Edvard Benes, Munk fled Prague in May 1939. He 
taught at Berkeley until 1944, before spending two years back in Central Europe working for 
UNRRA. He settled in Oregon, and, in Mastrude’s words, was “taken up by Portland society 
and lionized as their special intellectual garlic,” rather like Emeny in Cleveland a decade and a 
half earlier.  
As in Cleveland, the Oregon Council’s driving organizational force came from the 
women’s movement. Louise Grondahl, whose husband was the Oregonian’s classical music critic, 
had been president of the League of Women Voters of Portland, and served as the Council’s 
secretary and, for a time, its executive director. “Never in the history of our country,” she wrote in 
the Oregonian shortly after the Council’s founding, “has it been so important for everybody to 
take an active interest in our foreign policy, since it will determine whether or not we are to be 
involved in global war.” Information on foreign affairs was still comparatively scarce in Portland, 
so Grondahl and the Council’s other leaders filled the gap with the usual lectures and seminars, 
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as well as a project that linked “World Affairs,” a radio show on the local station KOIN, to 
neighborhood listening and discussion groups.104  
Even so, by the time Mastrude made his first visit to Portland, in January 1953, the 
Council remained a very small affair, with a part-time director and a “completely unacceptable” 
budget.105 Its planning of a meeting of community leaders and State Department officials in June 
1953 had been embarrassingly poor. The city, Mastrude thought, had little history of community 
education or even community organizing on which to build, and he had only small a base of 
progressive activists to tap into. While the Council made good use of the local university 
faculties, it was too puny, and too far from Washington and New York, to attract the 
policymakers or celebrities who might validate and promote the cause.106 Only an intervention by 
the corporate titan J. D. Zellerbach, an Association trustee, saved the Council. Zellerbach, the 
chairman of the World Affairs Council of Northern California and the former Marshall Plan 
administrator for Italy, opened a paper plant in the area, drawing local businessmen to support 
his pet cause of world affairs.107 Shortly after Zellerbach addressed a benefit dinner, making the 
case that businessmen ought to inform themselves about world affairs as their taxes were funding 
foreign policy, the Council doubled its membership and started a television program, “World 
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Affairs in the H-Age,” using its connections to executives at the Oregonian and the stations it 
owned. While the Council was still a precarious venture, Mastrude advised that it had “many 
opportunities, especially in terms of reaching the great ‘50% group’,” and, by August 1954, 
thought that it deserved further support from the Community Investment Fund.108  
 To find a distinctive, innovative program that would take world affairs education beyond 
the Council model, Mastrude looked to developments in adult education and social science. 
Even as political theorists moved away from seeing democracy as discussion writ large, a polity 
made up of “little circles of people talking with one another” as Mills neatly put it, adult 
educators and psychologists renewed their faith in small group discussion.109 The first reason for 
this was theoretical. Social scientists dismantled Deweyan democracy on the basis that the 
publics that comprised it were uninformed, but in the process, they also demonstrated that small, 
face-to-face discussion actually worked. In The People’s Choice, Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard 
Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet had found that personal contacts were the most effective way of 
spreading opinions beyond a dedicated mass-media audience.110 During and after the war 
scholars like Kurt Lewin, Dorwin Cartwright, and Joseph Klapper confirmed that discussion 
among a few people was a powerful vehicle to change attitudes and increase information, 
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certainly more so than lectures.111 Public discussion was found to be a necessary condition for a 
successful propaganda or educational campaign, as opinion leaders took in information from the 
mass media and passed it along to others. This article of communications-theory faith made its 
way to the Association through research and personal networks, and particularly through Cohen, 
who urged world affairs educators to expand “the use of techniques which capitalize on personal 
and intimate contact between the source of knowledge and its intended recipients.”112 Perhaps, 
Cohen once wrote, “discussions might even be held on back porches on a summer’s night.”113 
The second spur to the rediscovery of discussion was institutional. One of the forces 
behind the Fund for Adult Education was the Ford Foundation’s assistant director, Robert 
Maynard Hutchins. A former president of the University of Chicago, Hutchins had recast that 
institution’s core curriculum around a syllabus of “Great Books,” and taken that idea to a reading 
public by founding the Great Books Foundation in 1947. The “study-discussion” format it 
pioneered, in which peers led small groups in discussion of a common curriculum using packaged 
materials, became the Fund’s preferred means of liberal adult education.114 Of course, discussion 
materials had long been produced and used, but the Fund reconceived them for a mass market, 
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at once teaching their content and promoting ideal methods of learning, participation, and 
individual citizenship.115  
As well as supporting outside initiatives like Great Books and those run by the American 
Foundation for Political Education (AFPE), after 1951 the Fund’s Experimental Discussion 
Project spent $2.1 million in five years on the creation of textual and visual study materials that 
small groups could share, and on further research on training lay discussion leaders. One of its 
programs was the “World Affairs Are Your Affairs!” package, which ended with the viewing of 
World Affairs Are Your Affairs, the film made about the Cleveland Council. The Association 
repurposed Headline Books for similar purposes, building its own packaged discussion series. 
The Council on Foreign Relations used individual articles from Foreign Affairs in Let’s Talk 
About, a series that involved 641 discussion groups in 1952 and more than 1,200 by 1954.116 As 
the World Affairs Council of Seattle hoped in 1952, discussion groups fostered the presentation 
of views and resulted in the “formulation of public opinion on the basis of ideas which have been 
subjected to questioning and testing in open discussion.”117 The St. Louis World Affairs Council 
was running five separate packaged discussion programs by the fall of 1952, although they were 
taken up by very few members.118 The Oregon Council offered several programs by 1954, but its 
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AFPE series, costing an extraordinary $12 per person (well over $100 today), reached fewer than 
200 participants.119 
The Fund followed the Experimental Discussion Project with its Test Cities program, 
which aimed to make adult education a going community concern that could continue without 
subsidy. Just like Carnegie Corporation’s interwar councils, the Test Cities were eventually seen 
to have failed, but in the meantime they were platforms for experimentation, most importantly in 
the work of Eugene I. Johnson, who directed the Community Education Project in the Test City 
of San Bernardino, California.120 Johnson’s insight was to shift the dynamics of discussion groups 
by relating research to the community’s needs. Like other adult educators, he specifically framed 
adult education as “an effort to strike directly through the complexity of modern life in a bid to 
overcome civic apathy and draw local people into increased participation in community life.” 
And as most of his early methods had been tried before, he quickly came to understand their 
limits. As the mass media and voluntary associations did not “reach all, nor even a majority, of 
the people,” Johnson wrote in 1958, “the dissemination and utilization of knowledge by the 
people needs to be related more directly to the natural forms of social organization which people 
create for themselves — neighborhood units, groups of friends, work teams and others.” So, 
while Johnson, like the radio pioneers of two decades earlier, was aware of the need to embed the 
mass media in organized discussion, he shifted how communications would be received in order 
to reach a wider audience. Gone was the formal discussion group, one that tended to gather 
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strangers or a few, committed voluntary association members under a trained leader. Now 
discussions would take place in “natural friendship groups,” attracted by geography, background, 
profession, hobbies, and so on. They could meet wherever they felt most comfortable, above all 
in their own homes.121 
What was crucial about this work, for Mastrude and others, was its attempt to make 
sense of an abundance of information in an absence of experts. Foreign policy experts, with their 
attention turned towards the state and to their students, were ever less eager or indeed able to 
interact with the public. Home discussion groups meant they could be dispensed with. They 
maintained the Deweyan ideal of democracy as discussion but tore off the equally Deweyan 
concern — so important to the foreign policy experts of the 1930s — with physically situating 
expertise within the public. The payoff was that discussion groups could be replicated on a much 
wider scale, increasing the chance that those not already interested in foreign affairs might be 
reached. Media institutions could be brought on board under the pressure of their public service 
responsibilities, providing publicity. Mastrude became a fan, expressing his “extreme interest” in 
the potential importance of the technique, “particularly here in the West.”122 While he explored 
the social scientific literature to which Cohen opened the door, Mastrude started trying to apply 
Johnson’s communications methods.123 
 
121 Eugene I. Johnson, “Groups with a Future — in a New Communication System,” Journal of Communication 5 
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122 Allport, “Field Report: Portland, Oregon, February 16 & 18, 1954,” FPA, Part I, Box 29; Mastrude to Dorothy 
Robins, March 4, 1954, FPA, Part I, Box 77. 
123 Mastrude acknowledged Johnson’s inspiration repeatedly. See, e.g., Roger Mastrude, “Bringing World Affairs to 
the People,” Adult Leadership 4 (March 1956), p. 16. 
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But apply them to what? Here the national and the local converged. Back in New York, 
Nason and Allport sought a program that would provide a focus to the Association’s work and 
image, one that would move away from purely “organizational” efforts towards “substantive” 
concerns, and direct their work to the supposed middle 50% of the public. They settled on an 
attempt to narrow foreign policy down to a series of “basic issues” comprehensible to the mass.124 
What was a basic issue? To Allport, it meant a topic that was “active,” “on which the American 
people will have or should have an opportunity for expressing their opinion,” on which “enough 
information is available to the public to allow them to come to an intelligent opinion on it” — 
and one which “fundamentally affects the majority of American population.”125 Such topics 
would have to be willfully unspecific, as broad as possible. It made no sense, Mastrude wrote, to 
teach arcane matters like the technical composition of SEATO, but it made more to help people 
think through whether Southeast Asia was important enough to American interests to justify an 
alliance or an aid program.126 Even so, as Rowson pointed out, it would be difficult to translate 
the “basically emotional attitudes toward world affairs held by [the] average person FPA hopes to 
reach” into “definable, understandable questions which would strike a responsive chord among a 
large audience,” and at the same time mean something for the Association’s patrons in 
government, academia, and the media.127 Perhaps the questions could be decided by polling the 
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memberships of World Affairs Councils, or by a committee representing academic expertise and 
voluntary association leadership.128 Once the issues were decided, Nason wrote, they would 
“become focal points around which we would build much of the substantive program which 
emanated from the FPA headquarters or which was recommended to local groups.”129 
Defining the issues had always been one of the Association’s roles, in association with the 
State Department. The more difficult question was how to make people pay attention. As 
Mastrude once wrote, to “reach the average member of the great American public,” an educator 
had to “attract his attention”; “show him there is some good reason for him to learn about the 
subject”; “convince him the problems are not too ‘deep’ for him to understand”; “give him the 
essential knowledge on his level of language, without condescension”; “offer him education that 
suits his likes and habits”; and “find some way to involve large numbers of people as participants 
in a learning process” — all on a small budget.130  
The two most pressing problems revolved around apathy. Allport had taken care of what 
Mastrude thought was one basic cause of uninterest, the idea that foreign policy was too complex 
to be understood by the layman. The more difficult issue was to convince the citizens that her 
opinion mattered, that she could make a difference. Unless it was solved, nobody would bother 
to join the discussion groups that were at the center of Mastrude’s educational vision.131 As 
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“World Affairs Are Your Affairs” appeared not to have worked well, another slogan was chosen, 
stolen from a State Department pamphlet — “Your Opinion Counts.”132 
Mastrude put these ideas into practice in Great Decisions.133 It was tested in Portland, 
under the guidance of the World Affairs Council, which was chosen because it was more open 
than most to “making some initial experimental efforts to reach a broader public than the 
traditional one.”134 The program ran from February 20 to April 17, 1955, and concentrated on 
eight basic but bland issues, each being the chosen topic of conversation for one week so that the 
time commitment was limited and intense: 
1. Does U.S. security, prosperity, and freedom depend on the rest of the world?  
2. How shall we deal with the U.S.S.R.? 
3. Do we have a ‘stake’ in Asia? 
4. Do we have a ‘stake’ in Europe? 
5. Do we have a ‘stake’ in colonial Africa? 
6. How should we defend ourselves? 
7. Do we need friends and allies? 
8. Is there an American way in foreign policy? 
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Most of these questions were focused only secondarily on the cold war, dealing with American 
power first and foremost; most were phrased, too, far from neutrally in terms of the familiar 
polarity of internationalism and isolationism. But their content, in this test run, was less 
important than their means of broadcast. 
 The Council’s first concern was to set up a communications network for its program, 
broadly following the San Bernardino model. Borrowing from commercial advertising 
techniques, Mastrude understood that public attention was best created by using multiple means 
of communications — a “coordinated campaign,” as PR experts would call it. The Council 
therefore brought the Oregonian on board, and acquired the cooperation of KOIN’s radio and 
television facilities. KOIN-AM, which had a potential reach of over half a million radio sets, 
presented a half-hour panel show after Sunday church, using local academics. KOIN-TV 
donated a half-hour program on Wednesday nights, using its own production budget to create 
films and projections to support professors who “introduced the basic facts, discussed problems 
and presented alternative policies the United States might follow.” Meanwhile the Oregonian, 
with its circulation of nearly 300,000, supplied over thirty basic stories, contributed favorable 
commentary, and devoted half the page opposite its Sunday editorials to the program. This 
included articles by Munk, examining the pertinent questions that went into an assessment of 
each issue, as well as three or four comments from local leaders. As in San Bernardino, this 
media bombardment was designed to create enough community interest to drive the formation 
of home discussion groups, and to service those groups once the discussion period began. Mass 
media programs, which were arranged to blanket an area with information from as many 
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different stimuli as possible, had the added, if limited, benefit of reaching those who happened 
only incidentally to pay attention to any one medium.135 
 Putting Great Decisions together on short notice, the Council essentially outsourced the 
formation of home discussion groups, asking its members to invite their friends and neighbors. 
“Forming a discussion group in your home may sound formidable,” the co-chairwoman of the 
Council’s organizing committee told the Oregonian, but “if you have a group of friends you 
haven’t seen in a while, use this as an opportunity to invite them in for an evening of 
conversation.”136 One third of groups, or thereabouts, came about because discussion leaders 
responded to media announcements; the rest were put together by members of participating local 
voluntary associations.137 As the Oregonian reported, many of these had a longstanding interest in 
foreign affairs, including the American Association of University Women, the Junior Chamber 
of Commerce, and various churches. But many had been beyond the movement’s reach, not least 
veterans’ groups, the American Federation of Labor, and Parent-Teacher Associations. 
Teachers, too, signed up their high school classes.138 
In all, 81 adult discussion groups were formed, all but three of which met one evening per 
week in a private home, for about three to four hours, often taking in KOIN’s television program 
as part of the night. 1215 adults took part, in groups of between eight and sixteen people, and 
the discussion leaders who administered the groups estimated (very roughly) that about two 
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thirds were “new to active discussion of world affairs.” Between a third and a half of the groups 
met in neighborhoods where the average income was less than the national, and because they 
were relatively homogeneous, made up predominantly of “friends and acquaintances,” it seemed 
as if a genuinely new audience might be being reached. Mastrude, who had a professional 
interest in “race relations,” excitedly noted that a solitary “all-Negro group in a low-income 
neighborhood” was proof that “the program did specifically reach community levels distinctly 
outside the traditional audience.”139 
 What did these participants do? While experts were not present, many of those who led 
discussions were already experienced members of the League of Women Voters, or had 
volunteered to attend sessions run by the speech theorists of the state university’s extension 
division. At the very least, tips on discussion technique were made available to them in a 
pamphlet for group leaders.140 But even if a discussion leader lacked training, each participant 
was supposed to buy a set of fact sheets, priced at $1.50 for eight, which would allow her access 
to a common set of facts, “the basic minimum necessary for an intelligent consideration of the 
possible alternative policies.”141 The fact sheets, 22 by 26 inches and folded into four columns, 
were freely illustrated with cartoons, and they doubled as discussion outlines, complete with 
background information.142 They were written clearly and simply, and, when they were used as 
classroom material, children in the ninth grade had no trouble understanding them. Indeed, the 
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simplicity at times bordered on caricature, although not one outside the cold war mainstream. In 
one fact sheet, for instance, the United States was said to have three objectives in international 
politics, all defensive — “to keep [the] U.S. secure and safe from attack,” “to have high and rising 
standard[s] of living,” and “to maintain our free democratic society.” The Soviets, who likewise 
sought “security and prosperity,” would rather “destroy capitalism” and “weaken U.S. and free 
world power and strengthen her own.” From this presentation of basic information, the sheets 
moved to discussion questions that might be answered by extrapolating from general principles. 
“Should we participate in a conference on Formosa outside the U.N., as proposed by Russia,” a 
fact sheet on alliances and world trade asked? “Should we encourage trade between the 
Communist world and our allies in non-strategic materials?” If so, “would such trade be more 
likely to promote world peace or war?” 
 The centerpiece of the fact sheets, however, was Mastrude’s attempt to impart value to 
the entire enterprise. If participants were to be told that “Your Opinion Counts,” then it 
followed that they had to be offered some way of making their mark. Each fact sheet — and the 
weekly spreads in the Oregonian — came with an “opinion ballot,” which offered a series of 
policy options to readers, and space to write in other ideas. Should the USA, one ballot asked, 
“try to defend its own shores?” Should it “build treaties and alliances for a world-wide security 
system?” Should it “work for economic self-sufficiency?” Should it “maintain freedom by working 
with other free countries,” or “oppose the Soviet Union alone?” The ballot asked readers how 
their opinions had been made, that is, whether they had joined a discussion group, or had just 
watched the television program, or heard the radio show. It instructed readers to send the ballot 
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in to the World Affairs Council, which would tabulate the results.143 Opinion ballots were not, 
Mastrude said, “an attempt to deal with detailed issues in the manner of public opinion polls,” 
nor an effort to “delude people that they can make the detailed policy choices nor assume the 
responsibility of trying to clarify all the subtle, complex, contradictory, and domestic-political 
questions which go into decisions on specific policy acts.”144 Indeed, they were in part a response 
to a common critique of opinion polls, that they took a snapshot of opinion before a necessary 
period of discussion could allow the public to come to a rounded view. Instead, Mastrude’s 
opinion ballots primarily served an educational function, “to focus thought and discussion, 
provide a tangible ‘result’,” and “record generally where people stood at the end of a process of 
discussion and study.” It was made clear that summaries of the ballot results would be sent to the 
State Department, connecting the discussions to policymaking institutions in Washington.145 
  The opinion ballots were the physical manifestation of the stakes that all involved placed 
on Great Decisions, a means of proving that the public was capable of holding its own in a 
democratic foreign policy. Organizers received a note in the name of John Foster Dulles, who 
vouched for the State Department’s interest in the experiment and confided that “I have long 
held the conviction that our nation’s foreign affairs should be discussed in every American home, 
that every one of us has a task in making a successful foreign policy for the United States.”146 
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Assistant Secretary of State George V. Allen lauded the program during an unrelated speech in 
town.147 But Great Decisions was always as much about proving that democracy could work in 
foreign policy as contributing to policy itself. Munk portrayed Great Decisions as an attempt to 
disprove Walter Lippmann. Lippmann, whose Essays came out just as Great Decisions was 
starting, could be responded to in three ways, Munk wrote in the Oregonian: by leaving foreign 
policy “to the experts”; by resignation to “having decisions made by an uninformed public 
whipped into occasional frenzy by publicity-seeking demagogues playing on prejudice and 
emotion”; or by “a supreme effort to educate the public by the use of modern media of mass 
communication giving us, for the first time, access to the voter’s living room and mental 
horizon.”148 The Oregonian noted in a February editorial that “columnists like Mr. Lippmann 
have no hesitation in advancing their opinions”; Great Decisions was to show that “theirs are not 
the only opinions that count.”149 
Portlanders, and the few participants that the program incidentally reached in smaller 
towns like Salem and Corvallis, seemed to respond. Three quarters of group leaders, who were 
perhaps more likely to adhere to participatory ideals than other participants, “regarded the idea of 
forwarding opinions to the State Department as important.” Plenty of people sent in long letters 
with their ballots, explaining their views. A Mrs. Gilbert Reeves, for instance, wrote that the 
“‘FINAL BALLOT’ really awakened me!” and explained over five handwritten pages that while 
she had only “an average housewife’s viewpoint,” she now knew “what I’d like to do if I had any 
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influence or power.”150 And internationalists could take solace in the tabulations that a political 
science student at Reed College made of the results. Only 2% of respondents thought that the 
United States should “go it alone”; 95% agreed that the nation had a “stake” in Asia, and the 
same number that it had a “stake” in Europe. Only 4% believed in a withdrawal of forces from 
Europe, and 25% “felt the U.S. should concentrate on liberating the [Soviet] satellite countries.” 
These participants were not militarists, and they did not particularly want an increase in defense 
spending or a sterner military posture. 86% of ballots reported that American policy “should be 
guided by an ‘ideal of international cooperation and the United Nations’,” and 83% thought that 
principles of morality and justice should guide the national interest. Whether these results 
showed that people would naturally understand American policy if given time to think about it, 
or whether they showed that Great Decisions appealed to an already educated public was not yet 
clear.151 
The problem was that the opinion ballots, the centerpiece of participation and a 
promissory note for a democratic foreign policy, were a charade. “Having opinions actually 
reported to the State Department, the seat of policy-making,” Mastrude wrote in an internal 
report, had only “symbolic value.”152 Warren Rovetch, Mastrude’s deputy, went rather further, 
writing to New York that the “balloting is a major problem,” and “comes too close to snake 
oil.”153 This remained an experimental program at this stage, and when Allport went to explain it 
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properly to a skeptical Public Services staff, he thought he was able to convince them that it 
showed how the Association “was really breaking through the sound barrier and reaching new, 
unconverted audiences every day.” Foggy Bottom bureaucrats, he reported, had been more 
impressed with the opinion ballots they had received than they had anticipated. Either way, this 
was a crucial issue to solve, for if participants came to believe that policymakers were not 
listening, then the program would fail. Whether it depended on the State Department paying 
attention, or merely seeming as if it were paying attention, was another matter.154 
 Such problems were, however, barely a blot on what was thought to be a successful 
innovation. “This program as a whole entity is ‘special’ enough so that it should be tried out in 
any other regions on a carefully controlled basis,” Mastrude reported to Nason and Allport, for 
with its “exceptionally wide involvement” it offered “a rather large opening wedge for subsequent 
world affairs activity.”155 Rovetch noted that Great Decisions had, remarkably, “become a topic 
of social conversation,” something that people he met while traveling, or checking out of his 
hotel, had heard of and felt a duty to be involved with. It had made a “substantial sector of the 
community aware of a world affairs study program” and expanded the core audience for world 
affairs generally, rather than appealing only to a limited group. Indeed, outside of Portland itself, 
it had “in fact created a core where none previously existed,” as spontaneous groups popped up 
outside the city. “People who know this community cold,” Rovetch concluded, “say there has 
never been anything ever in Portland to equal this.”156  
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While there were regional directors who wondered whether Great Decisions could work 
in areas where organized world affairs education was not so novel, in September the board made 
it the Association’s major program going forward.157 The government lent its support during a 
Conference of World Affairs Organizations in Washington that December, as Assistant 
Secretary Allen presented Munk and Grondahl with an innovation award, judged by a panel that 
included Ralph Bunche and Eleanor Roosevelt. President Eisenhower, Adlai Stevenson, and 
Henry Cabot Lodge sent congratulatory telegrams, and Wayne Morse, Oregon’s senator, praised 
the Council as “an example of democracy at work.”158 Troublingly, the World Affairs Council 
chiefs in the audience resented the whole project, and lambasted Nason for failing adequately to 
support the existing, struggling councils.159 
Editors at Adult Leadership, however, gave over an entire issue of the magazine in March 
1956 to a program that had rapidly become a star in the Fund’s firmament. Mastrude 
extrapolated wildly from these early results — “it worked!” — and claimed that just one season of 
Great Decisions showed how “people are educable” even in “complicated choices.” He did not, 
notably, make any suggestion that the reporting of opinions had had any effect on policy.160 
Munk, who wrote that Great Decisions was explicitly an attempt to “preserve the democratic 
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process” in the face of those who believed that “only a small minority of experts can take part in 
foreign policy decisions,” reported that 60% of participants said they would more “closely follow 
foreign policy problems,” that far more than half were prepared to take part in similar discussions 
in future, and that nearly two-thirds “reported they had changed opinions on at least one major 
issue.” While there was ample evidence that Great Decisions, through its novel use of the mass 
media, had pierced “the ‘sound barrier’ that normally limits education in international affairs to 
the League of Women Voters type circuit,” it was still clear, however, that “the majority of the 
participants came from the middle-middle and upper-middle classes.”161 
And perhaps that was no surprise. For all Great Decisions’ innovation, particularly in its 
saturation approach to the mass media, it still fundamentally relied on a particular model of 
citizenship, information intake, opinion creation, and, ultimately democracy itself. It was a vision 
of citizenship that theorists thought was realistically applicable only to a few Americans. Could 
they be proven wrong? 
 
* * * * * 
 
Great Decisions grew dramatically, much faster than its architects ever expected. By early 1958, 
Nason was assigning up to 90% of his regional staff’s time and effort to the program.162 A year 
after the test run in Oregon, the Association told the Ford Foundation that 33 communities in 
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six states had set up similar programs, although other internal estimates put the number at 54 
communities in seven states, involving up to 6,500 adults in discussion groups.163 The following 
year, the regional directors were forced to start estimating the number of participants — based 
on sketchy reports from local organizing committees, inferences from the number of fact sheet 
kits bought, and other metrics — because they had to concentrate on creating the necessary 
communications networks for programs to succeed, leaving the formation of actual discussion 
groups to others. Even so, in 1957 it was thought that more than 1,300 groups were meeting in 
233 communities in 33 states, as part of programs that used Great Decisions material in 
everything from full-spectrum, municipal efforts on the Portland model, to traditional packaged 
series in chapters of the League of Women Voters and Junior Chambers of Commerce.164 If 
20,000 adults participated that year, at least double that were involved in 1958, and double that 
again in 1959, by which point there were programs in 509 communities, spread across 43 states. 
120 radio and television stations were involved, with 199 newspapers running advertising, full 
articles, or news coverage.165 
Under the pressure of grant deadlines, the Association became much less reliable in its 
statistical reporting from 1960 onwards, for while “fully documented” internal figures compiled 
for that year by the regional offices suggested that just over 70,000 adults were actively talking 
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through their decisions, a number of 
110,000 was quoted to the board, and 
as many as 200,000 to Ford.166 Local 
reports, it was thought, chronically 
underestimated total participation, and 
so the Association felt free to claim that 
between 250,000 and 300,000 people 
participated annually in the program up 
to 1964.167 But “the figures we have 
publicly used on Great Decisions 
participation have always puzzled me,” 
the Association’s president wrote in 
1964, and rightly so.168 Robert Tucker, 
the Princeton political scientist who 
evaluated the program for Ford in 1965, 
thought that it was “doubtful” that it 
reached even 100,000 adults per year.169 Less rosy Association estimates showed that the 
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program plateaued at around 40,000-50,000 adults nationally from about 1962 to 1968, before 
dropping off precipitously.170 
There were successes, particularly in areas where other world affairs programming was 
limited. Oregon remained a demonstration project, so successful that it outgrew the Council, 
which handed control of the program to an unprecedented committee of statewide agencies, 
including the public school system, the state libraries, the extension division of the state’s land 
grant university, and — most important for breaking out of Portland and into rural Oregon — 
the local office of the Federal Cooperative Extension Service, whose agricultural and home-
economics agents were employed by the Department of Agriculture. In 1957, all seven of the 
state’s television stations cooperated, along with 40 radio stations and 45 newspapers. 32 of the 
state’s 36 counties had active discussion groups, more than 300 of them in total, encompassing 
over 4,000 people. In some counties, over 5% of the adult population was involved in discussion 
groups; in one small town, 25%. The numbers were thought to be impressive, and became more 
so in 1958 when increased cooperation with the AFL-CIO and the Farm Bureau drove the 
creation of up to 600 groups, but the regional directors constantly tried to tell non-quantitative 
stories, ones that aimed to show the normative, educational value of the process itself. “No 
counting of groups,” Charles O’Brien and Warren Rovetch wrote from the San Francisco office, 
can set forth the gas station operator who had never before talked about his 
concerns for the world because he felt it would identify him as queer; the Methodist 
minister who ‘rediscovered’ his congregation; the woman from the small mountain 
community who ‘saw the world whole’ for the first time. 
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There were, after all, parts of Oregon which had only had access to electricity for a decade; now, 
as residents met in discussion, “world affairs and foreign policy were no longer matters a few 
‘thinkers’ talked about.”171 
Much the same was true in other predominantly rural areas, where new infrastructures of 
communications were developed with a burst of Great Decisions activity at their core. In 
Wyoming, for instance, federal agricultural extension services combined with the adult education 
division of the state’s university to create nearly a hundred discussion groups in 1958 and 1959, 
even though there were no statewide television stations, radio shows, or newspapers.172 Outside 
of major cities, Junior Chambers of Commerce often took responsibility, as young businessmen 
tried to make a name for themselves in local politics. Such cooperation was sporadic, however. 
Elsewhere, it took immense work to create successful programs, particularly in areas where the 
Association had had little previous experience. With the exception of cities like Atlanta and New 
Orleans, it refused to deal with fraught racial politics of the South. Even a promising test project 
in the calm city of Macon, Georgia, remained segregated at the request of white local leaders, 
and attracted only two black discussion groups out of 63 in 1959.173 
 While Great Decisions seemed particularly effective in mid-sized cities like Indianapolis 
and St. Louis, where suburbanization was still in its early stages, it still had notable success in 
four major cities. Each of these operated on a different pattern, and with a different relationship 
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to pre-existing foreign affairs institutions. Many World Affairs Councils remained skeptical 
about world affairs programs that went beyond attempts to grow their own membership.174 The 
most actively hostile was the World Affairs Council of Northern California, whose executive 
director, Calvin Nichols, saw Councils — especially on the west coast — as serving the scholars 
and expert elite who might be directly influential on policy processes. To Nason, Nichols was the 
most extreme of Council directors, interested basically in “outdoing even the Council on Foreign 
Relations.”175 Great Decisions, in Nichols’ view, had “no value whatever,” for it was “really a 
delusion and unfair to the participants to give the impression that they were getting something 
significant out of such a brief exposure.” As there was little evidence that Great Decisions 
converted participation into Council members, Nichols refused to get involved.176 San Francisco’s 
Great Decisions, nonetheless, became one of the strongest in the nation when it began in 1958, 
on the initiative of “a volunteer housewife in San Mateo.” With over a hundred cooperating 
groups — including schools, parent-teacher associations, churches, and the Junior Chamber — 
and coverage from the Chronicle’s media empire, by 1960 the program was so popular that people 
were being turned away from forty open, public discussion groups set up across the city. Even 
prisoners at San Quentin made up one of the 600 or so Bay Area groups.177 
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 Other Councils, or their equivalents, were much more willing to embrace the idea, not 
least because it was cheap, prestigious, and had the potential to create stronger links to other 
local voluntary associations. The first was the Boston Council, the successor to the Association’s 
early Boston branch and now presided over by Christian A. Herter, Jr., a Republican politician 
and the son of Christian A. Herter, Eisenhower’s second secretary of state. The support of 
Senators John F. Kennedy and Leverett Saltonstall, as well as the Christian Science Monitor, 
helped its initiative to reach 1,600 people in 110 discussion groups in 1957. The Boston Council 
made particular use of the abundance of local academics, including Max F. Millikan and Henry 
Kissinger, in a WGBH phone-in television show that won a Peabody Award in 1960.178 In the 
Midwest, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations briefly dallied with a program, helping to 
create about 300 discussion groups in 1958, but its financial difficulties quickly forced it shrink 
its offerings, and it retreated to a minor sponsorship role behind the Chicago Daily News.179 The 
female leaders of the United Nations Association’s local chapter were the original driving force in 
Baltimore, which had “perhaps the most ‘solid’ ‘Great Decisions’ program” in the northeast.” 
Even among internationalist activists there, however, the program’s populism split opinion. 
“Some of the old-timers,” the Association’s regional director Ruth Morton reported, “feel that 
the ‘common lot’ have muddied their hands.” In short order, the relatively successful program 
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was taken over by a large, standalone committee, as was also the case elsewhere.180 In smaller 
cities, the weak remnants of the Association’s old branch system mustered creditable programs, 
as in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, and occasionally strong ones, like in Hartford, Connecticut.181 
 As the program grew, politicians began to take notice, although their interest stopped 
well short of anything more than superficial cooperation. President Eisenhower, whose public 
remarks often noted the importance of citizen involvement in foreign policy, wrote in support of 
the Association’s program, but otherwise kept his distance.182 John Foster Dulles declined to ask 
the White House’s help with the Association’s budget, but he repeatedly endorsed Great 
Decisions, and instructed the State Department’s public services staff to write letters to 
community leaders.183 President Kennedy, who called the program an “eminently worthwhile 
effort” based on his own experience in Massachusetts, ceremonially received a Great Decisions 
fact sheet from members of the Association’s board in February 1962.184 Locally, programs often 
sought and received the backing of a city’s mayor, and the offices of many congressmen were 
happy to acknowledge letters and opinion ballots from their constituents. In 1963, the 
Association began to help arrange “Issues Conferences” at which delegates from discussion 
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groups met with their representatives, including, in that first year, a forum in Corvallis, Oregon, 
attended by Wayne Morse. 43 of these had been held by the end of the 1968 season.185 And by 
1974, as policymakers struggled to reconcile post-Vietnam public opinion with the nation’s 
diplomatic posture, leading participants testified in dedicated hearings before both the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.186 
 If political support from the top down was somewhat limited, a more complicated story 
about the willingness of communities to participate ran from the bottom up. Mastrude’s central 
theoretical problem had been apathy, which the Association attacked through constant 
invocation of the citizen’s duty to participate. On the cover of the most popular promotional 
leaflet for Great Decisions, a carpenter sawing, a father mowing, a secretary typing, and a mother 
cooking all looked out, saying “Who me?” Inside, a housewife shopping asked, “Do I really have 
anything to say about U.S. foreign policy?” “You bet you do!” answered the text, which reiterated 
that people were not expected to know “the day-to-day details (such as the exact size of a foreign 
aid appropriation voted by Congress),” but should take part in “the important, underlying 
decisions about which direction our foreign policy should follow.” A man leaning on a globe 
asked, “But isn’t foreign policy too difficult to understand?” “Not at all!” answered the 
Association. “You know you want peace, security, a better world for your children,” and any 
effort to learn the facts and “think through the great decisions” would represent “a constructive 
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contribution to U.S. foreign policy.” In a democracy, after all, opinions counted whether they 
were informed or uninformed. And, the leaflet stated, if you filled out an opinion ballot, your 
views would be “tabulated in your own community and the results direct to the State Department 
and Congress.” Every citizen who took part, who sent in their ballot, would “play a democratic 
role in the shaping of America’s foreign policy.”187 
 Few communities actually did send their views to Washington, however. As Philip Van 
Slyck, the New York director of program materials, put it in 1959, the ballots “dramatize, as no 
other device can, the basic philosophy of the program that informed opinions do count in the 
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democratic process.”188 But, as Van Slyck’s choice of verb implied, the ballots remained curiously 
performative. The Association left the details of tabulating ballot results to communities, which 
could choose whether and how to pass them along to policymakers. It took until 1959 for the 
Association to begin collating community tabulations on a national level in order to stoke press 
attention, and even then many communities were not interested.189 As H. Schuyler Foster of the 
State Department’s public opinion staff recalled, perhaps only ten or twelve sent in a report each 
season, a number that declined year on year, which mean that “most groups have not felt it 
worthwhile to send their conclusions to the State Department.”190  
Did this mean that the Association’s effort to convince Great Decisions participants that 
the government was listening, that their opinions mattered, had failed? Perhaps. Van Slyck 
repeatedly noted that some skepticism surrounded the ballots, and surmised in 1959 that “a few 
users and sponsors are cynical about the value of communicating opinions to Washington,” and 
thought the ballot a “gimmick.”191 Plenty, however, did not. Tens of thousands of participants 
regularly filled out the ballots and sent them to their local Great Decisions sponsors. Even so, the 
proportion of participants who did so varied wildly. Three quarters of surveyed participants in 
the initial Oregon test thought that the ballots were important, but Carnegie Endowment 
research on the Portland program a year later found that of the 35% of 220 surveyed community 
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leaders who took part, only 16% used one or more opinion ballot.192 A World Affairs Council of 
Boston report on the 1957 program relayed that about 30% of participants returned ballots to the 
council, but discussants in Macon filled out up to 1,200 ballots each week in 1959.193 There 
seemed to be no single pattern to explain such variations. One field report from Buffalo in 
March 1957, for instance, relayed that one luncheon group of men refused to fill out any ballot at 
all, that another group still “felt that they were really not qualified to form an opinion which 
would be of any value,” and that a third had talked for so long that they had run out of time.194 
Even if some groups remained hesitant, remarkably few ever gave up completely and dissolved. 
 It did not help that the State Department remained deeply ambivalent about the 
enterprise, caught between the competing imperatives of paying due attention to the public on 
the one hand, and bolstering its claims to sole expertise on the other. Perhaps more importantly 
to eager communities far from Washington, the department’s institutional capability to interact 
with the public had by this point severely diminished. If communities sent their tabulations in, 
they often did not receive the courtesy of a reply, let alone the assurance that their views were 
being heeded by policymakers. In 1958, Van Slyck met with the chief of State’s public services 
division, who admitted he had no familiarity with the domestic landscape at all, having just 
returned from ten years abroad. Van Slyck relayed the story of a lady from Medford, 
Massachusetts, who had gotten so caught up in democratic participation that she had written to 
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Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, her congressmen, and the State 
Department. All but the latter replied.195 Faced with such incompetence, Foster said in 1963, 
“some senders-in may unhappily conclude that the Department ‘doesn’t give a damn’ about what 
they think.” But even Foster never considered the ballots to have more than “quite marginal” 
value, though, because they were neither a random sample nor clearly an expression of views 
from a particular interest group. Although information about Great Decisions occasionally 
reached policymakers, Foster never used the ballots in his formal opinion reports.196 
It seems unlikely that most Great Decisions participants thought themselves inherently 
unqualified to express their opinions, not just because expression was obviously a requirement of 
the program, but because they put pressure on the Association to make the program not less but 
more demanding, more detailed, more concretely illustrative of policymaking dilemmas, more 
relevant to institutional processes. Mastrude’s plan had always been to keep the program at the 
broadly attitudinal level, in keeping with his intended audience, although he quickly understood 
that repeated iterations of the program in the same place would probably entail “becoming more 
current and specific.” Even so, in April 1955 he still thought that “we would not try to get them 
to say whether we should defend Quemoy,” but rather “whether we should fight, compete, 
cooperate with or woo China.” He neither wanted to “delude people” that they could make 
“detailed policy choices,” nor ask them to “clarify all the subtle, complex, contradictory, and 
domestic-political questions which go into decisions on specific policy acts.”197 And the most 
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difficult of questions, indeed, usually faltered in the field. Staffers emphasized that people 
seemed to like “‘person-place’ questions” on controversial issues, and that “abstract questions like 
nuclear strategy,” whatever their importance, “had the least popular appeal.”198  
But by 1958, as the Association noticed how many Great Decisions participants were 
repeating the program year after year, the topics and fact sheets went into greater depth. “People 
who have already been involved,” one policy planning group noted, “want something with more 
of an intellectual approach,” even if that might frighten newcomers.199 As such, the early, single-
page fact sheets, with their elementary information, discussion questions, and pocket-sized 
accessibility, were quickly abandoned in favor of texts with more heft. By 1962, a fact sheet on 
Vietnam spilled to 12 pages of dense prose, filled with population statistics, trade figures, and 
arcane diplomatic history. At the same time, and in response to demand, the Association 
abandoned the idea of the opinion ballots as prompts for discussion, and confined them to 
“issues of policy on which action could be taken rather than on questions of attitude.”200 Those 
discussing Vietnam in 1962 were offered nine policy choices to deal with “indirect Communist 
aggression against South Vietnam,” and twelve means of limiting or expanding their involvement 
in “South Vietnam’s internal problems of economic, social and political development.”201 As 
Councils became more enthusiastic about Great Decisions, so Great Decisions seemed to appeal 
more to the kinds of people who might be enthusiastic about World Affairs Councils. 
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 What kind of audience drove this escalation? Was the mass that Mastrude had thought 
he could reach more intelligent than even he had hoped? No. There is no doubt that Great 
Decisions was a more effective program than any other that the foreign policy elite had 
previously come up with at stoking organized discussion of world affairs. There is no doubt, too, 
that it reached people who had never previously thought in depth about the subject. But Great 
Decisions was that rare program that had specific, quantitative aims in mind, and as much as its 
developers enjoyed singling out relatively intangible, individual stories about education’s power, 
the program was designed to be susceptible to quantitative assessment. As soon as the program 
began to spread, staffers started to think how to evaluate it at scale.202 As a community endeavor, 
it was assessed at the community level, making it hard to put together a national picture. But as 
the Association’s first Ford grant came to its end, in 1959 it commissioned surveys in Boston, 
Macon, Denver, and Oregon, as it sought to prove that its “demonstration that ‘the people’ are 
neither apathetic nor beyond communication” had worked.203 
 It had not. Great Decisions reached a markedly similar audience to most other world 
affairs programs, just in greater numbers. “We feel reasonably secure in stating,” Alfred Hero of 
the World Peace Foundation reported from Boston, “that most of the participants in these 
sessions are among the better-informed, better-read, the more active and highly-motivated two 
or three percent of the population so far as international relations is concerned.” Even though 
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Boston’s program was deliberately aimed at the suburbs, on the racist assumption that black 
inner-city residents had no interest in world affairs, its demographic results were still woeful. 
93% of male participants, and 87% of female, had been to college; 46% of the men had graduate 
degrees. (According to the 1960 census, 8% of Americans nationwide had completed four or 
more years of college.)204 Half of respondents to the survey had family incomes of over $7,500, 
with the median for males being around $11,000. (Around 12% of American families earned 
more than $10,000 in 1959.)205 Only 2% of the women and 8% of the men responding were 
members of no “clubs, civic groups, churches, labor unions, or other organizations,” and the 
typical participant was one of the approximately 10-13% of Americans who belonged to four or 
more such groups. When at home, most Great Decisions participants were “very far above 
average in their self-exposure to world affairs in the more realistic and responsible mass media.”  
Overall, the picture was “generally one of an upper-middle class group with considerable 
privilege in education, means and social status,” even if the discussion groups were probably more 
varied in reality than the statistical surveys implied. Did this make it a total failure? Not quite, 
for the program was quite good at encouraging people who already had some interest and 
exposure to world affairs to get more involved. Less than half of even these participants, for 
instance, said they had taken part in any organized discussions about world affairs over the past 
few years. Even so, Hero wrote, the failure of Great Decisions to break out beyond a traditional 
world affairs audience — in which the median participant was a white, older, educated housewife 
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— was proof that it was “unrealistic” to try to reach a wider audience. If the “common man” did 
not care, he concluded, “communication with a few of their more thoughtful and active 
associates seems to us one area where limited, gradual improvement may be practicable.”206 
 Every survey conducted on Great Decisions participants distilled these results into an 
essence. Boston’s program, despite its suburban focus, was actually relatively progressive. In 
Denver, fully 28% of participants had graduate degrees, while in two selected counties in 
Oregon, it was 46%. Across the board, approximately 20-30% of participants had not been to 
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college. Almost half of all respondents were housewives; most of the men were professionals, 
academics, lawyers and the like.207 In Macon, 14% of participants were estimated to earn less 
than $5,000 before tax, but 24% over $10,000; the local Chamber of Commerce thought that 
about 53% of local families had an income of less than $4,000, after tax, and just 5.4% over 
$10,000.208 Moreover, it was increasingly clear that Great Decisions participants were not just 
likely already to be interested and active in world affairs, but actually were already involved. 
Universities and popular presses pumped out whole libraries of books on foreign affairs by the 
late 1950s, but the best estimates were that less than 1% of all Americans had ever read one 
outside a classroom.209 49% of Great Decisions participants claimed to read “not more than one” 
foreign affairs book during any given year, but 30% read two to four, and 20% read five or more. 
64% of respondents attended two or more “lectures or meetings on foreign affairs” per year.210  
To be sure, Great Decisions seemed to reach deeper than other programs into marginally 
interested, politically active communities, and perhaps to increase the activity of those who 
joined in. 67% of group members in 1959, for instance, relayed that they were reading more 
foreign news, and nearly half increased their intake of pertinent radio or television programs, 
although there was no real way to measure whether such improvements were temporary or 
permanent.211 However, statistical metrics based in theory showed that it was impossible to claim 
 
207 “Great Decisions… 1959: A Report to Colorado,” undated, FPA, Part II, Box 40, Appendix C. 
208 “Great Decisions 1959 in Macon, Georgia,” September 1959, FPA, Part II, Box 55. 
209 “Working Paper on FPA’s Role in Citizen Education in World Affairs,” June 25, 1959, FPA, Part II, Box 242. 
210 “Response to Questions from the Ford Foundation,” June 1, 1964, FF, FA732C, Grant 56-117, Reel 4159, p. 
80. 
211 “Highlights of Surveys of Great Decisions… 1959,” undated, Appendix B, FPA, Part II, Box 55. 
  
384 
that Great Decisions was achieving the task that Mastrude had set for it in 1955.212 Whatever 
the program’s normative value, the Association had a target audience, which it could either reach 
or not; it could either disprove Lippmann, or not. Comparable to the Great Books program, 
which had 42,000 participants in 1,100 communities by the end of 1960, Great Decisions was by 
far the most popular adult education program ever conceived for world affairs.213 The 1959 
surveys revealed that perhaps only 32% of participants were not habitual lecture-goers, that 25% 
of participants had not been educated beyond high school, that 39% of participants earned the 
national median family income or less.214  
It was something. It was not enough. 
 
* * * * * 
 
The failure of Great Decisions to meet its intended audience provided a practical case in point 
for the theoretical assault on classical, progressive ideals of citizenship, participation, and 
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education waged by political scientists. The academics, it seemed, were right. And the 
Association was not alone. Numerical measurements of adult education programs’ success and 
failure steadily replaced normative appreciations of their purpose, and statistical techniques 
revealed the profoundly limited nature of the endeavor. The Fund’s own studies revealed that the 
audience for civic, political, or simply non-vocational adult education was puny.215 Whatever the 
content of a program, from Socrates to SEATO, study-discussion programs in the liberal arts 
attracted a white, wealthy, professional, active, educated, mostly female, and politically 
uninfluential base. Reporting on a nationwide study of the Great Books program in 1960, for 
instance, NORC found that 84% of participants had been to college, whereas 86% of the 
population had not.216  
With hopes for an educated mass democracy dashed, there was a wholesale movement in 
institutions associated with Ford towards the elite. The American Foundation for Political 
Education, for instance, gave up on its attempt to reach into local communities in 1958 and 
switched to executive education.217 The following year, the Fund itself declared that the most 
 
215 Fund for Adult Education, 1951-1961: A Ten Year Report of the Fund for Adult Education; Bruch, Accent on 
Learning; Abbott Kaplan, Study-Discussion in the Liberal Arts (White Plains: Fund for Adult Education, 1960); Alan 
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217 The AFPE’s programs reached an even more elite audience than Great Decisions. A 1956 dissertation by a 
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urgent task of adult education was to “improve and expand educational opportunities for those 
who bear public responsibilities,” meaning leaders, present and future.218 The Ford Foundation 
cut the Fund loose in 1961, with the recognition that even such an extraordinarily well-funded 
endeavor would never sustain itself absent continual subsidy. If elites wanted to educate 
themselves, they could pay their own way.219 Under the protection of Ford proper, the 
Association survived. But the momentum behind its chosen model of education — indeed this 
last remnant of Deweyan democracy, with all it entailed in terms of participation and expertise 
— was dissipating, this time for good. 
Great Decisions survived as the Association’s main program, and still does today. Its 
ambitions were, however, drastically scaled back. By the end of the 1960s, the Association saw 
Great Decisions not as a tool to reach the “middle 50%,” but a much more limited group. As the 
Association’s vice president wrote in 1968, the audience it found “is essentially the one we seek”: 
“middle and upper class,” with “at least some college education,” “active as communicators,” but 
“not already highly attentive to foreign affairs.” With a narrowed theory of the public, Great 
Decisions came close “to being a theoretically ideal citizen education program.” The attack on 
the mass was forced into a retreat.220 
Roger Mastrude almost capitulated, too. “We must be honest in facing the fact,” he 
wrote in October 1959, “that the total efforts of the adult educators of this country have probably 
never made a perceptible difference in the public understanding of any crucial issue.” Perhaps a 
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nuclear world was just too bewildering, even for experts, he wondered. And yet he did not give 
up, indeed he did not think that anyone could give up. “To deny the capacity of the people to 
think and choose well for their society is to assume that democracy is a preposterous sham,” he 
wrote. “Unless we can educate the public to reasonable understanding of the great international 
issues,” he concluded, “we are left with no rational grounds for continuing to believe democracy 
to be viable.” Educators would have to do better, but if they could not, they would be forced to 









The Diplomatic 1% 
 
The Foreign Policy Association’s fiftieth birthday party made the front pages, as had its birthday 
parties before. A thousand of its supporters gathered for dinner at the Manhattan Hilton, 
between 53rd and 54th Streets, on November 14, 1967. Secretary of State Dean Rusk was the 
guest of honor, a former member of the Association like his predecessor before him, and his 
predecessor’s predecessor before that. Entitled “The Political Future of the Family of Man,” 
Rusk’s speech was a plea for people to see the benevolence of American primacy, to understand 
its burdens, to support its exercise. The problems of a complicated world “have to be approached 
on our knees,” the secretary said, deploring the “impatience” of those who sought simple answers. 
Rusk urged his audience, in their “occasional quiet moments,” to try to understand the 
“responsibilities” of a president “thinking about the full use of the unbelievable power of the 
United States to get something over a little more quickly than it otherwise might.”1  
Rusk wanted to talk about the whole breadth of American foreign policy, and not to 
reduce it to the war in Southeast Asia, but he found it impossible not to comment on the 
escalating war in Vietnam. It was those comments that made headlines. Vietnam was inescapable 
for the Foreign Policy Association, too. As the New York Times wrote in an editorial, while the 
 
1 Dean Rusk, “The Political Future of the Family of Man,” November 14, 1967, Department of State Bulletin 57 
(1967), pp. 735-741. 
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Association “spent its early years resisting the disastrous American retreat into isolationism,” now 
perhaps “some of its supporters could be usefully employed for the rest of the twentieth century 
in studying the dangers of American overinvolvement and overcommitment.” Like Rusk, 
though, the Times still thought that the Association’s most basic purpose was sound. “Its 
contribution to public enlightenment on foreign problems,” the editorial board wrote, “cannot be 
measured but is surely substantial.”2 The Association was right, as a Times reporter put it, to 
believe that “most Americans are poorly informed and apathetic about foreign affairs.”3 
The apathy was riotous outside the ballroom that night. Three weeks after students had 
laid siege to the Pentagon, now 3,000 antiwar protestors assailed Rusk’s presence at a rally turned 
violent. The thousand police guarding the hotel were pelted with stones, bottles, and eggs. Some 
were covered in what looked like red paint, but turned out to be steers’ blood, seventeen gallons 
of it, a symbol of blood spilled far away. The police returned fire, corralling the protestors on 
horseback, charging their lines on scooters. “You want to be treated like animals,” one officer 
yelled, “we’ll treat you like animals.”  
A “roaring mob,” the Associated Press called it, split off from the main picket and headed 
south, roaming around Midtown. Parts of the crowd locked arms and marched down Sixth 
Avenue “like an inept chorus line,” singing “Hey, hey, LBJ, how many children were killed 
today?” Others headed for Times Square, marauding towards the armed forces’ recruiting booth 
on 43rd Street. “You’re a bunch of Communists,” one old man heckled, “take a bath!” Another 
 
2 “The F.P.A. at Fifty,” New York Times, November 14, 1967, p. 46; “50 Years of the FPA,” Washington Post, 
November 26, 1967, p. B6. 
3 “Rusk, Here, Renews Offer to Talk With Hanoi,” New York Times, November 15, 1967, p. 2. 
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bystander beat a demonstrator over the head with a newspaper. The protestors cheered when the 
tickers on the skyscrapers reported their actions as news; they booed when the name of Lyndon 
Johnson appeared. Members of Students for a Democratic Society then headed east, reaching 
Bryant Park. “We’re not demonstrating against Rusk,” one young man told two hundred more 
through a bullhorn. “We’re demonstrating against the Foreign Policy Association. We’re 
demonstrating against the American establishment, against the liberal fascists.”4  
Forty-six protestors were taken into custody that night, for resisting arrest, for 
harassment, and for incitement to riot. Five police were injured. A few days later, the Times 
reported that the protest was not just a random event, but the start of a new, more violent period 
in the antiwar movement, in which even nonviolent pacifists were prepared to form alliances 
with students organized into an active “resistance” undertaking direct, provocative action.5  
Scenes like these played out repeatedly as 1967 turned into 1968. A few weeks later, Rusk 
delivered another dinner speech, this time to the World Affairs Council of Northern California 
at the Fairmont Hotel in San Francisco. Again, protestors spilled a symbol of blood; again, fifty 
or so people were arrested; again, there were injuries everywhere.6 And, predictably, the foreign-
policy old guard was unimpressed with this display. The executive committee of the Association 
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met the day after Rusk’s gala speech, and noted that there had been “wide newspaper, TV and 
other news media coverage” of the dinner. “Unfortunately,” the minutes continued, “most reports 
focused on the demonstrations outside.”7  
A couple of weeks later, the Association’s vice-president, C. Dale Fuller, gave an 
interview to the Louisville Courier-Journal, to promote the seventh season of that city’s Great 
Decisions program. He held firm to the view that discussion offered Kentucky’s citizens a “more 
meaningful” way to influence foreign policy than rage, but even Fuller now openly wondered if 
that was, in fact, true. It may have been, he said, that “demonstrations on such foreign policy 
issues as Vietnam may have sprung up around the country because individuals believe they have 
no other way to change America’s stance.”8 And Fuller was not alone in lamenting the decline of 
a democratic foreign policy. “If we had had something like that really going on, a large part of 
the grief over Vietnam might have been alleviated,” the principal State Department architect of 
the cold war, Francis H. Russell, told an interviewer in retirement in 1973.9 Riots now ran where 
talk had faltered. 
As Russell hinted, the Vietnam War revealed a broader failure, without quite causing it. 
What was at stake here was not just public revulsion about a misguided intervention in the 
jungles of Southeast Asia, but the whole domestic basis of the first age of American global 
primacy. As Charles Maier has put it, what was going on in the late 1960s and the early 1970s 
was “the unraveling of the prior structures of American leadership.” This was true of the balance 
 
7 “Meeting of the Executive Committee,” November 15, 1967, FPA, Part II, Box 17. 
8 “Policy Association Favors Concern, Not Disorder,” Courier-Journal, November 29, 1967, p. A15. 




of power, true of the global economy, true of ideas and rhetoric, true even, as Maier wrote, of the 
“established channels of political representation.”10 And it was true, too, of the instruments that 
the American foreign policy elite had devised for securing their project at home. In truth, it had 
been true for some time. 
Why? Why did even citizen educators lose faith, let alone those who had always been 
more skeptical of their work, years before Vietnam made clear the extent of their failure? After 
all, it was their failure. While participatory politics flourished, whether as protests or as teach-ins 
or as community organizing, elite internationalism wilted under pressure. In too many places to 
ignore, World Affairs Councils had foundered soon after they were founded. In places like 
Cleveland, white flight to the suburbs proved ruinous for urban institutions that relied upon a 
white, wealthy public. In places like Los Angeles, voluntary-association models patterned on the 
small northeastern cities of the progressive era simply did not fit the geography of a sprawling, 
modern metropolis. And even in places where Councils had some success, like Philadelphia, San 
Francisco, and Chicago, fewer and fewer Americans seemed interested enough in foreign policy 
problems to engage on the terms that foreign policy institutions sought. 
 The precarity of the citizen education movement reflected an increasing ambivalence 
about democracy on the part of the foreign policy elite. Presidents and secretaries of state still 
insisted on the democratic nature of their diplomacy, still implored Americans to inform 
themselves and play their part, and indeed stepped up their funding for basic education in the 
name of the cold war. But the institutions that they had built to make their rhetoric a reality 
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were left to rot. The State Department’s public affairs staff was short on expertise, short on staff, 
and short on cash. Graduates of top-flight universities flocked to join the sprawling, secretive 
national-security state, and they took with them notably reserved views about the nature of the 
democracy they endeavored to protect. Behavioral political scientists had finally erected pluralist 
theories that downplayed the importance and even the possibility of widespread participation — 
even as their students united under the banner of participatory democracy afresh.11 This, as it had 
been earlier in the cold war, was not merely a theoretical project, but one that was worked out 
hand in hand with practice on the ground. 
 Even more than before, the mediator of many of these processes was philanthropy. The 
citizen education movement had been one of the central projects of American philanthropy for 
the fifty years after World War I. Name a major foundation, and it had supported the 
movement, from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund to the Carnegie 
Corporation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Given that the reach of the 
state in this area was always limited, it was primarily through foundations that the foreign policy 
elite expressed its political, spiritual, and financial concern for a democratic foreign policy. And it 
was through foundations that the balance of the foreign policy elite finally gave up on that 
concern. 
Having conceived of citizen education in world affairs as a core project from its founding, 
the Ford Foundation had held a direct and powerful position over the citizen education 
movement since 1953. After 1960 that power became ultimate. At the same time as various parts 
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of the sprawling foundation were promoting the social-scientific research that was doing so 
much to undermine the basic philosophical assumptions of the citizen education movement, its 
International Affairs division continued to extend its influence over the movement itself, and 
indeed briefly took something approaching direct management of it. 
Maintaining Ford grants became the first priority of the Foreign Policy Association; 
acquiring them became the first priority of the leading World Affairs Councils. Programs were 
reshaped around the tempers of Ford officials. Offhand comments were pored over as possible 
hints of what the opaque policymaking processes of a diffuse and often confused foundation 
might lead to. Even among the small number of people at Ford who controlled the dollars on 
which the movement relied, whether low-ranking grant officers or the lofty board of trustees, 
there was no consensus as to its value, aims, or progress. But everyone understood that if the 
Foundation vacated the citizen education field, the movement would cease to be a vital concern. 
For that reason, the story of the citizen education movement is told here primarily as the story of 
the Ford Foundation — not as a monolith, but as a contingent, contradictory actor wielding 
immense power over a subject that, as it admitted, it barely understood. 
 
* * * * * 
 
When Gabriel Almond sat down to write a foreword for the second edition of his wildly 
successful The American People and Foreign Policy in 1960, he was more optimistic than he had 
been a decade before. Back in 1950, the political scientist wrote, “it was necessary to conclude 
that American mass opinion in foreign affairs was a ‘mood’ reaction, shifting radically in response 
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to events.” No more. Since then, awareness of and attention to foreign policy had steadied. 
Higher education had grown the “attentive public.” Opinions were now more uniform, as a result 
of closing class divisions, declining immigration rates, and the “floor of information and 
communication” provided by a national mass media. Almond did not go so far as to say that a 
proper public had been built for American foreign policy, but did say that the public could no 
longer easily be blamed for the faults of American foreign policy, as he saw them.12 
 By the time Almond returned to his work on public opinion and foreign policy in 1960, 
the assumptions of traditional democratic theory that his research had helped to weaken in 1950 
had been fatally undermined. Take three areas of research that were particularly important to the 
citizen education movement. First, voluntary associations. The idea that America was uniquely a 
“nation of joiners,” as the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., had put it in 1944, gave the 
citizen education movement faith that Americans would participate in foreign policy either by 
joining world affairs groups or by increasing the amount of world affairs discussion that they 
engaged in elsewhere, whether their Rotaries, their unions, or their churches.13 And citizen 
educators took hope from research that showed that voluntary association membership was rising 
with affluence and education.14  
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started seeing signs of improvement in Gabriel A. Almond, “Public Opinion and National Security Policy,” Public 
Opinion Quarterly 20 (1956), pp. 371-378. For further evidence of improvement, see James N. Rosenau, The 
Attentive Public and Foreign Policy: A Theory of Growth and Some New Evidence (Princeton: Center of International 
Studies, 1968). 
13 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., “Biography of a Nation of Joiners,” American Historical Review 50 (1944), pp. 1-25. 
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But the overall intellectual tenor was downbeat, and by 1962 the leading expert on the 
subject, the sociologist Murray Hausknecht, could write in The Joiners that the voluntary 
association had “played its part,” and shortly would “not be a significant factor in American 
life.”15 The latest research showed that perhaps only a third of citizens were members of a 
voluntary association, and between just a fifth and a sixth were members of more than one 
voluntary association, and hence more likely to be involved in civic or political groups. Even if a 
person was a member of a voluntary association, the likelihood that she actively participated in 
that association’s activities was slim, new research found. Charles Wright and Herbert Hyman, 
the leading experts on the subject, concluded in 1958 that “these findings hardly warrant the 
impression that Americans are a nation of joiners.”16  
 Second, communications theorists had sharply curtailed their understanding of the 
efficacy of information. By this point, nobody seriously believed that insufficient information 
about politics was available to citizens. “A fair flow of information is accessible to almost everyone 
in the society,” wrote the University of Michigan sociologist Philip Converse in 1962, and “the 
fact that little attention is paid to it even though it is almost hard to avoid is a fair measure of 
lack of public interest.”17 But whereas scholars working in the immediate postwar period took 
solace from wartime studies that showed that attitudes could be shifted under laboratory 
conditions, psychologists now located the root of opinions unreachably deep within the 
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subconscious, and communications experts additionally emphasized the social, psychological, and 
technical barriers to effective communications in the real world.18 As Robert A. Dahl put it in 
1961, “the average citizen is remarkably deaf and blind to everything not of vital interest to him,” 
so much so that “a great flood of propaganda channeled through the mass media diminishes to a 
thin trickle when it encounters the desert of political indifference in which most citizens live out 
their lives.” Converse and his Survey Research Center (SRC) team showed in The American 
Voter, the summit of behavioral research on democracy, that the most alert Americans were also 
the most partisan and resistant to facts. “Political indifference,” Dahl concluded, surrounded 
everyone else “like impenetrable armor plate.”19 
 Third, and relatedly, sociologists had now abandoned the idea that anything connected 
the rare active citizen to the typical “passive citizen.”20 Whether in terms of “ideological patterns 
of belief” or “abstract conceptual frames of references,” Philip Converse wrote in a seminal 1964 
article, elite and mass worldviews were now thought to be so distinct as to be incommensurate. 
“Opinion leaders,” those mythical citizens who were thought in the postwar research to connect 
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the elite to the mass, probably did not exist at all, and if they did, they were unlikely to be 
effective outside very tight-knit social groups.21 “Very little information ‘trickles down’ very far,” 
Converse wrote, because very few people had enough intellectual structure to be able to process 
it, certainly not enough to qualify as “internationalist” or “isolationist,” even “liberal” or 
“conservative.”22 “Of any direct participation in this history of ideas and the behavior it shapes,” 
Converse concluded, “the mass is remarkably innocent.”23 
The theoretical basis of the citizen education movement had been torn apart. There was a 
more basic problem, too, in that political science as a discipline was increasingly premised on the 
assumption that the people could not govern. As Daniel Bessner and Nicolas Guilhot have 
argued, “between 1940 and 1960, decision-making had migrated from the margins to the center 
of political science,” in part because of the prevalence of nuclear weapons, but mostly because the 
public seemed incapable of taking decisions.24 This was above all true in international relations 
theory, as Judith Shklar saw in 1964, where realists placed hope in a rational, non-ideological 
elite capable of discerning the national interest, as against an irrational, ideological public 
incapable of doing the same.25 The very foundation of cutting-edge thinking about politics 
 
21 As two citizen educators in the Midwest found in 1959, “Our Foreign Policy Opinion Makers [i.e. opinion 
leaders] are an extremely small group. We surveyed an area in which over a million and a half people live and yet we 
turned up only a dozen people, or fifty at most.” See William C. Rogers and Barney Uhlig, “Small Town and Rural 
Midwest Foreign Policy Opinion Makers,” International Studies Quarterly 13 (1969), pp. 306-325. 
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therefore assumed a lesser role for the people. And scholars of public opinion followed suit, 
privileging the needs of the policymaker over the rights of the public. 
 The problem with this was that scholars found it almost impossible to pin down how 
public opinion worked in this new “process.” Bernard Cohen tried. As we have seen, in his early 
work on the citizen education movement he had already underlined the important of citizens 
being educated in ways legible to policymakers. In later work on public opinion, he moved ever 
further in that direction. “The aim of research in this area is to improve the nation’s policy 
product,” Cohen bluntly wrote in 1957.26 But once Cohen started to look at the policy process 
itself, it turned out that few involved thought about public opinion in a satisfactory or coherent 
way. “Officials simply do not think about public opinion very much or very explicitly,” Cohen 
wrote in 1972, even if the scholar thought that policy still followed public opinion in the end. 
The paradox was that “a policymaking system which has mastered all the modes of resistance to 
outside opinion,” he concluded, “nevertheless seems, from a long-run perspective, to 
accommodate it.”27 And once the component parts of a participatory public had been abandoned, 
Cohen was not alone in struggling to work out what public opinion was for. The political 
scientist V. O. Key, for instance, wrote in 1961 that “to speak with precision of public opinion is 
a task not unlike coming to grips with the Holy Ghost.”28 Ernest R. May, the historian, wrote 
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three years later that public opinion was less a spiritual matter than a literary one. “The fact is 
that there is almost no evidence to support the proposition that officeholders have to heed public 
opinion when deciding issues of foreign policy,” May wrote much as Cohen later would. Yet 
“American statesmen have traditionally thought themselves responsible to, and supported or 
constrained by, some sort of general will.” May resolved that “public opinion” was merely an 
invention, one needed “in order to cope with the chaos that is reality.”29 
 
* * * * * 
 
Foundation officials were not much interested in funding fiction, but nor were they ever 
completely in hock to the conclusions of academics. It took time to translate the new academic 
knowledge that foundations themselves funded into practical recommendations and grass-roots 
programs, a delay that was unsurprising considering that theorists were asking practitioners to 
overthrow basic and widely-held conceptions of how their polity worked.30 It helped that grass-
roots programs based on earlier theories seemed not to be working out. In the process, just as 
communities abroad became testing sites for modernization doctrines that relied on the elitist 
theory of democracy, so communities at home became testing sites for that same theory. 
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 This process of adaptation was mediated through philanthropy, and the Carnegie 
Endowment led the way. Led after the Alger Hiss debacle by the historian and former State 
Department official Joseph E. Johnson, the Endowment spent much of the mid-1950s on a 
massive project that assessed public attitudes towards the United Nations in more than a dozen 
countries. In the United States the project turned into a crucial site for discussions about how to 
apply contemporary social science to practice. The first of its two parts was a study group that 
met from the fall of 1953 to the spring of 1954, and was chaired by the former assistant secretary 
of state for public affairs, Edward W. Barrett. It brought representatives of State, the United 
Nations, and UNESCO together with foundation officers, voluntary association leaders, and 
academic specialists including Gabriel Almond, Bernard Cohen, and Paul Lazarsfeld. Supplied 
with précis of the latest research, the group concluded that “mass participation on a level of 
formal discussion seems an impossibly ambitious goal,” and that there was “no royal road to 
converting Americans to a deep interest in international affairs.”31 
  The reading group then morphed into a three-year study called “The U.S. Public and the 
UN.” Chaired by the former Ford Foundation president, Marshall Plan administrator, and Los 
Angeles World Affairs Council founder Paul G. Hoffman, it involved two former assistant 
secretaries for public affairs (Barrett and William Benton), the Sunday editor of the New York 
Times (Lester Markel), the presidents of Columbia (Grayson Kirk) and Stanford (J. E. Wallace 
 
31 Robert H. Cory, Communicating Information and Ideas about the United Nations to the American People (New York: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1955), pp. 45-52. Cory, the study group’s secretary, was a leading 
expert on United Nations information campaigns, and eventually concluded that they were a waste of time and 
resources as long as Americans continued to declare their support for the United Nations in the abstract. See Robert 
H. Cory, “Uniting Nationals in Support of the United Nations,” PhD thesis, Harvard University, 1951; Robert H. 
Cory, “Forging a Public Information Policy for the United Nations,” International Organization 7 (1953), pp. 229-
242; Robert H. Cory, “The Role of Public Opinion in United States Policies Toward the United Nations,” 
International Organization 11 (1957), pp. 220-227. 
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Sterling), and the former head of the domestic branch of the Office of War Information (E. 
Palmer Hoyt). Directed for a time by the New School political scientist Saul Padover, the project 
comprised repeated interviews of municipal elites in six cities, further elite interviews in seven 
cities, local sample surveys, national Survey Research Center polls, analysis of historical data, and 
experimental information programs. Sprawling to the extent that most of the research was never 
published, the effort grew so much that the Endowment could not afford to run it alone, relying 
on Ford to the tune of $148,000.32  
The Endowment’s project started from the study group’s conclusion that the public as a 
whole was too much to bother with. It would be unrealistic, “indeed fatuous,” to advocate mass 
programs because “‘public opinion,’ as such, is just too much to cope with,” Benton’s assistant 
told Padover.33 And Padover, reading the research to date, agreed. “Whence do people derive 
their information on which to base their vote on issues or give support to steps relating to foreign 
affairs,” he asked? “The answer is that they don’t.”34  
So, the Endowment asked whether “community leaders” could be convinced to act 
differently. It seemed not. The community leaders interviewed in cities across the country did fit 
the imagined template of the ideal citizen-statesmen: they were middle-aged, college-educated, 
politically-active “joiners.” And yet, the Endowment concluded, they were not remotely 
 
32 Ford Foundation Annual Report: October 1, 1954 to September 30, 1955 (New York: Ford Foundation, 1956), p. 79. 
For publications, see Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The United States Public and the United Nations 
(New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1958); Saul K. Padover, U.S. Foreign Policy and Public 
Opinion (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1958); William A. Scott and Stephen B. Withey, The United States 
and the United Nations: The Public View 1945–1955 (New York: Manhattan, 1958). 
33 John Howe to Padover, August 13, 1957, William Benton Papers, Special Collections Research Center, 
University of Chicago, Box 436. 
34 Padover, U.S. Foreign Policy and Public Opinion, p. 44. 
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“prepared to cope with the challenges required of Americans in the field of foreign affairs.” The 
typical community leader did not take in much information about the world. He was not likely to 
be a member of his local World Affairs Council, which he saw as too left-wing, too feminine, 
too full of “do-gooders.” He might read a book about international relations once in a while, or 
enjoy a speech at the Chamber of Commerce, but probably not. If he did, even he did not feel 
like he had any power over foreign affairs. He was for the UN, for internationalism, and for anti-
communism, but he was “not particularly foreign policy conscious.” As the average citizen was 
“bored by the whole subject” of foreign affairs, Padover concluded, leaders needed to step up. But 
they were not stepping up, and for that reason, they ought to be the target of all citizen education 
efforts.35 
 A second assessment from within the core of the citizen education network concluded 
similarly. The World Peace Foundation, based in Boston, had converted itself from a pacifist 
group to a think tank after World War II, and a prestigious one, chaired by the MIT scholar 
Max Millikan and including on its board two former Boston branch chairs of the Foreign Policy 
Association, Harvey H. Bundy and the serving secretary of state, Christian A. Herter. Its 
secretary was Alfred O. Hero, an international relations scholar who had served in the military 
occupation of Germany. An experienced citizen educator who served as the secretary of the 
Boston World Affairs Council, Hero sought to find academic justification for his elitist outlook, 
and oversaw the production of seven “Studies in Citizen Participation in International 
 




Relations,” dense books intended to outline the relevant social-scientific research for 
practitioners. Hero himself wrote four. 
 Even more than his peers, Hero set outlandishly high standards for the public. While the 
minimum expected of any citizen “should be to consider the international views of candidates as 
one major determinant of their voting choices,” Hero wrote, there was a further continuum on 
which everyone should be measured. Ideal citizens would show interest; they would possess 
information; they would be active; and they would assess the issues “in a logical or rational way.” 
If the ideal citizen displayed all four traits, he would be sympathetic to other cultures, understand 
interdependence, know that sovereignty was relative, support alliances and international 
organizations, eschew militarism, and not be seduced by easy solutions. But Hero thought such 
citizens were rare. 3% of Americans might be interested, informed, and active, although many 
even of these Americans were crippled by a “feeling of helpless inability to take effective action.” 
Only 1% of Americans, at best, were interested, informed, active, and rational. Even this 
diplomatic 1% would still equate to a foreign policy public of about a million people, a number 
considerably larger than the memberships of World Affairs Councils or the readership of Foreign 
Affairs would imply.36 
 What, then, to do? How to act upon these constructions of the public? The Endowment 
concluded that the citizen education movement should just preach to the converted, for “a 
preacher who neglected his parishioners would soon find himself without a congregation.”37 
 
36 Alfred O. Hero, Americans in World Affairs (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1959), pp. 2-11, 14, 21, 24, 44, 56, 
61, 65, 106; Alfred O. Hero, Mass Media and World Affairs (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1959), p. 33. 
37 Carnegie Endowment, The United States Public and the United Nations, pp. 42-44 
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Cohen agreed that the task at hand was to make the most of the “present structure of public 
interest and participation, which meant aiming “toward the upper socio-economic level and 
toward the occupational ‘aristocracy’,” advice that he knew was “uncomfortably regressive.”38 
Practitioners at the Minnesota World Affairs Center, doing similar research, concluded that “the 
fully informed man in the street who takes an active interest in world affairs is clearly a fiction,” 
and that the mass should be left alone, not “held up to scorn or ridicule.”39 
Hero himself argued strongly against anything but a concentration on a tiny elite. It 
would be difficult to “modify significantly the views of most Americans who already have 
formulated attitudes on world affairs,” Hero wrote, but it would be even harder to create 
opinions among the vast majority of Americans who lacked them in the first place. After all, 
communications theory taught that information was “mediated by the predispositions of the 
audience and their products — selective exposure, selective perception, selective learning, 
selective retention, and selective forgetting.” And even if information did by some miracle get 
through, most people did not, in Hero’s view, have the mental tools to understand it.40 As such, 
“the effects of even the most competent single ‘campaign’ will frequently be so small as to be 
 
38 Bernard C. Cohen, “Citizen Interest and Education in World Affairs: Some Further Thoughts,” May 10, 1957, 
FPA, Part II, Box 41; Bernard C. Cohen, The Influence of Non-Governmental Groups on Foreign Policy-Making 
(Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1959), p. 21. 
39 Robert W. Hattery, Carolyn P. Hattery, William C. Rogers, and Barbara Stuhler, A Midwest World Affairs 
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pp. 30-31. 
40 Alfred O. Hero, Mass Media and World Affairs (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1959), pp. 21-22. 
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unmeasurable by even the more sophisticated social scientific techniques.”41 The only viable 
option was to focus on the “atypical Americans” who were already interested in world affairs.42 
 
* * * * * 
 
The Foreign Policy Association had tried to work around the first wave of public opinion 
research, with Great Decisions being the result. But as much as one of its regional officials, 
Hilton Power, took issue with what he called “the fallacy of the one percent,” this second wave of 
research was far too powerful to wish away.43 Moreover, the second wave of scholarship was read 
and enacted by a citizen education movement already shifting away from mass approaches, in 
part because of its own involvement in the creation of that scholarship, but in part, too, for other 
reasons. 
One of these was that the Association recovered its national position after the Emeny 
calamity. With the Association’s old ally John D. Rockefeller III briefly holding its vice-
chairmanship, and with the prestige of its Ford grants, it regained access to the policymaking 
class. During the Eisenhower administration, George Perkins left the board to become 
permanent representative to NATO, and James D. Zellerbach quit for the embassy in Italy. 
Arthur Goldberg became John F. Kennedy’s secretary of labor, and Roswell Gilpatric his deputy 
 
41 Alfred O. Hero, Opinion Leaders in American Communities (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1959), p. 48. 
42 Alfred O. Hero, Voluntary Organizations in World-Affairs Communication (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 
1960), p. 106. 
43 Hilton Power, “Let’s Stop Talking About It,” in Leonard Freedman and Hilton Power, The Few and the Many: 
Two Views on Public Affairs Education (Chicago: Center for the Study of Liberal Education for Adults, 1963), p. 16. 
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secretary of defense. Moving the other way came Dillon Anderson, who had been Eisenhower’s 
national security advisor, and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the former ambassador to the United 
Nations, future vice-presidential candidate, and ambassador to South Vietnam.44  
While the names of such board members give a sense of the increased standing of the 
Association, however, the sociology of a non-profit board should not be confused with the way it 
is actually governed.45 Rockefeller aside, only a few luminaries actively involved themselves in the 
Association’s work, and those who did initially found their influence limited. James B. Conant, 
the erstwhile president of Harvard and retired ambassador to West Germany, chaired the 
program committee for a while, but did little.46 Far more effective was his replacement on that 
committee, Robert R. Bowie. Bowie was an acolyte of John J. McCloy who had served in the 
occupying government of Germany and risen to become the director of policy planning at the 
State Department. A legal scholar, Bowie left State in 1957 to found Harvard’s Center for 
International Affairs with Henry Kissinger, and while the two of them sought to further 
knowledge and create the “men” who would make it there, they also committed their Center to a 
“well-informed and mature public opinion,” if only as “an instrument of foreign policy and a 
 
44 “Executive Committee,” March 18, 1955, FPA, Part II, Box 16; “Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of 
Directors,” December 13, 1956, FPA, Part II, Box 16; “Foreign Policy Association-World Affairs Center 1960-
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46 “FPA Program Committee: Summary of Meeting December 3, 1957,” FPA, Part II, Box 40; “FPA Program 
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limitation upon it.” In line with that belief, Bowie took a notably active, voluntary role at the 
Association, drawing on his policymaking experience and pushing it to aim for elites.47 
Under the influence of Bowie and others, the Association slowly moved away from its 
more progressive goals. When it applied for new Ford funding in May 1960, it projected a move 
towards “the education of the leaders of selected communities (as contrasted with the education 
of as many persons as possible within selected communities which is the continuing goal of 
‘Great Decisions’).”48 Roger Mastrude, the staff’s most committed populist, stopped working on 
Great Decisions and concentrated on programs for management at companies like the Sandia 
Corporation, voluntary association staffs members including at the National Council of Catholic 
Women and the National Council of Churches, and even labor union leaders at the United Auto 
Workers.49 So certain that political science could be proven wrong just a few years earlier, that 
the “middle 50%” of the people could be reached, in 1961 John Nason wrote in Adult Leadership 
that the movement was now once again “fumbling for an adequate conceptual scheme or 
 
47 Center for International Affairs, The Program of the Center For International Affairs (Cambridge: Center for 
International Affairs, 1958), p. 2, On Bowie, see Andrew McFadzean, “The Bigger Picture: Biography and/or 
History? Robert Bowie,” Australasian Journal of American Studies 22 (2003), pp. 41-63; Robert R. Bowie and Richard 
H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped and Enduring Cold War Strategy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998). 
48 “Notes on Future Program Activities of the FPA-WAC,” May 20, 1960, FF, FA732C, Grant 56-117, Reel 4159; 
“Request to the Ford Foundation from the Foreign Policy Association–World Affairs Center,” May 2, 1960, FF, 
FA732C, Grant 56-117, Reel 4159. 
49 Note that Mastrude remained highly doubtful that “leaders” could be found in the wild; hence his focus on 
“intensive work” through specific institutions. Roger G. Mastrude, “Comments on Leadership Groups for World 
Affairs Education,” April 13, 1962, FPA, Part II, Box 224; Mastrude, “Planning Paper, Field Services,” April 8, 
1963, FPA, Part II, Box 28. 
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framework within which to pursue our objectives.” If the “end target” was the “average citizen,” 
as Nason still hoped, he was pursued with increasing defensiveness.50 
 It took a change of leadership to force the issue, and to bring social science to bear on this 
broad, grass-roots trend. Although Ford had long plotted to remove Nason, he left only in 
January 1962, for the presidency of his alma mater, Carleton College.51 It took until August for 
the Association to find a replacement. And when it did, its selection represented the final 
triumph of the new political science, and all it taught, over progressive idealism. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Samuel P. Hayes, Jr., was the representative of everything the Association had been grappling 
with for two decades. After finishing a doctorate in psychology on voting patterns in the 1932 
presidential election at Yale in 1934, he spent a postdoctoral year at Harold Lasswell’s University 
of Chicago, taught psychology at Mount Holyoke and economics at Sarah Lawrence, and 
eventually worked at a New York advertising agency under George Gallup.52 An avowed 
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advocate of the use of surveys in public policy, and of the uses of social science (and social 
scientists) more generally, he headed into the government during the war, working mostly in the 
Foreign Economic Administration.53 Turning down the RAND Corporation, he joined the 
State Department, and helped to implement the Marshall Plan, Point Four, and the Mutual 
Security Agency.54 Later, he would write a blueprint for the Peace Corps and help to found 
USAID.55 But, crucially, in between his service in the Truman and the Kennedy administrations, 
Hayes had moved to Ann Arbor. An untenured professor at the University of Michigan, Hayes 
taught in the economics department and was the founding director of both the Foundation for 
Research on Human Behavior and the Center for Research on Economic Development, models 
for the application of social science to specific social problems. Both of those research units lived 
under the umbrella of the Institute for Social Research, a pioneering facility which was headed by 
the social psychologist Rensis Likert. Hayes and Likert hit it off, becoming co-authors and 
friends.56 And Likert was not only a guiding light of the behavioral revolution in social science, 
but headed the institution whose statistical surveys had done so much to undermine traditional, 
progressive conceptions of democracy, the Survey Research Center.57 
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 As soon as he arrived in New York, Hayes started interrogating the Association’s 
programs in light of behavioral science, far more thoroughly than his predecessors ever had.58 
Indeed, Hayes reconceived the Association’s entire purpose in those terms, using the fighting 
words of decisionism and academic realism. As his first redraft of the Association’s principles 
stated, the Association would aim  
to advance the national interest of the United States by improving the quality and 
increasing the influence of its foreign policy decisions thru heightened popular 
understanding of foreign policy and thru wider and more effective participation in 
the making of national decisions on foreign policy. 
 
It would concentrate on “major problem areas and underlying issues of foreign policy,” not 
“world affairs activities in general,” like cultural exchanges or public diplomacy.59 It would do 
more to ensure that opinions were not only based on knowledge, but expressed to the relevant 
policymakers.60 It would concentrate on “high-leverage groups” that were able to transmit 
opinions to officials or to the public. And that would mean that the “general public” was the least 
important of all its targets.61  
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Such plans gained approval from a group of foundation officers, organization leaders, and 
social scientists that Hayes convened in April 1963, including Alfred Hero and Angus 
Campbell.62 “General education of ‘attentive public’ was recognized as tremendous task,” Hayes 
noted, and questions were raised about the Association setting itself the “hardest task” of 
reaching “non-habituals” who were not used to active citizenship. “Considerable doubt was 
expressed,” moreover, about the “feasibility or desirability of general public reaching ‘decisions’ 
on specific foreign policy issues.” Campbell, Hayes’ old friend from Ann Arbor, pointed out that 
it was hard to prove how even the leaders who ought to be the Association’s main target might 
influence decision-making, let alone anyone else.63 In discussions through late 1963 and early 
1964, the Association’s board came to think likewise, as much for practical as for theoretical 
reasons. “While all present agreed that it would be desirable to educate the ‘masses’ on foreign 
policy,” the minutes of the executive committee revealed in October 1963, “it was generally 
recognized that ‘operationally’ this posed insurmountable problems.”64 
 By April 1964, Hayes had finally brought together behavioral political science and citizen 
education, and on the terms of the former, not the latter. In a strategy document that cited 
Gabriel Almond, Bernard Cohen, Alfred Hero, V. O. Key, and more of their peers, Hayes 
accepted an understanding of public opinion that privileged the state, defining it, following Key, 
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as “those opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed.”65 It 
followed that efforts to improve the quality of public opinion had therefore to be related to 
policymaking processes, which in turn dictated a focus on the Americans who were most active 
and influential within them. As such, Hayes thought it was folly to waste resources on the 90% 
of Americans who were politically passive, or on the 80% of Americans who paid little attention 
to politics. Instead, the Association would make its primary target those 6 or 7 million 
politically-active Americans who were not already interested in foreign policy, and its secondary 
target those 4 or 5 million Americans both already active and already interested in foreign policy. 
It would subsidize programs for the former, and expect the latter to pay. 
For Hayes, trying to reach Almond’s “attentive public” more broadly would be inefficient, 
because reaching those who paid attention but were not active would not have much utility. Nor 
would it be feasible or even desirable to bring about a “better informed and analytical mass public 
opinion, for  
the size of the ‘inattentive inactive’ majority is so great, the interest and attention 
aroused in it by foreign affairs treatment in the media so low, the competition of 
other stimuli and interests so strong, and the possibility of reaching the majority of 
the electorate through voluntary organizations so limited, that it would be far 
beyond FPA’s financial capabilities. 
 
Gone completely was the Newton Baker’s hope that every man, woman, and child might be in 
reach. Gone, too, was John Nason’s faith in the “middle 50%.” Hayes believed that only a sliver 
 
65 Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, p. 14. 
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of Americans could now possibly be brought into a democratic foreign policy. One hundred 
million Americans would be left on their own.66 
 What this meant in practical terms was a new concentration on leadership groups, 
balanced by continuing budgetary limitations. Take the 1963-64 season, the first over which 
Hayes had any real sway. Great Decisions remained the largest program, although it was now 
targeted not at the broad public it had initially been intended for, but at a much more exclusive 
public, the Association’s primary target of “inattentive actives.” It boasted programs developed by 
National Educational Television, and more of an effort was being made to set up conferences for 
participants and their congressional representatives. But the rest of the Association’s activities 
concentrated on those prepared to pay their own way, including a revival of the New York 
luncheons, the continuation of a speakers’ series for women, and the founding of Associates of 
FPA, a fundraising initiative which provided speakers like undersecretary of defense Roswell 
Gilpatric, Peace Corps director Sargent Shriver, and Pitney-Bowes chairman Walter H. Wheeler 
to a wealthy coterie of benefactors. 
Several programs were remnants of the World Affairs Center, a quasi-independent effort 
to lend some measure of coordination to the citizen education movements that the Association 
had organized in 1957 at the behest of several foundations. Operating from Carnegie 
Endowment facilities just across the road from the United Nations, the Center had a bookshop, 
an auditorium, and conference rooms, and it served as a clearinghouse for content and 
programming for voluntary associations. Its work was cut back in 1961, but a few of its programs 
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still operated. The most important of these took advantage of the tourist traffic passing through 
the halls of the United Nations via a Community Leaders Program held every Friday when the 
Assembly was in session. Clutching invitations issued by the U.S. ambassador, fifty or so local 
notables at a time heard briefing from members of the U.S. mission, had lunch at the 
Association, and visited the UN to witness its proceedings. Hailing mostly from business and 
industry, many of the participants came from the northeast but plenty came from further afield. 
If unambitious educationally, programs like these at least helped the Association raise increasing 
funds from corporate interests, which now contributed 16% of a million-dollar income propped 
up by foundations to the tune of 50%.67 
There were, however, several problems with this program. Set aside, for the moment, 
normative concerns about target audiences, and the troubling social limits of a program designed 
for an educated white elite in the midst of the civil rights movement. Set aside, too, the fact that 
the Association remained financially precarious, as, after the failure of its fortieth birthday 
celebrations to raise a significant endowment, it faced mortal risks from foundation cuts or any 
kind of economic instability. Viewed only on its own terms, the Association’s reoriented vision 
for the citizen education movement faced two significant challenges. One was that it had lost 
faith in, and practically abandoned, a World Affairs Council network crumbling in the face of 
critical funding pressures. But more crucially, its new focus on the impact of public opinion on 
the policymaking process depended on convincing the public that its opinions mattered. It 
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depended on that policymaking process being open to public opinion, being formalized in some 
way. But the structures that would have made that so were derelict. 
 
* * * * * 
 
On February 1, 1962, three members of the Foreign Policy Association’s board, and one of its 
staff, walked into the Oval Office. President Kennedy welcomed them with his usual warmth. 
He posed for photos. He flicked through a Great Decisions kit, and, if he was paying attention, 
might have seen articles on Berlin, Iran, and Vietnam. As the Association’s representatives told 
the New York Times, the president gave them “great encouragement” in their mission.68 
It seemed like a vote of confidence, one that recalled a time when the leaders of the 
Association had enjoyed easy access to the very top of the government. But it was just a photo 
call, no more. And if it meant anything at all, it meant crisis, not confidence. 
The idea came from Chester Bowles. After Kennedy fired Bowles as undersecretary of 
state late in 1961, he had been demoted to ambassador-at-large and tasked as a troubleshooter. 
And trouble this former public relations pioneer found. Forget the “bomber gap” or the “missile 
gap,” Bowles was much more concerned about the “information gap.” There was, Bowles told 
the president in January 1962, a “dangerous” mismatch between the “harsh, complex realities 
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with which Washington policymakers must grapple and the generally limited understanding of 
these realities by most Americans, including the press and Congress.”69 
 After consultations with staff at the Association and elsewhere, Bowles submitted an 
eighteen-page critique of administration information policies.70 “I have been struck,” the 
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ambassador wrote, “by the immensity of the problem and the tremendous effort that will be 
needed to do anything meaningful about it.” A “positive effort to reach the average citizen where 
he lives” was needed, but secretary of state Dean Rusk had inherited a Bureau of Public Affairs 
wholly unfit for purpose. The Bureau had a budget of $1.4 million, a minuscule appropriation 
compared to the $35 million that the Defense Department dedicated to public relations. $31,000 
was available for publications. Nothing was available to provide material for television and radio. 
The departments of defense, agriculture, interior, even the Bureau of Reclamation had film 
programs, but State had not one reel available for distribution. The Pentagon assigned four 
officers to liaise with Hollywood; State, none.71 State’s speakers bureau was “essentially a one-
woman operation,” and she came nowhere close to fulfilling public demand. Unqualified foreign 
service officers were put out to pasture where public relations professionals once thrived. This 
was a desperate situation. Bowles urged Kennedy to help State recover the glory days of its 
campaigns for the United Nations and the Marshall Plan.72 
 How far the State Department had fallen, and how fast. Despite the temptations of 
outright propaganda, at the end of World War II the department had committed itself to dealing 
with the public in what Dean Acheson had called a “two-way” relationship through the Office of 
Public Affairs and the Division of Public Liaison. That rather open commitment quickly gave 
way to purer forms of public relations, however, as policymakers sought to build support for the 
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cold war and blurred the line between the information campaigns they ran at home and the 
propagandistic psychological warfare they waged abroad.73 But the line still existed, both in the 
minds of the information specialists themselves, which meant they tried not to oversell the cold 
war, and in the minds of the congressmen who oversaw them.74 Republican majorities placed 
strict limits on State’s domestic powers in the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, compounding worries 
about progressive-era laws that banned the use of appropriated funds being spent to influence 
Congress, and they threatened to dismantle the Division of Public Liaison and even the harmless 
Bulletin.75 The Office’s funding therefore always remained limited. While the government spent 
$115 million on overseas information programs in 1952, its appropriation for the Division of 
Public Liaison was just $250,000.76 
 State Department operatives therefore turned to mediate their work through compliant 
state-private networks, making it seem more spontaneous, voluntary, and democratic than full-
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on propaganda.77 Just as they had with the United Nations, they outsourced their campaigns to 
promote the Marshall Plan and NSC-68 to nominally independent groups led by trusted former 
officials.78 Mass media cooperation was easily acquired as networks sought cheap ways to fulfil 
their public service missions, and the shows that resulted — like CBS’s World Briefing and 
Diplomatic Pouch — gave the impression of accountability while remaining tightly controlled by 
policymakers.79 Journalists eagerly swung behind official views, primed as they were by their 
shared boys’ club culture, their pack reporting methods, and the uncompetitive structure of the 
newspaper industry.80 Information was walled off from the public through secrecy classification, a 
“more palatable method of securing secrets than the antidemocratic censorship of speech or 
publication,” as Sam Lebovic has written.81 What was shared, and in what ways, was a process 
guided by assumptions brought over from advertising and psychological warfare, by the research 
of social scientists, and by the polling information that State created and collated.82 
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 Even so, the question of how far the public would participate in foreign policy remained 
contested and unresolved throughout the Truman administration. State’s Division of Public 
Liaison continued to promote more participatory means of interaction. Starting in 1947, it 
expanded its wartime conferences for voluntary associations into multi-day, off-the-record 
National Conferences on U.S. Foreign Policy featuring speeches by the secretary and roundtables 
with assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs.83 It held regional conferences in partnership with 
local groups, including World Affairs Councils, at which senior policymakers addressed 
audiences of activists, businessmen, and academics, on the trickle-down assumption that, as one 
memo put it, they “returned to their communities after first-hand contact with Department 
officers to continue to work of explaining and stimulating interest in the Government’s and the 
Department’s conduct of foreign policy.”84 In 1952, the Division kept close ties to about 400 
outside organizations, and looser contacts with 800 more. It ran 66 special meetings for 
voluntary associations, and State officers gave five outside speeches per day. A small army 
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answered mail addressed to the department and the White House, which together received 
145,000 “personally signed, intelligent communications from the public.”85 
Institutionally, however, neither the Office of Public Affairs nor the Division of Public 
Liaison was ever secure in the Truman administration. Public affairs officials barely had access to 
the assistant secretaries of state who oversaw them, let alone other policymakers. William 
Benton, George V. Allen, Edward Barrett, and Howland Sargeant each in turn concentrated his 
time and money on overseas propaganda. The Hoover Commission of 1949 warned that “neither 
the ‘top command’ level nor the Public Affairs units are presently organized to deal with public 
opinion in an adequate manner,” and criticized the failure to link public affairs products and staff 
to leading officials.86 Office of Public Affairs director Francis H. Russell repeatedly complained 
that his office was being sidelined, that it was underfunded and understaffed, and that “ignorance 
within the Department about PA’s function” had made it “ineffective.”87 Howard A. Cook, the 
former director of the World Affairs Council of Northern California and Russell’s successor at 
State, wrote in October 1952 that there remained “a lack of appreciation and understanding of 
PA’s function within the Department and methods by which it achieves its purposes.”88 A few 
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years later, the marketing maven and psychological warrior C. D. Jackson told a potential recruit 
that explaining foreign policy to the American people was “the zeroest of zero jobs.”89 
Nobody doubted that foreign policy was formulated with public opinion in mind. The 
problem was, as one State Department officer told Russell, that “PA plays a relatively modest 
role in this process which goes on anyway.”90 It was therefore easily set aside. Despite the verbal 
support that Eisenhower and Dulles gave to the citizen education movement, they and their 
Republican congressional majority that supported it were intent on budget cuts. The 
administration’s first assistant secretary for public affairs, Carl McCardle, slashed $430,000 and 
53 staff from the Office of Public Affairs in his first budget, halving its personnel from 1951 
levels. Although McCardle, a journalist for the Philadelphia Bulletin, had served on the board of 
the Association’s Philadelphia branch, he abolished the Division of Public Liaison and, in the 
process of forming a new Public Services Division, radically downsized the conference, 
publication, and speaking programs.91 Cook responded by giving the public a less capacious 
impression of the role of private citizens and voluntary associations in foreign policy than Russell 
ever had, but he still complained about the decline in State’s capabilities.92 In September 1955, 
he told McCardle that “valuable platforms and forums have been wasted because the 
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Department as a whole does not fully understand the value of presenting Department officers to 
the American public.”93 
At the same time as McCardle curtailed the State Department’s ability to speak, he also 
covered its ears. McCardle halved the staff of H. Schuyler Foster’s public studies office in 1953, 
and his successor, Andrew Berding, stripped the political scientist of his ability to commission 
opinion polls from the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) during a very minor scandal 
in 1957. Having accidentally discovered that State had been illegally funding its own polls since 
1944, through an appropriation for “emergencies in the diplomatic and consular service,” 
Congressmen were predictably angry. But the real story was just how little the State Department 
cared. Berding capitulated immediately; John Foster Dulles did not trust polls in any case. Clyde 
Hart, who ran the operation at NORC, told the House that the classified polls were “entirely too 
niggardly an operation,” an impoverished exercise that had cost barely half a million dollars in 
thirteen years. Nobody read them; nobody needed them; nobody missed them.94 And while the 
loss of the polls made little difference to the State Department’s operations, the loss of a primary 
technology through which the public was represented at Foggy Bottom was a sign that the 
department was abandoning its public affairs functions. The public studies staff was halved again 
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in 1961. It ceased its regular public opinion reports in 1963, and the reports it wrote on request 
were reduced in scope.95 By 1965, it comprised Foster alone.96 
 At the heart of all this were policymakers who held increasingly transactional views about 
the public. The tone was set from the top. John Foster Dulles, once a keen supporter of the 
citizen education movement and a longstanding member of the Foreign Policy Association, 
sought to rescue the State Department’s dreadful public reputation by centering attention on 
himself, and saw public relations mostly as media relations. His assistant secretaries of state for 
public affairs were little more than press aides.97 Dwight Eisenhower, who as a private citizen 
played a major role in the Crusade for Freedom and whose presidential campaign relied on 
advertising executives, thought about the public primarily in commercial terms, as the consumers 
of foreign policy products sold by his administration.98 This idea inspired a series of initiatives, 
either in partnership with private industry or put together by psychological warriors at the new 
United States Information Agency, which specialized in disguising schemes to market 
international affairs for domestic audiences as cultural diplomacy.99 
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Crucially, programs like the Atoms for Peace and People-to-People campaigns did not 
just embody denatured visions of popular participation as branding, as spectacle, as consumption; 
they actively diverted the attention of the citizen education movement at the same time as the 
State Department left it to fend for itself. Brooks Emeny, for instance, chaired the foreign affairs 
committee of the People-to-People campaign, and travelled around the Middle East, Southeast 
Asia, and Africa on USIA-funded tours in the late 1950s.100 World Affairs Council volunteers 
loved to host and house foreign visitors, whether through government initiatives, informal 
collaboration with Washington, or their own programs. The Dallas Council hosted 200 visitors 
per year through the State Department’s Foreign Leader Program; the Cleveland Council aided 
an estimated 5,000 visitors and international students in the decade after 1947.101  
Cultural activities like these, though popular and important, took up scarce resources and 
pushed aside older ideas about participation. Obvious on the ground, this was clear, too, in books 
on democracy and foreign policy. Compare Dorothy Fosdick’s Common Sense and World Affairs 
(1955), perhaps the last such book from the progressive tradition, with Andrew Berding’s 
Foreign Affairs And You! (1962), and the difference is stark. Like Fosdick, Berding instructed his 
readers to read the New York Times and even to join a World Affairs Council, but his book ended 
with a paean to other, less direct means of participation. Citizens could contribute most, he 
wrote, by welcoming an exchange student, by helping civic leaders find a sister city abroad, by 
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buying a ticket to see a touring orchestra — by acting as a citizen soldier in the global war for 
hearts and minds, rather than by debating the fundamental nature of U.S. foreign policy itself.102 
While the Kennedy administration offered the American people innovative ways to get 
involved with world affairs, not least the Peace Corps, it also tried to recover lost ground.103 Dean 
Rusk’s State Department increased the budget of the now-Bureau of Public Affairs to $1.75 
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Figure 8. Secretary of State Dean Rusk (l) and Samuel P. Hayes, Jr., at a Waldorf Astoria luncheon on 
November 21, 1962, at which Rusk was the guest speaker. FPA, Part II, Box 285. 
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million in 1964. It started to doubt trickle-down theory, and questioned its reliance on the mass 
media. It expanded its regional conferences, sending officials from the secretary down to meet 
with community leaders, embedding junior officers in cities for several days, and partnering with 
the few Councils now capable of mounting such endeavors.104 Rusk had refused to fund the 
Association as president of the Rockefeller Foundation, but as secretary of state he endorsed it 
frequently, vouching for it when its Ford grants came up for renewal, and supported funding that 
helped World Affairs Councils to pay the expenses of traveling foreign service officers, who 
otherwise had to pay their own way in order to address the public.105  
 But it was too late. By then, the citizen education movement was in trouble, as the State 
Department, the foundations, and the citizen education institutions steadily drifted apart. One 
reason for this was the failure of policymakers to maintain their commitments to a “two-way” 
democracy in foreign policy. But a lack of attention from policymakers only worsened the 
developing situation on the ground. As a prescient citizen educator in Cleveland had written as 
early as 1953, “unless we find ways to relate the educational groups to the actual processes of 
policy formulation and implementation, their growth will be stopped and perhaps they will even 
wither away.”106 
 
* * * * * 
 
104 Chittick, “The domestic information activities of the Department of State,” pp. 74-78, 156-170; E. S. Staples, 
“Discussion at State Department concerning citizens’ education in world affairs, December 3, 1964,” December 9, 
1964, FF, FA 582, Box 8. 
105 Text of statement recorded by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, December 26, 1962, FPA, Part II, Box 50; Rusk to 
Hayes, January 3, 1965, FPA, Part II, Box 17; Rusk to McGeorge Bundy, November 16, 1966, FF, FA617, Box 37. 




As white middle- and upper-class Clevelanders left the city limits for the suburbs and recast the 
rhythms in which they lived their lives, and as urban renewal projects failed to stem the tide, the 
Cleveland Council on World Affairs drifted into trouble.107 After Brooks Emeny departed for 
New York in 1947, the Council had gathered momentum under the leadership of the adult 
education specialist Shepherd Witman. Witman had retained his progressive spirit while others 
lost theirs, insisting that “no problem of world affairs is too difficult for any citizen to see,” and 
that community education simply required “confidence and faith in man, and the patience which 
this requires.”108 By 1950, the Council was reaching an estimated 125,000 people with 1,215 
events, a total that underestimated its reach in the city, given its radio programs and its speakers’ 
training clinics.109  
Patience wore thin, however. Budget deficits piled up. Witman spent more time away, 
coming up with projects separate from his Ohio work. As staff members were plucked from 
Cleveland to replicate their work elsewhere, those who remained in Ohio revolted early in 1954, 
complaining of a refusal to face the limitations of Witman’s community approach.110 
“Sometimes,” one of their memos said, “I wonder whether we are not simply creating in the 
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name of mass citizen education an elaborate system of filling stations from which the local 
consumer chooses his brand of gas and oil and then has absolutely no clear idea of where to drive 
the contraption.”111 When the Council surveyed its members for the first time, in January 1955, 
it discovered that 89.8% of them earned more than the national median wage, and 22% earned 
more than $25,000, five times that average.112 
When Witman offered his resignation at the end of that month, the Council came under 
the control of the chairman of its board, Kenyon C. Bolton. Son of the local congresswoman, 
Frances P. Bolton, Bolton quickly added titans of local industry to the board, and set about 
turning the Council from what he said was a “wishy-washy” group, easily dubbed “cream-puff” 
and “pink,” into a “virile, masculine” forum for business elites.113 Bolton ploughed tens of 
thousands of dollars of his own money into growing the membership, and board members 
publicly accused him of running a “one-man” show to the benefit of his own political career.114 
Association officials quietly discussed the matter in December 1955, worrying that the Cleveland 
Council was “tending to depart from the community education idea to work more with the elite,” 
and the Association’s regional staff feared the threat to the Council movement as a whole if its 
model “turns into a façade.” Bolton held out, though, and hired as his paid director Benjamin 
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Brown, a former official at the U.S. mission to the UN who ended community discussion groups 
and focused on big-ticket events.115  
Brown’s successor, Donald J. Pryor, likewise overturned Witman’s faith, writing in 1959 
that “to expect universal and detailed familiarity with world problems would be foolish.” But 
even as Brown and Pryor increased the budget in a failed search for the interested and involved 
elite, Bolton could not adequately broaden the financial base or meet fundraising targets. That 
left the Council with a considerably less ambitious program.116 The membership shrank, bank 
debts rose troublingly to cover costs, and the Association looked sadly at a Council in “serious ill-
health.”117 In 1961, Pryor told the Adult Education Association that “we do not pretend that we 
are successful; we know that we are not.”118 
Pryor remained hopeful, but the pattern played out elsewhere. World Affairs Councils 
faced what seemed to be insurmountable problems almost as soon as the movement hit its stride, 
and neither mass nor elite approaches proved satisfying. Take San Francisco. Since the arrival of 
Calvin J. Nichols as director in 1955, the World Affairs Council of Northern California had 
renewed its traditional emphasis on study and discussion groups for its members, explicitly 
intending to impact policy debates. With a membership of 3-4,000 served by a staff of ten, 
Nichols drew praise for trying to turn his group into a Council on Foreign Relations for the 
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West, albeit one slightly more rooted in public debate.119 Despite the restrained vision and the 
largest budget in the nation, one that doubled in real terms from $91,500 in 1955 to almost 
$200,000 by 1962, the Council still confronted persistent financial difficulties and lived in fear of 
cutbacks. Even successful Councils remained chronically unstable, sustained by the energies, and 
the cash, of a committed few.120 
Pressures on the ground put immense strain on the unity of the movement. An already 
tense relationship between the Association and the Councils it had birthed devolved into 
animosity after 1955, as the Association sought a mass public through Great Decisions at the 
same time as the Councils sought an elite base to right their finances — sometimes in the same 
city. As the weak cooperative structures that had maintained comity during the Fund for Adult 
Education grants were set aside, the Association saw no point in spending scant resources on 
Councils. Roger Mastrude, the Association’s vice-president, came to believe that the Council 
model was applicable only in a few mid-sized cities, and that there were perhaps “five good 
councils doing a fairly effective job of community-wide education” by 1958.121 A viable Council 
required significant private wealth behind it, help from the local business community, knowledge 
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and enthusiasm amongst activists, an interested public to build on, and competent leadership as 
expert in community affairs as in world affairs. In few places had this proven possible.122 
As the network frayed, the most vocal dissent came not from the weaker Councils, but 
the strongest. Rejected for grants by Ford and Carnegie, and facing a problem of “great urgency,” 
Calvin Nichols turned to New York for assistance.123 At a meeting of six Council directors 
hosted by the Association in May 1959, the representatives reported common difficulties finding 
sufficient local support for any kind of satisfactory program.124 Spurned by the Association, the 
Councils formed an ad hoc committee to approach the foundations, but their inquiries went 
nowhere precisely because, as local community groups, they had divergent needs and outlooks.125 
Lacking the funds even to travel on their own dime, the directors stopped meeting. While the 
Association tried to improve its relationship with the Councils, chiefly by holding conferences on 
subjects of mutual interest in 1961, the tension only grew.126 
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Amid the gathering crisis all eyes turned to Ford. Subject to the same forces of state 
doubts, philosophical attacks, and grass-roots frustration, however, Ford’s staff itself became 
increasingly ambivalent about what it privately called a “difficult and baffling field.”127 The 
foundation renewed its grants to the Association in December 1960, continuing one of the 
International Affairs division’s largest ongoing programs and stretching philanthropic support of 
citizen education in world affairs into its fourth decade.128 Although that grant was reduced from 
the 1956 sums to $1.5 million over four years — a cut that, among other things, forced the 
Association to end its central speakers bureau, further unraveling the movement — Ford 
remained committed to citizen education in the abstract.129 Led by John J. McCloy, the scion of 
the foreign policy establishment, the trustees recommitted the foundation in a statement of July 
1962 to “efforts to increase American understanding of and participation in world affairs.”130  
Nichols and the other Council directors tried again that year, pitching a request for $1.5-
2 million that would be spent turning the major Councils into regional rather than merely urban 
centers.131 Such a sum was fantastical, so Nichols instead asked Ford for a small grant to make a 
study of the Councils and their needs.132 Stanley Gordon, the grant officer who had grudging 
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responsibility for the foundation’s citizen education programs, was not keen on the idea. “My 
guess is that the survey will not reveal a new promising opportunity,” he wrote; “I hope I’m 
wrong.”133 But Gordon had been unhappy with the Association’s relationship with the Councils 
for years, and approved the study.134 Shortly thereafter, Ford started its own internal evaluation, 
led by a political scientist and Democratic party operative, Matthew Cullen.135 
 For the six years between 1962 and 1968, the citizen education movement became in 
effect the plaything of the Ford Foundation, subject to shifting balances of power within its New 
York offices, to the will of its major policymakers, to the specific choices it made in how to 
evaluate the movement, and to whom it chose to do the evaluating. All eyes were on the 
secretive, opaque processes of its decisions, and the prospect that the foundation might bail 
citizen educators out; programs were reshaped according to its perceived whims. Ford’s 
relationship with the movement, and with the Association in particular, became proprietary in a 
way and on a scale that not even the Rockefeller Foundation’s had been twenty years earlier. 
Repeatedly invoking the line that “if the FPA did not exist, it would have to be invented,” Ford’s 
grant officers and trustees understood that their money was a matter of life and death to the 
Association. What it chose to do when faced with this crisis had enormous ramifications not just 
on budgets and programs, but on the very idea and pursuit of a democratic foreign policy.136 
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Despite Ford’s investment of $3.4 million since 1952, in the decade since it had never 
really interrogated its interest and instruments in the field. Much as the International Affairs 
staff with responsibility for citizen education were often frustrated by the Association, they still 
took citizen education for granted as worthy of their money. At least one of the foundation’s 
trustees was also a board member of a World Affairs Council, and McCloy, as chairman of the 
board, tended to be a rubber stamp for projects proposed by his protégé and chief of the 
International Affairs division, Shepard Stone.137 Subjecting the citizen education movement to 
outside assessment and challenge was a new development, and a risky one. 
So, it mattered who Ford asked to look into the matter. And it mattered that its first 
proper consultant on citizen education was Nichols. He was a prospective grantee. He had a 
personal vendetta against the Association.138 And he had one of the most elitist outlooks that 
existed within the citizen education movement itself. As he told Hayes, he saw mass-
participation programs like Great Decisions as unfair to their participants, who were being 
deluded into thinking, wrongly, that they were receiving an education and that they were playing 
a constructive role in national life.139 But while Mastrude believed that “the council field has no 
future,” that it was not even “a national ‘movement’ or genus but a few local individuals,” Nichols 
still believed it was the way forward. Ford’s choice between these views had stark implications.140  
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When Nichols reported back on the state of the Council movement, he if anything 
painted too dire a picture. Just four Councils, he found, had a membership of over 4,000, 3 over 
2,000, and only 8 more over 500. No more than forty people were professionally employed in the 
movement, supported by 300 frequent volunteers and perhaps 2,000 occasional helpers. Ten 
Councils accounted for four-fifths of the total expenditures of about $700,000. “No council 
appears to be satisfied with the quality or adequacy of its program and operations in the light of 
the community and national needs,” Nichols wrote. “Almost without exception,” he continued, 
“the councils are in a precarious financial position, without sufficient funds to conduct existing 
operations at the level or standard of quality that the programs deserve, to say nothing of 
providing funds for growth or improvement in operations.” And yet citizen education was in the 
“national interest,” to foster “a climate in which leaders may lead and followers may follow 
intelligently in public criticism or support of foreign policy.” As a remedy, Nichols sought 
support for his own National Committee of Community World Affairs Organizations, asking 
for $1.6 million to rebuild the movement from the ground up.141 
Nor were Ford’s other evaluations brighter. One came from Theodore Kaghan, who, like 
Stone, was a psychological warfare specialist and journalist who had worked for McCloy in the 
military occupation of Germany. Kaghan attacked the citizen education movement’s 
“misconceptions about the democratic process,” in line with the assumptions of his colleagues. 
The idea that widespread participation was possible was folly, Kaghan wrote, and “encouraging 
the belief that knowledge about foreign affairs makes one a more ‘effective citizen’ is likewise 
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misleading.” Like Stone, Kaghan thought that a better quality of consent could be acquired 
through mass media spectacles.142 “We don’t have to descend to using Zsa Zsa Gabor as a 
bosomy interrogator of Dean Rusk on the Hungarian question,” he wrote, “but other 
combinations of glamor and statecraft should not be ruled out.”143  
To alleviate this pessimism, the Association mostly offered more of the same, albeit 
aimed at a more limited number of adults “significant in the democratic processes that shape 
foreign policy.” In the summer of 1964, Hayes asked for $3.9 million for new projects over five 
years, plus $1 million in general support, for a “big push.”144 Stone described this as a “horrible 
figure,” given growing doubts about citizen education as a whole, and Nichols argued that $1.25 
million over five years might be a more reasonable sum.145 “My personal feeling is that the record 
doesn’t justify even this much assistance,” Nichols wrote to Cullen, “but I realize that for 
practical purposes and reasons it may be necessary to do more now than could be justified 
otherwise.”146  
Still another consultant from within the movement, the former State Department official 
and serving World Affairs Council of Northern California trustee Charles E. Allen, similarly 
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advised stopping all funding and clearing away “the existing debris.”147 And Cullen agreed. “FPA 
is doing the kind of job that nobody else really wants to do,” he told Stone, “and as a result there 
is little enthusiasm for what it is doing.” While he thought it best to end funding entirely, he 
acceded to a terminal, decade-long grant of $1 million.148 
The Ford Foundation’s staff had not reckoned with their own president, however. Henry 
T. Heald, who despised adult education and sought vast investment in educational television as 
an alternative, forced Stone to halve the Association’s potential grant, to throw out Nichols’ plan 
for the Councils, and to note the historically “large amounts of money invested with only 
occasionally favorable results and limited improvement in world affairs education.”149 And when 
that plan was taken to the trustees, it turned out that Heald was not done. At a board meeting in 
September 1964, he undermined his own staff and asked the trustees to turn the plan down. 
Cullen resigned in protest, and the trustees, noting the Foundation’s “obligation,” angrily forced 
Heald to commission a fuller study.150 Heald duly appointed a committee chaired by Stone but 
otherwise separate from the International Affairs staff. Comprising four divisional chiefs from 
other sides of Ford’s domestic programs, its secretary was Malcolm Moos. Moos, the director of 
policy and planning, was a political scientist and former White House speechwriter who had 
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drafted Eisenhower’s farewell address, with its plea for an “alert and knowledgeable citizenry.”151 
His committee was given four months.152 
Citizen education was no longer to be automatically funded at the Foundation, and into 
the study poured all kinds of ideas, old and new, about democracy and diplomacy. “Not the least 
of the concerns I have,” wrote James Armsey, “is whether we shoot for the ‘leaders’ or the 
‘masses,’ whether, in short, we espouse the elitist approach or the democratic approach to 
ultimate decision making in this society in the area of world affairs.”153 “Who is trying to find out 
what we want citizens to know other than ‘everything’?” asked Marshall Robinson.154 Moos’ 
deputy, E. S. Staples, thought the whole task impossible. “You simply cannot inculcate the idea 
of being interested in foreign policy matters,” he wrote.155 Moos, for his part, knew that no 
answer would be easy. “The difficulty with any evaluation,” he sighed, “is that FPA is a sacred 
cow. 
All of us have a nostalgic recall when we think of FPA’s valiant work in the days 
Mussolini’s armies were chasing Haile Selassie’s warriors in Ethiopia or Hitler was 
reoccupying the Rhineland. But the educational landscape has changed mightily. 
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If the Association were to survive, Moos thought, it would only be because the trustees were 
scared to admit defeat, to kill off an organization they had funded even more liberally than the 
Council on Foreign Relations.156 
 Moos dived deeper than anyone at Ford before him, much more so than Stone wanted.157 
Only silence had passed between the State Department and Ford on the citizen education issue 
for several years, but Moos went to Washington and talked for hours to the public affairs staff.158 
He talked to Alfred Hero.159 He dined with Angus Campbell, whose Survey Research Center 
scholars put together a necessarily downbeat summary of the pertinent research, even as they 
tried to be as positive as they could for their old friend Hayes.160 And Moos hired a young Johns 
Hopkins professor, Robert W. Tucker, to look over the field. Operating within the dominant 
paradigms of a postwar political scientist, and an international-relations realist to boot, Tucker 
was especially troubled by the populism of Great Decisions. “I see little to be gained and a great 
deal to be lost,” he wrote, “by cultivating the idea that a few minutes of background material 
prepares one for making sound and responsible judgments on foreign affairs.”161  
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What Moos came up with by February 1965 was the Ford Foundation’s — in fact, any 
foundation’s — most serious and sustained analysis of a movement on which it had already spent 
nearly $5 million. Little impressed the Committee on Citizen Education in World Affairs. Its 
report showed no trace of the reformist zeal of earlier years, no imperative that the peace of the 
world demanded an informed citizenry at home. Instead, the report betrayed a profound 
weariness that such a task might still be necessary.  
“Every day Americans are made conscious of an uncomfortable world beyond our borders 
and that somehow we cannot disengage from it,” the report stated, but “no one with whom the 
Committee has spoken believes that there is any likelihood of a dramatic breakthrough in citizen 
education in world affairs.” The field had not “aroused leading social scientists to bestir 
themselves,” and it remained “spongy and complex,” evading “scientific proof.” No one could 
agree how even a small breakthrough might come about. Through the mass media? Through 
“trickle down”? Through a “soap opera program with a foreign policy theme”? Through 
abandoning the idea of adult education entirely and “reaching the citizen as he goes through high 
school”? “All in all,” the report concluded, “no one knows very much about the subject.” 
Such uncertainty inevitably colored the committee’s views of the Association. On the one 
hand, Ford found no evidence that the Association aroused enthusiasm. On the other, Ford 
found no evidence that the Association should be left to die. The upshot was a recommendation 
that the foundation provide a grant to the Association, to be considered terminal unless Hayes 
showed capacity to innovate, and that it consider an appropriation to cover small grants to 
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selected Councils.162 Unsurprisingly, the trustees agreed, clearing a grant of $1 million to the 
Association and a small fund of $300,000 to support the Councils. The Association was told to 
fix its relationship with the Councils if it wanted further funds.163 
What is striking about even this evaluation was that certain questions were kept off the 
agenda. It did not dwell on how discussion could be connected to policymaking, nor on what a 
public ought to know, or why. It did not ask whether citizen education was any more or less 
pressing because of developments in international politics, whether decolonization, or a calming 
of the cold war, or the escalation in Southeast Asia. Indeed, reference to actual foreign policy was 
scant in almost every assessment of the citizen education movement. And the committee still 
assumed, as many did, that education was the primary link between American leadership and 
American democracy. 
Whose education? The citizen the Committee had in mind was probably a “sophisticated 
American who is concerned and informed about world affairs,” the report noted, or a 
“responsible citizen who may or may not be concerned and who needs to be informed,” rather 
than a member of the “broad mass which is basically unconcerned and uninformed.” The 
underlying assumptions were unmentioned but stark. “Sophisticated” and “responsible” 
Americans were now the target, as if foreign policy were the province of some higher calling, of a 
1%, perhaps. Nobody asked whether white institutions ought to respond to black political 
activism, even in the year of the Voting Rights Act. Nobody asked whether urban voluntary 
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associations like World Affairs Councils could survive they saw, if dimly, white flight recast 
politics and geography alike.164 
But what Ford’s planners did do was take steps towards abandoning not just the citizen 
education movement, but the underlying conviction that adults could be educated at all. They 
looked at the commercial mass media, educational television, voluntary association work, 
university extension services, undergraduate education, public schools, and the federal 
government, much of which had received considerable Ford funding. The boom in college 
education, the committee thought, “should lead to some increased interest in world affairs,” but 
its overall impression was that the totality of all these efforts had failed to do very much.165  
 
* * * * * 
 
What to do? If psychologists said that attitudes formed early in life tended to be hard to break 
down, then it was early in life that worldliness would have to be taught. As such, the report 
stated, “the already heavily burdened formal educational process is being looked to from all sides 
for help.”166 Only a few days before Ford completed its report, and probably not coincidentally, 
Dean Rusk had written to Hayes that he felt that “it is especially important that younger 
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Americans, particularly those at the secondary school level, study and discuss the basic subjects 
which lay the foundation for a mature understanding of foreign policy issues in depth.”167 
This was defeat. As we have seen, for half a century and more internationalists had tried 
to rewrite school curricula, train teachers, and reach students. Internationalist activists had always 
been even more eager than citizen educators to build support from the youth up. But the 
concession by adult educators that it was not through adults but children that a foreign policy 
public might best be built was a surrender of everything they stood for. It just did not seem like it 
at the time.  
Defeat came wrapped in opportunity. Adult education had been a defining feature of the 
New Deal, but the defining feature of the Great Society was childhood education. And for 
Lyndon Johnson as for Franklin Roosevelt, a fresh commitment to education owed something to 
global challenges to democracy. “Education lies at the heart of every nation’s hopes and 
purposes,” Lyndon Johnson told Congress in February 1966; “the conduct of our foreign policy 
will advance no faster than the curriculum of our classrooms.”168 Schools had been defined as a 
national security resource since at least the Sputnik scare of 1957 and the National Defense 
Education Act of 1958, but Johnson turned on the spigot of federal funding like never before. 
The eighty-ninth Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in April 1965, 
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the Higher Education Act in November 1965, and the International Education Act in October 
1966, albeit leaving the latter unfunded.169 
And the dollars flowed, once the Association’s board voted to move ahead with a 
dedicated program in January 1965 — and to accept federal grants for the first time.170 Attracted 
by the appointment as director of school services of James M. Becker, a Ford-backed pioneer, the 
St. Louis-based Danforth Foundation, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW), and Ford piled almost $1 million into the Association’s new schools programs, driving 
its budget over $2 million by 1967.171 Most of the $750,000 Danforth grant went into 
conferences and workshops, and into a publication, New Directions, that appealed to social 
studies teachers.172 Those teachers were also served by a dedicated staff working out of the 
regional offices. Mastrude developed decision-making modules that took multimedia approaches 
into the classroom, and wrote a series of simulations, including one, “Dangerous Parallel,” that 
was modeled on the outbreak of the Korean War and split a class of 24 into teams of fictional 
cabinet ministers.173 Meanwhile, the U.S. Office of Education funded Becker to the tune of 
$137,500, resulting in a landmark study of the nascent movement for “global education.”174 
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HEW gave funds directly to World Affairs Councils, including a large grant to Cincinnati that 
sent teachers overseas over their summer breaks.175 
Part of the attraction of schools was that they offered citizen educators a way to overcome 
the failure of their historic methods to cope with the new geography of the United States. 
Schools were to be found in every community, with a captive audience, a communications 
infrastructure, and a more representative social base. Already responsive to shifts in demography, 
they were tempting points of safety on a map that citizen educators struggled to read.176 “Our 
greatest problem,” Hayes wrote in November 1964, “confronts us in the great metropolitan areas 
where the population of the country is rapidly coming to be concentrated.”177 When volunteers at 
the Oregon Council went on a Ford-funded junket to other Councils in 1966, they were struck 
not only by how “core cities” were “becoming huge Negro or Puerto Rican ghettos, or are semi-
deserted in the evening,” but also by how rural areas were being “denuded not only of population 
but, even more rapidly, of institutions that cater to the cultural needs of the remaining 
population.” Councils had to find ways to attract such audiences, perhaps by following their 
“actual and potential customers” to the suburbs. As of yet, they had not.178 
 
 
Toni Fuss Kirkwood-Tucker, Visions in Global Education: The Globalization of Curriculum and Pedagogy in Teacher 
Education and Schools (New York: Peter Lang, 2009), pp. 3-24. 
175 Zygmunt Nagorski, Jr., to Administrative Staff, March 24, 1967, FPA, Part II, Box 224. 
176 “Meeting of the Program Methods Committee,” April 1, 1965, FPA, Part II, Box 17; “Meeting of Program 
Methods Committee (joined by Program Content Committee),” June 1, 1965, FPA, Part II, Box 17. 
177 Hayes, “Outline of the proposed FPA multi-media project,” attached to “Meeting of Program Methods 
Committee,” November 4, 1964, FPA, Part II, Box 17. 
178 “Survey of Other Councils’ Activities and Organization and Suggestions for the Improvement of the Oregon 
Council,” attached to James R. Huntley to Stone et al, September 20, 1966, FF, FA748, Box 1. 
  
448 
Councils felt this reality harshly, and evidence continued to stack up that the situation 
among adults was beyond repair. At Ford’s prompting, in July 1966 the Association tried to 
shore up its relationship with the Councils by hiring Zygmunt Nagorski, a former journalist who 
had spent a decade as a USIA officer in Egypt, South Korea, and France.179 Nagorski crossed the 
country, making a hundred visits to Councils large and small, attending their board meetings, 
consulting on their programs, and assessing what kind of role could be played by an Association 
welcomed and distrusted in equal measure. Nagorski even shepherded the creation of a new 
Council in Detroit, learning the lessons of earlier experiences by involving union and black 
leaders and acquiring buy-in from congressional representatives.180 
If anything, though, Nagorski became more and more convinced of the bankruptcy of the 
movement. He found bewildering complexity and unevenness, ranging from decrepit Councils in 
small-town backwaters to the booming Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, which had saved 
itself from financial ruin by offering charter air tours of foreign hotspots.181 Nagorski estimated 
that the 43 functioning Councils had a budget of $1.3 million, a quarter of which was spent in 
Chicago, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia, and that they claimed about 50,000 members. Perhaps 
 
179 “Meeting of Board of Directors,” January 13, 1966, FPA, Part II, Box 17; Hayes to Regional Offices, January 25, 
1966, FPA, Part II, Box 52; “Zygmunt Nagorski, Founder of Leadership Center, Is Dead at 98,” New York Times 
(July 21, 2011), p. B 10. 
180 Detroit had had a weak Association branch from the end of the 1930s to about 1952, but the regional office 
failed to found a Council there. See “Summary of Foreign Policy Association Activities in Detroit, Michigan,” 
February 17, 1956, FPA, Part I, Box 12. It took Nagorski ten visits to Detroit, and three to Washington, to set up 
the Council by 1968. See “Proposal for the Establishment of a World Affairs Council in the Detroit-Windsor 
Area,” October 1967, Emeny Papers, Box 54; Nagorski, “World Affairs Council Activities: Bi-Annual Report, July 
1, 1967 to December 31, 1967,” January 24, 1968, FPA, Part II, Box 79; Nagorski to Administrative Staff, “Trip to 
Detroit,” February 15, 1968, FPA, Part II, Box 224. 
181 Nagorski to Hayes, “World Affairs Council of Portland, Oregon,” August 29, 1966, FPA, Part II, Box 47; 
Nagorski to Staff, “Chicago Council on Foreign Relations,” November 18, 1966, FPA, Part II, Box 47. 
  
449 
180,000 people nationwide attended citizen education programs, Nagorski thought. This was 
not a diplomatic 1%, as Hero had contemplated, but a diplomatic 0.1%. And what was striking 
was that, by this point, such numbers were a welcome surprise. “It does not sound enormous,” 
Nagorski wrote early in 1968, “but it is bigger than most of us, at this end of the operation, 
expected.”182 
As hopes were dashed numerically, the spiritual vitality of the movement dimmed. Some 
of the members of this “small national fraternity” did not “even know that they belong to such a 
body of people,” Nagorski wrote, while others were “discouraged by the meagre results of their 
local efforts and the passive attitudes of their fellows.”183 “It takes a lot of stamina and courage to 
conduct a minority mission within a hostile or semi-hostile climate,” he said early in January 
1967, and “it is often even more difficult to make inroads in a climate of indifference.”184  
Perhaps it was no surprise, then, that the diplomatic 0.1% seemed to have set aside their 
broader educational aims, even their self-educational aims, and found community among 
themselves. “‘Here we are, baffled and confused’,” Nagorski wrote of them in March 1968, 
“‘frustrated and closed off from the main current of decision-making groups. 
We want to be more active, to be alert without too much intellectual effort; most 
of us want to go through the motion of being closer to understanding foreign policy 
issues. The motion itself gives us a sense of participation… We need substitutes, 
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As such, Nagorski wrote, “an average world affairs council as it exists today is not an educational 
entity; in most cases it is an attempt to provide a mixture of entertainment and a feeling of 
participation in the national debate, to create an atmosphere of belonging to the elite.” It was by 
no means a way of reconciling democracy and foreign policy. And although surprisingly few 
citizen educators dwelled on how foreign policy itself was affecting how they went about their 
business, Nagorski noted that younger leaders had “their ambitions trimmed and their goals 
clouded by riots at home and a war overseas,” that “a sense of futility settles among many who 
object, e.g., to Vietnam and see how little their objections count.”185 
All this was true even of the most elitist institutions that sought a public for world affairs, 
the institutions we might expect even a wary policymaking elite to have cared for. With the 
support of the Carnegie Corporation, the Council on Foreign Relations’ Committees on Foreign 
Relations had slowly proliferated, with 2,170 members in 34 cities by 1966, up from 1,419 
members in 25 cities fourteen years earlier.186 During the annual conferences of the local 
Committee secretaries at Council House, however, New York officials repeatedly voiced worries 
that the Committees had reached “a plateau of activity, beyond which it would be increasingly 
difficult to advance,” that they were little more than social gatherings for an aging, bored, but 
“faithful core of regulars.”187 They were dominated by academics and lawyers, and neither 
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corporate managers nor labor leaders proved interested. Wholly white until 1969, the 
Committees shut out women until 1970, even though most of them had had ladies’ nights for 
years. As one representative from St. Louis noted, “some of the wives have proved to be more 
intelligent than their husbands.”188 
Like the World Affairs Councils, the Committees’ educational and political import 
rapidly diminished. The Committees had been founded to contribute to policymaking, but 
policymakers saw less of a need for private discussions with community leaders after 1945, and, 
as attendance flatlined, the Council office in New York used the Committee members as a 
sounding board less frequently. Between 1954 and 1959 the Council had ceased publishing 
annual reports based on surveys of Committee members; when the surveys restarted in 1960, far 
fewer members than before said that they felt qualified to submit answers to questions on U.S. 
foreign policy.189  
As the upward function of the Committees collapsed, their pretensions to downward 
influence evaporated. In the immediate postwar years, the Committee secretaries talked at length 
about discussion theory and public opinion with Francis H. Russell, with the adult educator 
Lyman Bryson, and with Rensis Likert, the director of the Survey Research Center. But these 
reminders of how democracy was supposed to work, of the duties of elites in trickle-down 
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diplomacy, were not repeated.190 And when New York asked the secretaries for evidence as to 
whether diplomacy was indeed trickling down, the answer was dismaying.191 “There is a defect in 
the theory,” wrote the secretary in Los Angeles in 1952, “that changing the attitudes of a few 
people in alleged positions of leadership is going to filter down and change the attitudes of the 
entire community.”192 “I have racked my brain and tried to find, if anyone was interested enough 
to do something about world problems as a direct result of a Committee meeting,” wrote the 
Indianapolis secretary William L. Lieber in 1963. “The answer is negative.”193 
As more and more of those Americans who had been most committed to world affairs in 
their communities gave up, so did those who funded them. The Carnegie Corporation ended its 
28-year subsidy of the Committees in 1965. The Ford Foundation would not be far behind. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Zygmunt Nagorski was not the only former USIA officer roaming the boardrooms of the World 
Affairs Councils. In New York, the Ford Foundation’s embrace of the Councils included the 
appointment in June 1965 of James Huntley, who admitted to “very little direct experience in 
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this field,” but had been a prospective hire for the Association a decade earlier.194 Huntley’s task 
was to spend the $300,000 of grants that the trustees had allotted to the Councils. Nichols left 
him fulsome assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of every Council and every Council’s 
director, as well as a relatively equitable plan for granting two-thirds of the total to the six largest 
Councils (Boston, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles) and the 
remaining third to ten more.195  
Huntley preferred to make large grants to the largest Councils, disappointing others.196 
He gave $97,000 to the World Affairs Council of Northern California, “one of the best in the 
country,” as Huntley put it, yet “nevertheless a weak organization.”197 San Francisco sought to 
appoint a director of studies to run its discussion groups and to restore its speakers bureau, and 
Ford also forced it to fund tours by State Department officials.198 Philadelphia asked for $42,000 
in September, and while Huntley dismissed its highly effective female director, Ruth Weir 
Miller, as running a “matriarchy” out of its offices in the famous Wanamaker department store, 
he was sufficiently impressed to double that sum to $80,000, on the condition that the Council 
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pay costs for foreign service officers to lead seminars.199 Cleveland, by now run by a longstanding 
member of its women’s discussion group, Dorothy Binyon, submitted a proposal at the same 
time, as did Cincinnati, despite Huntley’s lack of faith in the “pompous little man” who ran that 
Council, William Messner.200 In March 1966, Huntley asked for them to receive $63,000 and 
$40,000 respectively, including $3,000 apiece to pay the expenses of foreign service officers.201 
By December 1965, Huntley had become far more ambitious, planning out a total of 
$525,000 for Boston, Portland, Seattle, Minneapolis, Chicago, sundry smaller groups, and 
community organizations in Los Angeles, where he felt the Council founded by the former CIA 
director John McCone was incurably cautious.202 Huntley also gave considerable thought to the 
decline in the professional quality of the Councils’ directors, and asked the Carnegie Endowment 
to create a career track that would involve graduate degrees, sabbaticals in NGOs or USIA, and a 
pipeline for former foreign service officers to return home and serve their communities.203 All 
told, Huntley’s work represented a degree of involvement unmatched by any foundation official 
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in the history of the movement, so much so that the Association sensed a “new mood.”204 
Dominant financially for a decade and more, the foundation’s new energy made it dominant 
intellectually and operationally by the end of February 1966. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Enter McGeorge Bundy. 
Descending to the presidency of the Ford Foundation from the White House that 
March, the architect of the Vietnam War took a few months to sketch his vision for the richest 
philanthropy in the world. As it turned out, the former national security advisor’s tenure would 
be defined by a striking racial liberalism and a surprising aversion to international affairs.205 But 
even before that course was set, Bundy started to clear away the responsibilities that he had 
inherited. And one of the first thickets he tackled was citizen education in world affairs. 
It would be easy enough to think that it was inevitable that McGeorge Bundy would look 
on such programs with disdain. Was he not the son of an eastern Establishment that had ruled 
from gentleman’s clubs in the name of public service?206 Was he not the product of Groton, Yale, 
and Skull and Bones, a dean of the Harvard faculty whose formidable success was as much social 
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as intellectual? Was he not the architect of a war so cavalier in its disregard for popular consent 
that its failure caused a crisis in American life? 
Indeed, he was. And yet the history of the citizen education movement has shown us that 
even people such as Bundy were typically concerned in one way or another with educating and 
involving the public in American foreign policy. 
Think of Bundy’s father. Brahmin he may have been, but Harvey Hollister Bundy knit 
himself into the public-facing side of the foreign policy elite. He succeeded Christian Herter as 
the chairman of the Association’s Boston branch in 1936, retaining that position until war called 
in 1941. This Bundy thought that the branches did not go far enough, which is why he was an 
avowed supporter of Brooks Emeny. This confidant of insiders and a former assistant secretary of 
state was president of the World Peace Foundation after the war, and succeeded John Foster 
Dulles as chairman of the board of the Carnegie Endowment. 
Think of Bundy’s sponsors. John McCloy kept his distance from the rabble, but the man 
who brought Bundy to Ford funded the Association all the same, and had even been offered its 
presidency in 1946. Henry Stimson was no populist crusader, but the man who let Bundy draft 
his memoirs was the direct successor of Elihu Root, and took care to place the Association in the 
safe hands of Frank McCoy during World War II.207 Walter Lippmann may have doubted the 
power of education in theory, but the realist who told Kennedy that Bundy would be an ideal 
secretary of state had always supported the work of his old friend Newton Baker in Cleveland. 
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And Dean Acheson, who let Bundy edit his speeches and gave the young man a post at State, 
took no lectures on the importance of public engagement from anyone.208 
That Bundy had no use for such things ought, therefore, to be a surprise. And he was 
perfectly aware of the salience of public opinion. Teaching Government 135 at Harvard, he 
lectured on Tocqueville, Bryce, and the new political science literature; in Government 180, 
“Principles of International Politics,” the textbooks were by Hans Morgenthau; in Government 
185, he had students read Kennan, with all the diplomat’s bitterness about the public’s part in 
U.S. foreign policy.209 But even if Bundy was more of an idealist than his reading lists implied, he 
still had no use for citizen education institutions. Unlike Harvey Bundy, he was never a member 
of his local Committee on Foreign Relations. Unlike Dean Rusk, he was never a member of the 
Foreign Policy Association. Unlike even Henry Kissinger and Walt Rostow, he had no links to 
the World Affairs Council across the River Charles. He was unwilling to play along.210 
 Just four weeks after Bundy arrived in New York, he put Stone on the defensive. In a 
briefing memo for Bundy written at the end of March, Stone had to paint the citizen education 
program in an unusually positive light, situating it as one of Ford’s historic responsibilities and 
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even praising Great Decisions. The grants to Cincinnati and Cleveland still awaited approval, as 
did a considerable further appropriation that would have funded more Councils. “IA believes 
that the attitudes and opinions of the American people concerning international affairs,” Stone 
wrote, “are a significant element in either inhibiting or in forming and sustaining enlightened 
public policies.” Indeed, Bundy’s arrival caused Stone to strengthen his commitment to citizen 
education, rather than to take the chance finally to kill it off.211 
Bundy disagreed. He could not do much about the Ohio grants, which Dorothy Binyon 
of Cleveland saw, rather unfortunately, as “especially significant because you have so recently 
come from the active political arena.”212 But Bundy stripped the $3,000 that each grant devoted 
to paying the expenses of foreign service officers, which his former colleague Rusk had pushed so 
hard for. “I remain very skeptical on this,” Bundy scrawled on one of Stone’s memos.213 Bundy 
went further, too, although without enough clarity to end the matter. “Didn’t he indicate,” one 
officer asked forgetfully in September 1966, that “that would be the end of Foundation activity 
in this area?”214 
 Stone feared so, but his International Affairs division mounted a rearguard action. In 
talking points for Stone to use with Bundy, Huntley noted that the trustees had “consistently 
backed” efforts to increase public understanding of world affairs, that Councils had been a 
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training ground for policymakers, and that “the very existence of local WACs inhibits extremist 
elements, strengthens the vital center, and — in many cases — makes world affairs a respectable 
topic for community discussion.”215 And Ford bore responsibility for the mess it faced. It had 
supported the Association “usually half-heartedly but nevertheless copiously,” and the 
“consequences of FAE’s failure still badly warp the field.” Huntley asked for another quarter of a 
million dollars, to be directed towards Portland, Minneapolis, Boston, Los Angeles, and a 
number of small councils.216 And nobody in International Affairs doubted that the work was still 
necessary, even after Stone was replaced that summer with David E. Bell, President Kennedy’s 
budget director and USAID chief. As Slater told Council leaders, “we are so far short of a 
desirable state of affairs with respect to public knowledge, that we do not have to argue that.”217 
 When Bell sent that $250,000 grant to Bundy’s office in October 1966, it was little more 
than a trial balloon, to see if his mood had changed.218 It had not. Huntley tried once more. To 
reject such grants would be to commit another error in a process that the Foundation had 
“botched” for years. “The rapport which we have painstakingly built up with the world affairs 
education movement,” he lamented, “will be destroyed by our apparent fickleness.” Morale would 
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plummet. Extremists would have an easier time.219 And the International Affairs staff proved 
that they still had some of their old clout, even as they found their position at Ford 
diminished.220 “Dear Mac,” wrote the Secretary of State; “I have for some time observed with 
great appreciation the Ford Foundation’s imaginative support of efforts to strengthen world 
affairs education.”221 It was no use. Bundy killed the program in November. “All are now dead,” 
Huntley wrote.222 
 Ending appropriations to the World Affairs Councils was one thing, a novel experiment 
that could be terminated without tears. Ending appropriations for the Foreign Policy Association 
was another. Convinced that Ford’s offer of $1 million in 1965 to prove its worth was made in 
good faith, the board decided to spend quickly. Hayes radically increased his office’s tempo, 
raising more money from corporate sponsors and ploughing it into schools and Councils.223 
Before Huntley left the Foundation in disgust, as Cullen had before him, he wrote that the 
Association was “headed in the right direction and moving fast,” and recommended strong 
further support to the “essential core of any effective national effort in this field.”224 Yet now, for 
the first time in its history, Ford initiated significant financial cutbacks. With inflation rising, the 
trustees curtailed Heald’s lavish capital spending and cut Bundy’s budget to $200 million that the 
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Foundation earned each year.225 In this context, Slater told Hayes to lower his expectations when 
they started discussing a new grant in March 1967.226 Leading a booming organization if only in 
financial terms, Hayes did not do so, and sought $4 million over three years.227 “I fail to find this 
close to reality,” commented Stanley Gordon.228 Another Ford officer called it “sophomoric.”229 
As Bundy turned Ford inward, focusing it on race and the urban crisis, Ford cut away a 
program that had long defined not just its own outlook, but that of big philanthropy for nearly 
half a century. Bell used the progress that the Association seemed to have made against it, much 
as his predecessors at the Rockefeller Foundation had twenty years earlier. “The increased 
support that FPA has found in recent years gives us assurance that its continued existence is not 
critically dependent on the Foundation’s general support,” Bell told Bundy in December 1967, a 
few weeks after Rusk had addressed the Association during the battle of Madison Avenue. 
Ending Ford support might even have “salutary effects.”230 Although Bell and Slater worried that 
Bundy would not approve the $250,000 that they sought to give the Association as a parting gift, 
Bundy did.231 “My colleagues and I regret,” Bell’s assistant told Hayes just after Christmas, that 
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the problems caused “do not appear to be easy ones, but we have confidence that they will be 
manageable without grievous damage to the good work of FPA.”232 
 
* * * * * 
 
Four weeks later, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces unleashed the Tet Offensive, 
prompting a downward spiral in American public opinion that made an already unpopular war so 
divisive that it dethroned a president. In a year in which the United States seemed to be coming 
apart at the seams, in a time when Americans lost faith in authority and power, the Association’s 
belief in civility and reasoned debate seemed curiously antiquated. So too did its confidence in 
American power.  
This time the citizen education movement did not profit from a great debate about 
America’s place in the world. And to citizen educators, “neo-isolationism,” as it came to be 
called, was not just a vague mood, something for columnist to pontificate on, but a financial 
reality. For if even the Ford Foundation was turning away from world affairs in favor of the crisis 
at home, it was no surprise that others within the network did likewise. “The U.S. is turning 
inward,” wrote Fuller to Gordon shortly after the presidential election of 1968. “The staggering 
perplexities of the inner city, the struggle of minorities to find a suitable place in society, the 
disaffection of youth are the dominant concerns of many American community leaders,” and the 
Association’s “allies over the years are increasingly directing their program efforts toward the 
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smoldering sections of their localities and away from those explosive situations abroad which 
could engulf us all.”233 
Money and manpower were simply not available in the way they had been in decades 
past. Nor was the general financial situation so stable, as the global economy began to transform, 
taking with it the basis of American leadership. Corporations and even individuals had started 
giving to the Association as never before, with corporate contributions up 35% from 1964 to 
1967, and individual donations up 38%.234 The Association raised $1.24 million in its anniversary 
campaign of 1967-68.235 But this in no way made up for the relative certainty and generosity lost 
with the withdrawal of Ford, the Carnegie Endowment, and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund from 
regular support.236 Nor could the Association resist basic inflationary pressures. As early as 
March 1968, Hayes faced a financial cliff of half a million dollars. He closed Nagorski’s 
department, curtailed the Association’s publications, and asked the board to draw on anniversary 
funds it had hoped to set aside.237 
But even as new trustees including Dean Rusk, Cyrus Vance, and Hans Morgenthau 
came aboard, the giant Danforth grant for the schools program was not renewed. Faced with 
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further cuts, in April 1970 the board once again seriously considered closing the Association 
down.238 By August the situation was disastrous. Hayes did not even have the $200,000 he 
needed to fire people with their severance pay intact. All but one regional office closed; the 
schools program had to go. Whereas in 1967-68 the Association had had a budget of over $2 
million and a staff of 104, Hayes thought he would have barely $900,000 and a staff of 36 by the 
end of 1971.239 And despite Ford’s decision to prop up its investment with a small revolving 
fund, by 1976 the Association’s budget was just $600,000, less than a fifth of its income eight 
years earlier, in real terms.240 Much as Ford still believed by 1972 that a national organization 
concerned “with the enlightenment of the citizenry on foreign affairs is a necessary condition for 
fulfilling the democratic and participatory ideals of the nation,” the Association became little 
more than a World Affairs Council, Great Decisions aside, and a small one at that.241 
Nor did the Councils prosper. At first, the turmoil appeared to offer an opportunity. 
There was hope in the “malaise of disquiet about foreign policy,” wrote William Messner in July 
1968. There was a new challenge to be met, one which could not be dealt with by that “old banal 
slogan, ‘World Affairs Are Your Affairs’.”242 Yet the newsletter of the Society for Citizen 
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Education in World Affairs, founded earlier in the decade, took on an ever darker tone. Norman 
Pilgrim, the Association’s one remaining regional director, wrote in May 1970 that “world affairs 
education is in its own ‘midi-recession’,” and that the best that could be hoped for was that it was 
“a time to regain the moral strength in our profession of an idealism reborn through the 
temporizing hardness of cynicism, realism, and defeat known.”243 
Most of the World Affairs Councils survived, and only one of the four Councils granted 
Ford funds hit serious trouble. In San Francisco the situation grew so bad that there was nobody 
available to write a grant report, and an acting director told a caller from Ford that “the Council 
had gone through deep waters and that the administrative affairs had been left largely in the 
hands of the ‘girls in the office’.”244 In Cleveland, Binyon used her grant to keep the Council 
afloat, although its programs remained unambitious. By 1974 it had a budget two thirds what it 
had been in 1968, and by 1976 it had failed to balance its budget in eight out of the previous 
nine years.245 The trustees attributed their steady decline in membership, down to about 1,500 in 
1975, to both “increasing isolationism” and a realization that “the Council’s type of activity is 
appealing only to a narrow segment of the population.” They contemplated liquidation.246 
A few Councils thrived. Philadelphia made good use of its Ford money, strengthening its 
traditional programs, founding smaller, regional Councils, and starting a pioneering program at 
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the request of black students and teachers.247 The record was less innovative in Cincinnati, but 
Ford was still pleased, the Council having grown its membership and increased its budget by 
50%.248 Despite its failure to win Ford funding in the goldrush of 1965, the most dramatic 
success story by far was the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, which took off after its 
pioneering use of air tours as a fundraising tool. By 1975 it had 25,000 members, had converted 
that income back into educational programs, and had launched the first of the public opinion 
reports that it has run annually since.249 There were tantalizing signs that success was still 
possible. 
 Yet the breakdown of the movement continued, so much so that there was now nobody 
and no way to keep track of the whole. When even the Council on Foreign Relations was forced 
to plead for help from Ford in 1973, the foundations was as unsparing in its criticisms as any of 
the Council’s public critics, who attacked it for its subservience to power, for its devious means, 
and for the ruinous ends that it had promoted. “In these ten years there has clearly been an 
erosion in the Council’s influence on the foreign policy thinking of both the American people 
and the government,” one consultant wrote.250 At the same time, the Council, which Ford like 
Rockefeller had supported as a way of educating elites, no questions asked, had become too 
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controversial for Ford’s taste. It was the Establishment’s heir, McGeorge Bundy, who granted 
support of just $500,000 in 1974, for the last time.251 A few years later, the staffer tasked with 
evaluating the $3.5 million Ford had spent on the Council noted the end of an era. “The 
objectives of these major grants were tied up with the main purposes of the Ford Foundation 
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McGeorge Bundy did not often talk about the war in Vietnam. When he did, he talked about it 
indirectly, speaking not about his own role, but about what the war meant for how the United 
States ought to conduct its foreign policy.1 
 One of those rare speeches came in October 1973, during the Yom Kippur War. Bundy 
gave it, funnily enough, at an anniversary dinner of the St. Louis Council on World Affairs, and 
if the location was unusual, so was the content. Bundy had not often talked about the 
relationship between diplomacy and democracy, at least not in public, but here he did. The 
speech itself, “Toward an Open Foreign Policy,” was perfectly generic except in two ways.2  
For one thing, unlike his friend Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Bundy did not attack Richard 
Nixon and Henry Kissinger for making an imperial presidency even more powerful. Bundy had 
no problem with that, indeed he encouraged it. Rather, Bundy feared that Nixon and Kissinger 
were making an error that he, too, had made. “There is one element in the styles of the last 10 
years,” he said in Missouri, which “will be profoundly out of place in the next 25 years — the 
apparent belief that there is an indispensable need for secrecy and loneliness in the conduct of 
our major international affairs.” 
For another, while the palliative that Bundy prescribed was routine, the way he described 
it was telling. He sought openness, like so many other commentators: openness between the 
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White House and other parts of the executive branch; between the executive and the legislature; 
between the government and the press; and between the government and the “interested” and 
even the “general” public. What did Bundy call this? He asked for “two-way communication 
based on trust.”3 
Coincidence or no, these were the fighting words of Dean Acheson, words spoken by the 
men present at the creation of American primacy, by the men whose mantle and friendship the 
former national security advisor could once have claimed. By invoking them, Bundy dreamed 
again the dream of a democratic foreign policy. By invoking them, Bundy showed, too, that the 
dream of a democratic foreign policy had not become a reality. 
Nor was McGeorge Bundy the only chieftain of a ruined foreign policy establishment 
who turned to the past as a way to move forward. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, whom 
Bundy had approved for tenure at Harvard, did the same.4 Committed to a style of diplomacy 
that prized quietude, secrecy, and freedom of maneuver, Kissinger nevertheless had always 
understood the importance of public support for a successful foreign policy.5 He had adeptly used 
citizen education and other networks to speed his own rise to influence, appearing on the 
television programs of the World Affairs Council in Boston, even when they were related to 
Great Decisions.6 As secretary, Kissinger supported efforts to rebuild those networks, speaking to 
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the Foreign Policy Association, whose board he joined in 1977, and to World Affairs Councils. 
“I attach the highest importance to developing a broad public consensus,” he told the National 
Council of Community World Affairs Organizations in an October 1974 message, a “consensus” 
that would require and even be defined by “the broadest possible public discussion.”7 That same 
month, he told the National Council on Philanthropy that “these organizations are suffering 
from inadequate resources, financial and human. They need help.” It was not forthcoming.8 
A year later, with détente under such severe bipartisan pressure that State Department 
officials feared for their diplomatic posture, Kissinger stepped up his efforts to create a new 
foreign policy consensus. Since early 1975 he had traveled the country on his “heartland” tour, 
stumping with speeches that were part political philosophy, part partisan fightback. But the 
message was not getting through, a fact made clear by Kissinger’s firing as national security 
advisor in November. In a policy review launched immediately after that debacle, State’s Policy 
Planning Staff concluded that an “activist public affairs effort” was necessary to create public 
consent for détente, despite the perils of a presidential election.9 
What the State Department put together was familiar from its programs over the years, 
even if its institutional knowledge of its own history was so thin that it did not quite know it. 
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Building on its history of regional conferences, it arranged five “town meetings,” mostly in cities 
that Kissinger had already visited. Based on adult education templates, indeed on the language of 
interwar adult education, the “town meetings” comprised public lectures, roundtables, forums, 
call-in radio and television shows, and even small opinion polls. They were intended, as 
Kissinger’s assistant Lawrence Eagleburger told one audience, to solve the department’s 
“communications problem,” to prove at the most basic level that it “gives a damn about what 
individuals think about our foreign policy.”10 With that in mind, the sessions were rather more 
inquisitive than the department’s earlier, more proscriptive conferences, with study guides 
prepared by the Foreign Policy Association, with the agenda fairly flexible and locally-minded, 
and with lists of possible questions circulated in advance. A press release mentioned one that was 
remarkably open: “what do Americans want their diplomacy to achieve?”11 
As important as the message, and more so as détente crumbled, was the medium. The 
State Department sought partners and, as it often had, it found them. Each of the five “town 
meetings” was held at a World Affairs Council or similar institution, first in Pittsburgh, then 
Portland, San Francisco, Milwaukee, and Minneapolis. Kissinger’s State Department assumed 
that World Affairs Councils had been the backbone of a supposed internationalist consensus, 
and hoped that their publics would therefore be predisposed to understand where it was coming 
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from, and lend support.12 It sent leading officials with that idea in mind, including assistant 
secretaries of state, undersecretaries of state, and the director of policy planning Winston Lord, 
who ran the “town meeting” program and became the president of the Council on Foreign 
Relations in 1977. And the intention here was grand. As Bray put it early in 1976, the aim was 
“the recreation of a national foreign policy ‘establishment’ and the invigoration of the private 
organizational infrastructure.”13 
It did not work, at least not in the way that the State Department intended. It certainly 
found out what the foreign affairs public, or what was left of it, wanted from its foreign policy. 
The Americans that the State Department officers heard from wanted to recover a sense of 
morality, to “stand for the right thing” in a way that the pragmatism and opportunism of détente 
did not seem to allow. They did not necessarily know what the “right thing” was, but they 
wanted to stand for it all the same. Eagleburger therefore told Kissinger that he needed to 
embrace the “Kennedyesque moralism which Americans so like and which gives us a sense of 
purpose and uniqueness.”14 This was never likely to happen, so much so that Lord thought 
Kissinger should try mostly to secure a “personal legacy for the history books.”15 The secretary 
listened to that advice, but ignored the feedback that his subordinates gave him from the grass 
roots. In that, Kissinger was merely extending a long tradition. 
 
12 Winston Lord and John Reinhardt to Kissinger, “Addition to Your Pittsburgh Program – Town Meetings re US 
Foreign Policy,” November 8, 1975, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-76, Document Number P800158-
1570, aad.archives.gov/aad/series-list.jsp?cat=WR43 [hereafter cited in the form AAD/ P800158-1570]. 
13 Charles W. Bray, untitled memorandum, undated [early 1976], Lord Files, Box 358. 
14 “Memorandum from the Secretary of State’s Executive Assistant (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Kissinger,” 
February 24, 1976, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign 
Policy, 1973-1976 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012), p. 379. 
15 Lord to Kissinger, “Your Speeches in 1976,” February 26, 1976, Lord Files, Box 358. 
  
473 
What troubled the State Department officers more, however, was a fundamental rupture 
in American political culture that they felt with personal force during their meetings with vocal, 
often angry citizens. That Pittsburghers “do not understand many of the bedrock premises on 
which our foreign policy is based,” Lord, Eagleburger and two other officials wrote, was one 
thing. The more important problem was that “the Department as a whole has not come to grips 
with a fairly serious communications problem.” And it was not just the State Department. In 
Milwaukee, views on foreign policy were “colored — perhaps we should say discolored — by the 
cumulative impact of the news about malfeasance in government.” In Portland, the discussions 
suggested a “generalized disenchantment with government institutions from which the 
Department also suffers.” The foreign policy elite of the Steel City even expressed a “fair amount 
of pleased surprised” that the government officials had showed up at all.16 
Even so, the State Department’s initiatives were pale imitations of their forerunners, an 
attempt to create a public from the state outwards. The movement for citizen education in world 
affairs had always had its statist side, of course, but what was striking about the efforts of Lord, 
Eagleburger, Bray, and others, was how weak they were. They now had no help from the 
foundations that had once been practically at the command of secretaries of state. They now had 
no help from voluntary associations that had turned their attentions elsewhere. They now had no 
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help even from the people on whom they had once hoped to rely, from a foreign policy public 
their predecessors had tended. As one anonymous official told Bernard Cohen in 1966, “there is 
a considerable sort of feeling of unhappiness here that elements in the population that used to be 
thought of as our ‘natural constituency’ are not doing yeoman service for the Department now.”17 
Ironically enough, one of the most important causal arrows in the crumbling of the 
citizen education movement was turning. As we have seen, intellectual doubts about the viability 
and desirability of widespread citizen education spread slowly through the network and beyond 
after World War II, in a complicated yet devastating interaction of theory and practice. But if 
anything, the postwar scholarly consensus was fraying in a way that would have been helpful for 
citizen educators, had they possessed the ability and money to do anything about it.18 As the 
imperatives of the cold war weakened, as protests and defeats made the catastrophe of Vietnam 
and the desire for a new diplomacy ever clearer, and as Congress both asserted itself in foreign 
policy and added more transparency to government, thinkers who had once counseled skepticism 
about public opinion rethought their positions. 
Hans Morgenthau, that prophet of academic realism whose work McGeorge Bundy had 
read with profit, was perhaps the most famous convert. A model to student radicals, the Chicago 
professor fused his opposition to the war in Vietnam to a much broader critique of American life, 
including the sorry state of the public sphere, of the decline of democratic institutions, and of the 
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abandonment of the moral ideals of participation.19 Morgenthau became a board member of the 
Foreign Policy Association in 1969. In his intellectual wake came intellectuals who rethought 
American power and the place of the public within it. Noam Chomsky slashed at “twenty years 
of intensive cold-war indoctrination and seventy years of myth regarding out international role,” 
and a foreign policy that had been “supported by an apathetic, obedient majority, its mind and 
conscience dulled by a surfeit of commodities and by some new version of the old system of 
beliefs and ideas.”20  
Building on the work of William Appleman Williams and others, leftist historians picked 
up ideas that had floated around the foreign policy elite and turned them against it, arguing that 
the mass public had been hoodwinked into a foreign policy that served business and class 
interests. Apathy and ignorance in a class-riven society, wrote Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, had 
allowed business elites to create a foreign policy that serve their own needs. “It was out of the 
question that American foreign policy could have reflected domestically oriented mass priorities,” 
the Kolkos wrote. “The question for controllers of modern American power,” they continued, “is 
not how to reflect the desires of the masses, but to manipulate them so that they endorse the 
needs and goals of men who might otherwise have to resort to sterner forms of repression to 
 
19 Udi Greenberg, The Weimar Century: German Émigrés and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold War (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 237-255; Louis B. Zimmer, The Vietnam War Debate: Hans J. Morgenthau and 
the Attempt to Halt the Drift Into Disaster (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011). 
20 Noam Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins (New York: Pantheon, 1969), pp. 4-5. 
  
476 
attain their ends.” These were practically the words of Harold Lasswell, now turned against 
him.21 
Gabriel Almond went to work for the Eugene McCarthy campaign in 1968, but in his 
academic work he moved away from an explicit focus on foreign policy towards comparative 
studies of political culture.22 In his absence, The American People and Foreign Policy finally came 
under attack. Its assumptions and even its evidence were dismantled statistically at the end of the 
1960s by William Caspary, a doctoral student who appreciated “the injustice of the U.S. globalist 
— or, if you will, imperialist — foreign policy.” Caspary argued that survey data in fact showed 
that the public was neither moody nor inattentive, but had rather maintained remarkably stable 
and permissive opinions on world affairs. Even if the American people had regrettably offered a 
“blank check for foreign policy adventures,” their views might still therefore be worth taking 
more seriously than Almond and his generation had allowed.23 
Since Caspary, many international relations theorists have come to more “optimistic” 
ideas about the public, as two political scientists have written, and have shown that “foreign 
policy attitudes indeed have structure, and that the public reacts predictably and prudently to 
world events.”24 Core ideas in certain strands of international relations theory now rely on more 
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positive ideas about democracy than postwar scholars countenanced, including the democratic 
peace and “audience costs.”25 More skeptical scholars point out that such ideas are difficult to 
reconcile with models of public opinion found elsewhere in political science, particularly top-
down, “elite-cue” models that derive from the work of Converse and, ultimately, Lasswell.26 But 
recent attempts to bridge these two schools by building theories that include both top-down 
cueing and some measure of bottom-up intellectual structure still have far more faith in the 
people than cold war research, even ascribing to them a “folk realism” that, to say the least, 
would have surprised Almond, Kennan, and Morgenthau.27 
Unlike either progressive or elitist conceptions of democracy, however, such new ideas 
have not really translated into world affairs activism on the ground. Indeed, it is striking how 
disconnected this scholarship on democracy and diplomacy is from practice. Its force comes from 
opaque statistical reasoning, from complex analysis of poll results, from survey experiments 
 
University of Chicago Press, 1992). Even Robert A. Dahl came around, see, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, “Democracy 
deficits and foreign policy,” Dissent 46 (1999), pp. 110-113. 
25 Even structural neorealism can be seen as an attempt to take on the anti-democratic commitments of classical, 
postwar realism, although contemporary realists hold views of democracy closer to those of Hans Morgenthau than 
Kenneth Waltz. See Daniel Bessner and Nicolas Guilhot, “How Realism Waltzed Off: Liberalism and 
Decisionmaking in Kenneth Waltz’s Neorealism,” International Security 40 (2015), pp. 87-118. 
26 The major statement of the “elite-cue” model, explicitly following Converse but ultimately deriving from much of 
the Survey Research Center work in the immediate postwar period, is John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass 
Opinion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). Applying Zaller to foreign policy, see Elizabeth N. Saunders, 
“War and the Inner Circle: Democratic Elites and the Politics of Using Force,” Security Studies 24 (2015), pp. 466-
501 (in which Saunders, importantly, notes that “elite-cue” models seriously complicate and even contradict liberal 
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Opinion,” Perspectives on Politics 6 (2008), pp. 51-70; Joshua D. Kertzer and Kathleen M. McGraw, “Folk Realism: 




contracted to the online denizens of Amazon Mechanical Turk, a controlled environment not all 
that unlike the wartime propaganda laboratories of Samuel Stouffer. The days when the proving 
grounds for theories of public opinion were in educational campaigns, or in community-leader 
interviews, or World Affairs Council membership surveys, are long gone. And at the same time, 
the normative quality that had been a feature even of the scholarship of Bernard Cohen or Ithiel 
de Sola Pool, that desire to make democracy work better through research, has been lost. 
Meanwhile, other areas of political science and theory have come alive with the prospects 
of reform. In part as a result of Vietnam-era social movements, in particular student radicalism 
and the “community control” movement, theories of participatory and even deliberative 
democracy took off in the 1980s.28 Premising their work on the power of discussion in rather 
similar ways to the adult educators of the interwar period, theorists of deliberative democracy 
have tried out their explicitly normative work at the grass roots, albeit usually on a small, “mini-
public” scale looking at local or urban politics.29 And although scholars of world affairs have 
taken, again, to seeing international politics as a (partly) deliberative space, serious efforts at 
deliberative democracy in policy questions in U.S. foreign policy have been few.30 
 
28 Useful summaries of the state of deliberative democracy research are John S. Dryzek et al, “The crisis of democracy 
and the science of deliberation,” Science 363 (2019), pp. 1144-1146; Nicole Curato, John S. Dryzek, Selen A. Ercan, 
Carolyn M. Hendriks, and Simon Niemeyer, “Twelve Key Findings in Deliberative Democracy Research,” Daedalus 
146 (2017), pp. 28-38; Andre Bächtiger, John S. Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge, and Mark Warren (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Deliberative Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
29 See, e.g., James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1995); Archon Fung, Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban Democracy (Princeton: Princeton 
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Our Politics Through Public Deliberation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
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* * * * * 
 
Early in 2019, the Center for American Progress (CAP) published a study called America Adrift. 
Through an online poll, CAP talked to 2,000 registered voters; through focus groups in Atlanta 
and Detroit, it talked to members of the public who “indicated that they closely follow foreign 
policy news.” None of these citizens, or at least not many, felt like statesmen. It was not only that 
these citizens took issue with specific policy choices. It was not only that they believed that their 
priorities were not the priorities of their government. It was not only even that they felt left out 
of policymaking. No, CAP found a breach between elites and the public that was much more 
fundamental. “Traditional language from foreign policy experts about ‘fighting authoritarianism 
and dictatorship,’ ‘promoting democracy,’ or ‘working with allies and the international 
community’,” the study found, made no sense to those who were not experts. “Voters across 
educational lines simply did not understand what any of these phrases and ideas meant or 
implied,” CAP went on, so people simply deferred “to known mental models and shorthands 
based on their own personal values and experiences.” The gulf between policymakers and the 
public has become so wide, in other words, that language itself cannot bridge it.31 
 If it ever had, that is. Recall the words of Angus Campbell and George Belknap in 1951. 
Even with years of wars still raging, even with years of consensus censored by McCarthyism, 
 
31 John Halpin, Brian Katulis, Peter Juul, Karl Agne, Jim Gerstein, and Nisha Jain, America Adrift: How the U.S. 
Foreign Policy Debate Misses What Voters Really Want (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2019), pp. 1-8. 
For more on this theme, and specifically on the conflicting goals of policymakers and the public, see, e.g., Benjamin 
I. Page and Marshall M. Bouton, The Foreign Policy Disconnect: What Americans Want from Our Leaders but Don’t Get 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
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even with years of being bombarded in every conceivable medium with information that 
simplified international relations to the fighting words of the foreign policy elite, still “relatively 
few people have a logic of foreign affairs so well organized and so inclusive as to predict any 
specific attitude, given a knowledge of some other.” Even if most people had a bit of structure to 
their foreign-policy thinking, especially partisan structure, they could not be classified as either 
“internationalist” or “isolationists,” Campbell and Belknap wrote. This was not a matter of those 
terms being too crude to fit popular views, the Survey Research Center scholars implied. It was a 
matter of them not being crude enough.32 
What might be surprising is that so many leading American policymakers tried to avoid 
this outcome, and for so long. Every secretary of state from Charles Evans Hughes to Henry 
Kissinger lent his name, and often more, to the movement to make a citizenry educated to elite 
standards on foreign policy. Presidents of the United States did the same. For the most part, 
policymakers sought a public that would support their policies; the activists and scholars that 
they enlisted sought a public that would reason itself into internationalist world leadership. In 
the process, citizen educators hoped that they would bring American democracy closer to what 
they saw as its ideal, an ideal in which people would be informed and engaged, in which people 
would participate in policymaking, in which elites would subject themselves to popular control.  
Citizen educators, of course, hardly delved deep into American society. Their attempts to 
break out of a predominately wealthy, white, and above all college-educated elite were the 
exception, not the norm; those exceptions, such as the Great Decisions program, only proved the 
 
32 Belknap and Campbell, “Political Party Identification and Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy,” p. 603. 
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rule. This public appeared to many within the predominantly wealthy, white, and above all 
college-educated foreign policy elite to be the natural and possibly the only public for foreign 
policy; the political forms and political outlooks of that public, indeed of that elite, set the 
standard for everyone else. Black Americans, for instance, were never cultivated. They appear 
with extraordinary scarcity in the records of citizen education institutions, and then as a surprise. 
Their most mainstream leaders were never mentioned as potential collaborators by even the most 
progressive citizen educators, despite the State Department and other agencies of government 
using those same leaders to win hearts and minds abroad.33 Labor even of the AFL-CIO variety 
was not a serious, sustained target public until well into the cold war, when educators tellingly 
aimed at union officials, not at the rank and file. Where citizen educators did manage to reach a 
public beyond the kinds of people approved of by the members of the Council on Foreign 
Relations, they reached women. And the gendered nature of the organized foreign policy public 
— the very alliance with the League of Women Voters and similar groups that gave it much of 
whatever vitality it had in towns and cities across the nation — made it all the easier, in the end, 
for male policymakers to set aside. 
Nevertheless, it is more than worth remembering that citizen educators did not close 
foreign policy off for the few. There were structural impediments to mass participation, to be 
sure, from the need to appeal to donors to the complexity of the subject matter. But in 1929, 
anyone in any of fourteen northeastern cities who could afford to buy a luncheon ticket could hear 
some of the leading intellects of the day debate a topic of pressing importance. In 1939, anyone 
 
33 See, e.g., Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights; Penny Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play 
the Cold War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
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with a cheap radio receiver could hear Vera Micheles Dean, or William T. Stone, or another 
member of the Association’s research staff accurately, calmly, and briefly summarize the world’s 
descent into war, week by difficult week. In 1949, anyone with 25 cents could buy a Headline 
Book. In 1959, anyone could go to a public library in hundreds, thousands of towns in every state 
in the union, and take part in a Great Decisions discussion group.  
This dissertation has shown that much of the foreign policy elite left the door open to 
democracy. The Foreign Policy Association distributed millions of pieces of literature; it reached 
untold numbers of people over the radio; it made sure that most major cities in the United States 
had an institution, however weak, that was dedicated to the idea that diplomacy was subject to 
democracy control. Even if all that these institutions helped to create by 1960 was a diplomatic 
1%, hundreds of thousands of Americans, and perhaps many more, involved themselves in 
discussions about foreign policy.  
Start from the assumption that foreign policy will interest next to nobody, and such 
statistics might look impressive, but what this dissertation has also shown is that that assumption 
was historically contingent — and historically quite rare. At the dawn of American leadership, 
much of the foreign policy elite looked forward to the day when as many Americans could 
intelligently debate their diplomacy as could chat about their baseball team. Very few American 
policymakers were content to conduct diplomacy as their British predecessors had; very few 
doubted that there had to be a serious effort to reconcile democracy and diplomacy, one 
unparalleled elsewhere, if America was to lead the world. The myth of an exceptional American 
democracy impelled the foreign policy elite to make the effort. “No people has ever yet been 
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sufficiently well-informed to make the test,” said Donald Pryor of the Cleveland Council on 
World Affairs in 1961,  
and ours is the first democratic society ever to possess the technique, the means of 
communication, and the wealth to conduct it. If we should try and fail, so be it; we 
shall have failed honorably. If we should fail without trying, who will grant us even 
the solace of self-respect?34 
 
It was for the same reason that both the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation found 
it so difficult to cut the Foreign Policy Association loose. For all its faults, it was always a symbol 
of the kind of world power that the United States wanted to be. 
 And yet if symbols matter, they remain symbolic. The citizen education movement was 
the most participatory vision of democracy that the foreign policy elite as a whole was prepared 
to countenance. As this dissertation has shown, however, that movement was shot through with 
limitations. The inheritors of progressivism, adult educators wrapped themselves in the language 
of participatory democracy, but they sought a society in which policymaking elites were subjected 
to slightly more control, not subverted entirely. A banker like Thomas W. Lamont had no 
problem paying that price if it would help to secure a more internationalist future; the Ford 
Foundation was hardly trying to undercut expert rule. Even so, the Association and the Councils 
were never given anything close to financial security, even though they counted Rockefellers and 
Warburgs among their donors. They and their members were never given anything close to 
policy input, even though the State Department built institutions that could have made it so. 
Instead, policymakers chose faster, harsher methods for acquiring popular consent, when they 
bothered at all. They inflated threats; they unleashed paranoia; they militarized their foreign 
 
34 Donald J. Pryor, “Must Athens Fall Again?” November 7, 1961, CCWA, Box 2.  
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policy and their culture at home. Their response to the pressures of power made even a more 
participatory democracy less and less likely. If they never quite abandoned the Association, they 
did not make its work easy. 
 The question for American foreign policy now is whether that work can be made easier. 
Since the presidential election of 2016, the clamor for a more democratic foreign policy has 
grown louder, particularly on the left.35 But that no coherent attempt to rekindle anything along 
the lines of the citizen education movement has really been forthcoming from the foreign policy 
elite is a telling reminder the nature of the problem has still not been grasped. The foreign policy 
elite is still using models for citizen engagement that were developed in the first half of the 
twentieth century; indeed, it is still using the same institutions, and still not at all well. 
There are now ninety or so affiliates of World Affairs Council of America (WACA), a 
convening group that emerged in 1986 from the National Council of Community World Affairs 
Organizations, including the Foreign Policy Association, which, Great Decisions aside, today 
functions mostly as a Council for Manhattan.36 Growth in areas where populations have boomed 
has offset a collapse in the old internationalist heartland of the Northeast, and the list of the ten 
largest Councils by budget reflects that shift: San Francisco, New York, Dallas/Fort Worth, 
Philadelphia, Houston, Los Angeles, Seattle, Portland, Minneapolis, and Jacksonville. About 
half of WACA affiliates earn less than the $50,000 in non-profit revenue that requires the filing 
 
35 See, e.g., Daniel Bessner and Stephen Wertheim, “Democratizing U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs (April 5, 
2017), foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-04-05/democratizing-us-foreign-policy. 
36 One notable institution not affiliated to WACA is the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, formerly the Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations. It is now much more of a think tank than a community institution, and arguably 
could be thought of as the real successor to the Foreign Policy Association of old. And on that front, it has been very 
successful, with a budget of $18 million in FY 2016-17. See Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Annual Report: 
Fiscal Year 2017, digital.thechicagocouncil.org/Global/FileLib/PDFs/CCGA_Annual_v5.2_singles.pdf, p. 19. 
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of an IRS 990 form. In 2016, the affiliates that met the threshold collectively brought in nearly 
$30 million, a bit more than double the total budgets, in real terms, of the Association and the 
Councils as Calvin Nichols calculated them in 1964. Much of that growth has come in corporate 
sponsorship.37 
Scan the websites of the Councils, drained of their imperative to build a more perfect 
democracy and a more peaceful world, and they have a certain familiarity to them. They do what 
they always did, a mix of adult education programs-cum-big-ticket lectures, of media programs, 
of filling in where the education system fails.  The World Affairs Council of Northern California 
now hosts a Global Philanthropy Forum to cater to the well-heeled givers of the Bay Area, but 
beyond that maintains a speakers series downtown and at satellite Councils in the area, a student 
program for high schools and community colleges, simulations for students, networking events, 
podcasts and videos, and a weekly broadcast on public radio, “World Affairs,” as it has since at 
least 1956.38 In Philadelphia, where the slogan insists that “Democracy Demands Discourse,” 
there is still the traditional focus on schools programs, a concentration on tours abroad, and a 
television show, The Whole Truth With David Eisenhower.39 In Dallas there are Junior World 
Affairs Councils in fifty high schools, one of which, Plano West, is a frequent winner of 
WACA’s flagship youth education program, WorldQuest, a team quiz sponsored in part by the 
Qatari foreign ministry. Otherwise, much of the work in northeast Texas is to do with State 
 
37 Calculations derived from list of World Affairs Councils (worldaffairscouncils.org/About/index.cfm?PageID=5) 
and IRS 990 forms taken from ProPublica’s Nonprofit Explorer (projects.propublica.org/nonprofits). The total 
includes the World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C., which ceased operations in 2018. 
38 World Affairs Council of Northern California, “What We Do,” worldaffairs.org/what-we-do.  
39 World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, “About the Council,” wacphila.org/about.  
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Department visitor programs, tourism, and networking. Members join, the Council’s website 
says, “to pursue lifelong learning, to network and grow professionally, to support international 
awareness and diplomacy, and to socialize with other globally minded individuals.”40  
What is missing today is the fervor that once had been brought to this task. Newton 
Baker thought that a World Affairs Council could save the world. Capturing at least some of 
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